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 This dissertation examines the role of law as a tool in struggles against social inequalities, 
by tracing the history of Ontario’s human rights legislation and enforcement from the enactment 
of fair practices statutes in the 1950s through the restructuring of the enforcement regime in 2006. 
Ontario was the first Canadian province to pass anti-discrimination legislation and to establish a 
human rights commission enforcement process.  This legislation and the commission 
enforcement process were the models for all other Canadian jurisdictions. 
The dissertation approaches the role of law through the framework of tensions between 
the “aspirations” and the “practices” of law.   On the one hand, law holds out the promise of 
enhancing citizen agency and imposing responsibility for conduct by promoting access to justice 
through the power of legal norms, institutions, and enforcement and other processes.  On the 
other hand, efforts to fulfill this promise raise questions about the content of legal norms, the 
operation of legal institutions, the practice of legal processes, and the relationship between law 
and social power.   
The historical record examined in the dissertation shows human rights advocates 
successfully engaging the power of the state to enact anti-discrimination legal norms, but then 
facing new challenges in their efforts to engage the power of the state to enforce these norms.  
Although access to the coercive power of law was a consistent theme in the advocacy for anti-
discrimination legislation and enforcement, in practice there has been relatively little access to 
this power.  Both the government agency model, and the tribunal model which replaced it, have 
emphasized informal, non-public and voluntary resolution over formal, public, more coercive 
adjudication. The emphasis on private, voluntary resolution of anti-discrimination claims may 
increase the potential for private social outcomes; however, these social outcomes may also 
reflect rather than redress imbalances in social power relations.  The emphasis on private, 
voluntary resolution also has the potential to limit the public development of anti-discrimination 
legal norms.  Thus, while anti-discrimination legislated norms have become important tools for 
citizen agency, this agency has arguably been most effective outside of the formal legal 
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Empowerment, Zeph. What is this new thing? What happened to what we used to call 
justice?1 
 
I entered Osgoode Hall Law School in September 1984, after abandoning the idea of 
becoming a philosophy academic in favour of pursuing a more activist career.  My interest in 
ethics came with me to law school, informing my goals for studying law and working as a 
lawyer.  As a law student, I took very few “core” courses, focusing instead on what have come to 
be called “outsider” courses (e.g. courses in feminist legal theory and occupational health and 
safety) and spending one semester at Parkdale Community Legal Services, the student legal aid 
community clinic attached to Osgoode.  In the context of law school, my interest in ethics 
became an interest in how law could be used as a tool by people who are relatively socially 
disempowered – because they are poor, because they are workers, because they are women, 
because they are racial or religious minorities, because they have disabilities, because they are 
immigrants and refugees, etc. Many of my law professors were extremely skeptical of the idea 
that law could be a useful tool for positive social change where that social change was directed at 
changing some social balance of power.  Intellectually, I understood and respected their critique.  
However, I had decided to find my way by providing legal services, and I refused to be deterred.  
My goal was to be a “cause lawyer”, to use the descriptor coined by socio-legal commentators.2 
I articled and then practiced law for about 14 years, from 1987 to 2002, with the Toronto 
law firm then known as Cavalluzzo Hayes Shilton McIntyre & Cornish, and now called 
Cavalluzzo.  In my law practice I was involved in successes and failures, but never lost my belief 
                                                 
1 Nadine Gordimer, None to Accompany Me (New York: Penguin, 1994) at 285. 
2 Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional 
Responsibilities (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
that law had some positive role to play in struggles against social inequalities.3  Both during and 
after my law practice, I was also involved in a variety of capacities with the Women’s Legal 
Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”), including as co-counsel on their Supreme Court of 
Canada intervention in Newfoundland v. NAPE,4 and as co-author of their study on the 
implications of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Law v. Canada5 for statutory human 
rights.6   
Human rights was a significant area of my legal practice, and has continued to be a major 
area of interest for me after leaving practice.  When I originally applied to the LLM programme, 
I was interested in exploring whether restorative justice methods could be effective in statutory 
human rights enforcement.  In the end my research and thesis did not address that question, 
although it continues to interest me, especially in light of Ontario’s move to a “direct access” 
process for enforcing statutory human rights claims.  The “direct access” debates in Ontario were 
taking place while I was completing my LLM and turning my thoughts to doctoral work.  I was 
an interested by-stander to the debates, with friends, acquaintances and colleagues on both sides 
of the debate.  My spouse has been a Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario since 
September 2009. 
I understood the concerns on both sides of the “direct access” debate.  I had difficulty 
deciding where I would align myself if I had to take a firm position, and I still do not have a clear 
                                                 
3 My LL.M. thesis, Contesting Women’s Solidarity:  Human Rights Law and the FWTAO Membership Case (LL.M. 
Thesis--York University, 2007), centred on a major legal failure with which I was deeply involved for almost the 
entire duration of my legal practice. 
4 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004], 3 SCR 381.  LEAF’s factum in the Supreme Court of was 
intervention was published in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & Kate M. Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: 
Seeking Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 471. 
5 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497. 
6 Karen Schucher and Judith Keene, “Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality:  Why and How to Avoid 
the Injury of the Law Approach” (March 2007):  
http://leaf.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2007-statutory-human-rights-substantive-equality.pdf. 
 
answer to that dilemma.  I understood the significant problems with how the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission process worked in practice.  On the other hand, I heard what sounded to me 
like naïveté about the realities of legal process in the advocacy supporting “direct access”.  My 
goal in this dissertation is not to criticize, but to analyze and to reflect.  The lawyer advocates 
who participated in the “direct access” debates, and in the five-year review of the move to “direct 
access” are also “cause lawyers”, who are committed to the potential for human rights law to 
address social inequalities. 
This dissertation evolved from my interest in two opposing questions about law and 
enforcement. One question is whether the conventional model of  “law” creates barriers to a 
remedial approach to addressing social issues, including human rights issues, and whether there 
is a role for more restorative justice approaches in more legal process venues. This question grew 
in part out of my experiences with how people react to allegations of discrimination in a range of 
different social contexts:  the workplace, community organizations, political organizations, and 
informal social settings. I observed that people are often shocked and offended when they are 
faced with allegations of discrimination, and that they are typically reluctant to hear the basis for 
the allegation.  They focus on defending themselves against the allegation, instead of being open 
to considering the potential impact of their conduct. This observation led me to consider whether 
there is a stigma attaching to allegations of discrimination, which undermines the stated remedial 
goal of human rights legislation.  
The opposing question is whether formal legal process can require people to listen to 
claims and perspectives they otherwise refuse to acknowledge.  This question grew out of my 
experiences - in the same contexts noted above - with how people often refuse to listen to claims 
that conflict with their deeply-held interests, perspectives, and values.  I was interested in 
exploring the utility of legal process as a method for interrupting these “states of denial”,7 by 
compelling people at least to listen to things they do not want to hear.  Through my experiences 
as a legal practitioner, I had observed situations where legal process worked effectively to 
provide a venue for dialogue on competing perspectives, as well as situations where legal 
process failed to create such a venue. 
These two questions coalesced for me around the Ontario initiative to eliminate the 
human rights commission enforcement model.  I wanted to examine this initiative in the context 
of history of the promise and practice of human rights law that led to this initiative, as well as to 
consider what the change may mean for future efforts to use statutory human rights as a tool in 




                                                 
7 I borrow the phrase “states of denial” from the work of Stanley Cohen, who examines this question from the 
perspective of sociology and organizational psychology in States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering 






‘We have a tendency’, it has been said, ‘to lose sight of actual living 
conditions in the logical pursuit of abstract legal doctrines.’1 
 
      Law, like any remedial mechanism, is more likely to be employed at a 
distance: courts correcting police rather than internal police disciplinary 
procedures, war crimes punished years or decades later. Law prefers to 
articulate procedural rules rather than dictate outcomes.  It expresses 
universal values in the language of rights but abdicates distributive 
questions to politics and the market. It is more powerful as a shield against 
abuses than as a sword to achieve substantive goals, as the protector of 
negative liberties rather than the guarantor of positive ones. 
      For all its limitations, however, law is indispensable, a source of hope 
and leverage to those who lack any other.2 
 
This dissertation explores the “promise and practice”3 of law as a tool in struggles 
for social equality. The central theme of the dissertation is the tension between law as a 
tool for achieving social goals and law as an end in itself.  My interest in these questions 
is shaped by my own conflicting experiences with law, including my experiences as a 
social justice legal practitioner.  I understand the seductive force of law’s promise, and 
the depth of disappointment when law fails to deliver on that promise. 
                                                 
1 Bora Laskin, “The Problem of Interests by Statute and the Problem of ‘Contracting Out’” (1938), 16 Can. 
Bar Rev. 669 at 672, quoting Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy 
(1933) at vi. [Laskin, “Interests by Statute”].  
2Abel, Richard, “Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering” in Austin Sarat & Stuart 
Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 69 at 103 [Abel, “Speaking Law”]. 
3 The phrase “promise and practice” is inspired by Colleen N. Sheppard’s “The Promise and Practice of 
Protecting Human Rights: Reflections on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms” in Nicholas 
Kasirer and Roderick Macdonald, eds. Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau, (Cowansville, Québec : Éditions 
Yvon Blais, 1997) 641 [Sheppard, “Promise and Practice”].  Similar, but perhaps more cautionary, ways of 
framing this idea are: Byron Sheldrick’s “perils and possibilities”, in Perils and Possibilities: Social 
Activism and the Law (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2004) [Sheldrick, “Perils and Possibilities”], and 
Shirley Tillotson’s the “attractions and treacheries of human rights law”, in “Human Rights Law as Prism: 
Women’s Organizations, Unions, and Ontario’s Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 1951” (1991)  
Can Hist’ Rev 532 at 535-544 [Tillotson, “Human Rights as Prism”]. 
2 
 
Different points of view about the extent to which law might provide remedies for 
social inequalities raise questions about how we define social inequalities and about what 
we expect from law.  In relation to human rights law, the kinds of questions that arise 
include:  What are the goals of human rights laws?  Are human rights laws designed to 
facilitate equality of opportunities, equality of outcomes or other objectives?  Should all 
material differences be judged inequalities or only some, and if only some - which ones?   
What processes should be used to resolve disagreements about which social practices and 
conditions should be judged discriminatory?   In order to examine these questions, we 
must look at both the promise of law and the practice of law. The “promise” refers 
generally to the goals established by law; the “practice” refers generally to how these 
goals are achieved through various approaches to engaging with these goals, including 
formal processes for enforcing law.  However, the categories of promise and practice are 
not mutually exclusive.  Promise both affects process, and is affected by process. 
Examining the role of law as a tool in struggles for social equality is significant 
for social activists and for the choices they make about where and how to pursue 
struggles for social equality.  This analysis is also significant for questions about the role 
and obligations of the state in furthering social equality goals.  My dissertation examines 
these questions through the example of Canadian human rights law.  Canadian human 
rights law provides an interesting site of inquiry because it claims a direct connection 
with issues of social inequality, because it has had complex and contested enforcement 
processes, and because Canadian equality rights advocates are now asking whether 
3 
 
human rights statutes can provide a more effective legal avenue than constitutional 
equality rights.4  
My dissertation focuses on law in the form of prescriptive norms, set out in 
legislation and in decisions of courts and tribunals, and law in the form of a range of 
processes for enforcing these prescriptive norms, including the institutions and the people 
involved in these processes.  Most of the forms of law I examine have some connection 
with the state, and the role of the state in law is an important topic in my dissertation. I 
am not, however, advancing a position that might be considered “legal centric” from a 
legal pluralistic perspective. I focus on forms of law connected with the state because 
they play an important role in efforts to use law as a tool for social equality, and because 
they raise important questions about the public and private action and responsibility. My 
focus is on these forms of law as tools for social engagement, not on these forms of law 
in themselves, separate from their role in society. 
This chapter is divided into five sections.  The first three sections examine the 
broad themes relating to law and social inequalities which informed my research and 
which I have explored through my analysis of the research.   These three broad themes 
are:  (1) Law:  Coercion, Justice, and Social Power, (2) Agency through Law: Legal 
Norms, Enforcement, and Dispute Resolution, (3) Responsibility at Law: Fault, Remedy, 
                                                 
4 My understanding of this development is based on my experiences in legal practice described in the 
Preface, as well as my experiences in various volunteer roles with the Women’s Legal Education and 
Action Fund (LEAF) and my experience as a staff lawyer with the Clinic Resource Office at Legal Aid 
Ontario.  In particular, I was a member of a LEAF’s sub-committee on statutory human rights and co-
author with Judith Keene of a position paper on how to try to avoid importing the negative jurisprudential 
developments under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, The Constitution Act, 1982, 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 into the statutory human rights context:  Karen 
Schucher and Judith Keene. “Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality:  Why and How to Avoid 




and Responsive Regulation.  In the fourth section of the chapter I provide a brief 
overview of the role of Canadian human rights law as the specific site of my research.  In 
the fifth and final section, I introduce the three case studies that form the substance of this 
dissertation, explain the methodology I used to identify and conduct these case studies, 
and outline the concluding chapter of the dissertation.  
 
1 Law: Coercion, Justice and Social Power 
 
 
The law, an intrinsically powerful discourse coupled with the physical means 
to impose compliance on others, can be seen as a quintessential instrument of 
normalization.5 
 
…. the authority of law is seen to derive not from its sanction, but from its 
integrity.6 
 
Coercive power and justice are key elements of law’s appeal as a tool in struggles 
against social inequalities.  Social inequalities are often linked with social power 
imbalances.  The coercive power of law holds out the promise of being able to reduce 
imbalances in social power through access to the power of law.7 Appeals to justice hold 
                                                 
5 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987), 38 Hastings LJ 
814 at 838 [Bourdieu, “Force of Law”]. 
6 Roderick A. Macdonald, Prolegomena to a Theory of Legal Relevance (University of Toronto LLM 
Thesis, 1975) at 180. 
7 I understand social inequality connected with power inequality to have many dimensions, such as Richard 
Abel described, for example:   “Power inequality assumes many guises. Some have a material base: control 
of the means of production in the Marxist formulation, wealth and income disparity in the liberal. Both 
approaches have recently broadened their conception of resources to include intangibles like knowledge, 
educational credentials, and cultural capital. A second manifestation of inequality reflects differential 
ability to participate in and influence the polity: the size and organization of interest groups, their material 
resources and political sophistication, access to the media, ideological position, and incumbency. A third 
kind of inequality is located in the social system: status differences associated with nationality, language, 
gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disability. Public and private forms of 
power are inextricably connected, sometimes indistinguishable.” - “Speaking Law” at 69. 
5 
 
out the promise that the goals sought to be achieved through law are worthy because they 
seek to reduce injustice and unfairness. Justice is a many-facetted ideal that has both 
substantive and procedural aspects. Questions of justice are also often linked with 
questions of morality, and there are recurring debates over when it is appropriate to 
engage the power of law in relation to morality and what consequences flow from doing 
so.  
The coercive power of law is often linked with state power and, as noted earlier, 
my dissertation focuses on forms of law that have connections with the state.8  Although 
access to this coercive power is one of law’s attractions in struggles against social 
inequalities, there is a range of arguments about the extent to which this power can in fact 
be harnessed.  Since law has been used to create and sustain social inequalities, it is fair 
to ask whether law can also be engaged to challenge social inequalities.  Similarly, it is 
fair to ask whether it is possible for the state, through law, to act against the interests of 
dominant social power.  Different positions on the question of whether law can be 
engaged to address social inequalities are informed by different views about how social 
relations are constituted, different views about the role law as a social institution, 
different views about which social conditions constitute inequalities that law might 
address, and different views about whether coercive power is inherently, or necessarily, a 
bad thing. 
                                                 
8 I would argue that coercion is an aspect of any social practice that is considered to be a form of law.  
However, it is not necessary for me to make this argument because my dissertation focuses on forms of law 
that all have at least some connection with the state. 
6 
 
Many theorists argue that law is an integral part of a political economy based on 
social stratification and substantive inequalities and that, in a liberal capitalist society, 
law functions primarily to maintain social structures that reflect liberal capitalist norms 
and values. As articulated by Jeanne Gregory with reference to anti-discrimination 
legislation: 
 
[Anti-discrimination legislation] is on the statute book in order to protect, 
not threaten, the fundamental structures of capitalist society, and therefore 
cannot by itself constitute the vehicle for achieving a non-racist, non-
sexist society.9 
 
These theorists argue that law functions to sustain substantive social inequalities by 
creating processes through which claims can be asserted, then dismissing these claims 
and providing ideological rationalizations that legitimate the inequalities.  For example, 
Alan Freeman has argued with reference to anti-discrimination legal doctrine in the 
American context: 
 
As surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it  
has affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children 
in all-black, poorly-funded schools, have no opportunities for decent 
                                                 
9 Jeanne Gregory, “Sex Discrimination, Work and the Law” in Bob Fine, Richard Kinsey, John Lea, Sol 
Picciotto and Jock Young, eds., Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From Deviancy Theory to Marxism 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1979) 137 at 138, 140 and 150 [Gregory, “Sex Discrimination”]. See also: 
Alan David Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine” in Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney, eds., Marxism and Law (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982) 210 [Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination”]; Judy Fudge, “The 
Paradoxes of Pay Equity: Reflections on the Law and the Market in Canada and PSAC” (2000) 12 CJWL 
313 [Fudge, “Paradoxes of Pay Equity”]; Judy Fudge, “What do We Mean by Law and Social 
Transformation?” (1990) 5 Can. J. L. & Soc’y 47 [Fudge, “Law and Social Transformation”]; Jeanne 
Gregory, Sex, Race and The Law (London, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1987) [Gregory, Sex, Race]; Nicola Lacey, “Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a 
Feminist Perspective” (1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 411 [Lacey, “Feminist Perspective”]; Margaret Thornton, The 
Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia (Auckland, Melbourne, New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990) [Thornton, Liberal Promise]. 
7 
 
housing, and have very little political power, without any violation of 
antidiscrimination law.10 
 
According to Freeman, law must hold out a “promise of liberation” and “occasionally 
offer at least illusions of reconciliation and resolution”, but ultimately  “fail to deliver on 
that promise”.11    
These theorists argue that law can sometimes be successfully used in liberal 
capitalist societies to challenge formal inequalities, to challenge state-imposed 
inequalities, and to challenge abuses of state power.12 Carol Smart, for example, argued 
that when women have engaged the power of law in sex equality struggles, this power 
has been most effective when it has been invoked to remove impediments created by law 
itself.13   Successful challenges to formal inequalities, to state-imposed inequalities and to 
abuses of state power do have social impact.  For example, Ruth Fletcher has observed 
with reference to sex discrimination that challenges to formal inequalities are important 
and do have some substantive effect:  
 
      Historically, women were excluded from the category of human ‘likes’ 
on the grounds of their difference from men and their perceived closeness 
to nature.  When difference was the excuse used to deny women rights, it 
was almost inevitable that women would argue that they were like men in 
order to access those rights.  The idea that women are the same as men in 
                                                 
10 Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210-211.  See also Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 818: 
“… judicial decisions can be distinguished from naked exercises of power only to the extent that they can 
be presented as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of unanimously accepted texts.” 
11 Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210.  
12 Abel, “Speaking “Law”; Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination”; Fudge, “Paradoxes of Pay 
Equity”; Fudge, “Law and Social Transformation”; Gregory, “Sex Discrimination”; Gregory, Sex, Race; 
Lacey, “Feminist Perspective”; Thornton, Liberal Promise. 
13 Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 138 [Smart, Power of Law] at 138-139. 




the sense that they share membership of the human species was, and still 
is, a powerful tool in the face of dehumanizing tactics.14  
 
However, the argument remains that the power of law cannot be used to transform 
substantively unequal social relations. 
 Other theorists focus on the potential harm of using the power of law in struggles 
against social inequalities.  One argument is that excessive reliance on law as a tool can 
have a negative effect on democratic and other social political processes, and undermine 
the power of these other processes.  In Canada, many of these debates have taken place in 
relation to the adoption of constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms in the early 
1980s.15  Another argument is that when efforts are made to use law to define social 
problems as legal harms, there is a tendency to label people who experience the harms as 
“victims”, and a corresponding tendency for the victim label to make it difficult for those 
persons to exercise agency through law.16   These arguments provide important cautions 
about the implications of ceding social power to law.  
A third group of theorists argues that law is not simply the tool or product of those 
who already exercise social power but is also a producer of social relations and social 
power. Law is a social institution with which all people can engage and, therefore, there 
                                                 
14 Ruth Fletcher, “Feminist Legal Theory” in Reza Banakar and Max Travers, eds. An Introduction to Law 
and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 150-151. 
15 See, for example: Judy Fudge, “The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the 
Imperialism of the Courts” in Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and Adam Tomkins, eds., Sceptical Essays on 
Human Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
16 See, for example: Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) at 52 [Bumiller, Civil Rights Society] and Kathryn 
Abrams, “Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory” (1995) 95 Colum. L.R 304 
[Abrams, “Sex Wars Redux”].  Abrams proposed a concept of “partial agency” to capture both the 
possibility of agency and the reality of constraints on agency.  See also Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive 
Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 137-138 [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality]. 
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is legitimate role for law in struggles against both formal and substantive social 
inequalities.  I would argue that legal practitioners and academics who share this third 
perspective on law and social power are lawyers who Sarat and Scheingold describe as 
“cause lawyers”, that is, lawyers who are “not indifferent to the ends to which services 
are put.”17  Catharine MacKinnon framed her perspective on this argument in terms of the 
role of law in defining social relations, accountability, and responsibility: 
 
When law is abandoned to the powerful, corruption and physical force 
remain the real law, a fact ignored by those who, having a choice, urge 
abdicating this ground.  It is hard to avoid the feeling that women are 
urged to think law can do nothing for them precisely because it can do so 
much. 
… 
In whose interest is it for women to leave a power like this to men?  Law 
can mean community; your people stand behind you, hear you, support 
you.  It can mean reality: what you say happened is found to have 
happened; your knowledge is validated.  It can mean vindication:  it is 
wrong that you were wronged; someone took something that belongs to 
you; you count.  It means hope: what happened to you might not happen 
again.18 
 
Colleen Sheppard framed the argument in terms of the potential for law to shape social 
relations grounded either in caring for others or lack of caring for others:  
 
Focusing on human relations is consistent with the traditional project of 
law.  Law is deeply implicated in creating, interpreting, rationalizing, 
applying and enforcing rules of social interaction between individuals and 
groups.  Though not always acknowledged in relational terms, law is 
integrally connected to the nature, quality and character of human 
                                                 
17 Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, “Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: 
An Introduction” in Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and 
Professional Responsibilities (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 3 at 3 [Sarat and 
Scheingold, “Cause Lawyering Introduction”]. 
18 Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Law in the Everyday Life of Women” in Women’s Lives – Men’s Laws 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2005) 32 at 42-43. 
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relationships. It is in this capacity that law has contributed to the absence 
of caring and the widespread existence of relations of permanent 
inequality.  Ironically, this same capacity also gives law the potential to 
promote more caring relationships and thereby enhance equality.19 
 
Jennifer Nedelsky similarly argued that examining law through the lens of social relations 
illuminates law’s role in shaping social relations and thus creates opportunities to 
consider how changes in law can help change social relations:  “[A] relational approach 
turns our attention to the ways law inevitably structures relations, in ways that, in turn, 
affect core values and who can enjoy them.”20  Nedelsky commented that it is “not so 
much a choice to use law as a means of seeing how law is currently being used and its 
consequences.”21  She also observed that while law “is an important way power is 
exercised, shaped, and justified”, social relations “structured by law often serve to hide 
power and to hide the role of the state in that power.22  Diana Majury has similarly 
emphasized pragmatic considerations, arguing that law is a social form that cannot and 
should not be ignored because it is deeply implicated in shaping social struggles and 
resistance to these struggles:    
 
Using law against itself, seeing law simultaneously as a tool, as foe, and as 
focus for change, demystifying law as institution, and recognizing law as 
                                                 
19 Colleen N. Sheppard, “Caring in Human Relations and Legal Approaches to Equality” (1993) 2 NJCL 
305 at 329 [Sheppard, “Caring in Human Relations”].  A relational approach to law and inequality was also 
a dominant theme more recently in Sheppard, Inclusive Equality.  In both “Caring in Human Relations” and 
Inclusive Equality, Sheppard also argued that redistribution of income cannot, by itself, ensure greater 
equality of access to substantive goods, and that this goal requires restructuring of human relations.  In her 
view, once we identify the basic substantive goods or concerns, we have to consider whether individuals 
and groups have access to these things in accordance with their needs and desires, which ultimately leads to 
an inquiry into how they are being treated by others in society.  
20 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 72 [Nedelsky, Law’s Relations]. 
21 Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at 72. 
22 Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at 72. 
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presenting multiple sites of struggle rather than a solid one-dimensional 
monolith may by now be post-modern truisms, but these understandings 
provide grounding for contemporary feminist legal equality struggles, as 
in the past the grounding may have been provided by the liberal promise 
of equal opportunity.23 
 
As Majury noted, law can also be used against people in struggles against social 
inequalities.  Sometimes, therefore, there is no choice about whether or not to engage 
with the power of law.   
 In my view, all three categories of argument contribute to analyzing the 
experiences that socially disempowered individuals and groups may have when they try 
to engage the power of law in struggles against social inequalities.  It is also my view that 
elements of each category tend to be seen when we examine the historical records of 
efforts by socially disempowered individuals and groups to engage the power of law in 
their struggles against social inequalities.  
 
2 Agency through Law:  Establishing, Using and Enforcing Legislated Norms 
Questions about whether people can affect social inequalities by gaining access to 
the power of law are also questions about whether people can exercise agency through 
law.  Can law be a tool for human agency?  If so, how can law be a tool for human 
agency?   Legal norms, and the processes for enforcing these norms, are important tools 
through which people seek to exercise agency through law.   My dissertation focuses 
                                                 
23 Diana Majury, “Women’s (In)Equality before and after the Charter” in Radha Jhappan, ed., Women’s 
Legal Strategies in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 101at 102 [Jhappan, Women’s 
Legal Strategies].   I also like Bryan Palmer’s articulation of the idea of  “strugg[ling] for law against law”.  
See “What’s Law Got to do With It? Historical Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint, 
and Capitalist Authority”(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 465 at 479. 
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primarily on legislated legal norms, the opportunities for citizen agency in establishing 
legislated norms, and the legal processes established specifically for enforcing these 
legislated norms.  However, I also examine the ways in which using legal norms as a tool 
goes beyond specific legal enforcement processes and the tensions that exist between the 
public and private dimensions of using legislated norms as tools for social equality. 
 
Agency through Establishing Legal Norms, Legislated and Common Law 
 
Law is not based on the natural existence of a normative order, which all 
members of society implicitly accept. It is based on the desire to make a 
normative order, to have some order established, even in the face of 
continued normative diversity within society at large.24 
 
Legal norms have both symbolic and concrete roles.  Symbolically, they reflect 
and help to define social values and morals.  Concretely, they provide direction on how 
people are expected to conduct themselves. All legal norms derive their authority through 
being established in accordance with accepted procedures.  Many legal norms also claim 
legitimacy on the grounds that they promote justice and, sometimes, morality.  Thus, 
debates and arguments over the content of legal norms are often debates over different 
views about what justice objectives or moral objectives a legal norm should promote. 
Legal norms with a direct connection to the state are established by legislation and by 
common law.25 
                                                 
24 Jeremy Webber, “Legal Pluralism and Human Agency” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 167 at 177. 
25 Legal norms specific to individual situations can also be set out in “private” legal documents, including 
contracts and wills, although they too will reflect and comply with the relevant public legal norms. 
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Access to the power of law through legislation may provide opportunities for 
citizens to engage the power of the state on behalf of socially disempowered individuals 
and groups.  Legislated legal norms are the most public legal norms because they require 
state support and they establish expectations for society as a whole.26  An important role 
of the state is to generate ideas to improve legislated norms, and such legislative agendas 
are often part of political parties’ election campaigns.  Members of the public, as 
individuals and as groups, can also be involved in the processes for establishing 
legislation:  they can put pressure on government to change or pass legislation; they can 
participate indirectly in debates about the content of proposed legislative reforms by 
working with their elected representatives; and they can participate directly in debates 
about the content of proposed legislative reforms when the state holds public hearings on 
proposed legislation.  The legislative process thus provides an opportunity for citizens to 
exercise agency by making or opposing efforts to change existing legislated norms or to 
establish new legislated norms. 
Common law norms are established by courts, through litigation.  Litigation, as a 
process, may create the illusion of enhanced agency.  It may appear to provide a more 
direct route to the power of law than the legislative process, which involves and requires 
the cooperation of the state, acting through many people in many different social 
                                                 
26 I use the concept of the public to refer to a collectivity in the sense that this collectivity is subject to the 
same state government.  Within this collectivity, however, there will be many different social groupings, 
and many different points of view on government decisions and actions.  As Andhil Fineberg wrote: “There 
are many publics. There’s the high-minded, unprejudiced public, and the mildly prejudiced public, and the 
public that hates one group, and the public that hates some other groups, and also a lunatic public whose 
members can be readily aroused to hate any out-group. To talk about ‘the public’ or ‘the masses’ as though 
they were one great herd of people, innocent of all prejudice and simply deceived by others, is infantile.  … 
Unprejudiced folk will be found among the rich and among the poor, among the educated and uneducated, 
among the great and the unknown, among those of every religion and of every race.”  Punishment without 
Crime: What You Can Do About Prejudice (New York: Doubleday, 1949) at 35. 
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locations.  However, there are many barriers to litigation as well, including access to 
financial resources and being able to frame the social goal as a legal claim that can be 
adjudicated. There are also limited opportunities for individuals and groups who are not 
parties to the litigation to participate in the litigation.  In addition, common law norms 
tend not to have the same symbolic and concrete roles as legislated norms.  They tend to 
be regarded as applying to the particular dispute and the particular parties to the 
litigation, even when the norm is framed in broad language, e.g. a manufacturer owes a 
duty of care to the consumers of its products.  The courts’ primary focus is on the dispute 
before them and the parties to that dispute, even though they are are public adjudicative 
bodies (created and maintained by the state) and have some obligation to act in the public 
interest.  Common law norms are usually also less accessible to the public, unless they 
receive significant media attention.  
Thus, legislation is generally a more systemic method of establishing legal norms 
than litigation:  when a legislated norm is established, there is in principle no dispute that 
it applies to society as a whole.   Although the process of establishing legal norms 
through legislation may be more mediated, in a democratic society it can be expected that 
the process of engaging the power of the state to establish a state-imposed legal norm 
with broad application to the public will be a mediated process.  
 
Agency through Using and Enforcing Legislated Norms 
Once a legislated norm has been established, it becomes immediately effective 
when people act to comply with its requirements.  Legislated norms do not have to be 
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formally enforced in order to be effective; indeed, it would be impossible for legislated 
norms to be effective if they were effective only when formally enforced:  “… the 
primary objective in laying down standards of conduct is perhaps even more to induce 
people to comply with them than to deal with the situation when they do not.”27  
Legislated norms can also be effective without recourse to formal enforcement when 
people invoke them, rely on them, and informally seek compliance with them – all of 
which are ways in which law can in a sense be informally “enforced” by being used as a 
tool in people’s daily lives:  
 
 [L]egal norms play the role of opening spaces for ongoing engagement about 
current practice in relation to aspirations that have been identified to be of public 
significance. Law is elaborated through dynamic interactions on the ground. Law 
institutionalizes occasions for analysis, reflection, relationship-building, boundary 
negotiations and institution-building.28 
 
Engaging directly with legislated norms is an important dimension of agency through 
law. For example, if a trade union believes that an employer is failing to comply with 
legislated norms, the union can raise this concern with the employer and the employer 
may change its practices to comply with the legislation without the need for formal legal 
intervention.  Similarly, if a tenants’ association believes that a landlord is failing to 
comply with requirements of residential tenancy legislation, it can bring this to the 
attention of the landlord and the landlord may change its conduct to comply with the 
                                                 
27 T. Hadden, “Contract, Tort and Crime: The Forms of Legal Thought” (1971) 87 Law Quarterly Review 
240 at 256. 
28 Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 73, quoting Susan Sturm, “Owen Fiss, Equality Theory and Judicial 




legislation without the need for formal legal intervention.29 This form of engaging with 
legal norms can also be coercive - even when people voluntarily comply with the norm - 
if this compliance requires them to do things they would rather not do or prohibits them 
from doing things they would like to do.   
However, effective formal enforcement is needed for those situations where 
people refuse to accept or comply with legal norms.  Enforcing legal norms is arguably 
the paradigm of the coercive power of law, captured by metaphors such as “hard” law (as 
opposed to “soft” law), and law with “teeth”.   Enforcing legal norms connotes forcing 
people to act in particular ways and imposing consequences when they fail to comply 
with legal norms.  Effective formal enforcement makes it clear that people are expected 
to comply with the norm.  Conversely, lack of effective formal enforcement diminishes 
the coercive dimension of the legal norm, signaling that it is “soft law” rather than “hard 
law”. When legal norms are not enforced, this can send a number of messages to society:  
it can suggest that the legitimacy of the norm may be in question; it can suggest that the 
norm, although legitimate, is not a high priority; or it can suggest that the norm is not 
really intended to be a norm but is rather a guideline, with which compliance is voluntary 
rather than mandatory. 
Effective formal enforcement is also important to the impact of legislated norms.  
Formal enforcement develops the meaning and scope of all legal norms, especially legal 
norms that are prescribed in more general and abstract terms.  However, there is almost 
always room for argument about what legal norms mean, whether they should apply to 
                                                 
29 Individual employees and individual tenants may similarly raise these concerns, although doing so may 
place them at risk of reprisal. 
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particular situations, and how they should apply to particular situations.  As Roderick 
Macdonald wrote, “legal rules are not self-evident and self-applying characterizations of 
human behavior” and “there can be more than one appropriate legal characterization of 
human conduct”.30   The meaning and scope of all legal norms is continually shaped 
when they are placed “at the level of the debate concerning a specific application” 31 – 
sometimes to be expanded, sometimes to be narrowed. 
The state is closely involved in the enforcement of many, if not most, legislated 
norms.  Criminal law norms and their enforcement are arguably the paradigm of the 
coercive power of state law.  A significant element of the rationale for this exercise of 
coercive power is that criminal law norms address the most harmful, most wrong or most 
immoral social conduct.  The legal processes for enforcing legislated norms generally 
involve “informal” and “formal” options.  The more “informal” options are the 
alternative dispute resolution processes, usually mediation or negotiation (plea bargaining 
in the criminal law context).  The more “formal” options are the adjudication processes.  
Courts are the adjudicative bodies for criminal law, some quasi-criminal law, and some 
civil law (family law, in particular).  Administrative tribunals are the adjudicative bodies 
for most civil administrative law (i.e. non-criminal) and some quasi-criminal law.32   
                                                 
30 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice: A Study Paper by 
Roderick A. Macdonald with commentaries (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995) at 47-48 [Macdonald, 
Prospects for Civil Justice]. See also Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 821: “The practical meaning of law is 
really only determined in the confrontation between different bodies (e.g. judges, lawyers, solicitors) 
moved by divergent interests.”  
31 Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 822. 
32 I use the term civil as a broad category, to include all non-criminal and non-quasi-criminal law.  As I 
discuss further below, others might use the term “regulation” or “regulatory” to describe many legislated 
norms and regimes. 
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For many legislated regimes, enforcement begins with an informal process that 
involves making an application or claim to a state agency, with an option for subsequent 
consideration, review or appeal by a more formal enforcement process.33  For other 
legislated regimes, enforcement begins with an application or claim directly to a formal 
tribunal processes.34  The rationale most often presented for enforcement by 
administrative tribunals rather than by courts is to provide greater access to adjudication 
by establishing processes that are less complex, less expensive, and more efficient.35   
Administrative agency and tribunal enforcement processes also provide the state with a 
significant level of involvement in enforcing legislated norms, by giving the state a role 
in shaping how the legislated norms are applied to people’s lives.36  My dissertation 
explores questions relating to the role of the state in enforcing legislated norms, and the 
corresponding public and private dimensions of engaging with legislated norms.  
 
Enforcing Legal Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Law in Context 
Because, as noted earlier, the social impact of legal norms is seen primarily 
through their application to concrete situations, there is a significant public dimension to 
                                                 
33 This is the typical structure for a wide range of programmes, including: government benefit programmes, 
such as social assistance and employment insurance; hybrid benefits programmes such as workplace safety 
and insurance benefits; employment standards claims; immigration and refugee determination;  and the 
human rights commission model.  
34 For example “direct access” statutory human rights and criminal injuries compensation. 
35 For an important critique of how the administrative tribunal regimes actually operate, see: Ron Ellis, 
Unjust by Design: Canada’s Administrative Justice System (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).  For a 
discussion of access to justice issues in relation to administrative law, see: Lorne Sossin, “Access to 
Administrative Justice and Other Worries” in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in 
Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013). 
36 There are many different types of structure, which provide the state with varying degrees of involvement 
and control.  In some cases, the state is a party to the process and may also have some control over how the 
process can be used.  In other cases, the state is more indirectly involved through its control over how the 
tribunal is structured, funded, and staffed. 
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how legislated and common law legal norms are used and enforced.  However, this public 
dimension is in tension with the more private notion of enforcement as dispute resolution. 
When processes for enforcing legal norms are characterized as dispute resolution, this 
emphasizes the individuality of the case and de-emphasizes the public interest in knowing 
how the legal norm was used and applied and what consequences, if any, resulted. 
If legislated norms are public norms, any potential violation of a legislated norm 
is both a “dispute” between the alleged violator and society as a whole, and a dispute 
between the alleged violator and the persons more directly affected by the violation.   
Within a dispute resolution framework however, the potential violation becomes a 
dispute between two parties – the party claiming the violation and the party whose 
conduct is in issue.  Where the state is one of the parties to the dispute, it can be viewed 
as the representative of society and, as such, asserting an interest in upholding the 
legislated norm as well as an interest in resolving the particular situation.   However, 
even in cases where the state is a party, the dispute resolution framework creates a 
tension between the interest in upholding the legislated norm and the institutional 
pressure to resolve cases.  
In the case of some legislated norms, it may also be possible to “enforce” them in 
more than one formal legal process.  Where there is potential for multiple enforcement 
venues, this can lead to tension between engaging with the formal enforcement process 
created for that legislated norm and engaging with the legal norm in other enforcement 
venues, or even in the social context to which the legal norm applies. To borrow 
20 
 
Galanter’s phrase, it may be possible to pursue “justice in many rooms” 37.  Some of these 
rooms may be public rooms, as with the adjudicative venues established and maintained 
by the state, and for some legislated norms there may be competing public venues for 
their enforcement.  Other rooms may be more private rooms, in the social contexts to 
which the legal norms apply and with more private enforcement processes: the 
boardroom, the classroom, the community centre room, the hospital room, the 
workrooms, etc.  Being able to use and enforce legislated norms in a variety of places 
may create opportunities for pursuing justice.  At the same time, when multiple venues 
are available, there may be questions about whether the legislated norms will be 
considered in the same way in all these venues, as well as questions about the 
interrelationships between these venues.  My dissertation explores the tension between 
enforcing legislated norms in their specific, public adjudicative venue and enforcing them 
in other public and private venues, which is now an important question for the 
enforcement of statutory human rights in some Canadian jurisdictions, including Ontario. 
  
3 Responsibility at Law: Fault and Remedy 
An important goal of seeking agency through law is to use the power of law to 
hold people responsible or accountable for their conduct - past, present and future.  This 
goal can be masked by the language of rights, which has a strong hold on how legal 
norms are talked about, understood, and expressed.  Like many others, I am cautious 
                                                 
37 Marc Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law,” (1981), 19 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 1.  Galanter argued for recognizing not only private as well as public venues for 
addressing legal norms but also private as well as public legal norms. 
21 
 
about the utility and the effects of rights discourse.  One of my concerns is that it 
characterizes rights as things or possessions, that people “have” or “own”.  This property-
like characterization also suggests that being a “rights holder” is a passive state or status, 
which is by itself sufficient to produce results.   
I am, however, attracted to Anthony Woodiwiss’s social relations formulation, 
that “…the term ‘rights’ refers to a legally enforceable set of expectations as to how 
others … should behave …”.38  This formulation emphasizes that rights are relational and 
dynamic.  They are relational because their concrete effect is determined by how people 
treat each other.  They are dynamic because they do not implement themselves and 
require action through claims and responses to these claims:  “ … law is an activity and 
not a thing. Its ‘being’ is in the ‘doing’ of the participants within the practice.’”39    
A social relations approach to engaging with the power of law entails the 
recognition that legal rights have social impact only if there are corresponding 
responsibilities, and methods to ensure that these corresponding responsibilities are 
fulfilled: “The mix of entitlements and obligations we can legitimately claim depends on 
the kinds of human relationships we can defend nothing more and nothing less.”40 In the 
context of struggles against social inequalities, then, another goal of seeking agency 
through law is to impose responsibilities to make changes.  Sometimes the argument is 
that legal responsibility should reflect and be commensurate with exiting social power, so 
that individuals or groups who have more social power should have more legal 
                                                 
38 Anthony Woodiwiss, Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) at xi. 
39 Dennis Patterson, “Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative” (1990), 76 Virginia L R 937 at 
941, quoted in Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 74.  
40 Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at fn 128, quoting Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradox of Property (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) at 216. 
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responsibility.  Sometimes the argument is that legal responsibility should be a vehicle 
for changing balances in social power, so that legal responsibility should not necessarily 
reflect and be commensurate with existing power relations.41 
 
Responsibility and Consequences   
Legal norms address questions of responsibility by prescribing expectations for 
conduct and prescribing, or providing guidance on, the consequences that should be 
imposed when people fail to meet conduct expectations.  Punitive consequences and 
remedial consequences are the two types of material consequences that are generally 
imposed.42  Punitive consequences are most common in criminal and quasi-criminal law 
contexts.  Their impact is directed primarily to the person found to have acted contrary to 
law, who may be required to pay a monetary penalty, to engage in community service, to 
serve time in prison, or to change their practices to avoid similar wrongdoing in the 
future.  Punitive consequences can also be imposed in civil law contexts, but are much 
more rare and usually take the form of punitive damages and punitive costs orders.   
                                                 
 41  Ideologies of responsibility and “responsibilization” have been used against socially disempowered 
people, often as part of a larger move to diminish social responsibility for inequalities.  For discussion of 
the complexity of shared responsibility in the occupational health and safety context, see: Eric Tucker, 
“Remapping Worker Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety Regimes” (2007), 37 
Intl J Health Services 145, and Eric Tucker, “Diverging Trends in Worker Health and Safety Protection and 
Participation in Canada, 1985-2000” (2003) 58 Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 395. For 
discussion of responsibilization and disempowerment in the criminal law context, see, for example: 
Elizabeth Comack, and Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault 
Survivors: The Slippage between Responsibilization and Blaming the Victim” (2005), 17 CJWL 283; and 
Nicola Lacey, “In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal 
Law Theory” (2001), 64 Mod L Rev 350.  
42 Declarations that a legal norm was violated do not have material consequences.  For purposes of this 
discussion and categorization, I would treat injunctions as remedial consequences. 
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Remedial consequences are most common in civil law contexts, and their impact 
is directed primarily to the applicant/claimant who initiated the legal claim.  In court-
based civil actions, the remedy is usually monetary compensation.  In administrative law 
civil cases, remedies may also include a range of specific performance orders.  Although 
civil remedies are largely understood to be remedial, the person against whom a remedial 
consequence is ordered may experience that consequence as punitive: for example, a 
defendant /respondent who is ordered to pay a high damages award to an 
applicant/claimant may feel that scope of the award also represents punishment for the 
wrongdoing found by the adjudicator. 
In criminal and quasi-criminal cases, the “wrongdoer” is the “recipient” of the 
consequences, in the sense that the penalty or punishment is imposed directly on the 
wrongdoer. In civil cases (court and administrative law), the applicant/claimant or 
“victim” is the recipient of the remedial consequences.   In both contexts, however, it is 
the “wrongdoer” - the defendant/respondent – who is responsible for fulfilling the 
consequences.  It is the defendant /respondent who pays the fine, serves the prison 
sentence, does the community service, changes practices, provides monetary 
compensation, and carries out specific performance orders. 
Legal responsibility is a central question in the processes for enforcing legal 
norms.  Both formal (adjudicative) and informal (ADR) enforcement processes are 
concerned with holding people responsible for alleged failure to comply with legal 




Responsibility, Fault and Formal Legal Process   
Adjudication requires people to participate in a formal legal process that can 
result in a judgment that legal norms were violated and in the imposition of consequences 
for the violation.  The adjudicator must pass judgment on the responsibility of the 
individual(s) whose conduct is in question.  In order to pass this judgment, the 
adjudicator must first determine whether the individual(s)’s conduct was, is, or will be 
contrary to legal norms (unless responsibility for acting contrary to legal norms is 
admitted).  If the adjudicator finds a past, present, or future violation of legal norms, the 
adjudicator must then determine what consequence(s) should be imposed. The specific 
issues the adjudicator will have to consider in addressing the question of responsibility 
will vary in different legal areas.  However, the ultimate question for the adjudicator is 
whether they should impose legal responsibility on the person against whom a charge has 
been brought or a claim has been made. 
The question of responsibility or accountability is also often connected with 
questions about the defendant/respondent’s intention in relation to the conduct, and their 
control over the conduct.  In order to hold a defendant/respondent responsible, 
adjudicators usually need to be satisfied that the defendant/respondent knew or knows 
about the conduct, and had or has at least some ability to control the conduct.  This 
connection between intention, control and responsibility is also linked to a connection 
between fault and responsibility.  Where an adjudicator determines that a 
defendant/respondent is responsible for conduct contrary to legal norms, that 
determination is also a determination that the defendant /respondent was in some way “at 
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fault”.43  The concept of fault has generally negative connotations. The degree of 
negativity or stigma associated with a finding of fault for illegal conduct, however, 
depends on the degree of “badness” or wrongfulness associated with the conduct.  As 
noted earlier, social judgments about whether conduct should be considered bad or wrong 
are often part of the process of establishing and changing legal norms. 
In principle, questions of fault focus primarily on the person responsible for 
wrongful conduct, the defendant/respondent, whereas questions of remedy focus more on 
the applicant/claimant, who has been harmed in some way by the wrongful conduct.  
However, because the applicant/claimant will receive a remedy only if the 
defendant/respondent is found responsible for illegal conduct, the questions of 
responsibility and fault remain dominant.  In some cases, the degree of harm that an 
applicant/claimant can establish may influence an adjudicator’s determination about the 
defendant/respondent’s responsibility for that harm.  Nevertheless, questions of 
responsibility are separate from questions of remedy, even though in practice they may 
have a synergistic influence on one another.  In all civil (including administrative law) 
adjudicative processes, then, a successful outcome for an applicant/claimant is possible 
only where the adjudicator decides to impose responsibility on the defendant/respondent.  
The legal claim asserted by an applicant/claimant is inextricably linked to whether or not 
the adjudicator will hold the defendant/respondent accountable.   
                                                 
43 Some legal norms purport to eliminate questions of fault by imposing absolute liability or to minimize 
questions of fault by imposing strict liability.  Most quasi-criminal legal norms impose strict liability, 
which provides the defendant /respondent with a due diligence defence of their intention to avoid the illegal 
conduct.  See: Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 4d (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 15-17. 
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In relation to anti-discrimination claims, Alan Freeman described this focus on the 
defendant/respondent as the “perpetrator perspective” and argued that this perspective is 
at least as important as the “victim perspective”: 44 
 
The perpetrator perspective sees racial [or sex] discrimination as actions, 
or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator.  The focus is 
more on what particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some 
victims than it is on the overall life situation of the victim.45 
 
The perpetrator perspective is dominant in criminal and quasi-criminal prosecution, since 
the primary focus is on the conduct of the defendant.  For the reasons discussed above, I 
argue that the “perpetrator perspective” is also at least as important as the “victim 
perspective” not only in relation to anti-discrimination claims, but in relation to all civil 
(including administrative) adjudicative processes.   This is because there will be no 
remedial outcome for the “victim” unless the adjudicator is willing to impose 
responsibility on the defendant /respondent. 
 
 
                                                 
44 Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210-212. 
45 Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 211.  In “Harm and Fault in Discrimination Law: The 
Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001), Theor. Inq. L. 349, Denise Réaume 
explored tort liability as a comparative model for tracing an expanding recognition of fault and liability in 
discrimination law.  Her goal was to ground an interest-based, non-distributive normative rationale for 
recognizing unintentional discrimination.  She argued that tort law liability standards evolved from malice 
to intention to negligence, and that a similar progression can be seen in the case of discrimination law.  She 
also argued that the notion of denying a service or benefit simply for the sake of doing so, on the basis of 
identity, is the unifying harm of discrimination, which she conceptualized as injury to dignity.  Her work 
since has focused on the role of dignity in equality rights claims.  See, for example: Denise G. Réaume, 
“Discrimination and Dignity” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality 
Rights Real: Seeking Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 123, and 
Denise Réaume, “Dignity, Equality and Comparison” in Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds., 
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 7. 
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Responsibility, Remedy and Informal Legal Process 
In practice, most legal disputes do not reach the formal, adjudicative process.  
Their outcome is instead decided through more informal processes of alternative dispute 
resolution.  In more informal legal processes, the parties involved in the legal claim 
mediate or negotiate and decide for themselves what the outcome should be, sometimes 
with the assistance of legal representatives, a third-party mediator or a third-party 
negotiator. The parties may agree to the same types of consequences that an adjudicator 
can impose, but they may also agree to consequences that an adjudicative body could not, 
or would not, impose.  The settlement agreements that result from these processes are 
private documents, which receive no publicity unless the parties agree to make them 
public. 
There is a range of different approaches to alternative dispute resolution in civil 
and administrative law contexts, including rights-based approaches and interest-based 
approaches.46  One feature that all informal enforcement approaches share, however, and 
that differentiates them from adjudication, is that voluntary resolutions do not require an 
admission of responsibility or liability in order for the parties to agree to remedial or 
punitive consequences.  Achieving such an admission may be a goal for some 
applicants/claimants, and it is open to the defendant/respondent to agree to include an 
admission of responsibility or liability as a term of the settlement agreement.  Most 
settlements agreements do not, however, include admissions of responsibility.  Most 
settlement agreements are also not available to the public.  Therefore, even if a settlement 
                                                 




agreement did include an admission of responsibility, that admission would be known 
only if the parties agreed to make the agreement available to the public. 
 A second feature that informal enforcement processes share, and that also 
differentiates them from formal enforcement processes, is that their primary focus is on 
the outcome:  what result can the applicant/claimant and the defendant/respondent agree 
to that will allow them to avoid formal legal process?   In alternative dispute resolution 
processes, then, consequence is the primary focus of responsibility.  In criminal and 
quasi-criminal contexts, what penalty or punishment will the defendant/respondent agree 
to accept?  In civil contexts (court and administrative law), which remedy or remedies 
will the defendant/respondent agree to provide to the applicant/claimant?  Within 
alternative dispute resolution processes, the focus on the defendant/respondent is less 
concerned with passing judgment on whether or not they are at fault and more concerned 
with whether or not they will agree to accept a penalty or punishment, provide a remedy 
or remedies, that will satisfy the applicant/claimant (or Crown in the criminal context).   
Thus, whereas responsibility as fault is a central question in adjudication, it plays 
little if any role in alternative dispute resolution processes.   Conversely, whereas remedy 
is an issue in adjudication only if fault is found, responsibility as remedy is the primary 
focus in alternative dispute resolution processes. 
Alternative dispute resolution is a subject of much debate and critique, from many 
different perspectives, including issues of inequalities in bargaining power and unequal 
access to legal representation.   My dissertation does not engage specifically with these 
debates, although my research resonates with some of the issues they address.  I am, 
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instead, interested in the ways in which formal and informal enforcement processes have 
provided opportunities to impose responsibility for discrimination through law. 
 
Responsibility and Responsive Regulation 
The dynamic of informal dispute resolution processes at the level of individual 
cases has conceptual parallels with the concept of responsive regulation at the societal 
level, as argued first by Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick and then by Ian Ayres and 
John Braithwaite.  Nonet and Selznick proposed a framework of three “modalities” of 
law, with varying degrees of coercion being one of the characteristics defining each type.  
According to their typology, the most coercive laws are those which establish and 
facilitate repressive power; the intermediately coercive laws are those which focus on 
“taming” repression and protecting the integrity of law as an institution; and the least 
coercive laws are those which are designed to respond to and facilitate “social needs and 
aspirations”.47  They characterized this third and least coercive form of law as 
“responsive law”, because it represents an effort to engage the power of the state in 
response to people identifying what they wanted from law.48  They also argued that, “If 
there is a paradigmatic function of responsive law, it is regulation, not adjudication.”49  
Their rationale was that responsive law is concerned with substantive “legality” rather 
                                                 
47 Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1978) at 14-15 [Nonet and Selzick, Law and Society in Transition]. 
48  Again, because the “public” is not homogenous, it is important to acknowledge that different people and 
groups will reflect different social interests and will want state law to do different things. 
49 Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition at 108. 
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than with “legalization”, which they described as focusing on “the proliferation of rules 
and procedural formalities.”50 
Ayres and Braithwaite argued that their concept of “responsive regulation” shared 
some of the key characteristics of Nonet and Selznick’s, in particular, “flexibility, a 
purposive focus on competence, participatory citizenship, negotiation”.51   They also 
emphasized that they were advocating “a method of regulation rather than of the ends of 
regulation, a method that is negotiated and flexible”.52  In their model, the goal is the 
voluntary assumption of responsibility through processes for negotiating how legal norms 
will regulate social conduct.  They also argued that voluntary compliance will be 
achieved only as long as a state regulatory agency has coercive methods available and is 
willing to use these methods.53  They described this enforcement model as the “Benign 
Big Gun”:  regulatory agencies that “will be more able to speak softly when they carry 
big sticks” and in which “Paradoxically, the bigger and the more various are the sticks, 
the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly.”54  
Tension between voluntary and coercive enforcement methods is a significant 
theme in my dissertation.  There are recurring arguments that voluntary persuasion is the 
preferred enforcement method, but requires the option of coercive methods in the 
background to be effective. To borrow the phrase coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser, it 
                                                 
50 Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition at 107-108. 
51 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 5 [Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation]. 
52 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 18. 
53 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 19 and Chapter 2, “The Benign Big Gun” at 19-57. 
54 Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 19. 
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is voluntarism “in the shadow of the law”.55   In the statutory human rights context, 
however, there is a history of state reluctance to employ coercive methods, and this 
history raises questions about the role of the coercive power of law in struggles against 
social inequalities. 
 
4 Anti-Discrimination Law as a Site of Inquiry 
In Canada, the statutes that carry the label “human rights” are, in large measure, 
anti-discrimination statutes.56  Anti-discrimination legislation explicitly aligns itself with 
social equality goals by linking prohibitions against discrimination with legal rights to 
equality.57  Most Canadian human rights statutes were first passed in the 1960s and 
1970s, having evolved from earlier anti-discrimination and fair practices legislation that 
was passed in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.  These statutes apply to both the private and 
public sectors, and to defined social areas that generally include employment, goods and 
services, housing and vocational associations.  In structure, they typically create 
prohibitions against “discrimination” and against certain forms of conduct based on 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The prohibited grounds of discrimination in the 
                                                 
55 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case of 
Divorce” (1979), 88 Yale L.J. 950. 
56 Two Canadian human rights statutes also include “civil or political rights” provisions:  The 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 includes a Bill of Rights (ss. 4-8) and a right to 
education (s. 13), and the Yukon Territory Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 116, also includes a Bill of 
Rights (ss. 3-6).  The Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. , c.C-12 includes “economic, 
social and cultural rights”: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ss. 1-9.1), Political Rights (ss. 21-22 ), 
Judicial Rights (ss.  23-38), and Social and Economic Rights (ss. 39-48). 
57 Since 1981 this link has been explicit in the language of Ontario’s Human Rights Code, which provides 
for rights “to equal treatment without discrimination”. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the equality rights provision, similarly links equality rights with protection against 
discrimination. “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” [emphasis added] 
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first provincial statutes were race, religion, and ethnicity.  Additional prohibited grounds 
of discrimination were added over the succeeding decades, beginning with age, sex and 
marital status in the 1970s, disability and family status in the 1980s, sexual orientation in 
the 1990s, and gender identity and gender expression in the 2000s. 
The prohibited grounds of discrimination are central to Canadian human rights 
legislation because they represent the social conditions and issues that anti-discrimination 
legislation is designed to address. These prohibited grounds are intended to represent 
particular social groups who have experienced and continue to experience discrimination 
and discriminatory practices: racialized minorities; religious minorities; ethnic minorities; 
women; persons with disabilities; families with children; single-parent families; lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans and queer persons; and younger and older persons.58 The range of 
discriminatory practices includes exclusion from, or low participation in, employment; 
exclusion from housing; harassment and bullying; profiling; denial of services or inability 
to get access to services.59 
                                                 
58 Although the prohibited grounds of discrimination are central precisely because they are intended to 
respond to social inequalities, there has also been criticism of this categorical approach, especially within 
feminist legal theory.  For just a very small sample of this literature, see: Nitya Iyer, “Categorical Denials:  
Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” (1993) 19 Queen’s LJ 179; Marlee Kline, “Race, 
Racism and Feminist Legal Theory” (1989) 12 Harv Women’s LJ 115; Toni Williams, “Re-Forming 
‘Women's’ Truth: A Critique of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada” 
(1990) 22 Ottawa L Rev 725.  I recognize the challenges posed by trying to fit complex social realities into 
a categorical framework, and the need to recognize the multiple ways in which social groups experience 
discrimination depending on the complexities of their social identities.  However, I believe that a grounds-
based approach continues to be an important way to maintain a focus on social groups and social inequality 
in human rights law. See, for example: Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real 
People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 CJWL 37, and Colleen Sheppard, “Grounds of Discrimination: 
Towards an Inclusive and Contextual Approach” (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 893. 
59 There is much commentary on the meaning and role of anti-discrimination or human rights legal 
doctrine.  For a recent collection see: Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds., Philosophical 
Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). My dissertation does not 
engage directly with these questions.   
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Direct enforcement of human rights statutes has, until recently, been the 
responsibility of human rights commissions and tribunals in most of Canada’s common 
law jurisdictions.60  Human rights commissions have traditionally had a mandate to 
receive and process complaints of statutory violations, to engage in research and policy 
work, to provide educational services about human rights, and to play a role in the 
administration of special programmes.61  In their complaint-processing enforcement role, 
commissions have been generally required to investigate complaints, to assist the parties 
in efforts to reach a voluntary resolution and, where the parties cannot reach a voluntary 
resolution, to decide whether or not the complaint will be referred to a tribunal for a 
formal hearing.  When the commission decided to refer a complaint to a formal hearing, 
it typically had carriage of the proceedings and was responsible for representing both the 
complainant’s interests and the public interest dimension raised by the complaint.  
Human rights statutes cannot be enforced directly either through civil actions in the 
courts or by administrative tribunals.  However, the legal protections that human rights 
statutes establish can be raised in the social contexts where they apply and can be 
addressed in civil and administrative adjudication.62   
 By the time the equality rights provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms came into effect in 1985, the human rights commission enforcement model had 
                                                 
60 British Columbia is the one Canadian jurisdiction that has operated both with and without a commission-
type institution.  For a discussion of the “turbulent history” of human rights in British Columbia, see R. 
Brian Howe and David Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada (Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 13-14 and 65-68 [Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality]. 
61 Special programmes are also often known as affirmative action programmes. 
62 Human rights legislation can be directly enforced only by using the statutory enforcement process.  
However, people can attach human rights issues to other legal claims they advance through civil and 
administrative legal processes (for example, breach of contract, tort, landlord tenant disputes, disputes over 
government benefits, etc.) and receive additional remedies in relation to the human rights issue if the court 
or tribunal finds a violation of human rights in addition to a violation of the other legal rights in dispute. 
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produced several legal victories, some of which equality rights advocates relied on in 
their arguments about how s. 15 of the Charter should be interpreted and applied.63   
However, the human rights commission enforcement model was soon to become the 
subject of significant criticism, both as a model and in relation to how the model was 
functioning.  Scholars and activists began to ask whether the equality rights provision of 
the Charter offered the promise of a new avenue to pursue social equality through law.  
However, after several decades of litigation experience with s. 15 of the Charter, equality 
rights advocates have become increasingly disappointed with this legal tool,64 and there is 
now renewed interest in reinvigorating human rights statutes as an avenue for pursuing 
equality through law.  In some jurisdictions, of which Ontario is one, this interest has 
been accompanied by a major change in the process for enforcing human rights statutes.  
This initiative for change in Ontario is the destination point of my dissertation.65 
 
5 Dissertation Methodology and Overview 
The dissertation is organized around three cases studies through which I examine 
this tension between the promise and practice of law in struggles for social equality.  
                                                 
63 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143. 
64 See, for example:  Beverley Baines, “Equality, Comparison, Discrimination, Status” in Fay Faraday, 
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: Seeking Substantive Equality under 
the Charter (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 73 [Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, Making Equality Rights 
Real]; Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 
299; Bruce Porter, “Expectations of Equality” (2006) 33 SCLR (2d) 23; Fiona Sampson, “The Law Test for 
Discrimination and Gendered Disability Inequality” in Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, Making Equality 
Rights Real: Seeking Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 245; Margot 
Young, “Blissed Out: Section 15 at Twenty” (2006) 33 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 45. 
65 The CHRA Review panel also recommended that the enforcement process under the Canadian Human 
Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6 be changed to provide for claims to be filed directly with the human rights 
tribunal – see Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa, 2000). 
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Each case study involves a pivotal contribution to the development of Canadian statutory 
human rights law. 
The first case study, which is Chapter One of the dissertation, explores how social 
activists engaged with law as a tool for social equality in relation to the fair practices 
statutes passed in Ontario in the 1950s.  The first part of Chapter One examines the social 
activists’ quest for fair practices legislation.  The second part of Chapter One examines 
the structure of the enforcement process and the social activists’ experiences with 
enforcement of the legislation. The goal of the fair practices case study is to examine the 
history of the social activism for fair practices legislation and the history of what 
ultimately became the human rights commission enforcement model. When I began my 
research, I learned that the story of the passage of Ontario’s fair practices statutes is a 
subject of considerable academic interest, with a rich literature in a wide range of 
academic disciplines. Some of this literature discusses questions about law and the role of 
law, but these questions have not been a central focus in the literature and they are the 
central focus of my interest. Therefore, I proceeded to conduct my own examination and 
analysis of key primary source documents, looking at them specifically through the lens 
of law as a tool for social equality.   
My primary source research focused on the archival records of the two 
organizations which led the social activism for Ontario’s fair practices statutes:  (1) the 
Jewish Labour Committee, including in particular the Ontario Labour Committee for 
Human rights and the Toronto Joint Labour Committee for Human Rights, and (2) the 
Joint Public Relations Committee of the B’nai Brith and the Canadian Jewish Congress   
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My research on the Jewish Labour Committee and related fonds was conducted in 
Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa and the Archives of Ontario.  My research on the 
Joint Public Relation Committee was conducted in the Ontario Jewish Archives in 
Toronto, which houses the records of the Central Region of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress, and in the national archives of the Canadian Jewish Congress, which are 
housed in Montreal. 
The second case study, which is Chapter Two of the dissertation, examines the 
relationship between law and social relations through the Bell v. McKay litigation.  The 
first part of Chapter Two examines the history of human rights protection against 
discrimination in rental housing and the continuing evolution of the human rights 
commission enforcement model.  The second part of Chapter Two examines the Bell v. 
McKay litigation, the first statutory human rights case decided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which raised questions both about the substance of anti-discrimination 
legislation and the human rights commission enforcement model.  
This second case study grew out of my participation in a symposium on the life 
and work of Dr. Daniel Hill, organized by The Harriet Tubman Institute of York 
University.  My involvement in this symposium subsequently led to an opportunity to co-
author an article on the Bell v. McKay litigation for the Canadian Property Law Cases in 
Context collection.66  I chose to include a Bell v. McKay case study in the dissertation 
because doing so provided the opportunity to examine this history in more detail and 
                                                 
66 Frank Luce and Karen Schucher, “‘The Right to Discriminate’: Kenneth Bell versus Carl McKay and the 
Ontario Human Rights Commission” in Eric Tucker, Bruce Ziff and James Mujir, eds., Canadian Property 
Law Cases in Context (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012) 
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more specifically through the lens of the tension between social goals and legal 
processes. The research for this chapter included legislative history research, case law 
research on decisions of boards of inquiry under the Ontario Human Rights Code, and 
more archival research in records of the Ontario Labour and Human Rights Committee of 
the Jewish Labour Committee. 
The third case study, which is Chapter Three of the dissertation, examines the 
tension between legal goals and social goals through the history of the demise of the 
human rights commission enforcement process in Ontario. The first part of Chapter Three 
provides contextual background for the Bill 107 debates, by examining key themes in the 
development of human rights jurisprudence and in the functioning of the human rights 
enforcement process after Bell v. McKay.  In the second part of Chapter Three, I examine 
and analyze the fiercely competing positions in the Bill 107 debates.  In the third part of 
Chapter Three, I review the preliminary assessments of the Bill 107 model in action.  
As explained in the Preface, this third case study grew out of my interest in the 
Bill 107 initiative.  In February 2006, the Ontario government announced its intention to 
eliminate the human rights commission enforcement process and substitute a process in 
which people would file human rights claims with an adjudicative tribunal. This initiative 
instigated a bitter debate within the Ontario human rights advocacy community. I was 
interested in this debate and attended many of the public events at which the different 
perspectives were debated. What interested me was not the personal acrimony, but the 
fact that each side had such a deep commitment to the merits of its position.  I wanted to 
examine what values and interests were promoted by each side of the debate, as well as 
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the potential implications of each side’s arguments.   For this case study, I researched the 
socio-legal and political context in which the initiative came forward and the Bill 107 
legislative history, including the transcripts of the public hearings.  
 In the Concluding Reflections on the Promise and Practice of Law, I 
reflect more generally on how the three case studies contribute to the four themes that 
informed my research: the relationship between law and social power, the potential for 
agency through law, the meaning of responsibility at law, and the tension between law as 
a tool for determining concrete outcomes and law as a process through which to struggle 































Historical Roots of Ontario’s Human Rights Code and  
Human Rights Commission Model:  
Fair Practices Legislation and Enforcement, 1946-1961 
 
 
Introduction to Chapter One 
What led a diverse group of social activists in Ontario, in the 1940s and 1950s, to 
seek the enactment and enforcement of legislation as a tool against racial, religious and 
nationality discrimination in employment, housing, services, and public spaces?   This 
question is the primary focus of this first chapter, through which I explore questions 
about the role of law and legal norms, questions about the meaning of social 
responsibility, and questions about different approaches to legal process.   The fair 
practices legislation which resulted from the social activists’ campaigns established 
prohibitions against discrimination and a state agency enforcement model which laid the 
groundwork for Canadian human rights codes and the human rights commission 
enforcement model. 
In Part I of the chapter, I discuss the campaigns for fair practices legislation 
through the lens of law, focusing on why and how the advocates for fair practices 
legislation saw law as a tool to address direct discrimination in the fundamental social 
areas of employment, services, and access to public spaces.  The advocacy for fair 
practices legislation involved arguments for state and citizen responsibility to change 
social norms relating to direct discrimination, and arguments for an enforcement process 
that gave preference to conciliation over adjudication.  In Part II of the chapter, I explore 
how the fair practices advocates used the new fair practices legislation as a tool against 
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direct discrimination.  Both the structure of the enforcement model and its 
implementation raised issues about the meaning of legal process and about access to the 
coercive power of law, issues that continued to be experienced under human rights code 
enforcement.  In the Conclusion to the chapter, I identify four questions that emerge from 
this early history and that I argue have particular relevance to the evolution of the 
promise and practice of statutory human rights law in Ontario and in Canada.  These four 
questions continue as themes in the subsequent historical periods that I examine in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three. 
 
Part I:  The Quest for Fair Practices Legislation 
 
 
I think it was a mistake to expect too much of the courts.   After all, we do 
not want judges to make law: we want law to be made by the elected 
representatives of the people.67 
 
… while within its own framework equity might perhaps develop new 
remedies, the responsibility for the protection of new social forces must 
hereafter be primarily the concern of the legislature and not of the courts. 
… where social advance has outstripped legal theory and the gap between 
the two must be closed, the legislature is better fitted than are the courts to 
accomplish the result.68 
 
Ontario was the first Canadian jurisdiction to pass fair practices legislation and 
provided the lead for other Canadian jurisdictions, most of which followed suit to pass 
similar legislation. In legal form, the fair practices statutes were closely modelled on 
                                                 
67 A private communication of Ted Jolliffe, leader of the CCF, quoted in James W. St.G. Walker, “Race,” 
Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies (Toronto:  The Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 1997) [Walker,“Race”] at 211.  
68 Bora Laskin, “The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem of ‘Contracting Out’”, [1938] XVI 
Can Bar Rev 669 at 671 [Laskin, “Protection of Interests”]. 
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legislation passed in several jurisdictions in the United States, beginning with New York 
in 1945. This legal form was a partial departure from earlier Ontario anti-discrimination 
legislation, discussed below, and also from a competing bill of rights model, as in The 
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947.69  Ontario’s fair employment and fair 
accommodation practices statutes, enacted in 1951 and 1954 respectively, targeted direct 
discrimination based on race, religion and ethnic origin. 
 
1   From Common Law to Legislation 
The early history of Canadian efforts to establish anti-discrimination legal norms 
through the courts illustrates the limitations of a court-based law reform strategy.70  With 
the exception of the famous Re Drummond Wren71 case, the courts were not receptive to 
claims that exclusionary conduct based on race and religion should be judged illegal.  
According to James Walker, in 1916 a group of African Canadians asked the 
federal government whether racially discriminatory practices were legal and were told by   
the Deputy Minister of Justice that legislation was silent on this issue and that “The 
                                                 
69 The Saskatchewan statute was more extensive in scope, including both civil rights provisions [rights to 
freedom of conscience, etc. (s. 2), free expression (s. 3), free assembly and association (s. 4), freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention (s. 6), and freedom to exercise the franchise (s. 7)] and anti-discrimination 
provisions relating to occupations and businesses, land ownership and tenancy, education, and publications 
[ss. 8-13]. The anti-discrimination provisions were structured as a “right to” participate in these areas 
without discrimination. For example, the text of the right to engage in occupations and businesses read: 
“Every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to engage in and carry on any occupation, 
business or enterprise under the law without discrimination because of the race, creed, religion, colour, or 
ethnic or national origin of such person or class of persons.” The provision relating to publications (s. 14) 
was structured as a prohibition against discrimination, similar to Ontario’s Racial Discrimination Act, 
1944, discussed below. Saskatchewan later followed Ontario to pass fair practices legislation, although it 
also retained its Bill of Rights Act for the civil rights provisions. 
70 See also Ross Lambertson, Repression and Resistance: Canadian Human Rights Activists, 1929-1960 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) [Lambertson, Repression and Resistance] at 206, 216. 
71 [1945] OR 778 (HJC) [Drummond Wren]. 
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remedy is in the courts”.72  A number of court cases involving challenges to 
discrimination were subsequently brought in the 1930s and 1940s.  These cases focused 
on discrimination in two social areas: provision of services and restrictive covenants in 
relation to property.  In some of these cases individuals asked the courts to rule on the 
enforcement of legislation that was itself discriminatory and on discriminatory 
enforcement of otherwise non-discriminatory laws. In other cases individuals asked the 
courts to rule on discriminatory practices by non-state service providers and property 
owners.73  
 The leading case on services was the Supreme Court of Canada’s now infamous 
ruling in Christie v. York Corp., decided in 1941.74  The incident that led to the Christie 
case occurred on July 11, 1936. Fred Christie went with friends to the York Tavern, in 
Montreal.  The waiter said to them: “Gentlemen, I am very sorry I cannot serve colored 
people”.75  With the support of the Christie Defence Committee, Mr. Christie sued the 
York Tavern for $200 in damages for the humiliation he suffered.  The trial judge 
awarded him $25 and costs of the action, on the grounds that the Tavern’s decision to 
refuse to serve Black persons contravened ss.19 and 33 of the Quebec License Act.  
                                                 
72 Walker,“Race” at 143-144. 
73 See, for example:  Walker, “Race” at Chapters 2 and 5;  Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal 
History of Racism in Canada 1900-1950 (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press for the 
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1999) [Backhouse, Colour-Coded];  Stephanie D. Bangarth, 
“‘We are not asking you to open wide the gates for Chinese immigration’: The Committee for the Repeal of 
the Chinese Immigration Act and Early Human Rights Activism in Canada” (2003) 84 Can Hist’l Rev 395 
[Bangarth, “Chinese Immigration Act”]. 
74 [1940] S.C.R. 139 at 141 [Christie v. York]. 
75   For a detailed discussion of the facts of the case and the litigation, see Walker, “Race” at 123-124 and 
143-168.   This type of incident was not unprecedented; Blacks in Canada were regularly denied access to 
services, public places, housing and employment. This was also not the first time law was engaged to 




Section 33 of the statute stated that "No licensee for a restaurant may refuse, without 
reasonable cause, to give food to travellers."76 The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned 
the trial judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Quebec Court of 
Appeal’s decision, with one judge dissenting.  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s majority reasons opened by defining Mr. Christie 
as a racialized person: “The appellant, who is a negro, entered a tavern …”.77  The 
majority took a technical approach to the question before them in holding that the 
Tavern’s conduct was legal because Mr. Christie “… was not a traveller asking for a meal 
in a restaurant … he was only a person asking for a glass of beer in a tavern.”78  This 
conclusion was informed by the Court’s application of the overriding principle that  “Any 
merchant is free to deal as he may choose with any individual member of the public” as 
long as the merchant did not establish a rule “… contrary to good morals or public 
order”.79  For the majority of the Court, then, a rule denying service to Black persons was 
not contrary to “good morals or public order”.  Bora Laskin published a brief comment 
criticizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Christie, where he wrote: “The 
principle of freedom of commerce enforced by the Court majority is itself merely the 
reading of social and economic doctrine into law, and doctrine no longer possessing its 
19th century validity.”80 
                                                 
76 RSQ 1925, c 25. 
77 Christie v. York at 141. 
78 Christie v. York at 145. 
79 Christie v. York at 144. 
80 See “Tavern Refusing to Serve Negro – Discrimination” (1940) 18 Can Bar Rev 315 at 316.  For a 
discussion of freedom of contract ideology, see Karen Pearlston, “A Restricted Country?: The Racist 
Legacy of Restrictive Covenants” (1996, unpublished) at 4-7 [Pearslton,  “Restricted Country”]. 
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Justice Davis’s dissenting reasons opened with a different description of Mr. 
Christie:  “The appellant is a British subject residing in Verdun …”.81  Although this 
description effectively erased the question of race, it emphasized Mr. Christie’s 
commonality with the category of British subject - a category of person who would not, 
as such, have been denied service in the tavern.  In Justice Davis’s opinion, freedom of 
contract did not apply to the Tavern’s conduct because the sale of alcohol was completely 
regulated by the government.82  The government decided which merchants were 
authorized to sell alcohol, and the government told citizens that they were allowed to 
purchase alcohol only from merchants with government licences to sell alcohol.  
According to Davis J., then, the Tavern was required to sell alcohol to all members of the 
public unless the government gave the Tavern permission to refuse to sell to particular 
individuals or classes of individuals. Section 43 of the statute prohibited the sale of 
alcohol to various categories of persons, but none of these categories was based on race. 
The scope of freedom of contract was also tested in cases challenging covenants 
that prohibited the sale of property to Jews and other minority groups.  The first case 
involved Drummond Wren, the head of the Workers’ Educational Association, who 
purchased a piece of land subject to a covenant prohibiting it from being “sold to Jews or 
persons of objectionable nationality”. 83 Mr. Wren brought a court application seeking a 
                                                 
81 Christie v. York at 146. 
82 Christie v. York at 152.  The Quebec government’s regulation of alcohol was governed by the Alcoholic 
Liquor Act, RSQ 1925 c 37. 
83 Drummond Wren at 778. In his biography of Bora Laskin, Philip Girard writes that the case was set up as 
a test case by the Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B’nai Brith.  
Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 
2005) at 249- 252  [Girard, Bora Laskin].  This discussion is part of a chapter devoted to  Laskin’s 
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declaration that the covenant was void.84  The case was heard by Justice Keiller MacKay, 
and the published report of the reasons for decision indicates that no one appeared to 
oppose the application.85  Justice MacKay concluded that the restrictive covenant was 
illegal, primarily because it was contrary to public policy.  A key source for the public 
policy relied on by Justice MacKay was the founding Charter of the United Nations, the 
San Francisco Charter, which was adopted in 1945 and contained declarations of 
principle similar to those subsequently included in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted in 1948.86  Justice MacKay reasoned that the physical separation or 
“segregation” of different peoples that could result from restrictive covenants was 
harmful to the public good, because it could have the effect of deepening divisions 
among “religious and ethnic groups”.   In his view, the court had “... a moral duty, at 
least, to lend aid to all forces of cohesion, and similarly to repel all fissiparous tendencies 
which would imperil national unity.”87  Justice MacKay’s decision was not appealed, and 
was hailed as a great victory by the groups that took the case forward.88 
                                                                                                                                                 
involvement with “Human Rights” in this period (Chapter 11).  For other discussions of the case see:  
Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 210-213 and Walker, “Race” at 201-205. 
84 The Canadian Jewish Congress also intervened in the case, and was represented by J.M. Bennett.  Mr. 
Wren was represented by John Cartwright, who was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and by Irving Himel. 
85 It seems interesting to me that the fact that the application was not opposed does not appear to figure in 
literature discussing the history of the case, even though it was noted as important by Schroeder J., in his 
decision in Re Noble and Wolf, [1948] OR 579, aff’d [1949] OR 503; rev’d sub nom Noble et al. v. Alley, 
[1951] SCR 64, discussed below [Noble v. Alley]. 
86 The Drummond Wren case was litigated before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted 
by the United Nations in 1948.  The other key public policy source was Ontario’s The Racial 
Discrimination Act, 1944, SO 1944, c. 51, discussed below.  
87 Drummond Wren at 783. 
88 See, for example, Lambertson, Repression and Resistance, at 213-214; Walker, “Race”, at 204; and 
Bruner, “The Genesis of Ontario’s Human Rights Legislation: A Study in Law Reform”, (1979) 37 UT Fac 
L Rev 236 [ Bruner, “Genesis of Legislation”] at 245.  
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In the subsequent Noble and Wolf case, the vendor, Mrs. Noble, and the 
purchaser, Mr. Wolf, took joint legal action to void the restrictive covenant in the title to 
a cottage that was part of the Beach O’ Pines summer resort on Lake Huron.  They were 
opposed by a group of cottagers, who defended against the application. Mrs. Noble and 
Mr. Wolf’s claim was dismissed by Justice Schroeder of the Ontario High Court, whose 
decision was the upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal.  Part of Justice Schroeder’s 
stated rational for rejecting Justice MacKay’s reliance on public policy was that it was 
not the role of the courts to create new legal norms based on public policy: 
         
        In my view it is within the province of the competent legislative 
bodies to discuss and determine what is best for the public good and to 
provide for it by the proper enactments. Such matters can with greater 
propriety and safety be left to the duly elected representatives of the 
people assembled in Parliament or in the Legislature.89 
 
In the Court of Appeal decision upholding Justice Schroeder’s ruling, Chief Justice 
Robertson went even further to state that law generally - without distinguishing between 
law in the form of judicial rulings and law in the form of legislation - was not an 
appropriate method of achieving “mutual goodwill and esteem” among people of 
different races: 
 
Doubtless, mutual goodwill and esteem among the people of the numerous 
races that inhabit Canada is greatly to be desired, and the same goodwill 
and esteem should extend abroad, but what is so desirable is not a mere 
show of goodwill or a pretended esteem, such as might be assumed to 
comply with a law made to enforce it. To be worth anything, either at 
home or abroad, there is required the goodwill and esteem of a free 
people, who genuinely feel, and sincerely act upon, the sentiments they 
                                                 
89 Noble v. Alley (Wkly Ct) at 598. 
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express. A wise appreciation of the impotence of laws in the development 
of such genuine sentiments, rather than mere formal observances, no doubt 
restrains our legislators from enacting, and should restrain our Courts from 
propounding, rules of law to enforce what can only be of natural growth, if 
it is to be of any value to anyone.90 
 
In the paragraph preceding this conclusion, Chief Justice Robertson had expressed the 
view that the restrictive covenant was not criminal or immoral, and did not concern the 
public interest: 
 
The purpose of clause (f) here in question is obviously to assure, in some 
degree, that the residents are of a class who will get along well together.  
To magnify this innocent and modest effort to establish and maintain a 
place suitable for a pleasant summer residence into an enterprise that 
offends against some public policy, requires a stronger imagination than I 
possess. … There is nothing criminal or immoral involved; the public 
interest is in no way concerned.91 
 
The fact that the property was a summer resort was also an important consideration for 
Justice Schroeder and the Court of Appeal. 
Noble and Wolf were ultimately successful in the Supreme Court of Canada, but for 
reasons that did not attack the substance of the restrictive covenant, as did Justice 
MacKay’s reasons in Drummond Wren.92  Two of the judges were of the view that the 
covenant did not touch and concern the land because it did not deal with the use of the 
                                                 
90 Noble v Alley (CA) at 386.    
91 Noble v. Alley (CA) at 386. 
92 In the period between the release of the Court of Appeal’s decision and the hearing before the Supreme 
Court of Canada, Ontario amended the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act to prospectively void any 
covenant restricting sale, ownership, occupation or use of land on the basis of race, creed, colour, 
nationality, ancestry of place of origin: SO 1950, c 11, s. 1. 
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land.  Four of the judges were of the view that the covenant was void for uncertainty.93   
Justice Locke was the sole dissenting judge in the Supreme Court of Canada appeal. He 
expressly agreed with the reasons of Chief Justice Robertson in the Ontario Court of 
Appeal that law was not an appropriate method of achieving “mutual goodwill and 
esteem” among people of different races.  This argument, that the force of law cannot and 
should not be used to address racial and religious discrimination, thus became an 
important theme in the subsequent opposition to the social activism for fair practices 
legislation.  
 
2   Social Advocacy for Fair Practices Legislation 
Ontario’s fair practices statutes were born of concerted social activism that is a 
subject of enduring interest in Canadian scholarship.94  Stories about this social activism 
have been told and re-told in a range of disciplines, including social work,95 political 
                                                 
93 As expressed by Justice Rand in his reasons, “... it is impossible to set such limits to the lines of race or 
blood as would enable a Court to say in all cases whether a proposed purchaser is or is not within the ban.” 
94 Indeed, Carmela Patrias suggested that part of the reason why less has been written about the history of 
the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act is the comparative absence of social activism in its evolution: 
“Socialists, Jews, and the 1947 Saskatchewan Bill of Rights” (2006) 87 Can Hist’l Rev 265 at 266 [Patrias, 
“Socialists, Jews”].  According to Patrias, the initiative for the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act came from 
the state, rather than from social activists. This statute was passed by the CCF government, which was 
elected in 1944.  Despite the CCF’s leadership in anti-discrimination initiatives, Patrias and Frager have 
also argued that there were at the time racist attitudes prevalent within the CCF , particularly in relation to 
Japanese Canadians:  see Carmela Patrias & Ruth A. Frager, “‘This is our country, these are our rights’: 
Minorities and the Origins of Ontario's Human Rights Campaigns” (2001) 82 Can Hist’l Rev 1 at 8-9 [ 
Patrias and Frager, “Our Country”]. 
95 Joanne L. Griffith, An Analysis of Community Action and Legislation in the Ontario Human Rights Field 
(M.S.W. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1964); Herbert A. Sohn, Human Rights Legislation in Ontario: A 
Study of Social Action (D.S.W. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1975) [Sohn, Human Rights in 
Ontario]. Griffith wrote the that Ontario Human Rights Commission was interested in the social action that 
influenced governments to pass human rights statutes and encouraged her to undertake her research (at 4).  
Sohn’s dissertation covered similar ground to Griffith’s work, but more extensively and in more detail.  
Like Griffith, Sohn’s work was inspired by “… an interest in efforts to promote social legislation” (at iii).  
Sohn had been on the staff of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and was “… most favourably 
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science,96 social history, 97 and legal history.98 As Patrias and Frager have argued, the 
actions taken against prejudice and discrimination “. . . were not spontaneous reactions 
against the horrific consequences of racism that had manifested themselves during the 
war, but the result of campaigns that were carefully and painstakingly orchestrated by 
small groups of Anglo-Canadian activists, and especially by key minority groups.”99  
The accounts of the advocacy for fair practices legislation draw vibrant pictures of 
highly-energetic and multi-faceted activities and campaigns:  activists gathered empirical 
data to prove the existence of the problems they were asking the government to address; 
they commissioned opinion polls, magazine and newspaper articles, and radio 
programmes; they organized lectures, workshops, forums, demonstrations and publicity 
campaigns; they prepared briefs to governments and sent delegations to meet with elected 
representatives to discuss their briefs; and they published pamphlets, newsletters, and 
magazine articles.  Many of the documents produced by the advocates provide the 
primary sources for my discussion and analysis in this chapter. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
impressed by … the efforts of Ontario’s social activists to assist the Commission and improve the Ontario 
Human Rights Code.” Sohn’s dissertation is referred to regularly in the literature. 
96  J.C. Bagnall, The Ontario Conservatives and the Development of Anti-Discrimination Policy: 1944-1962 
(PhD Dissertation, Queen’s University, 1984 [Bagnall, Ontario Conservatives];  R. Brian Howe, “The 
Evolution of Human Rights Policy in Ontario” (1991) 24 Can J Pol Sci 783 [Howe, “Human Rights 
Policy”].  Bagnall’s dissertation is also regularly cited in the literature. 
97 Irving Abella, “Jews, Human Rights, and the Making of a New Canada” (2000) 11 J Can Hist’l Assoc 3 
[Abella, “Jews, Human Rights”]; B. Kayfetz, “On Community Relations in Ontario in the 1940s” (1994) 2 
Can Jewish Stud 60 [ “Community Relations”]; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance, at 197-242, 281-
317;  Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’”, Walker, “Race”; James W. St.G. Walter,  “The ‘Jewish Phase’ 
in the Movement for Racial Equality in Canada” (2002) Can Ethnic Stud 34 1 [Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’”].  
98 Bruner, “Genesis of Legislation”; Girard, Bora Laskin, P.V. MacDonald, “Race Relations and Canadian 
Law” (1960), 18 UT Fac L Rev 115 [MacDonald, “Race Relations”]. 
99 Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’”, at 2-3. 
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Key Players in the Ontario Advocacy for Fair Practices Legislation 
The literature highlights ‘Jews’ and ‘Jewish’ organizations100 as playing a 
significant leadership role in the initiatives for Canada’s first anti-discrimination 
statutes.101  There were two main Jewish organizational participants: (1) the Joint Public 
Relations Committee (JPRC) of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B’nai B’rith, 
formed in April 1947,102 and (2) the Jewish Labour Committee of Canada (JLC) and its 
local Joint Labour Committees for Human Rights that local unions and labour councils 
established in several urban centers, including Toronto.103 The JPRC tends to be 
characterized as the more mainstream organization, whose members were mainly middle-
class entrepreneurs and professionals, although Labour Progressive Party (“LLP”) MPP 
Joseph Salsberg was also an active member of the JPRC.104 The third key organizational 
player was the Association for Civil Liberties (“ACL”), which was formed in 1949 and 
                                                 
100 Individuals and organizations associated with Jewish identity represent a wide range of class interests, 
political affiliates and religious orientations. When people are classified as Jews, this social identity is 
arguably constituted in relation to non-Jews.  Put another way, Jews are a collectivity when looked at from 
the perspective of other religious groups, However, as the literature recognizes, there were important 
differences among Jews and Jewish organizations, which constituted them as members of other social 
groups -  labour organizations, professional associations, and political allegiances. There are interesting 
questions about what positions they may have held in relation to a shared Jewish identity as Jews.  
However I raise this only as a point of interest, and personal experience, since such questions are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  
101 Indeed, Walker calls this period “The ‘Jewish Phase’ in the Movement for Racial Equality in Canada”. 
See also: Abella, “Jews, Human Rights”; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 196-242; Patrias and 
Frager, “‘Our Country’” at 17-34;  Patrias, “Socialists, Jews”; Walker, “Race” at 182-199. 
102 In the historical records and the literature, this joint committee is usually referred to as the Joint Public 
Relations Committee or JPRC.  On the other hand, the Ontario Jewish Archives, which houses the archival 
fonds for this organization, refers to it as the Joint Community Relations Committee or JCRC.  In my 
dissertation, I refer the organization as the JPRC. 
103 Girard, Bora Laskin at 248-253; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 201-202; Patrias and Frager, 
“‘Our Country’” at 17-34; Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 7-16; Walker, “Race” at 198-199.  The JPRC is 
also described as playing an instrumental role in the Drummond Wren and Noble v. Alley litigation. Kalmen 
Kaplansky founded Joint Labour Committees for Human Rights in Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, 
Vancouver, Windsor and Halifax as subcommittees of the JLC - Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 8, 10 and fn. 
38. 
104 Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 206. 
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based in Toronto.105  Many of the individuals who were involved in the JPRC and the 
JLC also became involved with the ACL’s activities supporting the anti-discrimination 
campaigns. Collectively, these organizations brought together a wide range of players, 
including adult educators, labour activists, legal academics, politicians, practicing 
lawyers, religious officials, and social activist groups representing racialized and 
religious minorities.  
A number of individuals emerge in the literature as playing key roles in the 
campaigns.  They include the following individuals:  Ben Kayfetz, who became the 
Executive Director of the JPRC in 1947;106 Kalman Kaplansky, who in 1946 became the 
National Director of the JLC and held this position until 1957;107 Lesley Wismer, Vivien 
Mahood, Donna Hill, Sid Blum and Alan Borovoy, named in the chronological order in 
which they held the position of executive secretary of the Toronto Joint Labour 
Committee for Human Rights;108 Irving Himel, who was employed for a time at the 
Workers’ Educational Association and later formed the ACL;  and Prof. Bora Laskin, at 
that time a law professor at the University of Toronto, who was one of the chairpersons 
                                                 
105 Girard, Bora Laskin at 258-259; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance, ibid. at 225-226; Walker, 
“‘Jewish Phase’” at 9-10.  Girard writes that the ACL was formed to “provide a home for the non-
Communist members of the Civil Liberties Association of Toronto.” 
106 Girard, Bora Laskin at 253; Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 8. 
107 Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 7.  In 1957 Kaplansky left the Jewish Labour Committee to join the staff of 
the Canadian Labour Congress.  He also became the Canadian representative to the International Labour 
Organization, in which capacity he voted against the inclusion of sex as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in the Convention concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation.  
This is one of several stories I stumbled upon during my archival research about which I hope to conduct 
further research. 
108 Girard, Bora Laskin at fn. 22. See also Bruner, “Genesis of Legislation” at 240-242 and Kayfetz, 
“Community Relations” at 59. 
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of the JPRC legal sub-committee.109  Although it is evident that men were dominant in 
the organizational leadership roles, Vivien Mahood and Donna Hill made significant 
contributions during their leadership tenures.110 
Lawyers in practice and legal academics played key roles in the advocacy for fair 
practices legislation and were also involved in preparing draft legislation and meeting 
with members of cabinet.111 The JPRC established a special committee on law and legal 
research to study the feasibility of introducing anti-discrimination legislation, the 
membership of which was primarily lawyers and legal academics.112  The ACL was run 
by lawyer Irving Himel, and its board of directors included lawyer Andrew Brewin and 
Prof. Bora Laskin.113  Prof. Frank Scott, a law professor at McGill, was a leading thinker 
about human rights issues as well as an activist in the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (“CCF”) and civil liberties organizations.114 Montreal lawyer Manfred 
Saalheimer, who was on the staff of the Canadian Jewish Congress, was very involved 
with anti-discrimination issues and wrote a number of important articles on issues raised 
                                                 
109 Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 210-211.  Girard wrote that Syd Harris shared the role of 
chairing this committee with Prof. Laskin:  Bora Laskin at 252. 
110 As I discuss below, discrimination against women was generally not included in the campaigns for fair 
practices legislation.  
111 Kayfetz wrote that Premier Leslie Frost asked Prof. Jacob Finkelman, who was at that time on the law 
faculty at the University of Toronto and national chairperson of the JPRC, to submit “. . . a proposal for a 
fair employment law modeled on the Ontario Labour Relations Act of 1950” - “Community Relations” at 
64.  Prof. Finkelman later became a vice-chairperson of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and then held 
office with the Federal Government. Girard wrote that initial draft legislation was prepared by Prof. Laskin 
and Syd Harris - Girard, Bora Laskin at 216 and at 260-261.  See also, Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’” 
at 24, 26; Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 13.  
112 Girard, Bora Laskin at 252; Patrias, “Socialists, Jews” at 273.   
113 Girard, Bora Laskin at 258-259; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 210-211; Walker, “‘Jewish 
Phase’” at 9-10; Walker, “Race” at 222. 
114 Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 25-27. The Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, 1947 was drafted by 
Morris Shumiatcher, a lawyer who was active in the CCF and joined the Saskatchewan Public Service after 
the CCF formed a government in 1944: Patrias, “Socialists, Jews” at 283.  Patrias also notes that the draft 
that Shumiatcher prepared underwent significant changes before it was enacted. 
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in the advocacy for fair practices legislation.115 Although Saalheimer has not figured in 
the literature on the history of Ontario’s fair practices legislation, I make reference to his 
work in this chapter. 
  The account I provide in this chapter focuses on the role of law in the advocacy 
for fair practices legislation.  In telling this story, I refer specifically to the organizations 
and individuals identified above, who led the campaigns.116  There appears to have been a 
significant degree of coordination among the organizations and, as I mentioned above, 
key individuals often participated in more than one organization.  The organizations and 
individuals appear to have generally agreed on the arguments for fair practices 
legislation.  Sometimes they presented these arguments collectively, such as in briefs and 
delegations to government; other times they presented them independently, such as in 
their own publications and speeches.   
 
Social Solidarity and Universalism  
 Ideologies of social solidarity and universalism animated the campaigns against 
racial and religious discrimination.  For Jewish activists, in particular, there appear to 
have been two aspects to their views of social solidarity and universalism.  One involved 
                                                 
115 For example:  Canadian Jewish Congress National Charities Committee Archives (Montreal), Canadian 
Jewish Congress Organizational Records fonds, CJC0001, Series ZB, Saalheimer, Manfred Saalheimer, 
“F.E.P. [Fair Employment Practices] Laws for Canada?” in Information and Comment (Committee on 
Social and Economic Studies of the Canadian Jewish Congress), August 1947, No. 6; Manfred Saalheimer, 
“Laws Also Educate” in Food for Thought: Group Relations in Canada, Toronto, October 1949; Manfred 
Saalheimer, “Canadian Group Relations and the Law: Progress Report for the Year ended June 30, 1954” 
in Information and Comment (Social and Economic Studies Published by Canadian Jewish Congress), 
October 1954, No. 15 [CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series ZB, Saalheimer, 
Manfred, Human Rights]. 




Jews coming together from a range of social and political backgrounds to work on the 
campaigns, and finding ways to work together despite differences in social class and 
political allegiance.117  The second involved Jewish organizations broadening the scope 
of the struggle and joining together with other groups to pursue common goals.  Jewish 
activists would have been affected by their own experiences of anti-semitism and 
discrimination.   However, Jewish groups began to conceptualize anti-semitism in more 
general terms as a form of prejudice and discrimination, and began to make links between 
anti-semitism and the prejudice and discrimination experienced by other racial and 
religious groups.   
One reason to conceptualize anti-semitism in the more generic language of 
prejudice and discrimination was to prevent Jews being perceived as a special interest 
group seeking special treatment.118  At the same time, the universalizing strategy also 
seems to have reflected a general concern about the discrimination that other groups 
faced, and a genuine interest in fighting all forms of discrimination and prejudice.119  In 
                                                 
117 Abella wrote that the alliance between the JPRC and the JLC was “not a happy one” because the JPRC 
“… composed of middle class businessmen and professionals, never felt comfortable with the combatative 
trade unionist leaders”of the JLC.  However, he goes on to say that “in the end, both submerged their 
differences and joined together to fight the battle for human rights.” See “Jews, Human Rights” at 10.  See 
also Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 283-285.   In contrast, the literature suggests that the civil 
liberties groups that formed to challenge abusive conduct by government in the 1940s and 1950s, in 
response to perceived threats to national security, were more fragmented and less able to transcend political 
differences – see, for example, Dominique Clément, “Spies, Lies and a Commission: A Case Study in the 
Mobilization of the Canadian Civil Liberties Movement” (2000) 7 Left Hist 53 [Clément, “Spies, Lies”]. It 
would appear that at least one reason for this fragmentation was the fact that the conduct in question was 
more specifically political, and more explicitly engaged with conflict between communists and socialists. 
118 Walker wrote that the specific tactics reflected both a universalist philosophy and the influence of 
Jewish experience with campaigns against discrimination before 1945, in which they were sometimes 
perceived as seeking to advance their own cause and as matching the stereotype of  “‘pushy Jews’” - see 
“‘Jewish Phase’” at 3. 
119 In the labour context, for example, Kaplansky linked the struggles against discrimination with the 
struggles for labour justice: “‘It was not only a Jewish question.  The battle for social justice  - the battle 
against discrimination, for equality – is a battle that concerns the very existence of the trade union 
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conducting their campaigns, Jewish organizations formed alliances with organizations 
that represented other affected minority groups, and with other groups that wanted to 
support the anti-discrimination campaigns.120   In fact, one of the key focal points of the 
campaigns for fair accommodation practices legislation was the discrimination against 
Blacks in Dresden, Ontario, which had originated as the end of the “underground 
railroad” for fugitive slaves.121   
The Ontario campaigns for fair practices legislation began in the mid-to-late 
1940s.  While ideologies of universality and common humanity appear to have unified 
activists in relation to racial and religious discrimination, other social factors also likely 
contributed to these unifying tendencies in relation to racial and religious 
discrimination.122   Social factors of particular significance were the events of the second 
world war, the emergence of the CCF as a significant political force in Ontario and 
                                                                                                                                                 
movement.” – personal interview quoted in Bruner, “Genesis of Legislation” at 238.  See also Lambertson, 
Repression and Resistance at 205-206; Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’” at 18-20; Walker,“Race” at 
198-199.  At the same time, several authors also noted that at least some of the collectivities involved in 
championing anti-discrimination legislation, including the CCF and labour organizations, also faced 
internal struggles around prejudice and discrimination.  In the labour context, it appears that appeals to the 
common interests of labour were presented as factors that ought to bring workers on board with anti-
discrimination struggles.  See also Patrias and Frager, “Our Country” at 4-10; Agnes Calliste, “Sleeping 
Car Porters in Canada: An Ethnically Submerged Split Labour Market” (1987) 19 Can Ethnic Stud 1. (See 
the discussion below for differences between solidarity in relation to race and religion, and solidarity in 
relation to sex.) 
120 Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 3.  For further discussion of these alliances see: Girard, Bora Laskin at 253; 
Lambertson, Resistance and Resistance at 223-226; Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country” at 4. 
121 Ross Lambertson, “’The Dresden Story’: Racism, Human Rights, and the Jewish Labour Committee of 
Canada” (2001) 47 Labour/Le Travail 41 at 61 [“’Dresden Story’”].  See also Alan Borovoy, “Fair 
Accommodation Practices Act: The ‘Dresden Affair’” (1956) 14 UT Fac L Rev 13 [Borovoy, “Fair 
Accommodation”]; Patrias and Frager, “’Our Country’” at 15-16; Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 15-16. 
122 It has also been argued that although the universalizing approach had some benefits in relation to racism 
and religious discrimination, this approach later came to be regarded as imposing assimilation as a cost of 
inclusion - see Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 20. See also Stuart Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice: American 
Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) at 178-193 [Svonkin, 
Jews Against Prejudice].  The people Svonkin acknowledges include his father-in-law, Owen Shime, “… 
whose dedication to social justice gave me [Svonkin] a better understanding of my subject, [and] gave wise 
counsel when it was most needed.” - at x.  (Owen Shime is a well-known Ontario labour arbitrator.) 
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elsewhere, the potential impact of discrimination on the immigration needed for 
economic development, and a desire to assert the moral superiority of capitalism over 
socialism.123   
In addition, anti-discrimination legislation targeting racial, religious and ethnic 
discrimination had been on the political agenda in Ontario since the early 1930s.124  In 
1932, the Insurance Act was amended to prohibit licensed insurers from discriminating 
unfairly between risks.125  Broader anti-discrimination legislation was initially proposed 
by MPPs Joseph Salsberg and Alex MacLeod, who made it a campaign issue in the 1943 
Ontario provincial election and proposed legislating against discrimination in 
employment, housing, public accommodations and recreation.126  Instead, a much 
narrower statute was passed in 1944:  despite “the sweep of its title” - to borrow Arnold 
Bruner’s words - The Racial Discrimination Act, 1944 contained only one prohibition, a 
prohibition against discrimination in publications, signs or other representations.127  In 
                                                 
123 See Bagnall, Ontario Conservatives; Howe, “Human Rights Policy”; Lambertson, Repression and 
Resistance at 233.  
124 Walter Tarnopolsky argued that the anti-slavery statutes passed in Upper Canada in 1793 and 1833 can 
be regarded as 19th century predecessors to the 20th century anti-discrimination legislative measures - see 
“The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of Human Rights Legislation in 
Canada” (1968), 46 Can Bar Rev 565 [Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand”] at 567-568.  Walker also references a 
statute passed in Lower Canada in 1832 for the purpose of recognizing Jews as equal subjects – see Walker, 
“Race” at 183, discussing An Act to Declare Persons Professing the Jewish Religion Intitled to All the 
Rights and Privileges of the Other Subjects of His Majesty in This Province (1832) 1 Wm IV, c 57. 
125 The Insurance Act, 1932, SO 1932, c 24, s. 4.  For discussions of the history of this amendment, see: 
Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties 
(Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Vancouver: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975) at 50-51 [Betcherman, Swastika 
and Maple Leaf]; Lita-Rose Betcherman, “The Early History of Canada’s Anti-Discrimination Law” (1973) 
7 Patterns of Prejudice 19 at 20 [Betcherman, “Early History”]; Walker,“Race” at 193; Walker, “‘Jewish 
Phase’” at 3-4. 
126 “‘Jewish Phase’” at 5 and “Race” at 195-197. There had also been an earlier, unsuccessful attempt in 
1932 to introduce broad anti-discrimination; instead, the legislature passed a resolution condemning 
discriminatory notices and advertisements.  See Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 220. See also 
Betcherman, Swastika and Maple Leaf at 50-52; Betcherman, “Early History” at 20. 
127 SO 1944, c 51. Bruner, “Genesis of Legislation” at 245.  
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1948, four years after the Racial Discrimination Act was passed, MPP Salsberg 
introduced a fair employment practices bill as a private member.128  According to 
Lambertson, this bill not only died but also had the negative effect on some people of 
linking fair practices legislation with communism, which by this time had increasingly 
negative associations.129 
The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act was amended in 1950 to void 
prospectively any covenant “running with the land” that restricted the sale, ownership, 
occupation or use of land on the basis of race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry of place 
of origin.130  The Labour Relations Act was also amended in 1950, to deem invalid a 
collective agreement which discriminated on the basis of race or creed.131 This 
amendment was part of a package of other amendments to the statute; however, it is 
interesting to note that in May 1947 the JPRC discussed a plan to meet with MPP Leslie 
Wismer to discuss adding a non-discrimination clause to collective agreements as a 
strategy for “mobilizing labour and management” to act against discrimination: 
 
… one technique for consideration by agencies is a non-discrimination 
clause in collective bargaining agreements as a means of mobilizing 
labour and management into concrete action against employment 
discrimination. The consideration of this technique will be urged.132 
 
This proposal was not taken up in the 1950 amendments to the Labour Relations Act. 
                                                 
128 Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 198-200.  See also Walker, “Race” at 195-196. 
129 Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 198-200. 
130 Manitoba similarly amended its Law of Property Act in 1950: SM 1950, c. 33, s. 1. For further 
discussion of these amendments see Walker, “Race” at 223-225. 
131 The Labour Relations Act, 1950, SO 1950, c 34, s. 34(b). 
132 Ontario Jewish Archives, Fonds 17, Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario Region, Joint Community 
Relations Committee, Meeting of the Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress 
and B’nai B’rith, Central Division, Wednesday, May 28, 1947 [OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC]. 
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In addition to these legislative measures, several Ontario municipalities passed 
regulations or ordinances in the 1940s to prohibit the exclusion of minority groups from 
public places and access to services.133  Thus, the campaigns for fair practices legislation 
did not raise a completely novel idea and there was some ground laid for persuading the 
legislature to further expand the exercise of its legislative authority on issues of 
discrimination.  
 
3 Discrimination as a Social Issue Requiring Response 
 The fair practices statutes, like the earlier anti-discrimination legislative measures, 
were sought in response to specific social conditions. The amendment to the Insurance 
Act was initiated in response to negatively differential treatment of Jews. Ontario’s 
Racial Discrimination Act was passed in response to signs, advertisements and 
publications that read, for example:  “Gentiles Only”, “No Jews Need Apply”, and “Jews 
and Dogs Not Admitted”.134 The legislation prohibiting restrictive covenants was passed 
in response to restrictive covenants of the type challenged in the Drummond Wren and 
Noble v. Alley cases, discussed above. 
The form of discrimination targeted by advocacy for fair practices legislation was 
what we now call “direct discrimination”.  Direct discrimination refers to conduct, 
                                                 
133 See, for example, Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 237-238; Walker, “Race” at 205. 
134 Betcherman, Swastika and Maple Leaf at 50; Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 198; Walker, 
“‘Jewish Phase’” at 5. There were also unsuccessful initiatives, in both Ontario and Quebec, to obtain 
legislative measures against hate libel in response to anti-semitic speeches and publications.  Manitoba 
amended its Libel Act in 1943 to add a provision allowing persons to sue for an injunction to prevent the 
continuation of a libel against their race or religion, where the libel was likely to expose them to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, and tended to raise unrest or disorder: An Act to amend “The Libel Act”, SM 1934, c 
23, s. 1. See Betcherman, Swastika and the Maple Leaf at 13-19; Betcherman, “Early History”; 




policies and practices that expressly and intentionally cause negative, differential 
treatment for particular social groups.135   The focus of campaigns was direct 
discrimination against racialized, religious and ethnic minorities, in the social areas of 
employment, services, and use of public spaces.  Fair employment practices statutes were 
sought in response to employers refusing to hire racialized and religious minorities.  Fair 
accommodation practices statutes were sought in response to the exclusion of racialized 
and religious minority groups from public recreational facilities such as skating rinks, 
movie theatres, and dance halls; and the refusal to provide services to racialized and 
religious minorities in places such as restaurants, barbershops and hairdressers.  Ben 
Kayfetz (JPRC) offered the following description of the social conditions and practices 
that were the focus of campaigns for fair practices statutes:  
 
       Those old enough to recall that era will remember that Jews were 
barred, both formally and informally, from renting or buying houses in 
certain parts of Toronto and Ontario, that very few Jews were employed in 
the banks or in insurance (other than as salesmen) and that the large 
downtown department stores rarely took on Jewish staff.  Jewish high 
school teachers were as rare as hen’s teeth: They would be considered for 
Barrie, Sault Ste. Marie or Thunder Bay but teaching in the metropolis 
was, if not barred, effectively restricted.  One could go down the line 
specifying many other professions, trades and occupations, and the story 
would be the same. Discrimination was the norm. 
       As for Blacks – Negroes as they were known then – the situation was 
an unhappy one.  Young men with education and training were 
condemned to portering jobs on the railway.  Rarely, if ever, did one see 
any black, brown or Oriental faces behind a wicket or counter in any 
office, or shop, be it governmental or privately owned.  Some firms 
carried their bias further and never hired Catholics.136 
                                                 
135 See, for example: Russell Zinn, The Law of Human Rights in Canada: Practice and Procedure 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc., 2013) at 1:20.1-1:20.2. 
136 Kayfetz, “Community Relations” at 57-58.  For other descriptions of the discrimination experienced by 




Thus, the prohibitions ultimately legislated in the fair practices statutes were a direct 
response to the concrete social conditions that were the focus of the campaigns for this 
legislation.  
 Significantly, although there were also efforts to include sex as a prohibited 
ground of discrimination in some of the early anti-discrimination statutes, these efforts 
were not successful. Efforts to draw on a universalizing ideology appear to have worked 
against women social activists who sought to conceptualize and raise issues about sex 
discrimination. In the labour context, for example, efforts to distinguish women’s 
experiences from men’s were seen as undermining the broader struggles of labour.137  
Similarly, in the political context, efforts to distinguish women’s experiences could be 
seen as undermining broader political struggles. Carmela Patrias and Joan Sangster have 
argued that although the first draft of Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights Act, 1947 included 
sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination, sex was probably removed from the bill out 
of a desire to maintain protective labour legislation for women, together with generally 
paternalistic attitudes towards women.138  Dean Beeby writes that CCF women in Ontario 
tried to include sex as a prohibited ground in their proposed bill of rights, and that these 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Resistance at 197- 199, 208-209; Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’” at 1, 11-12, 16; Walker, “Race” 
at 124-151, 183-192.  
137 See Joan Sangster, Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950 (Toronto: McClelland 
& Stewart Inc., 1989) [Sangster, Dreams of Equality] at 213-215; Julie Guard, “Fair Play or Fair Pay?  
Gender Relations, Class Consciousness and Union Solidarity in the Canadian UE”(1997) Labour/Le 
Travail 149; David Goutor, “A Different Perspective on the ‘Labor Rights as Human Rights’ Debate: 
Organized Labor and Human Rights Activism in Canada, 1939-1952” (2011) 36 Labour Studies 408. 
138 See Patrias, “Socialists, Jews” at 280-281; Sangster, Dreams of Equality at 213-215.  See also Patrias 
and Frager, “‘Our Country” at 3-4, for a brief discussion of the failure to include sex as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination in Ontario’s Fair Employment Practices Act. 
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efforts were undermined by the exclusion of sex from Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights.139  
However, Ontario did pass legislation to address disparities in wages paid to women and 
men workers who were performing the same work at the same time as it passed its fair 
employment practices statute.140 
To the extent that the discriminatory practices targeted by the fair practices 
campaigns were socially acceptable, they were also in some sense “legal” – implicitly, if 
not explicitly. Ben Kayfetz characterized these discriminatory practices as “the norm” 
during that period.141  Therefore, advocates for fair practices legislation had to advance 
arguments that discriminatory conduct, policies and practices should no longer be 
considered socially acceptable and should be legally prohibited.  
 The advocates for fair practices legislation presented two angles to the argument 
for changing the social norms relating to this discrimination: the “anti-discrimination” 
angle and the “fairness” or “equality of opportunity” angle.142  The anti-discrimination 
angle was reflected in the subsequent statutory provisions, which were generally 
structured as prohibitions against discrimination.  It was also reflected in language 
describing the early committees, which were established “to combat racial intolerance”.  
This more negative side focused on the reasons why discrimination was harmful conduct 
                                                 
139 Dean Beeby, “Women in the Ontario C.C.F., 1940-1950” (1982) 74 Ont Hist [Beeby, “Women in 
CCF”]. See also Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 237. 
140 For a discussion of the evolution of Ontario’s Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act see Shirley 
Tillotson, “Human Rights Law as Prism: Women’s Organizations, Unions, and Ontario’s Female 
Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 1951” (1991) 72 Can Hist Rev 532 at 535-544 [Tillotson, “Human 
Rights as Prism”]. 
141 “On Community Relations” at 57-58.  See also: Backhouse, Colour-Coded at 1-17; Walker, “Race” at 
124-151, 183-192. 
142 These two aspects are similarly shared by Canadian human rights statutes and by s. 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11. 
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that should be prohibited. The anti-discrimination side also linked more directly to the 
persons who engaged in discriminatory conduct and practices, since it was their 
behaviour that would need to change in order to reduce or eliminate discrimination. 
 The equality of opportunity side, on the other hand, was reflected in the name of 
the statutes, calling for fairness in practices relating to employment, services, public 
spaces, and housing.  It was also reflected in the language of “human rights”, which 
ultimately became the dominant characterization.  This more positive angle called 
attention to the benefits to be gained by eliminating discrimination and to the protective 
nature of the legislative provisions. The social activists also referenced the recently-
adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights,143 which called for all persons to be 
treated with equal dignity and equal rights.  The equality of opportunity or fairness angle 
linked more directly to the persons who would benefit from an end to discriminatory 
conduct and practices. 
 Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) described the fair practices advocates as facing the 
dilemma of whether to emphasize the positive or the negative angle: 
 
… [Les] Wismer touches on the subject which had bedevilled the human 
rights constituency for many years and is still a problem, namely that of 
presentation of material.  Should it concentrate on the negative, the cases 
of discrimination, and the hardship and misery caused by it, or should it 
emphasize the positive, the promotion of unity, of nation-building?144 
 
                                                 
143 (10 Dec. 1948), UNGA Res. 217 A (III) (1948).  
144 Library and Archives Canada, Kaplansky, Commentaries by Kalmen Kaplansky 1946-1984, R5491-5-
7-E (formerly MG30-A53), volume 20, Notes on Reports of Activities for Improved Human Relations, 
1949 at 6 [LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, vol. 20, Notes on Reports]. 
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From the very beginning we realized that we should be working for 
something, rather than against; that we should start on a positive note, 
rather than a negative one.145  
 
He also commented on the semantic differences between the language of racial 
discrimination and the language of human relations, stating that “improved human 
relations” was a “euphemism for work against religious and racial tension”; 146 as he 
stated, committees “should assume a name, which would indicate the positive nature of 
their work.”147  In practice, the fair practices advocates relied on both angles in their 
arguments for changing social norms relating to racial and religious discrimination.  
However, in their arguments for outlawing discrimination, they tended to emphasize the 
anti-discrimination angle rather than on the equality of opportunity aspect, consistent 
with the fact that fair practices could be achieved only if discriminatory conduct was 
eliminated or reduced.  
 The advocates for fair practices legislation presented two rationales for 
prohibiting discrimination, one focused on the negative impact of discrimination and the 
other on the negative character of discrimination.  On the question of negative impact, 
they argued that the discriminatory conduct and practices were harmful both to the 
individuals and groups directly affected, and to society as a whole.  In relation to the 
affected individuals and groups, discrimination caused harm by excluding them from 
access to fundamental social goods – employment, services, and public spaces and by 
treating them as second-class citizens:  
                                                 
145 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, vol. 20, Notes on Reports 1949 at 2. 
146 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, vol. 20, Notes on Reports 1949 at 3. 





It is also widely recognized that discrimination in employment is harmful 
because: 
1. It threatens the individual’s basic right to earn a living and improve 
his lot. 
2. It bars many people with talent who would be real assets to the 
community if given a chance. Able workers are kept at the bottom 
of the economic ladder, when they might otherwise advance to 
better paying jobs, increase their buying power, and thus bring 
greater prosperity to the whole community.  
3. It produces discontent and resentment among those who are forced 
in the role of “second-class citizens.”148 
 
        The effect on the morale and mental health of those to whom we 
allow merely “second class” citizenship is harmful in the extreme. … The 
economic conditions alone of groups which are discriminated against and 
which because of this discrimination cannot find jobs, result in poor 
housing conditions where ill health, crime and family difficulties are 
bred.149  
 
In relation to society overall, discrimination caused harm by assaulting democracy: 
discrimination undermined social unity, freedom, and equal rights.150   As stated in a 
                                                 
148 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 5, 1953, File 4A An Appeal for a Fair Employment 
Practices Law in Ontario (1951) at 2. 
149 Archives of Ontario, George Drew Papers, RG3-17, Box 436, File: “Fair Employment Practices Act”, 
“Memorandum on Unequal Opportunity in Employment in the Province of Ontario and the Need for Fair 
Employment Practices Legislation” (February 1947) at 3, See also: Library and Archives Canada, Ontario 
Labour Committee for Human Rights, 1945-1972 fonds, R2870-0-0-E (formerly MG28-I173),Vol. 3, 
Articles and Speeches Miscellaneous 3-3, Gordon G. Cushing, Address to the National Conference 
Banquet of the Jewish Labor Committee, Dec. 2, 1950, where Cushing argued that unions needed to 
advocate against a society with second-class citizenship [LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 
1945-1972]. 
150 “Discrimination in employment breeds other forms of discrimination; it magnifies differences between 
groups of Canadians by preventing normal intermingling, at work and play; it gives rise to differences in 
living standards and education. People living in the same community, but kept apart by occupational and 
social barriers, cannot be expected to understand and respect each other, or to hold the same regard for our 
democratic society.  The effect is to undermine the unity which is so vital to our national welfare”.  OJA, 
Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, An Appeal for a Fair Employment Practices Law in Ontario (1951) at 
2.  See also OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, A Brief to the Premier of Ontario, January 24, 1950 
at 3; and LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Vol. 20, Notes on Reports 1948 at 62, quoting from 
the text of a radio speech given by Vivien Mahood on June 28, 1948: “We must consider the value of a Fair 
Employment Practices Act, to enforce the right to employment based on qualifications other than race and 
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research paper prepared by the JPRC, the community dimension of the harm of 
discrimination was an important element of the arguments about the appropriateness of 
legislative action: 
 
It is the duty of the state to ensure for each of its members the rights, 
freedoms and privileges that are his by virtue of his citizenship. 
Unfortunately, there is confusion in the minds of some of our legislators as 
to the righteousness of this course. They reason that laws of this nature are 
resorting to coercion and force which is contrary to democratic principles. 
It is strange reasoning indeed which condones restriction and denial of 
basic rights on the one hand, yet fears to prohibit this evil on grounds of 
‘force.’  To discourage crimes against society, we pass laws which fine 
and penalize. Violations of civil rights are crimes against the community 
and as such can only be restrained and prevented by appropriate legal 
action. If the state will not recognize the principle at stake and act 
appropriately, it is small wonder indeed that the race bigots go on with 
their evil routine.151 
 
Labour activists similarly invoked the values of unity and solidarity in the workplace 
context, appealing to the importance of workers standing together and not allowing 
discrimination to become a vehicle for division within the bargaining unit.  As Kaplansky 
(JLC) commented: 
 
We in the labour movement are particularly concerned to see 
discrimination on the grounds of race or religion minimized.  Our strength 
lies in solidarity.  We have no room for racial and religious antagonisms 
within our ranks.152 
                                                                                                                                                 
religion, remembering always that economic and social discrimination seriously jeopardize our national 
unity.”   
151 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 2 of 1947, Sydney Lawrence Wax, “Civil Rights for All 
Citizens” (July 1947) at 8. 
152 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Notes on Reports 1948 at 50, quoting Willard S. 
Townsend, President of United Transport Service Employees - CIO, the Red Caps Union. See also Claude 
Jodin’s 1948 statement in the “Report to the 63rd Annual Convention of the Trades & Labor Congress of 
Canada on the Activities of the Standing Committee on Racial Discrimination of the Trades and Labor 
Congress of Canada” at 3, 4: : We feel that our Standing Committee has performed a necessary functio- 
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The arguments based on harmful impact were usually stated in morally neutral language, 
and compared the proposed anti-discrimination statutory measures to other examples of 
civil legal provisions.  For example, a pamphlet published by The Committee on Group 
Relations in Canada noted that: “There are scores of laws to safeguard property and other 
rights of business. Human rights are no less important than property rights and equally 
deserve the protection of the law.”153 
 Although harm is arguably not morally neutral, the language of harm is less 
inflammatory than the language the fair practices advocates used when their arguments 
were addressed more directly to the question of discrimination as immoral conduct.  In 
these arguments, they described discriminatory practices, and the persons responsible for 
these practices, as “evil”, “anti-social”, and “diseased”.  For example, a 1947 brief to the 
Ontario Premier stated: 
 
Every additional case of discrimination in employment is a further and 
ever more dangerous threat to our way of life. But discrimination is an evil 
that will not disappear if only we are willing to ignore it. It requires 
serious consideration and decisive action.154  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
[sic] in the trade union movement of Canada.  Through our activities and through the work of local 
Committees, the trade union movement of Canada is becoming conscious of the need of combatting the 
evils of race hate and religious prejudice.  We are definitely of the opinion that this important educational 
work should be continued because we felt that these evils are a threat to the very existence of the trade 
union movement.” Library and Archives Canada, Jewish Labour Committee of Canada 1925-1978 fonds, 
R3286-0-8-E (formerly MG28-V75), Volume 15 – Correspondence, File 15-11 [LAC, JLC 1925-1978]. 
153 Library and Archives Canada, Canada, Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights, 1945-1972 fonds, 
R2870-0-0-E (formerly MG28-I173), volume 13, FEP General, F.E.P., a pamphlet published by The 
Committee on Group Relations in Canada, at 6.  
154 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, A Brief to the Premier of Ontario, 1947 at 3.  See also Stanley 
Grizzle’s comment: “It may well be the judgment of history that our age has faced no more vital issue than 
the disease of racial discrimination and its twin toxins – segregation and exclusion.”  OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, 
Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 12 [1960 Files 32A-35, 1961 Files 1-16], 1961 File 16: Fair Employment 
Practices Activities Ontario Jewish Archives “Discrimination: Our Achilles Heel?”, published by Dept. of 
Labour at 3. 
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A document prepared in connection with a 1949 ballot on racial segregation in 
Dresden, Ontario Canada described “white supremacy” as “one of the most 
virulent plagues on earth’, a disease, the importation of which needed to be 
prevented in the same way that Canada maintained “rigid import restrictions on 
plants and animals from the United States to prevent the spread of disease and 
germs.”155  When discrimination was described as a matter of morality, the 
proposed anti-discrimination provisions were compared with criminal laws that 
similarly prohibited unacceptable social conduct.  As one report stated, “The idea 
is growing that laws to protect citizens against assault on their human rights and 
dignity are as necessary as laws to prohibit reckless driving and criminal physical 
assault.156   A 1950 brief to the Ontario Premier presented a similar argument, as 
follows: 
 
… experience has demonstrated the need to apply legal sanctions to 
protect society and the individual from conduct which violates their 
principles. That is why we have laws which make it an offence to kill, to 
                                                 
155 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 6, 1949, Document on ballot on race discrimination in 
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racial and religious minorities.  The authors of the document compare voting on discrimination to voting on 
theft.  See also the comparison between racial discrimination and disease from 1960 submissions on racial 
discrimination in housing: “Racial discrimination is one of the most crippling diseases to a free society. We 
submit our sincere hope that this Council will adopt and apply the medicinal antidote that we have 
prescribed here today. OJA, Fonds 17, Box 11, 1960, File 6, Submissions re: Racial Discrimination in 
Multiple Housing Accommodations at 4. 
156 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, vol. 24. Trades and Labor Congress of 
Canada - Convention Report Relating to Work for Improved Human Relations 1949, Report on the 64th 
Convention of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, September 1949 at 7. Cf. CJC Nat. Charities 
Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series ZB, Saalheimer, Manfred, Human Rights, Manfred 
Saalheimer, “Laws Also Educate” in Food for Thought: Group Relations in Canada, Toronto, October 
1949 at 40; OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, “A Fair Employment 
Practices Law Why It Is Necessary and Feasible” at 3; OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, A Brief to 
the Premier of Ontario, January 24, 1950 at 3. 
68 
 
steal, to bear false witness, to physically assault your neighbour. It is to 
prevent anti-social forms of conduct. … 
     The same is true of anti-social conduct in the form of discrimination 
practices. Does it not seem strange that we provide protection for the 
individual and society from physical assault, and yet when the same 
person is assaulted in a somewhat different way, by the force of 
discrimination, with possibly much more injurious consequences to him 
and the members of his race or religion, psychologically, economically 
and spiritually, we provide no protection at all.157 
 
 
According to Walker, psychologists and social scientists in the 1930s had begun to 
challenge the widely-held view that some races were by nature inferior to others.  They 
contended that there was no biological or other material basis for the ideology of racial 
inferiority, and that this ideology should be regarded as a psychological disorder or 
disease and as a social evil.158  “Prejudice” was the term that came to be associated with 
the view that racism was a sickness and an evil attitude; “discrimination” was the term 
that came to mean the exclusionary social practices that resulted from prejudice.  It was 
discrimination that was the focus of the campaigns for legislation and, as we will see in 
the next section of this chapter, the fair practices advocates relied upon this distinction 
                                                 
157 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, A Brief to the Premier of Ontario, January 24, 1950 at 7. Cf. 
CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series ZB, Saalheimer, Manfred, Human Rights, 
Manfred Saalheimer, “Laws Also Educate” in Food for Thought: Group Relations in Canada, Toronto, 
October 1949 at 39. 
158 Walker, “Race” at 12-21. The studies referred to were: Robert E. Park, Race and Culture (Glencoe, IL: 
Free Press, 1950); Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, 2 
vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1944); T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levinson and R. Sanforo, 
The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper Row, 1950); Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 
(Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954); Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Personality and Sociocultural Factors in 
Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison” (1958) 2 Journal of Conflict Resolution 29. See also: 
Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 205-206; Patrias and Frager, “‘Our Country’” at 17-18; and 
Abraham L. Feinberg’s description: “Little Black Sambo, a children’s book which perpetuates Negro 
minstrel-show comicality, was for me a scared coloured kid sinking under an overhanging sycamore tree.  
Although my demand for its removal from the public school reading list aroused patronizing levity in some 
quarters, I insisted that Canadians must protect young minds against the virus whose end-product is a 
concentration camp and genocide.”- Storm the Gates of Jericho (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and 
Stewart Limited, 1964) at 66 (emphasis added) [Feinberg, Gates of Jericho]. 
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between prejudice and discrimination to support their argument that legislation was an 
appropriate and necessary measure to address discrimination.  
The philosophy of universality and inclusion that underpinned the campaigns for 
fair practices legislation was an understandable response to ideas and practices which 
treated racialized and religious minority groups as inferior or second class human beings. 
The campaigns for anti-discrimination laws in the 1940s and 1950s did not challenge the 
social structures and social relations through which these practices were constituted and 
maintained.   Walker described the approach to discrimination in these campaigns as 
reflecting an understanding of prejudice as “… an individual pathology in a democratic 
society that was fundamentally fair”;159 thus, the anti-discrimination legislation that was 
passed did not include corrective features to address structural problems in the economy 
or society which tended to reinforce or support discriminatory practices. This approach to 
discrimination ideology later came to be characterized as a “formal” response approach to 
social inequality, because it focused exclusively on responding to overt practices of 
restriction and exclusion.160    This approach to discrimination also came to be 
understood, as Girard writes, “… a mostly unthreatening ‘colour-blind’ philosophy of 
                                                 
159 Walker, “Race” at 20. 
160 Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 20. He distinguished this philosophy from the philosophies of identity 
politics and particularism, which he wrote became dominant in the 1960s and later.  These later 
philosophies were to some extent a response to the perception that “inclusion” meant, or required, 
assimilation and non-differentiation  – women to be men, racialized minorities to be white. See, for 
example, Abella’s comment:  “It was in these years, recalled the long-time director of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress, Saul Hayes, that Canadian Jews finally became ‘white’.” “Jews, Human Rights” at 14.  
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equal treatment rather than proposing more radical measures such as quotas for particular 
minority groups.”161  
There were more substantive perspectives on social inequality, but these were not 
the ones which shaped and informed the anti-discrimination statutes. Stuart Svonkin, 
writing about the U.S. context, argued that some activists had earlier connected anti-
discrimination goals with social and economic equality during the New Deal period.   
According to Svonkin, these activists: 
 
. . . argued that fair employment depended upon full employment, that fair 
education depended upon full education, and that fair housing depended 
upon full housing.  This analysis suggested that prejudice and 
discrimination might be eliminated, or at least lessened, by extending the 
social safety net … 162  
 
However, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, arguments in favour of expanding the New 
Deal welfare state were under attack and these activists retreated to the view that 
prejudice and discrimination could be addressed within existing political and economic 
relations.163  According to minutes of the December 1947 meeting of the Non-Violent 
Action Committee, Ben Kayfetz (JPRC) reported on his participation in drafting a “race 
                                                 
161 Girard, Bora Laskin, at 271; c.f. at 262-263. In a similar vein, the equal pay statute was limited to the 
more narrow requirement that women be paid equal wages when they did the same jobs as men, and did not 
require employers to pay equal wages when women did jobs of comparable worth to the jobs men did, as 
the CCF and women’s groups had sought: Tillotson, “Human Rights as Prism” at 542-544. 
162 Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice at 177. 
163 Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice at 177. Carmela Patrias argued that CCF advocacy in relation to 
human rights was different from advocacy by Liberals and Conservatives, because it was connected to a 
belief that social and economic rights guaranteed by the state provided the basis for protecting human 
rights.  She also argued that the reason the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947 Act did not include social 
and economic rights when it was enacted was because the government believed that a bill of rights would 
not be enforceable – and not because it was retreating from socialist principles. According to Patrias, the 
government believed that social and economic welfare would be more effectively guaranteed by separate 
social security and health insurance legislation. Patrias, “Socialists, Jews” at 269. 
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relations” news sheet, expressing the view that the suggested title - “Towards Equality” - 
was too idealistic, and should be changed to “Equal Opportunity”.164 
 Equal opportunity has come to be characterized, and sometimes denigrated, as 
being only a formal approach to inequality.  It is certainly true that equality of 
opportunity does not address all aspects of social inequality.  However, it is useful to 
remember that practices of formal inequality contribute to social inequalities and that 
struggles against formal inequalities were and are an important component of struggles 
against social inequalities.165 
 
4 Why Law?  
The campaigns for anti-discrimination statutes in the 1940s and 1950s were 
campaigns for state protection and for public action against discriminatory conduct 
practiced by “private” social actors.  The three significant themes in these campaigns 
were:  (a) the normative role of law, (b) public (both state and citizen) responsibility to 
address discrimination, and (c) the coercive power of law.  Many of the arguments 
advanced by the Canadian fair practices advocates drew on similar arguments made by 
fair practices advocates in the United States.  Both Ben Kayfetz, Executive Director of 
the JPRC, and Kalmen Kaplansky, National Director of the JLC, were sent to New York 
                                                 
164 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 3, 1947, Minutes of Meeting of Non-Violent Action 
Committee held Dec. 2 1947. 
165 I repeat Ruth Fletcher’s observation, also noted in the Introduction to my dissertation: “Historically, 
women were excluded from the category of human ‘likes’ on the grounds of their difference from men and 
their perceived closeness to nature.  When difference was the excuse used to deny women rights, it was 
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still is, a powerful tool in the face of dehumanizing tactics.” Ruth Fletcher, “Feminist Legal Theory” in 
Reza Banakar and Max Travers, eds., An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2002) at 150-151. 
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shortly after they were hired to learn about that state’s experience with fair practices 
legislation.166  Walker argued that Kalmen Kaplanksy (JLC) was not initially as keen on 
legal avenues as either the JPRC or some of his JLC colleagues, with reference to the 
following exchange between Kaplansky and Vivien Mahood: 
 
On 21 April 1949 Vivien Mahood appeared on a panel discussing fair 
employment legislation, and was quoted on page 1 of the Toronto 
Telegram as saying "Education is a catch-all phrase that usually means 
absolutely nothing. When you get a fair employment law you have 
something concrete." Kaplansky wrote admonishingly: "Your statement... 
caught me by surprise. If you are correctly quoted, I doubt whether I can 
agree with you.... I recognize the value of laws, but I wouldn't dismiss 
education in such sweeping terms. The Canadian Jewish Congress people 
are all for laws and I think that their interest is greatly influenced by 
developments in the United States. I hope to discuss this matter with you 
fully. . .”.167  
 
Despite Kaplansky’s initial reluctance, the JLC became an active participant in the 
campaigns for legislation, and he himself was soon heard using the metaphor of law as a 
“weapon”.168 
                                                 
166 Ben Kayfetz wrote that his first priority was “. . . to obtain the passage of a fair employment practices 
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The fair practices campaigns were campaigns for law in the form of legislation.  
The call for legislation evolved, in part, from the experience with law in the form of 
litigation in the adjudication of the Noble v. Alley case.  Leslie Wismer (JLC-Toronto), in 
his report on Justice Schroeder’s decision in Noble v. Alley wrote: 
 
By placing the responsibility for protective legislation and implementation 
squarely at the door of the legislators, Justice Schroeder contributed to an 
invigorated public campaign in this area.  What's more he helped an 
informed public opinion to concentrate on social action and legislation, 
rather than to rely exclusively on 'good will' approaches and so-called 
educational devices.169 
 
Claude Jodin, President of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, similarly wrote in 
his 1948 report on the Activities of the Standing Committee on Racial Discrimination, 
that Schroeder J.’s decision “… established the need for legislation, both federal and 
provincial, which would make it illegal in Canada to discriminate against people because 
of their religious affiliations or racial origin.”170  As he argued: 
 
We urge all our affiliated Trades and Labor Councils and Provincial 
Federations of Labor to press for the enactment of the necessary 
legislation protecting the various racial and religious groups of our country 
in the exercise of their rights as citizens of a free and democratic 
Canada.171 
 
                                                 
169 LAC, Kalmen Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Notes on Reports 1948 at 64, quoting from 
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170 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Volume 15 – Correspondence, File 15-11, “Report to the 63rd Annual Convention 
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In much of the advocacy, however, the arguments were framed in general terms as 
campaigns for “law”, and did not distinguishing between law as legislation and law in the 
form of adjudicative decisions.  However, “law” in the context of these campaigns meant 
legislation and the enforcement of legislation.  And since the authority to establish law in 
the form of legislation rested with the government, the campaigns were directed at 
enlisting the government’s legislative authority.  
 
The Normative Role of Law 
The fair practices advocates argued that legislation was an appropriate and 
necessary response to discrimination because of the important role law plays in defining 
social norms.  They described social norms as being “legal” in two ways.  First, a social 
norm was legal if its legality was not challenged.  This is a particularly interesting 
argument, because it rests on a view that legality is a characteristic that automatically or 
necessarily attaches to conduct, and that conduct is understood to be legal unless its 
legality has been successfully challenged.  In other words, where there was no law 
against particular conduct, that conduct was presumed to be acceptable and “legal”.  
Therefore, the fact that there was no law against discrimination meant that discrimination 
was legal: 
 
An important element in the argument is that suggested in the article by 
Will Maslow reprinted from Congress Weekly. Namely, that the law by its 
very neutrality encourages discriminatory practices since it leaves it 
entirely up to the personal goodwill or ill-will of the individual to deprive 
other citizens of their basic rights. It unconsciously serves in the creation 
of patterns of discrimination which are self-prolonging and which tend to 
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fix themselves in the popular mind as part of the accepted social mores 
and standards of society.172 
 
        A case in point is the absence so far -- with the exception of the 
Province of Saskatchewan -- of legislation outlawing racial and religious 
discrimination in rental housing.  Until Fair Accommodation Practices 
laws covering this field exist in the various provinces, landlords have no 
official pronouncement of public policy to guide them in this respect.173  
 
A second way in which social norms obtained legal status was when their legality 
was challenged unsuccessfully.  Thus, a failure to obtain legislative change or an 
adjudicative ruling that a social norm was legal reinforced its legitimacy and its authority: 
 
A restrictive covenant would be useless if the law did not recognize it and 
give it force.174 
 
… the insertion of such a [restrictive covenant] clause in a legal document 
gives sanction of Law to racial discrimination in the sale of land. It will 
give comfort to bigots and race haters and will encourage them to insert 
such covenants at every opportunity. We cannot over-estimate the 
‘security’ that legality gives to these malpractices. 
… 
To have such a ban upheld by the courts is to give it an authority that it 
could not possibly obtain otherwise.175 
 
Conversely, a judgment of illegality would enhance other efforts to change conduct and 
prescribe new norms of acceptable conduct.  A law prohibiting discrimination would 
                                                 
172 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 2, 1947, Memo dated October 29, 1947 from B.G. 
Kayfetz to Rabi A.L. Abraham Feinberg.  Will Maslow was general counsel to the American Jewish 
Congress and wrote extensively about legal strategies against discrimination. 
173 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 8 (1957 & 1958), 1958 File # 9-B, Bill of Rights File, 
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175 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, s. 5-4-1, File 7 Letter dated July 11, 1949, from B.G. Kayfetz 
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mean that discrimination was now considered illegal and would, therefore, establish a 
new social norm against discriminatory actions:  
 
The enactment of anti-discrimination legislation is a basic sign that 
labour’s community relations work and educational programs are 
successful.  The existence of an anti-discrimination law signifies public 
acceptance and agreement in the principle that bigotry and intolerance 
have no place in Canadian life.176 
 
From the labour perspective, a law against discrimination would also enable trade unions 
to assist people in aspects of the employment relationship, or would-be relationship, over 
which they did not otherwise have the authority to provide assistance, such as the hiring 
process and for employees in non-unionized workplaces:  “Only the law is all pervading.  
It alone can reach out to and beyond the hiring gate. It alone can reach into the 
unorganized shop, store or office….”.177 
The fair practices advocates also pointed to the fact that illegality can generate 
social stigma and argued that it was appropriate to employ the power of legislation to 
create this stigmazing effect in relation to discrimination.  In a 1956 article on the fair 
accommodation practices legislation, Alan Borovoy wrote: “To do anything which has 
the stigma of illegality usually involves a certain loss of social prestige and respectability 
…”.178   According to Brian Howe, Conservative MPP Allan Grossman supported anti-
discrimination legislation in part because “... law would put ‘the stigma of indecency on 
                                                 
176 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Volume 13 – Correspondence etc., File 13-12 – Minutes of Meetings: National 
Committee on Human Rights, CLC including submissions, CLC National Committee on Human Rights, 
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discrimination.’”  According to Howe, Grossman believed that law would not end 
discrimination, but would “… create moral pressure against practices restricting 
opportunities and freedom.”179  
The common standards that could be established by legislation were also 
expressions of certain moral values. Walker wrote that the offence created by the 1932 
Ontario Insurance Act amendment to prohibit discrimination in insurance contracts “… 
suggested intriguing notions about public policy and the legislative reflection of common 
moral values.”180  In the context of discrimination, moral values were concerned with 
both preventing harm and promoting good.  As noted earlier, when the comparison was 
between anti-discrimination law and criminal law, the focus was on the role of law in 
defining the boundaries of moral conduct.  Prof. F.R. Scott wrote that “The law can 
buttress moral principles, and make the path of the wicked more difficult.”181;  and 
D.A.L. Smout wrote that restrictive covenants  should be treated as illegal and thus 
unenforceable for reasons of moral impropriety, in the same way that law was used 
against the wagering contract on the basis of the moral impropriety of gambling.182   
There were also positive moral values, associated with the social good, that were 
connected to prohibiting discrimination.  From this perspective, the argument was that the 
power of law could be employed productively and beneficially to shape positive values 
                                                 
179 Howe, “Human Rights Policy” at 792-793. 
180 Walker;“Race” at 193. 
181 Scott, “Dominion Jurisdiction” at 521.  Later in the same piece, he described unemployment, bad 
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182 “An Inquiry into the Law on Racial and Religious Restraints on Alienation” (1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 
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and positive actions.183  George Egerton wrote that Prof. Scott offered a “. . . secular 
jurisprudence centred on human-rights protection by governments and courts”, which 
incorporated a view of the power of law as a productive social force, and quotes the 
following statement from a brief authored by him: 
 
We think of law now in terms of ‘social engineering,’ where law is ‘a 
force itself,’ a ‘constructive and creative influence in society.’184   
 
Lambertson referenced a Toronto Star editorial on discriminatory convenants, where the 
argument was made that “… tolerance could also be the result of ‘cultivated growth’ and 
that ‘the law can be made a powerful implement in its cultivation.’”185 
The fair practices campaigners thus advocated a view of a society in which law 
had a prominent role in shaping social attitudes and norms of behaviour.  And within this 
framework, the government, as the legislator, had a central role and responsibility. 
 
Public Responsibility to Address Discrimination 
 The fair practices advocates also argued that the responsibility to take action 
against discrimination was a public one in the sense that rested with citizens as well as 
with the state: 
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Where lies the solution to this vexing problem [of discrimination]? It 
would seem that remedial action leads in two directions.  One path 
encompasses the individual and his duty as a citizen of a democratic state; 
the other path leads to parliament and the protection through legislation of 
our basic rights and privileges.186 
 
The state, as the representative of the public, had a responsibility to pass legislation to 
protect people from harm and to ensure that people fulfilled their responsibilities to one 
another.  This required the state to take a position that was not neutral on issues about  
which there could be differing positions among citizens:  
 
Looking back at it from the vantage point of 1959, I think it can be said 
that this Act [Racial Discrimination, 1944], modest though it was [sic] 
historic in its importance because it established the principle that 
government is not neutral in these matters and that it is a matter of public 
policy that citizens do not suffer discrimination because of their birth, 
ancestry or belief. In practice the act had certain concrete and tangible 
effects. The unsightly signs such as ‘Gentiles Only’ that had been defacing 
the landscape of our province became a collector’s item, obsolete – in fact 
extinct. It was the elimination of these signs that helped clear the air, in 
my view, and make for a better atmosphere that helped prepare the way 
for future measures.187 
 
... ‘the very fact that there was a law added an entirely new dimension, for 
it put the state on the victim’s side and made clear that discrimination was 
wrong.’188 
 
Brian Howe argued that the late 1940s and early 1950s saw a shift toward accepting the 
state as having a positive role to play through law and administration.189 This changing 
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view of the role of the state was reflected in the following passage from a 1947 JPRC 
document on civil liberties: 
 
… since the time when Dicey so authoritatively enunciated the principle 
of the rule of law, there has been a marked shift in the emphasis of the 
constitution from its interest in preserving civil liberties, to the present 
absorption of the state with the task of services for the general good. 
        The abandonment of the principle of laissez-faire has altered the 
nature of much of our law.  A system of law, which like the common law 
is based on the protection of individual rights, is not readily comparable 
with legislation which has, for its object, the welfare of the public, or a 
large section of it, as a whole.  The common law rests upon an individual 
conception of society and lacks the means of enforcing public rights as 
such.  The socialization of the activities of the people has meant 
restrictions of individual rights by the conferment of powers of a novel 
character upon Government organs .... So far as the provision of the state 
social services and the regulation of economic conditions have become 
part of the accepted philosophy of government, the rule of law still means 
the supremacy of parliament.190 
 
Philip Girard argued that during this period, society was becoming more accepting of 
state intervention in areas of life that were previously considered out of bounds because 
they were “private”.191  He commented that this approach to legislation marked a shift 
away from British examples and towards American legal models which, he says, was 
evident in many areas of Canadian law in the period after World War II.  I would also 
argue that the legitimacy of fair practices legislation rested significantly on whether or 
not the regulated conduct was understood to have a “public” dimension.192  In the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
189Howe, “Human Rights Policy” at 787. 
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services regulated by the government -- for example, places of business such as taverns, 
which required a government licence -- fair practices advocates argued that the state had 
a responsibility to ensure equal access to services that came under its regulatory 
authority:  
 
When a person comes to the state for a license to serve the public, it 
should be on the understanding they serve all the public and not just who 
they want to serve. It is not a license to do what they like.193  
 
More generally, there were arguments about the social context and the need for law to 
proscribe discrimination in the interests of democracy: 
 
The welfare state concept rests upon the proposition that every member of 
a democratic community must have an equal opportunity to participate in 
and reap the benefits of all forms of public intercourse. The differential 
among men should relate to merit rather than privilege. The welfare state 
concept also seeks to guarantee to everyone a minimum standard of living. 
i.e. the acquisition of the fundamental material conditions of a self-
respecting and dignified life. 
     There is little difficulty in relating these principles to anti-
discrimination legislation. The objective of anti-discrimination legislation 
is then seen as the promotion of equal opportunity to participate in and 
reap the benefits of public activity regardless of race, colour, creed, origin, 
nationality or place of birth…. 
     The government can properly impose this standard upon all people who 
exercise any control on the streets of public intercourse. Businessmen put 
their products on the public market in the hope of a profit. As a condition 
of the right to participate in the public market, the government would be 
within the bounds of propriety to require compliance with certain 
standards of fair play which are designed to promote equality of 
opportunity for its citizens. 
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     … The rights of the business are qualified because of the public nature 
of this activity and so that the opportunities of public participation may be 
equalized throughout the community without unfair discrimination.194  
 
This argument echoed the dissenting reasons of Justice Davis in Christie v. York about 
state-regulated activities, and went one step further to maintain that the mere act of 
entering into the public market place as a seller, whether state-regulated or not, imported 
an obligation not to engage in discriminatory practices while engaged with the market.  
 Walker characterized this shift during the 1940s and 1950s as the second phase of 
the movement for racial equality in Canada after the Second World War.  He described 
the first phase as a campaign for “‘Equal Citizenship’”, in which the struggles focused on 
government conduct that imposed restrictions based on race and ethnicity; he described 
the second as the “‘Protective Shield’” phase, during which the government was regarded 
as an ally and was called upon to pass legislation to protect citizens from the 
discriminatory behaviour of other citizens.195  At the same time, Walker observed that 
these two phases were not entirely chronologically discrete, in that the state could and did 
discriminate at the same time as it was legislating against discriminatory conduct by 
private actors.196   Prof. Scott captured this dual nature of the state in a 1949 article, 
                                                 
194 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Volume 3, A. Alan Borovoy, “The Role of 
Legislation in the Fight Against Discrimination” (1960) at 3, reprinted from “Obiter Dicta”, 1960, Vol 1, 
No. 1 at 37-42. 
195 Walker characterized the third phase as the “‘Remedial Sword’” phase, during which governments were 
asked to “… correct systemic conditions that produce discriminatory results even in the apparent absence of 
overt prejudicial acts.”  Walker argued that these phases were not strictly chronological and have co-
existed; in his view, however, each one predominated during particular periods. The “Equal Citizenship” 
phase predominated in the 1930s and first half of the 1940s; the “Protective Shield” phase predominated in 
the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s; and the “Remedial Sword” phase predominated in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. Walker, “‘Jewish Phase’” at 2-3, 20-21. 
196 There also continued to be activism against oppressive conduct by the state, and debates about seeking 
legislation to protect citizens against abuses of state power.  For example, the “Gouzenko Affair”, in which 
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where he argued that there is no contradiction in recognizing the state as both a potential 
source of protection and a potential source of oppression; and that there is no 
contradiction in both calling upon the state to protect the needs of citizens and 
challenging illegitimate uses of state power:197  
 
Preventing the state from taking away liberties does not help the man 
whose freedom is attacked by a fellow citizen, or whose liberty is 
destroyed by poverty.  Defence against the state and protection by the state 
are two correlative functions, not contradictory but complementary.” 198 
 
In the context of the fair practices campaigns, the focus was on the harmful conduct of 
citizens rather than on harmful conduct by government.   In that context, it was argued 
that the state had a responsibility to protect citizens from one another and that legislation 
was a vehicle through which the state could define people’s duties to one another.   
Bora Laskin raised the question of people’s obligations to one another when he 
began his 1938 article, “The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem of 
‘Contracting Out’”, by asking “… whether law is to be regarded primarily as a system of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the state detained and imprisoned without due process persons suspected of spying against Canada, was one 
issue around which there were efforts to mobilize civil liberties activism.  See, for example: M.H. Fyfe, 
“Some Legal Aspects of the Report of the Royal Commission on Espionage” (1946) 24 Can Bar Rev 777; 
Clément, “Spies, Lies”; Lambertson, Resistance and Repression at 143-195. Several authors suggest 
categories for these different struggles against injustice and oppression, variously using the labels “human 
rights”, “bill of rights”, “freedoms”, “civil rights”, and “civil liberties”. The “bill of rights” and “civil 
liberties” labels appear to be closely associated with legal protection against state power, although this is 
not always the case.  See, for example:  Lambertson, Repression and Resistance at 7-9; Bora Laskin,  “An 
Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights” (1959) 37 Can Bar Rev 77 at 79 [Laskin, “Inquiry into Bill of 
Rights”]; F.R. Scott, “Dominion Jurisdiction Over Human Rights” (1949) 27 Can Bar Rev 497 at 507-508 
[Scott, “Dominion Jurisdiction”]; Ziff, Bruce.  Unforeseen Legacies: Reuben Wells Leonard and the 
Leonard Foundation Trust (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2000) 104-105 [Ziff, Unforeseen 
Legacies]. 
197 For an excellent analysis, see Bryan Palmer’s articulation of the idea of  “strugg[ling] for law against 
law”.  See “What’s Law Got to do With It? Historical Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of 
Constraint, and Capitalist Authority”(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 465 at 479.   
198  Scott, “Dominion Jurisdiction” at 536.      
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rights or of duties”.199 According to Laskin, this argument was central because legal 
rights tend to be associated with guarantees of individual freedom, whereas legal duties 
tend to be associated with restrictions on that freedom.  Duties were paramount, for 
Laskin, because restrictions on liberty were necessary to enhance liberty:   
 
Law exists for the sake of enlarging the liberty of men, and as a 
consequence there must be restrictions on the liberty of man; based on this 
premise, law is to be regarded primarily as a system of duties, involving 
the proper recognition of the interests of others as a necessary limitation 
upon self-interest. Hardly anyone to-day is disposed to challenge the 
assertion that law cannot fulfil the function assigned to it unless it ceases 
to accentuate the recognition of rights and devotes itself to the protection 
of interests.200 
 
Through legislation, law could recognize and protect social interests, identify who was 
responsible for ensuring that these social interests were recognized and protected, and 
prescribe the duties required to achieve these goals.  
 On the role and responsibility of citizens as citizens, the fair practices advocates 
argued that citizens had a responsibility both to influence the government to fulfill its 
responsibilities and to address discrimination themselves. Citizens had the ability and the 
responsibility to press government to pass legislation.  Citizens also had the ability and 
responsibility to speak out against discrimination and take their own action against it.  A 
1947 brief on the need for fair employment practices legislation emphasized the 
responsibility of citizens to know about discrimination, to care about discrimination even 
                                                 
199 Laskin, “Protection of Interests” at 670. 
200 Laskin, “Protection of Interests” at 669. 
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if they were not personally affected, and to participate in efforts to eliminate 
discrimination: 
 
Discrimination in employment is not the concern of only those who are 
most directly affected. If this were the case, we might be able to turn our 
heads, pretend it does not exist and minimize its extent and injurious 
consequences. In a democracy, however, it is everyone’s problem and 
everyone’s responsibility because it prevents the fullest and most efficient 
utilization of our manpower and makes a mockery of our democratic 
principles and strivings. Every additional case of discrimination in 
employment is a further and ever more dangerous threat to our way of life. 
But discrimination is an evil that will not disappear if only we are willing 
to ignore it. It requires serious consideration and decisive action.201 
 
In a 1949 article, Vivien Mahood, executive secretary of the Toronto Joint Labour 
Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, emphasized the myriad ways in which citizens 
could and should act to address discrimination.  As she argued:  “It is the responsibility of 
every citizen to learn, and it is the responsibility of every agency of propaganda—
meaning the newspapers, radio, school, magazines, movies, books, organizations, to 
spread the facts, to adopt honesty and justice as their guide, so that knowledge will 
permeat [sic] the whole structure of our society and make the world a better place for all 
of us.”202  In the union context, union members were encouraged to become “fire 
fighters” to spot and speak out against racism.203  And last, but not least, citizens had an 
obligation not to engage in discriminatory practices: 
                                                 
201 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 1 of 1947, Brief for Fair Employment Practices 
Legislation at 2. 
202 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights,1945-1972 , File 3-4, Vivien Mahood, “Law vs. 
Education”, August 10, 1949 at 4. 
203 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, volume 7, File 7-22 – Correspondence: J.L.C. 1946, Attachment to letter dated 





… All the law really does is prevent the employer from running his 
business in a way that is contrary to the welfare of the country. It simply 
attempts to make sure that he cannot shirk his public responsibility.  After 
all, free enterprise does not mean unlimited license. The basis of English 
jurisprudence is the realization that every man owns and operates his 
property and business subject to the requirements of the public welfare.204 
  
The first step, then, was to establish the common standards.  The second step was to 
ensure that those common standards were respected and followed. 
 
The Coercive Power of Law 
The ability to harness the “force” or power of law was a major reason why the fair 
practices advocates fought for law as a tool.  They argued that both education and law 
were required, and that law was a tool for education as well as a necessary adjunct to 
education: 
 
      One hears repeatedly that ‘we must educate, not legislate’ for tolerance. That 
argument will not be proposed by anyone engaged in educating for tolerance. Our 
teaching would be much more effective if it were backed by the force and prestige 
of law.  The one needs the other.205 
 
                                                 
204 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Volume 13, FEP General, Special 
Bulletin of the Joint Labor Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, dated March 10, 1951. 
205 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 24, File: Toronto Licensing By-law 
Letter dated May 1950, from the Joint Labor Committee to Combat Racial Tolerance in Toronto to Mayor 
of Toronto regarding the proposed Toronto Licensing By-Law. See also Rabbi Feinberg argument: “If the 
refusal to regard the law as an instrument of tolerance was consistently applied to all moral spheres, a part 
of Ontario’s statute books becomes futile and irrelevant. Laws against theft would need to be revoked 
because they cannot ‘cure’ dishonesty; laws about gambling are then superfluous because law cannot ‘cure’ 
people of the itch to make money without working, and laws regulating the consumption of liquor would 
possess no value because the government cannot ‘legislate’ temperance. The teachers of religion have been 
urging people not to kill and steal since the Ten Commandments 30 centuries ago—but laws must still be 
passed against murder and theft, after generations of preaching and teaching.” OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. 
Region, JCRC, Abraham L. Feinberg, “A Fair Employment Practices Law Why It Is Necessary and 
Feasible” at 4. 
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B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League discarded to a great extent the 
notion that good will can be sold and promoted as soap is and that a 
sufficient quantity and mass distribution would eventually win over the 
mass of American people to good citizenship and brotherliness as they 
have been won over to jello, coca cola or Rinso.206 
 
For the fair practices advocates, education was distinguished from coercion.  They appear 
to have understood education as non-coercive because it was a process which encouraged 
people to act differently but could not force them to act differently. Law, on the other 
hand, could force people to act differently.  However, they advocated for an enforcement 
that would be primarily non-coercive.  Why did they take this position? 
 The minutes of the first meeting of the JPRC legal sub-committee, established in 
1946, record that Prof. Laskin raised the issue of enforcement for discussion and that 
copies of the legislation in force in New York and Massachusetts were circulated, as well 
as an American Jewish Congress model bill and a proposed version of the Saskatchewan 
Bill of Rights, which would be passed the following year.207 At what may have been the 
second meeting,208 the sub-committee members endorsed their preference for legislation 
“armed with teeth” over legislation that simply established a code of conduct: 
 
The meeting opened with a discussion of policy as to whether the 
proposed legislation be armed with teeth, or whether it should merely 
                                                 
206 Speech drafted for Jacob Finkelman for Windsor Meeting Spring 1951 at 2, Canadian Jewish Congress, 
Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, Box 2, File 53, Ontario Jewish 
Archives. 
207 Minutes of Meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Research Division of the CJC held July 23, 
1946, Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, 
Central Region Legal Committee Minutes Jul. 1946-Nov. 1957, Ontario Jewish Archives. 
208 Unfortunately, there was no way to confirm that the archival records included minutes of all the 
meetings of the JPRC sub-committee.  It is possible, therefore, that there were minutes of other meetings 
which I did not have the opportunity to review. 
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establish the principle that employment discrimination is without the law, 
thereby discouraging discrimination by moral persuasion. 
 
It was felt that the first alternative was necessary to make the bill effective 
in outlawing unemployment caused by discrimination, and to allow to all 
groups the exercise of those capacities which could fit the individual to 
any profession or occupation, no matter what his ethnic or national origin 
or ancestry, race, color, religion, or creed.  The question of specific 
methods of enforcement was left for later discussion.209 
 
Metaphors of “weaponry” and “teeth” were often used to connote the coercive power of 
law achieved through legislation and its enforcement. 
This potential for access to the coercive power of law through enforcement was a 
key element in the opposition to fair practices legislation.210   The opponents of fair 
practices legislation argued that it was not appropriate to use force because, as Robertson 
CJA expressed in the passages from Noble and Wolf quoted earlier, it was neither 
appropriate nor effective to legislate “morality”, i.e. to try to use force to change 
attitudes, beliefs and feelings.  This argument often appeared in Globe and Mail editorials 
as, for example, in the following 1944 editorial on the Racial Discrimination Act: 
 
Bigotry is an affliction which does not respond to repressive treatment. 
     More to the point, we think, was the Premier’s expressed hope for 
reform through education. It is in education that the cure to intolerance 
and discrimination must be sought. … It is in the schools rather than by 
                                                 
209 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, CJC Central Region Legal Committee Minutes Jul. 1946-
Nov. 1957, Minutes of the Meeting of the Legal Committee, Economic and Social Research Division held 
August 6, 1946. 
210 The fair practices advocates of course faced opposition to anti-discrimination legislation on a number of 
other grounds as well, which included the following arguments: there was no need for legislation because 
discrimination did not happen; some forms of discrimination were necessary to protect white Christian 
interests; minority rights should not be protected in majoritarian democracy; free speech was a more 
important value than equality; and the state has no business in bedrooms and boardrooms. See Lambertson, 
Repression and Resistance at 199, 228. 
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laws that the Government can best further the ideal of full equality in the 
enjoyment of man’s rights.211 
 
A similar position was stated in a 1950 editorial in the Toronto Telegram: 
 
Respect for human rights is not to be advanced by restrictive laws which 
invade the principles of individual liberty, nor is bigotry to be cured by 
coercion. It is in the schools, rather than in the Legislature, that the right 
against intolerance and discrimination is to be fought with greatest hope of 
achieving worthwhile results. Tolerance will come through development 
of the individual’s awareness of the full meaning of freedom and his 
consciousness of his responsibilities under the rights and privileges of that 
freedom. It is a state of mind which cannot be created merely by 
legislation nor by the multiplication of legislative restrictions.212 
 
Even a supporter of anti-discrimination legislation expressed the view that the biblical 
injunction to love thy neighbour “loses its beauty if legally enforceable”.213   
The fair practices advocates had three responses to this opposition:  (1) law was 
directed to changing conduct, not changing beliefs;  (2) the power of law enhanced its 
value as a tool for education; and (3) the proposed fair practices enforcement model 
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212 “Legislation has its Limitations in Combating Discrimination”, Toronto Telegram, February 3, 1950. 
213 Smout, “Restraints on Alienation” at 871.   Nevertheless, Smout also wrote that even if it was not 
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practices.” – at 872. See also the statement quoted by Rabbi Abraham Feinberg in Gates of Jericho at 70: 
“Laws ain’t the answer.  It’s the Christ in man.  Slow but sure!” 
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would rely primarily on persuasion through education, rather than on coercion through 
adjudication. 
The first argument, that law was aimed at changing conduct not changing beliefs, 
relied on the distinction between “discrimination” and “prejudice” discussed earlier.  
Prejudice was the mental attitude or belief that often led to discrimination; discrimination 
was the conduct that resulted from prejudice.  The fair practices advocates agreed that it 
was not appropriate to try to use coercion to change attitudes and argued that the purpose 
of fair practices legislation was not to change people’s minds.  Education was the remedy 
for prejudice.  Law, however, was an appropriate tool to address discriminatory conduct.  
A JPRC brief in 1947 expressed the distinction in the following way: 
 
Education is the solution frequently proposed for such problems as 
discrimination in employment. With this view no one can have any 
quarrel. The removal of prejudice is, in the final analysis, an educational 
problem – in the broadest sense and going far beyond actual schooling. 
But the elimination of those of its manifestations which, like 
discriminatory employment practices, are seriously injurious to all persons 
and groups in our midst, is a matter for legislation.214 
 
An article focused on fair practices legislation, prepared by The Canadian Association for 
Adult Education to accompany a radio program broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Association on March 17, 1948, explained the distinction as follows: 
 
Many people of goodwill do not give their support to fair employment 
laws because they are convinced that it is impossible to legislate against 
prejudice. Prejudice directed toward members of minority racial or 
religious groups has been with us since the beginning of time. … 
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Legislation at 3. 
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Education in all its aspects, and not the passing of another law, must 
remain our hope of bringing about fundamental changes in outlook. … 
        Advocates of legislation have a reply to this argument. A Fair 
Employment Practices law is not aimed at prejudice. Its objective is to 
eliminate discrimination-the action which springs from prejudice. 
Admittedly no law can force an anti-semite to be friendly, sympathetic, 
understanding and fair-minded in his approach to the Jew. But a law can 
prevent the anti-semitic employer from making the Jew suffer 
economically as a result of his attitude. There is no claim that legislation 
will suppress intolerance and bigotry.215 
 
Thus, the arguments confirmed that people were free to hold onto prejudiced beliefs, but 
were not permitted to engage in discriminatory conduct based on those beliefs. 216 
Nevertheless, the fair practices activists also expressed the hope that changing people’s 
conduct would, over time, also change their attitudes and thus reduce or eliminate 
prejudice as well as discrimination: 
 
These legislative measures have had a profound educational effect on the 
attitude of the people of Ontario toward discrimination. They have 
                                                 
215 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, The Canadian Association for Adult Education, “Should We 
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prejudice-in-action limits such rights, it should be outlawed.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for 
Human Rights, 1945-1972, F. E. P. [Fair Employment Practices] published by The Committee on 
Group Relations in Canada, at 12. 
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promoted both the idea of adherence to the law, and the conviction that 
discrimination is wrong. They have developed new habits and 
expectations and have provided effective support to educational work for 
better group relations in Ontario.217 
 
The argument that changes in conduct could also lead to changes in attitude was 
conceptually linked to their second response to the opposition to using coercion against 
discrimination.  This second response was that the power of law was not only useful as a 
tool of force but also a useful tool in the educational process: 
 
Such legislation would, in addition, act as a powerful educational force by 
putting the stamp of public disapproval on acts of intolerance and 
discrimination and by placing beyond the pale of the law those who 
commit such acts.218 
 
It is also a case of education through legislation. Public discussions on 
appropriate Government control by which evil practices can be ended, 
parliamentary debate, and finally administrative and judicial enforcement 
practices will all in themselves be effective educational processes.219 
 
The fair practices advocates’ third response to the opposition to coercive 
measures against discrimination was that the proposed fair practices enforcement model 
was based primarily on conciliation and would employ coercion rarely, if ever.  
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Conciliation was understood to be a non-coercive, or at least a less coercive enforcement 
method, and adjudication represented the coercive power of law enforcement. Thus, 
conciliation was linked more with “education” than with law, and adjudication was 
linked more with “law” than with education.  In an article published in the Globe and 
Mail, responding to an editorial opposing the use of compulsion against discrimination, 
Gordon Milling, (JLC-Toronto) wrote that conciliation was an educative rather than a 
coercive process: 
 
The conciliation procedure adopted is in itself educational in theory and 
practice. Its purpose is to obtain voluntary compliance with the law by 
demonstrating that ‘employment on merit’ is based on sound business 
principles; and conversely, that discrimination because of race, religion or 
ancestry is equally unsound whether from the viewpoint of the firm, the 
individual or the community.220 
 
In a 1967 article on the history of American fair employment practices legislation, Arthur 
Bonfield argued that the state agency enforcement model was preferred in large measure 
on the theory that “the expense of the investigation and proceeding would be borne by the 
government” and that the commission’s powers to issue flexible remedies would better 
position it to achieve “the legislation’s real objective”, which was to eliminate 
discrimination.221  He also wrote, however, that many of the statutes actually passed 
“were not as imaginative or ambitious” as had been proposed for them and were “wholey 
inadequate and ineffective because the agencies they created had no enforcement powers 
                                                 
220 Gordon Milling, “FEP Education v. Compulsion”, Globe and Mail, April 23, 1953, responding to 
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…”.222 In a 2011 article on this same history, David Freeman Engstrom has argued that 
not all the fair practices advocates in the United States supported an administrative 
agency enforcement model, and that some would have preferred litigation in the courts.223  
There does not appear to have been a similar difference in points of view in Ontario.  In 
the Ontario context, it was the opponents of fair practices legislation who were opposed 
to the government agency enforcement model. They argued that if there was going to be 
anti-discrimination legislation, such legislation should be enforced by the courts.224 
The fair practices advocates promoted conciliation both as the preferred 
enforcement method, and as the enforcement method that would be used most often in 
practice. They relied heavily on the United States model and experience to support these 
arguments:  
 
     It is generally agreed by most informed people on the subject, and this 
is borne out by experience, that the best method of administering 
legislation of this kind is through the establishment of a provincial board 
against discrimination. We would therefore urge that such a board be set 
up, and like the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, its 
function should include: 
1. Investigation of complaints of discrimination; where the complaint 
is well-founded, to attempt to conciliate.  Failing this, to be in a 
position to take more effective methods to remove the 
discrimination. It is interesting to point out that the New York 
State Commission Against Discrimination has rarely found it 
necessary to go beyond the stage of conciliation. Even though it 
has handled many thousands of cases since it was established, the 
Commission has only found it necessary to prosecute in one case 
to date. 
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2. To conduct a continuous program of education of the public as to 
the purpose and nature of the law with a view to creating an area of 
co-operation and climate of public opinion favourable to the 
administration of the law, and a broad educational programme to 
promote understanding and harmony between all members of the 
community.”225 
 
In addition, Will Maslow, general counsel to the American Jewish Congress, wrote that 
penal statutes were not effective because “District Attorneys are loathe to prosecute and 
juries to convict.”  He also explained that the administrative agency enforcement model, 
“backed up always by the threat of public exposure and judicially enforced orders” was 
considered the preferable method for fair practices enforcement because it put the burden 
of enforcing the community norm on the state rather than on the individual who raised a 
discrimination claim:  
 
Statutes allowing private individuals to sue are probably the least effective 
type of measure because the entire burden of litigation is imposed upon 
the individual and the state assumes the role of referee, not that of one 
condemning racism.226 
 
Conciliation, as a dispute resolution process, was first developed in the labour 
relations context around the same time as the first fair practices statutes were passed in 
the United States.227 In theory, a conciliation process could “voluntarily” persuade the 
respondent to accept that their conduct was contrary to law, and “voluntarily” persuade 
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them to agree to an appropriate resolution - there is, after all, a coercive aspect to having 
to engage with the legal process at all, when one would otherwise choose not to do so. 
The fair practices advocates also argued that discrimination would be easy to “prove” in a 
conciliation process because it would be easy to persuade the respondent to understand 
why their conduct was wrong: 
 
Experience with the operations of FEP laws in the United States shows 
that, actually, discrimination is easy to prove. Most often employers admit 
it. Discrimination, where practiced, is usually a well established policy, 
openly acknowledged and recorded in newspaper advertisements, orders 
to employment agencies, payroll records, and so on. It also often happens 
that the members of a minority group are never even given an opportunity 
to interview the employer or his representative.228 
 
The JPRC gave a similar account in a report on a meeting with Ontario Premier Kennedy 
in 1949.  In response to the Premier’s questions about how discrimination would be 
proved if an employer refused to admit to discrimination, the answer given was: 
  
It was pointed out to him that the experience of such statutes in New York 
and other States proved that a direct personal interview between the state 
agent and the employer soon got to the root of the matter and that the very 
fact that the Government showed its interest in fairness of employment 
was enough to convince employers of the need of such equality.229 
 
The fair practices advocates also argued that respondents’ willingness to accept 
responsibility in the conciliation process was a significant reason for the relatively small 
number of cases requiring formal hearings in the United States experience: 
                                                 
228 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, volume 13, FEP General, F.E.P., a 
pamphlet published by The Committee on Group Relations in Canada, at #16. 
229 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 6, 1949, Report on JPRC meeting with Premier Kennedy 
on March 12, 1949. 
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The large-scale programme of education carried on by the Commission, 
through the radio, the movies, the press, and the public platform, has 
greatly contributed to this result [few formal hearings]. But basically the 
explanation appears to be that the ordinary citizen, if given a chance, will 
respond intelligently to policies of tolerance and understanding.230 
 
Although “sharp teeth” was an essential element of the enforcement process 
sought by fair practices advocates, they consistently emphasized that recourse to the 
coercive power of adjudication would be rare. In a 1947-48 Citizens’ Forum document, 
the authors observed that the fair practices law in New York had sharp teeth but 
emphasized persuasion and conciliation:  “Thus, while the law has sharp teeth, it is most 
important to note the great stress that is laid upon conciliation and persuasion.”231  
Similarly, a radio broadcast which aired in January 1951 (and for which Pierre Berton 
wrote the script) presented the argument as follows: 
 
We want to emphasize this, however – these court orders are a last resort. 
Only a very few cases ever reach the hearing stage. The job of FEPC is not 
to seek revenge through the law. It is to show people that discrimination in 
jobs is a silly, wasteful and unnecessary business.232 
 
They also argued that the emphasis on conciliation reflected the fact that the purpose of 
the legislation, and its enforcement process, was not to punish people for engaging in 
illegal conduct but to eliminate discriminatory conduct and practices.233   
                                                 
230 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, s. 5-4-1, File 5, Citizens’ Forum, “Should We Have Fair 
Employment Practices Acts in Canada?”, March 1948 at 5. 
231 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, s. 5-4-1, File 5, Citizens’ Forum, “Should We Have Fair 
Employment Practices Acts in Canada?”, March 1948 at 3. 
232 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Transcript of “Fair Employment is Fair Play”, Cross Section, 
January 4, 1951 at 20. 
233 See, for example: “It would be well to keep in mind that the real purpose of legislation is not to punish 
people who discriminate, but to get them to change their ways. Consequently, the emphasis is placed on 
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In the end, the government passed fair practices legislation and provided for 
enforcement of this legislation through a state agency, using a process that began with 
conciliation but also created the potential for adjudication.  
 
5 The Fair Practices Statutes 
Ontario’s fair practices statutes, like the earlier anti-discrimination statutory 
provisions, were structured as prohibitions against discrimination on the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.  The prohibited grounds of discrimination in these first 
statutes were: race, creed, nationality, ancestry or place of origin (“race, religion or 
ethnicity”).  The Fair Employment Practices Act, 1951 contained three prohibitions: (1) a 
prohibition against employers refusing to employ, refusing to continue to employ, or 
discriminating in regard to employment or to any term or condition of employment, on 
the basis of race, religion or ethnicity; (2) a prohibition against trade unions excluding, 
expelling or suspending from membership, or discriminating against a person, on the 
basis of race, religion or ethnicity; and (3) a prohibition against employment applications 
or advertisements which expressed any limitation, specification or preference as to race, 
religion or ethnicity.234  The statute did not apply to all workers: domestic workers, 
employees of charitable, philanthropic or religious organizations, and persons employed 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion, conciliation and persuasion. The approach used is to try and make the employer understand that 
discrimination is economically and socially wasteful, morally and religiously wrong; to convince the 
employer that it is bad for business to hire people for their race or religion rather than for their ability and 
experience. It is interesting to note that out of 5,200 reported cases in the United States, in only six was it 
found impossible to settle complaints by conciliation.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights,1945-
1972, Irving Himel, “The Canada Fair Practices Act” at 2. 
234 SO 1951, c 24, ss. 3 4, 5 [FEPA]. 
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by employers with fewer than five employees were all excluded from its protection.235  
The Fair Accommodation Practices Act, 1954 contained two prohibitions236: (1) a 
prohibition against denying accommodation, services or facilities customarily available to 
the public, on the basis of race, religion or nationality, and (2) a prohibition against 
publishing or displaying signs indicating discrimination or an intention to discriminate, 
on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity.237  The Female Employees Fair Remuneration 
Act, 1951 prohibited employers from discriminating between female and male employees 
by paying female employees at a rate of pay less than the rate paid to male employees 
doing the same work, or substantially the same work, in the same establishment.238  
What distinguished the fair practices statutes from the earlier anti-discrimination 
provisions was the enforcement process and the range of consequences that could apply 
to a failure to comply with the prohibition.  In Ontario’s early anti-discrimination 
legislative measures, the failure to comply with the prohibition was a quasi-criminal 
offence, with punitive sanctions.239 The fair practices statutes also constituted the failure 
to comply as a quasi-criminal offence, but also established a civil process which was the 
primary enforcement method. 
The Fair Employment Practices Act provided for the creation of a new branch of 
the Department of Labour, called the Fair Employment Practices Branch (FEPB), which 
                                                 
235 FEPA, s. 2.  
236 The word “accommodation” did not refer to housing or tenancy, as it often did subsequent in human 
rights codes and still does in Ontario’s Human Rights Code.  Rather, it referred to public spaces and 
services, which the subsequent human rights statutes referred to more typically as services and facilities. 
237 SO 1954, c. 28 [FAPA], ss. 2,3.    
238 SO 1951, c 26 [FEFRA].  Saskatchewan was the one province which passed equal pay legislation that 
was applicable to “work of comparable character” rather than to work that was equal or the same. The 
Equal Pay Act, SS 1952, c 104, s. 3. 
239 Ontario’s Racial Discrimination Act.  As noted earlier, the enforcement process under the Saskatchewan 
Bill of Rights Act was also quasi-criminal. 
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became responsible for enforcing all of Ontario’s fair practices statutes. The process 
began with a person submitting a complaint in writing to the FEPB.240  This complaint 
could then be referred to a conciliation process for inquiry and resolution, at the 
discretion of the Minister of Labour acting on the recommendation of the FEPB 
Director.241  If the complaint could not be resolved, the Minister, on the recommendation 
of the FEPB Director, would decide whether or not to refer the complaint to a formal 
hearing before an administrative tribunal called a commission.242  If a complaint was 
referred to a hearing and the tribunal found that the complaint was supported, the 
tribunal’s authority was limited to providing remedial recommendations to the FEPB 
Director; the FEPB Director would then make recommendations to the Minister of 
Labour, who had the sole authority to make remedial orders.243 Violations of the statute 
and violations of orders made under the statute were separate quasi-criminal offences, 
punishable by modest monetary penalties.244  However, prosecutions could be instituted 
only with the Minister’s consent and the Minister could give consent only on the 
recommendation of the FEPB Director.245  The fines were a maximum of $50 for an 
individual and maximum of $100 for a corporation or trade union.246 
 
 
                                                 
240 FEPA, s. 6(2); FAPA, s. 4(2); FEFRA, s 3(2).  FAPA assigned responsibility for investigation to an 
“officer designated by Cabinet” and, in practice, this was the FEPB.  
241 FEPA, s. 6(1); FAPA, s. 4(1); FEFRA, s 3(1). 
242 FEPA, s. 7(1); FAPA, s 5(1); FEFRA, s 4(1). 
243 FEPA, s. 7(3)-(6); FAPA, s. 5(3)-(6); FEFRA, s. 4(3)-(6).  Human rights tribunals in Ontario did not 
have autonomous jurisdiction to make orders until the Human Rights Code was amended in 1971 by The 
Civil Rights Law Amendment Act, 1971, SO 1971, c 50, s. 63. 
244 FEPA, s. 8(1); FAPA, s. 6(1); FEFRA, s 5(1). 
245 FEPA, s. 10(1); FAPA, s. 7; FEFRA, s 6. 
246 FEPA, s. 8(1); FAPA, s. 6(1); FEFRA, s. 5(1). 
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Part II:  Fair Practices Enforcement 
The concept of a Bill of Rights is the static one of protection, not the 
dynamic one of positive assistance by governments. …  the mere 
enunciation of rights, important though it is, has little practical value 
unless it is backed up by adequate enforcement machinery.247 
 
While I like the phraseology a great deal, my chief concern in Bills of this 
sort is the method of enforcement which is provided with them.  This I 
think, is the weakest link in the chain of our demands and while it is a 
problem not readily solved, I think we should give more and more 
consideration to the problem of enforcement as opposed to the substantive 
provisions in such Bills.248 
 
 With the passage of the fair practices statutes, their advocates had an additional 
tool to employ in their struggles against direct racial and religious discrimination in 
employment, services, and public spaces.  As Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) argued, their job 
now was to make sure that law “on the books” did not just stay on the books, but also 
became law “in action”: 
 
The vital problem today is whether this protective legislation will remain 
law on the books only or whether it will be turned into law in action.  If 
the former prevails, then of course, these laws will be worthless.  If they 
can be turned into important instruments for social change then they will 
ameliorate the living conditions of thousands of Canadian citizens. 
… 
As Roscoe Pound stated: ‘Law can make habits instead of waiting for 
them to grow.’ It is incumbent upon all men of goodwill to aid the law in 
this noble purpose of minimizing the effects of bigotry and discrimination 
and to make human and decent behaviour a lasting habit.249 
                                                 
247 Scott, “Dominion Jurisdiction” at 503 and 514. See also Howe, “Human Rights Policy” at 789-790. 
248 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, volume 20, Notes on Reports 1946-1947 at 148, quoting 
Letter dated December 10, 1947 from Morris Schumiachter to Kalmen Kaplansky. 
249 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 3, Articles and Speeches: Miscellaneous 
1948-1958, File 3-4, Kalmen Kaplansky, “Operation of Fair Employment Practices Acts in Canada”, An 
address delivered on Thursday June 30, 1955 to the Regional Zone Leadership Training Conference of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (AFL-TLC) at 7 and 9.  See also the statement by Reg Gisborn, a 




The legislation represented a new community standard for conduct, but fair practices 
advocates recognized but this standard would become real only if there was compliance 
with it: “The legislation is of course, some help to us insofar as it admits that 
discrimination is practiced.  On the other hand, if it is not used, the legislation loses even 
this limited usefulness.250 
 For the fair practices advocates, legislation was a tool for everyone to use, and 
citizens had a role in both formal and informal enforcement.   Indeed, consistent with 
their argument that both the state and citizens had a responsibility to take action against 
discrimination, they argued that both the state and citizens had responsibilities in relation 
to enforcing the new legislation The enforcement structure made the government 
responsible for investigating and conciliating complaints, for referring complaints to 
adjudication by a commission, and for prosecuting violations of the statute or of orders 
made under the statute.  Citizens had a responsibility to encourage people to seek formal 
enforcement, to ensure that the state fulfilled its formal enforcement mandate, and to seek 
improvements to the formal enforcement process when they were needed.  As Kaplansky 
(JLC) noted: “Even the Financial Times said, ‘The anti-discrimination bill is a worthy 
piece of legislation’, although it still insisted that the Government could not enforce such 
                                                                                                                                                 
Party): “In pressing for fair practices legislation, labor has demonstrated that the principles of brotherhood 
and equality are not merely ‘lip service’ principles but rules of conduct to be applied and protected in all 
areas of life. Labor has also stressed the necessity for policing this legislation, publicizing cases that arise 
and assisting victims of discrimination so that human rights laws live and do not remain still-born on the 
statute books of the land.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, File: Ontario 
Federation of Labour, Fair Employment Practices Conference 1956, Address of Reg Gisborn on Fair 
Practices. 
250 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Volume 41, File 41-6 – Correspondence, reports: Toronto Joint Labour 
Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, April –June 1952, Letter dated June 3, 1952 from Gordon 
Milling to Kalmen Kaplansky at 2. 
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a law. It was up to us to prove that the Government could enforce the Act. This was the 
next phase of our activities in this area.”251 Thus, the fair practices advocates pressed the 
government to be robust in fulfilling its enforcement responsibilities so that the formal 
structure would have concrete impact on discrimination.  They also encouraged citizens, 
including those directly affected by discrimination, to engage with the legislation in the 
context of the daily situations where it might apply.  For example, Kaplansky (JLC) 
urged:  
 
… there is a definite need to induce those whose rights are at stake to take 
advantage of the provisions under the law.  There is a tendency on the part 
of members of so-called minority groups to look with scepticism, nay even 
cynicism, upon all efforts to pen new opportunities. Then there is also the 
reluctance on the part of such people to be pioneers, to become only one 
representative of a minority group in a plant or establishment, where the 
majority is suspected of being prejudiced. … 
        It is necessary for organizations concerned with this problem to 
encourage and support such individuals. Pioneers are needed to blaze new 
trails. We should, however, also try to devise ways and means to help not 
only pioneers, but also ordinary people to do likewise.252 
 
The legislation and its enforcement process provided a tool to challenge expressly 
discriminatory conduct by employers, service providers and those in charge of public 
spaces and facilities.  They could also be used to challenge conduct suspected to be 
discriminatory using a method for “testing” conduct by employers, service providers and 
those in charge of public spaces and facilities. The testing method was used when a 
                                                 
251 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries by Kalmen Kaplansky 1946-1984, R5491-5-7-E (formerly MG30-
A53), Vol. 20, Notes on Reports of Activities for Improved Human Relations 1953 at 85-86.  Although this 
statement was made with reference to the federal fair employment practices legislation, the social activists 
took the same approach to the Ontario legislation as well. 
252 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 3, Articles and Speeches: Miscellaneous 
1948-1958, 3-4, File #3 Part 1 of 2, Kalmen Kaplansky, “Operation of Fair Employment Practices Acts in 
Canada” (1955) at 8. 
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racialized or religious or ethnic minority was told, for example, that a job had been filled, 
that a service was not available or that access to a public facility was not available.  Fair 
practices advocates would test these denials by having a White or Christian or Canadian 
individual apply for the job or request the service or try to enjoy the public space or 
facility. If the White or Christian or Canadian person’s application or request was 
accepted, this was considered some evidence that the previous denial was discriminatory. 
Fair practices advocates had used the testing method during the campaigns for fair 
practices legislation to garner support for their campaigns by gathering evidence of 
discriminatory conduct.253  Once the legislation was passed, they continued to employ 
testing to look for evidence of discrimination, but now with a new tool with which to 
fight back when they suspected discriminatory conduct.  The same three organizations 
which had led the campaigns for fair practices legislation also led the advocacy around 
enforcement issues, although the labour organizations may have been slightly more active 
on these issues. 
  
1     Aspiration Meets Practice in State Enforcement of Fair Practices Legislation 
 At the same time as the Ontario campaigns for fair practices legislation and 
enforcement were in full gear, advocacy groups in the United States were beginning to 
express concerns about how their enforcement model was working. Once the Ontario 
                                                 
253 See Pierre Berton, "No Jews Need Apply", MacLean's, Nov. 1, 1948, where Pierre Berton reported on 
potential evidence of discrimination gathered using the testing method.  Berton wrote a follow-up piece 12 
years later, in which he claimed that the Fair Employment Practices Act had resulted in fewer job 
applicants between rejected over the phone based on a name that was identifiably Jewish (Weinberg) as 
compared to a name that was identifiably non-Jewish (Craig):  Pierre Berton, “Jew and Gentile: An 
Experiment in Job Hunting”, Toronto Daily Star, 11 August 1960. 
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legislation was in place, fair practices advocates in Ontario began to raise similar 
concerns. The record on enforcement of Ontario’s fair practices statutes is not a lengthy 
one, given that they were operational for less than a decade before the Human Rights 
Code replaced them in 1962.  Although the same three organizational players were 
actively involved in issues of enforcement, they appear to have worked more 
independently of one another and sometimes to have had different views about some 
enforcement issues. 
  
The United States Experience with Commission Enforcement 
   In December 1948, a letter circulated by the American Jewish Congress’s 
Commission on Law and Social Action opened with the following sharp criticism of the 
first three years of enforcement of the New York fair practices statute: 
 
The New York State Committee Against Discrimination has been in 
existence since July 1, 1945, more than three years. Yet it has failed to 
issue a single complaint against a single employer, labor union or 
employment agency. It states that there has been no occasion to do so 
since all the complaints made to it have been either adjusted or dismissed 
for lack of merit. Except for one disturbing fact, this would be a happy 
state of affairs, unparalleled in the history of regulatory legislation. No one 
knows what cases have been settled, what cases have been dismissed, or 
upon what basis or grounds the action has been taken. In other words, the 
public must accept at full face value SCAD’s claim that it has not yet 
encountered a stubborn employer who has resisted its efforts. 
        We suspect, from our own experience before SCAD, that there are 
other reasons for the refusal to issue a complaint. SCAD operates on the 
one premise that it must not antagonize the business community. 
Accordingly it appeases them in every way. It will take for settlement a 
mere promise to post notices and to behave in the future. It will not insist 
that a particular complainant be hired, even though SCAD has found that 
discrimination has been practiced against him, as long as a promise is 
effected from the employer that henceforth he will not discriminate. 
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Second, before SCAD is convinced of discrimination, it insists upon a 
degree of proof which is generally beyond the ability of the complainant to 
produce. 
        It is true that no other state FEPC—Massachusetts, Connecticut, or 
New Jersey—has issued a complaint but here again, without possessing 
the same information about their affairs as we do about SCAD, we suspect 
that they are merely following SCAD’s major strategic lines.254 
 
The list of concerns with the commission-based enforcement model was long and grew 
quickly.  The primary concerns were the following: 
• Fewer complaints came forward than had been expected; 
• The enforcement agency relied too much on individual complaints coming 
forward and did not exercise the jurisdiction it had to initiate its own 
investigations and more systemic investigations; 
• There was too much delay in the process;255 
• Relatively few cases were “substantiated” and resolved through conciliation; 
• There was very little information available about the resolutions that were 
achieved during conciliation; and 
• Very few cases were referred to a formal hearing.256 
                                                 
254 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 1, File 51, 1948-1949, Letter dated December 16, 1948, 
circulated by the Commission on Law and Social Action at 1-2. 
255 The average delay was said to be about three months, a length of time which sounds veritably speedy in 
comparison with the delays that later became typical in Ontario and across Canada. 
256 Michael A. Bamberger and Nathan Lewin, “The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement 
of Antidiscriminaiton Legislation”, [1961] 74 Harv L Rev 526; Morroe Berger, Equality by Statute: The 
Revolution in Civil Rights, Revised Edition (New York: Doubleday, 1967) at 175-214; Duane Lockard, 
Toward Equal Opportunity: A Study of State and Local Antidiscrimination Laws (New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 1968) at 73-101 for fair employment practices legislation (enforcement of fair housing 
practices legislation and fair public accommodation practices legislation are discussed in separate 
chapters); Herbert Hill, “Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical 
Analysis with Recommendations” (1964-65) 14 Buff L Rev 22; and Leon H. Mayhew, Law and Equal 
Opportunity: A Study of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1968). 
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Fair practices advocates did not think that the surprisingly low number of complaints 
reflected a corresponding low incidence of discriminatory practices.  On the contrary, 
they believed that there were a number of barriers to individuals coming forward with 
complaints.  These barriers included lack of knowledge about the legislation and about 
the option for complaint, fear of repercussions for coming forward with a complaint, and 
lack of confidence in the enforcement process. Fair practices advocates also observed that 
private pressure on the state agency was required: “Action on the part of a Jewish agency 
is needed even where a state agency dealing with fair employment practices exists.  
Experience has shown that the private agency serves as a necessary stimulus for action.257 
A 1951 Joint Memorandum of the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish 
Congress discussed the negative impact of weak enforcement and suggested that there 
may have been a brief period when at least some commissions were willing to be more 
forceful in enforcing the legislation: 
 
It is noteworthy that several state agencies charged with enforcement of such  
laws have recently shown an increasing willingness to press cases through to 
public hearing, and to issue cease-and-desist orders requiring abandonment of 
practices of discrimination found to exist. 
… 
At first, all complaints filed with these agencies were disposed of by 
conciliation and mediation. Some of the settlements attained by this method 
might not have been the best possible, but the agencies seemed to feel it 
important not to exercise their powers of compulsion and publicity in the initial 
stages of their operations. This attitude may have encouraged recalcitrance in 
some respondents who apparently felt that the agencies would rather reach an 
amicable settlement than be compelled to hold public hearings and issue cease 
and desist orders. Such recalcitrance in turn, probably led the administrative 
                                                 
257 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 4, Reel 3, 1947, Memo dated March 21, 1947 from 
Manfred Saalheimer to Saul Hayes reporting on the Plenary Session of the National Community Relations 




agencies to realize that, in the long run, an anti-discrimination law can be 
effective only if the enforcing agency shows a willingness to use in appropriate 
cases all of the enforcement powers spelled out in the law. 
        A second effect of a willingness on the part of a state agency to 
compromise complaints is to weaken the confidence of precisely those groups 
who most need the safeguards created by the laws… 
        The increased willingness of the administrative agencies to use their 
ultimate weapons, public hearings and cease and desist orders, is a major 
advance in the enforcement of state laws against discrimination. The state 
agencies enforcing such laws have apparently become aware of the value of 
open hearings in appropriate cases as an educational measure. Few newspaper 
readers find the summaries of commission reports interesting reading. On the 
other hand, a press report of a public hearing, with its drama of questioning and 
cross-examination, involving as it frequently must, respondents who are known 
in the local community, makes interesting reading matter and serves to inform 
the public of the existence and operations of the law and the state agency 
enforcing it. Hearings also serve to encourage persons feeling themselves 
discriminated against in violation of the law to invoke the provisions of the 
law.258 
 
However, as will be discussed, if there was any shift to greater use of formal enforcement 
procedures, it seems to have been short-lived.  
 
The Ontario Experience With Commission Enforcement 
Ontario’s fair practices advocates had similar experiences and concerns with the 
commission enforcement to those raised by their counterparts in the United States. They 
were concerned with the low number of complaints that came forward, with the 
investigation and conciliation process, and with the low number of complaints referred to 
adjudication.  
                                                 
258 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 5, 1952, File 9, Fair Employment Practices 
Correspondence, Joint Memorandum of the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League 
of B’nai B’rith dated September 17, 1951 at 1, 2, 5-6. 
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In relation to the lower-than-expected number of complaints, Ontario fair 
practices advocates echoed their American colleagues in rejecting the conclusion that a 
small number of complaints reflected a low incidence of discrimination.  They similarly 
preferred to explain the low number of complaints by pointing to factors such as lack of 
knowledge about the right to bring a complaint and reluctance on the part of individuals 
to bring complaints.259  The fair practices advocates argued that the government had a 
responsibility to educate the public about the new legislation, and they argued that there 
should be less reliance on individual complaints by providing for complaints by third 
parties and by enabling the state agency to initiate its own investigations. 
The question of public education was a major issue in the advocacy for fair 
practices enforcement.  The minutes of the August 1946 meeting of the JPRC Legal 
Committee record the view that “Educational work is not necessarily tied up with the 
Act, though it has been incorporated in the New York and Massachusetts legislation.”260 
There is evidence that labour and CCF activists, at least, believed that Ontario’s 
legislation should have included provisions requiring education about the new law: 
 
During debate on the bill in the legislature, CCF members expressed grave 
doubt that the proposed law would prove effective without the 
establishment of a full-time Fair Employment Practices Commission. 
They pointed out that bills presented by the opposition had been defeated 
by the argument that “discrimination could be only eliminated by 
education”.  Now the government was completely neglecting the need for 
education.261 
 
                                                 
259 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, volume 20, Notes on Reports for March 1952 at 7. 
260 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Minutes of the Meeting of the Legal Committee, Economic 
and Social Research Division, held on August 6, 1946 at 2. 
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When Ontario’s fair practices statutes were enacted, they did not expressly require the 
government to conduct education campaigns about the new legislation, and the 
government did not independently undertake education campaigns for either statute. By 
contrast, the federal fair employment practices statute, passed in 1953, included a 
provision for undertaking educational programmes, and the federal government did carry 
out educational programs that included written materials and an eight-part radio series.262  
Labour fair practices activists believed that the Ontario government had a similar 
obligation to provide public education, even if this obligation was not specifically 
required in the legislation, and pointed to the federal model as a good example to follow: 
 
The provincial FEP and other anti-discrimination laws lack any 
substantive provisions for educational work.  Thus far the Provincial 
governments concerned have failed in their duty to make the provisions of 
these laws widely known to the public at large and to the potential and 
actual victims of discrimination;...  There is no need to elaborate on this 
point - a law which is not popularized becomes a dead law.  It is therefore 
the duty of the governments concerned to institute, without any further 
delay, a proper educational campaign which would make the intent of the 
legislation and the provisions of the Acts known to as many people as 
possible.263 
                                                 
262 CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series CA, Box 49, Fair Employment Practices 
May-Dec. 1953; FEP Jan.-Apr. 1953, The Canada Fair Employment Practices Act (Queen’s Printer, 1953); 
LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, FEP Material, Legislation for Fair Employment 
Practices in Action; Report of the Joint Public Relations Committee, Central Region, 1952-1954 at 2. 
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The call for public education about the legislation also provided another opportunity for 
fair practices advocates to emphasize the complementary relationship between law and 
education, and the role of legislation as a tool for achieving compliance through 
education: 
 
Out of this experience [anti-discrimination education], organized labour 
has learned the great value of education as a part of the legislative process 
as well. It has also learned the great value of legislation as part of the 
educational process. That is why organized labour has consistently urged 
governments to not only pass fair employment practices laws but also to 
provide for broad educational programs to parallel their administration.”264 
 
Although lack of knowledge about the legislation may well have been a barrier to 
individual complaints, Ontario fair practices advocates - like those in the United States - 
believed that there were other barriers as well, in particular, fear of repercussions and 
difficulty in managing the process alone.  They emphasized the role of advocacy 
organizations in supporting individuals to bring complaints forward and their position 
was confirmed by the commissions themselves.  At a 1956 Canadian Conference of 
Commissions Against Discrimination, it was even suggested that it was more important 
in Canada than in the United States for private agencies to support fair practices 
complainants: 
 
The role of the private agency in the field of FEP in Canada assumes 
greater importance than in the States because of the weaknesses in budget 
                                                 
264 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Vol. 20, Notes on Reports of Activities for Improved 
Human Relations 1953 at 86-87, quoting from Labour on Guard editorial from “What Labour is Doing 
About Discrimination” issue. 
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and staff of the public agencies. Some of the private agencies’ functions 
are self-evident: (1) public support and public pressure for more effective 
FEP Departments; (2) maintaining close personal liaison with the 
government persons responsible for administering FEP laws; (3) 
publicizing fair practices laws and doing practical educational work, e.g. 
Conferences, reports to labour councils, etc.; (4) channeling complaints 
and advising complainants. The State Commissions mentioned that they 
had not received too high a proportion of complaints by referrals from 
private agencies.  This may have been due, in part, to the agency settling 
the complaint themselves – but this was doubted. In Canada, perhaps the 
great majority of legitimate complaints reach the government through 
referral from private agencies.265 
 
It is not necessary to try to decide whether or not private organizations had to play a 
greater role in Canada than in the United States.  The relevant point is that the state 
enforcement process needed not only individuals coming forward with complaints but 
also private support for these individuals.   
One study reported that 51% of the 311 complaints that were submitted under 
Ontario’s fair employment and fair accommodation practices statutes in the period 
between 1951 and 1959 came as referrals, and that these referrals were mostly made by 
trade unions, the JLC, and the JPRC.266  In a 1955 report, Frank Hall, Chair[man] of the 
Canadian Labour Congress’s Human Rights Committee, claimed that labour 
organizations were responsible for processing and bringing forward 75%-90% of 
                                                 
265 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 7 (1956 & 1957), 1956 File 5, Notes on Conference of 
Commissions Against Discrimination held in Toronto June 4-6, 1956 at 2.  
266 The percentage of cases referred was not a constant figure but increased and decreased during this 
period as follows:  in the period from 1951-1953, the government received 57 complaints of which 81% 
(54) were referred; in the period from 1953-1955, the government received 133 complaints of which 24% 
(32) were referred; in the period from 1955-1957, the government received 51 complaints of which 76% 
(39) were referred; in the period from 1957-1959, the government received 60 complaints, of which 55% 
(33) were referred.  See Sohn, Human Rights in Ontario at 146.  I have included data up to 1959, although 
Sohn’s data continues through until 1971.  
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complaints and stated that individuals needed assistance to ensure that their complaint 
was properly handled.267   
 The labour activists argued for enforcement by way of third-party complaints and 
state-initiated investigations, to supplement individual complaints. Both of these options 
reflected the view that there was a public interest in obtaining compliance through 
enforcement and a corresponding public responsibility to ensure that there were multiple 
ways for the discrimination to come to the enforcement agency’s attention: 
 
While it is essential to provide a procedure for the settlement of individual 
complaints, we question whether it is wise to restrict the operation of the 
administrative agency to this single avenue of approach. After all it is to 
be recognized that a violation of the law is not merely an offence against 
an individual but an offence against the people of Canada. It becomes 
therefore the duty of the administration to obtain compliance with the law 
whether or not the initiative has come from an aggrieved individual.268 
 
There is some evidence that Prof. Jacob Finkelman did not support allowing third parties 
to bring complaints: “While I am not entirely happy about the limitation as it now exists, 
nevertheless I feel it is unwise under present conditions to open the door to certain groups 
who may exploit alleged cases of violation for improper purposes.”269   However, other 
fair practices advocates continued to argue for this change and when Ontario’s Fair 
                                                 
267 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Volume 14  - Correspondence File 14-22 
Correspondence Frank Hall Chairman CLC Human Rights Committee 1956-1959, Report on developments 
in Fair Practices Field Canada Since 1955 at 1. 
268 LAC, Ontario Labour Committee for Human Rights, 1945-1972 fonds, R2870-0-0-E (formerly MG28-
I173), FEP Act Federal, Association for Civil Liberties brief on proposed federal legislation at 2. 
269 Untitled document described as Professor Finkelman’s views [on the proposed federal fair practices 
legislation] at 7, Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations 
Committee, 1953, Box 5, File 4A, Ontario Jewish Archives.  On the other hand the JPRC Legal Committee 
had recommended including provision for third-party complaints in the proposed legislation: Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Legal Committee, Economic and Social Research Division held on August 6, 1946 at 1, 
Legal Committee Minutes July 1946 - November 1957, Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, 
Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, Ontario Jewish Archives. 
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Accommodations Practices Act was passed, it authorized inquiries into “the complaint of 
any person that a contravention of this Act has taken place”,270  which is to be 
distinguished from a complaint made by an individual alleging that they had been the 
subject of discriminatory conduct. 
State-initiated investigations were also seen as having the advantage of 
approaching issues in a more systemic way.271  For example, the historical record 
suggests that the Fair Employment Practices Branch achieved success in eliminating 
discriminatory questions from applications for employment and employment 
questionnaires, by taking a proactive and systemic approach to addressing this problem: 
they required employers to submit these documents for review, advised employers of any 
changes required, and could follow-up to ensure that the changes were in fact made: 
 
From 16,000 to 18,000 letters had gone out to employers throughout 
Ontario asking them to submit their employment application forms to have 
the Department scrutinize them for their propriety under the new 
regulations.  Mr. Fine said that 98% of the firms reached had replied.  The 
interpretation of the regulations on application form wording had been 
very strongly applied.  Photographs of applicants were among those things 
forbidden. 272 
 
The agency’s work on application forms was described by Ben Kayfetz (JPRC) as 
“probably the biggest job achieved by the FEP Act”.273 
                                                 
270 FEPA, s. 4(1). 
271 CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series CA, Box 49, File 452, Fair Employment 
Practice 1952, Letter dated November 26, 1952 from B.G. Kayfetz to E.Z. Palteil.  
272 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 4, File: Minutes (JCRC Only) 1951 2, Minutes of 
Meeting of the JCRC held on November 27, 1951.  
273 CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series CA, Box 49, FEP Jan.-Apr. 1953 452, 
Letter dated January 19, 1953 from B.G. Kayfetz to Saul Hayes at 2.  
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Increasing the number of complaints was, however, only part of the strategy to 
improve enforcement.  The labour activists also had concerns about how complaints were 
handled when they did come forward.  They claimed that the state did not take its 
enforcement responsibilities seriously when complaints did come forward and that this 
sent a message that fair practices legislation did not need to be taken seriously: 
 
While the labour movement accepted the introduction of the Fair 
Employment Practices Act as a step in the right direction, we are not 
satisfied with the Act in operation. Very little has been done along 
educational lines to acquaint the people of Ontario with the purposes of 
the legislation, and investigations under the Act have been half-hearted 
and slow.  It seems to us that no effort is being made by the government 
either by education or law enforcement, to inform the people of Ontario as 
to the evils of discriminatory practices.274 
 
 The labour activists and ACL also had concerns both about the structure and the 
implementation of the enforcement process.  Their structural concerns were that there 
was not a separate agency entrusted with fair practices enforcement, and that the Fair 
Employment Practices Branch of the Department of Labour, which was responsible for 
enforcing all of the fair practices statutes, was under-resourced.  Early on, the JPRC 
Legal Committee had expressed the view that the expense of establishing a separate 
                                                 
274 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 20, File: Fair Practices 
Conference Ontario Federation of Labour 1954, “A Statement of Legislative Proposals of the 
Ontario Federation of Labour, CCL., to the Premier and other Ministers of the Government of 
Ontario” at 5.  And as Kaplansky (JLC) argued in 1954: “… even those who are familiar with the 
provisions of the acts do not consider them in the same light as other legislative and administrative 
enactments. The feeling still prevails that even though these acts are on the statute books, they do 
not have to be observed in the same manner as other laws. … Primarily … it is the duty of the 
Provincial Government to enforce to the letter the provisions of its own legislation, if these acts 
are not to become a mockery. Delay, procrastination, biased and inefficient investigations, tend to 
place these laws in disrepute. And it is only natural that if one branch of the law-making 
machinery breaks down, it undermines the entire fabric of laws in our society.”  LAC, JLC 1925-
1978, Vol. 34, File 34-12, Address by Kalmen Kaplansky Address to the First Fair Practices 
Education Conference of the AFL-TLC, October 31, 1954 at 3, 4. 
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commission made this an unrealistic option, and suggested responsibility for enforcement 
could be given either to the Attorney General’s office or to an existing agency, such as 
the Industry and Labor Board.275  Although during their campaigns for the legislation the 
fair practices advocates requested a separate agency, there is some evidence that, after 
both fair practices statutes were in place, the JPRC may not have believed that a single 
and separate enforcement agency was necessary.276  However, the labour and ACL 
activists were strongly of this view and repeatedly included this in their requests for 
improvements to the enforcement process. 
 On the issue of resources, the Fair Employment Practices Branch was staffed on a 
part-time basis; only the Director’s position was full-time.  Fair practices advocates 
argued that this level of resources did not provide the new branch with adequate staffing 
to function effectively, and that inadequate staffing levels contributed to delays in the 
process. 
 On the question of implementation, the fair practices advocates had concerns 
about delays in the enforcement process, about the quality of investigations conducted, 
and about the reluctance to refer complaints for adjudication.277  There is little detail 
about the precise extent of the delays experienced, but it is reasonable to surmise that 
staffing levels would have had an impact on how quickly the process functioned.  
                                                 
275 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Central Region Legal Committee Minutes Jul. 1946-Nov. 
1957, Minutes of the Meeting of the Legal Committee, Economic and Social Research Division held 
August 6, 1946. 
276 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, CJC Central Region Legal Committee Minutes, July 1946 - 
Nov. 1957, Minutes of the Special Legal Committee on Anti-Discrimination Laws Held on Sept. 28, 1955 
at 2. 
277 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Letter dated February 26, 1951 from The Association for 
Civil Liberties to Premier Frost.  
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Expressed concerns about the quality of investigations seem to have reflected a broad 
concern about the outcome of complaints in the conciliation process, even though the fair 
practices advocates do not appear to have specifically framed their concerns in relation to 
the outcomes of conciliations.  In a 1961 study, Herbert Sohn reported that 156 
complaints were filed under the Fair Employment Practices Act, of which 105 involved 
allegations that the employer asked questions that violated the statute, or used advertising 
or an application form that violated the statute.  Of the remaining 51 complaints, Sohn 
provided information on the outcomes for 45 of the cases, as follows:  
- four complaints were found to be valid;  
- three complaints were found to be outside the protection of the statute; 
- three complaints could not be interpreted, established or denied; and 
- 35 complaints were found to be invalid.278  
It appears that in the four cases where the complaints were found to be valid, a resolution 
was achieved by voluntary settlement. As with the United States data, there is no 
information about the substance of the complaints and no explanation for why over 75% 
of the complaints were found to be invalid. In the absence of such information, there is no 
way to assess whether more than four cases could or should have been found to be valid.  
Nevertheless, these complaint resolution data raise questions about whether the low rates 
of substantiated complaints were primarily due to lack of merit or whether, in some cases 
at least, the government agency was not able to gather sufficient evidence to establish a 
                                                 
278 Herbert A. Sohn, Fair Employment Practices in Ontario: Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward the Fair 
Employment Practices Act Expressed by Employers Charged under the Act (M.S.W. Thesis, School of 
Social Work, University of Toronto, 1961) at 69-77 [Sohn, Fair Employment Practices].  
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prima facie case of discrimination, or whether those dealing with the complaints lacked 
the requisite understanding or expertise to deal with them properly. In his retrospective 
reflections on this period, Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) commented that the emphasis on 
conciliation had the pragmatic objective of seeking to minimize opposition to fair 
practices legislation, but was not easy in practice:  
 
        It is characteristic of our defensive and cautious attitude during these 
days that Wismer underlined the work [sic] "conciliation", totally ignoring 
the punitive aspects of the proposed legislation.  This was our main selling 
point - that legislation would provide for investigation and conciliation, 
based on the notion that most offenders in this area were people of good 
will and that once their discriminatory actions were revealed, and brought 
to their attention and explained, they would cease being discriminatory 
and there would be no need for any punitive action.  It was a good 
approach to minimize opposition to legislation, but experience proved that 
it wasn't that easy.279 
 
On the issue of referrals to adjudication, there is no record of any fair employment 
practices or equal pay cases being referred to either of the two adjudication options, 
namely, civil hearing before a commission or quasi-criminal prosecution in court. The 
few cases that did find their way to adjudication were fair accommodation practices 
cases, and these were only referred as a result of pressure from fair practices activists.  As 
Claude Jodin stated, for example:   
 
While we have no quarrel with the conciliation processes used in the 
handling of the complaints, it seems to us that when decisive action has to 
be taken by the Department of Labor in approving court action, there 
seems to be very little willingness to go through with this necessary 
process on the part of the Department of Labor. Generally we have a 
feeling that the Department of Labor has to be forced in actuality by 
                                                 
279 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984 volume 20, Notes on Reports 1948 at 45. 
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public opinion to take the necessary action. We look forward for a much 
more sympathetic approach on the part of the Government to enforce its 
own legislation.280 
 
Two infamous cases in 1955 highlighted this tension between rigorous enforcement and 
caving to prevailing community views. They involved two Dresden restaurant owners 
who openly refused to comply with the fair accommodation practices legislation after it 
was passed.  At the commission hearing, the restaurant owners admitted that they had not 
complied with the law and that they had no intention of doing so.  Alan Borovoy wrote 
that the government initially refused to make the commission’s report public or to 
prosecute, and released the report only in response to public pressure.  The government 
also agreed to prosecute only after more public pressure and controversy. The magistrate 
convicted the restaurant owners, but this conviction was overturned on appeal.  In one of 
the appeal cases, the appeal judge held that there was no express intention to deny service 
because the complainant was not specifically told that she would not be served but was 
only left unserved. In the other case, the judge held that there was no denial of service 
because the server said they were “too busy” to provide service.  The judge also held that 
the restaurant owner could not be held responsible for the actions of the servers and that 
there was not enough evidence to show that the conduct was because of race or color.281  
One of the hotel owners was prosecuted again the following year, this time 
                                                 
280 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Vol. 15, Correspondence, File 15-15, Address by Claude Jodin, Joint Labour 
Committee for Human Rights (1959) at 2-3. 
281 Borovoy, “Fair Accommodation” at 15-20. The judge who decided the first appeal was Grosch J., who 
happened also to be a member of the Beach O’Pines Protective Association which defended the restrictive 
covenant in Noble v. Alley  – see Pearlston, “Restricted Country”. 
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successfully.282  However, in 1958, the government withdrew a prosecution against a 
Chatham hotel owner that was initiated after a waiter in the hotel restaurant had refused 
to serve three black customers on the grounds that the hotel had a policy against serving 
“Negroes”.  The government’s stated reason for withdrawing the prosecutions was that it 
did not have evidence to establish that the hotel owner was responsible for the refusal to 
serve.283 
The Ontario government’s approach to enforcing the fair employment and fair 
accommodation statutes was similarly experienced in relation to the equal pay legislation.  
Labour activists reported that they were disappointed with how equal pay legislation was 
enforced by the government and that most issues were being addressed under collective 
agreements:  
 
Experience under this legislation has been unsatisfactory. Labour leaders 
who have processed the one or two complaints filed under the act in 
Ontario felt that the complainants did not receive redress and were 
inadequately protected. Most equal pay complaints are processed under 
equal pay provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 
        However it is felt that the laws have had beneficial effects in 
educating the employer and the public to the injustice of different scales of 
pay for women doing the same work as men.”284  
 
Shirley Tillotson has written that no commissions were appointed on any of the 12 equal 
pay cases in which complaints were brought, and that the only cases which resulted in 
any improvements in women’s wages were cases in which the employer voluntarily 
                                                 
282 Regina Ex. Rel. Nutland v. McKay (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 403 at 409 (Ont. Co. Ct.). 
283 For discussion of these cases see Borovoy, “Fair Accommodation” and MacDonald, “Race Relations” at 
124-125.  
284 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Volume 14 - Correspondence , File 14-22 Correspondence Frank Hall Chairman 
CLC Human Rights Committee 1956-1959, “Report on Developments in Fair Practices Field in Canada 
Since 1955” at 3. 
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agreed to the improvement.  She also wrote that Louis Fine, who was appointed director 
of the Fair Employment Practices Branch in 1951, took a very narrow approach to 
interpreting the statute and displayed hostility to initiatives to enforce it.285 Her overall 
conclusion was that the statute had some limited educational benefits and achieved some 
minimal improvements in women’s wages, but that the potentially coercive enforcement 
methods were not available when employers or bureaucrats were hostile to women’s 
claims.286 
According to Morris Schumiachter, the Saskatchewan government was similarly 
reluctant to apply formal enforcement of the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, 1947, under 
which quasi-criminal enforcement was the only adjudicative option. In a 1949 letter to 
Heinz Frank at the Canadian Jewish Congress, Shumiatcher recorded that there had been 
no prosecutions, that discriminatory advertisements were dealt with by warnings, and that 
proving discrimination in employment would be almost impossible and reached the 
conclusion that there was little opportunity for coercive enforcement.287 
 Ontario labour activists argued for two changes to address their enforcement 
concerns. One request was that the government establish a separate agency, appropriately 
                                                 
285 Tillotson, “Human Rights as Prism” at 544-546.   
286 Tillotson, “Human Rights as Prism” at 557. 
287 “Thus, it is seen that the principal value of an Act of this sort arises from the educational value which it 
obviously has. It is impossible to legislate people into the Kingdom of Heaven, or to improve them 
materially simply by writing pious hopes or desirable principles into the statute book. What such legislation 
does accomplish, however, is that it serves notice upon all persons in the province to the effect that the vast 
majority of people in the province, through their Legislature, subscribe to certain very definite principles. 
Among these principles is one which regards the rights of all persons within the province to be equal, and 
which disapproves of the practice of discrimination against any minority group. The sanction of public 
opinion then is brought to bear upon those persons who would engage in practices connoting racial 
discrimination. Herein, lies one of the principal advantages of the statute.”  LAC, Kaplansky, 
Commentaries 1946-1984, Volume 20, K. Kaplansky Notes on Reports 1949 at 7, 9. 
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staffed in terms of numbers and expertise.288  Their second request was that the 
government establish a Citizens’ Advisory Committee to work with the agency.  The role 
of the Citizens’ Advisory Committee would be to lend community expertise to the 
government’s anti-discrimination education and enforcement activities.289  The call for a 
Citizens’ Advisory Committee reflected the position that there was a subject-matter 
expertise in discrimination that was different from legal expertise and that was relevant to 
the implementation and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation.  A Citizens’ 
Advisory Committee would also provide an opportunity for citizens to be directly 
involved in the work of the agency responsible for enforcing the fair practices legislation.  
Establishing a separate fair practices enforcement agency, with appropriate 
staffing, might in principle reduce delays and improve the conciliation process.  It was 
less likely, however, that a separate fair practices enforcement agency would change how 
the state approached the role of adjudication in the fair practices enforcement process. 
                                                 
288 For example: “It is high time that Premier Frost appointed a separate commission, a special branch of 
his government, to deal with and administer all the anti-discrimination legislation that Premier Frost is so 
proud of.  The men on this commission should be men of high calibre, especially competent and 
experienced in work concerning prejudice and discrimination, and inter-group relations.  Where such 
special Commissions have been appointed in several of the Northern States, many of them in existence for 
many years - there has been no hint of the kind of inefficiency and reluctance to act; reluctance to carry out 
its own anti-discrimination legislation - that this province is plagued with; and has been plagued with ever 
since the legislation was passed.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 3, Articles 
and Speeches: Miscellaneous 1948-1958 3-4, File #3 Part 1 of 2, “The Conservative Government and the 
Dresden Issue” at 5. 
289 For example: “We expressed to the Minister our feeling that in this legislation, where so much emphasis 
is placed on education, persuasion and conciliation to secure compliance, a Citizens’ Advisory Committee 
can serve a valuable function. The establishment of an advisory body would make available to his 
Department, on a regular basis, the experience of community, church, labour and employer organizations in 
dealing with problems of prejudice and discrimination. It would afford the interested non-governmental 
bodies an opportunity to meet with the Department to discuss such matters as the special problems of 
discrimination which might exist in certain occupational or geographic areas of employment: new and more 
effective methods of providing information on fair practices legislation to the public, and the assistance of 
voluntary agencies in furthering the elimination of discrimination.” OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, 
JCRC, Box 8 (1957 & 1958), 1957 File 15: Fair Employment Practice Correspondence, “Talk by Frank 
Hall, Chairman, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Canadian Labour Congress” at 4-5. 
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The Ontario government’s reluctance to employ the coercive power of law was consistent 
with its stated policy that the purpose of the legislation was to eliminate discrimination 
through persuasion, not prosecution:  
 
The Minister of Labour has stated, when the Act was introduced, it was 
not considered as a means of prosecuting and obtaining convictions for 
breaches of it but designed to encourage the people of this province to 
eliminate discrimination because it is undesirable in human society.290 
 
This policy was, of course, entirely consistent with the arguments about enforcement that 
the fair practices advocates made during their campaigns for the legislation.  However, 
although the fair practices advocates may have argued – and even expected – that there 
would be little need for recourse to adjudication through commission hearings or 
prosecution, it is equally clear that they sought access to the coercive power of law for 
those situations where it was needed.  
The fair practices enforcement model placed the state in the middle of disputes to 
which it was not directly a party.  Referring cases to adjudication, whether to a 
commission hearing or to a prosecution, effectively required the state to align itself with 
the complainant. These facts, alone, may have made some government officials reluctant 
to engage the coercive power of law.  However, there was another potential barrier to 
dealing with  discrimination cases through adjudication. Direct discrimination, the 
conduct targeted by fair practices legislation, has an “intent” or mental component as well 
as a conduct component.  Where a claim of direct discrimination can be established, the 
                                                 
290 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, Vol. 23, File 23-8 , “Information on The Fair Accommodation Practices Act for 
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nature of the wrong is that people are treated in a negative way because of their race, 
religion or national origin.  Therefore, establishing a claim of discrimination required 
evidence of both a respondent choosing  to engage in differential treatment based on 
prohibited grounds of discrimination and the conduct that flowed from this intent. 
Direct discrimination claims are relatively straightforward where a respondent 
admits to intentional differentiation or where there is publicly available evidence of 
intentionally differential treatment.  Examples of publically available evidence included 
signs, advertisements, and written policies that explicitly contemplate or require 
differential treatment based on prohibited grounds of discrimination.291  However, where 
intent to differentiate was not openly expressed and the respondent did not admit to the 
intent, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to prove direct discrimination.  
A 1949 article captured the fundamental challenge associated with proving individual 
claims of direct discrimination in the absence of clear evidence or an admission: 
 
… discrimination may exist independently of malice or intention to 
discriminate. 
          Nevertheless, the essential element of discrimination in its legal 
context is the mental process of the alleged discriminator.  An employer 
who has decided to hire a white rather than a Negro stenographer has 
made a choice adversely affecting the Negro.  But the choice is in itself 
not discriminatory unless race is a consideration in the formulation of that 
choice. It is in identifying these mental processes in individual cases that 
legal proof of discrimination can be distinguished from its sociological 
counterpart. The sociologist, whose primary interest is group behavior, is 
not concerned with whether single actions within a total behavior pattern 
are themselves acts of discrimination.  He looks primarily to the social 
effects of the general pattern to determine whether the pattern is 
discriminatory. In dealing with the unequal treatment of Negroes and 
                                                 




whites in a particular region, community, or industry, the sociologist has a 
collection of single instances of unequal treatment from which he may 
detect race as the single element always accompanying the unequal 
treatment. Thus by an inductive process he may conclude that race, the 
common element in one group as well as the distinguishing element 
between the groups, is the cause of the unequal treatment. The lawyer, on 
the other hand, because he is, in many cases, forced to deal merely with a 
single instance of unequal treatment is deprived of other instances with 
which he can make a comparison. As a result he must look directly to the 
mental processes of the alleged discriminator in order to determine 
whether there has been discrimination. 292  
 
When fair practices advocates argued in the campaigns for legislation that discrimination 
would be “easy” to prove, their claims depended on the respondent admitting to 
differential treatment based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, or the availability 
of other evidence of differential treatment based on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.  As has been noted, the cases under the fair practices statutes involved 
individual complaints of direct discrimination.  With these cases, if there was no publicly 
                                                 
292 “An American Legal Dilemma – Proof of Discrimination” (1949-1950) 17 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 
109-110, published as a Note prepared by the Editorial Board, with no specific author identified. 
In his 1997 book, From Direct Action to Affirmative Action: Fair Employment Law and Policy, 
1933-1972 (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1997) at 119-120, Paul 
Moreno similarly captured this tension between individual discrimination claims, the group aspect 
of individual discrimination claims, and systemic approaches to understanding discrimination as 
follows:   
     “… the commission was created to protect individuals against arbitrary discrimination in 
employment, but often concerned itself with opening opportunities for minority groups in entire 
industries. This confusion was perhaps inherent in the problem of protecting individuals from 
suffering discrimination based on their membership in a racial group. … Underneath these 
differences about individual or group focus, and the appropriate administrative machinery, lay the 
fundamental question of the nature of discrimination. The individual complaint procedure was 
based on the idea that discrimination consisted of discrete, identifiable instances of unequal 
treatment, while the pattern-centered approach implicitly regarded discrimination as systemic, 
unintentional, and impersonal.  
     The implications of these ambivalent approaches were profound, bringing into question the nature of 
discrimination. … the civil rights groups suggested that discrimination was not an act by particular 
employers against individuals, but a group phenomenon, with blacks as a group needed protection… The 
commission likewise was confused on whether it should apply a legal standard to individual cases, or a 
sociological approach to groups.” 
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available evidence of intentional differentiation and if the respondent took the position 
that the conduct was not linked to a prohibited ground of discrimination, discrimination 
could be proved only if the adjudicator was prepared to decide that the respondent’s 
explanation for their conduct was not a reasonable alternative to an inference or a 
presumption of intentional differentiation. The difficulty of proving discrimination was 
undoubtedly at least one factor that affected both the conciliation outcomes and decisions 
about taking unresolved cases to adjudication. 
 
2     Fair Practices Advocates’ and Citizens’ Enforcement Role and Responsibilities 
The fair practices advocates believed that they, and all citizens, had a 
responsibility to ensure that the fair practices goals were fulfilled and that attention was 
brought to bear on situations where the goals were being contravened. Labour activists 
argued that they had a responsibility to step into the public education breach created by 
the government’s failure to provide education about the legislation: 
 
        Lack of information about the Act is seen as one reason for the small 
number of formal complaints, according to a recent editorial in the 
Toronto Star.  The Ontario Federation of Labor, in this year's brief to the 
Ontario government, asked that the Department of Labor undertake a 
program of public education along the lines followed by the New York 
State Commission Against Discrimination.  In the meantime, it has been 
the policy of the Toronto Committee to carry on educational activities in 
the local unions, and to provide as much information about the FEP Act as 
is possible within the limitations of our resources.  ..."293 
 
                                                 
293 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Vol. 20, Reports on Activities for Improved Human 
Relations, 1952, Report for March at 7. 
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Labour activists also saw themselves, as well as their memberships, as having 
responsibilities to ensure that violations were noticed and that appropriate responsive 
measures were taken:  
 
       It is the duty of our national and local officers, committeemen and 
shop stewards to explain the provisions of these laws to the members at 
large and to be on the look-out continually for infractions of these laws 
and regulations.  Only when there is a sufficient number of people 
constantly on the alert, ready to help in case of need, prepared to approach 
the proper authorities for the purpose of enforcing these laws, only then 
can we hope to translate these acts into living instruments for the 
improvement of the lot of our people.  This is where education and social 
action have such an important part to play in eradicating intolerance and 
injustice.294 
 
Labour activists held annual fair practices conferences and established or maintained 
existing committees to continue anti-discrimination education and advocacy.295 They 
argued that fair practices statutes “belonged” primarily to the people for whose benefit 
they were enacted.  They urged racial and religious minority workers to understand that 
fair practices provisions were their rights, and they emphasized that workers needed to 
assert these rights in order for them to be effective: 
 
Complete protection is not yet available, but Canada has gone a long way 
towards establishing the basic rights of workers to fair employment 
practices. These are your rights; the laws were passed for your protection 
                                                 
294 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 3, Articles and Speeches: Miscellaneous 
1948-1958 3-1, File #1 Part 1 of 2, “A Survey of Group Relations in Canada”, An address by Kalmen 
Kaplansky, to be presented on May 1st, 1954 at the Third Annual Fair Employment Practices Conference 
of the Ontario Federation of Labor at 5-6. 
295 LAC, Kaplansky, Commentaries 1946-1984, Vol. 20, Notes on Reports 1952, Report for April at 1-2, 
referencing the First Ontario Federation of Labour Conference in 1952. 
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– it is up to you to safeguard these rights and keep them from falling into 
disuse.296 
 
In a 1952 address to the Ontario Federation of Labor Convention, Eamon Park, who was 
at that time the Legislation Representative for the United Steelworkers of America and 
co-chair of the Toronto Joint Labour Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, described 
unions as having a responsibility to work directly with their memberships as well as to 
assist with seeking enforcement of the new legislation.297 
The JPRC also saw itself and citizens at large as having responsibilities relating to 
enforcement, but they focused more on responsibilities relating to enforcement as such 
than responsibilities for education.  Ben Kayfetz described the JPRC and all citizens as 
having a responsibility to ensure that statutes, once enacted, were then implemented: 
 
I feel we would be more than derelict in our duty if we sat back and were 
satisfied with the existence of these statutes on the books.  We must as 
B’nai B’rith members, as Jews and as citizens consolidate the advances 
and gains that have been made and only through a more intense follow-up 
                                                 
296 LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, File 3-5, These Are Your Rights Under 
Federal and Provincial Fair Employment Practices Legislation (Montreal: Canadian Labour Reports, 
1954) at 10. 
297 “The responsibility of the unions in working under the F.E.P. Act is a two-fold one. First comes 
the responsibility of dealing with complaints of discrimination at the local level. The actual 
process of making a complaint to the F.E.P. Branch is not very complicated; but it is essential that 
local union officers know how to go about it, and understand what is to be expected from the 
governmental agency in following up the complaint. … A second part of our responsibility is that 
of educating ourselves in the direction of better understanding each other’s backgrounds and 
problems, so that petty frictions and hostilities within our own ranks will be reduced to a 
minimum. Honest differences of opinion are bound to exist in any democratic organization. But 
democratic organizations have no place for antagonism based on a person’s nationality, racial 
origin, or religious conviction. …Lobbying and public relations activities can be carried out by a 
few people. Educational activities, on the other hand, demand the co-operation of everyone.”  
LAC, JLC 1925-1978, volume 13, File 13-19 – Correspondence, Address by Eamon Park to OFL 
1952 Convention at 3, 4. 
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and personal implementation can we help make these statutes an effective 
instrument for better citizenship.298 
 
Saul Hayes described the JPRC as focusing its resources on law rather than on 
education.299  In 1956, Prof. Albert Rose, a professor of social work at the University of 
Toronto, expressed the view that there was an over-representation of lawyers on the 
JPRC, that the JPRC had become disconnected from the community, and that the work of 
the JPRC had become too focused on individual cases and did not give enough attention 
to bigger questions, including job discrimination.300   In his response, Ben Kayfetz 
(JPRC) acknowledged that lawyers, including legal academics, constituted 40% of the 
JPRC’s membership, but disagreed with that the JPRC’s work had shifted away from 
important issues, including job discrimination, and maintained that lawyer members had 
not skewed the Committee’s work.301  
The high proportion of lawyers involved with the JPRC is interesting and 
noteworthy.  It is not surprising that these lawyer members, and the MPP representatives, 
would have been interested in pursuing legislation and its enforcement as tools in the 
                                                 
298 B.G. Kayfetz Speech about the Enactment of the Fair Accommodation Practices Act at 6, Canadian 
Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, 1954 Box 6, 
1954, File 24, Ontario Jewish Archives. 
299 “The J.P.R.C. does not spend much energy on general educational programmes in the firm conviction 
that it cannot amass the resources necessary.  It therefore concentrates on law and social action as its 
highest priority for action.  It goes all-out to eliminate discrimination.  It is not as concerned with prejudice 
believing the resources necessary to eliminate prejudice are too elusive.  It stimulates only such education 
programme as directly relates to its legal and legislative agenda.” LAC, JLC 1925-1978, File 20-8 – 
Canadian Jewish Congress National Office 1955-56 Assembly Papers – Jewish Community Relations – 
General Assembly – Nov. 1956 Saul Hayes, “Jewish Community Relations in Canada”, Item #4 at 5-6. 
300OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 7 (1956 & 1957), File 11:  Central Region J.P.R.C. 
Correspondence Letter from Albert Rose to Sydney Harris dated Nov. 15, 1956.  Prof. Rose also expressed 
the view that there were not enough women on the JPRC. 
301 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 7 (1956 & 1957), File 11:  Central Region J.P.R.C. 
Correspondence Canadian Jewish Congress, Memo from B.G. Kayfetz to S.M. Harris dated Nov. 22, 1956. 
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struggle against discrimination.  However, I see no evidence in the historical record that 
they were interested in law for its own sake.  In my view, the JPRC lawyer members 
were early “cause lawyers”, interested in the potential of law as a tool for social action 
and for achieving concrete social improvement. 
In 1958, the Ontario legislature passed The Ontario Anti-Discrimination 
Commission Act, 1958.  This statute provided for the creation of a new agency, the 
Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission, which would have authority to advise the 
Minister of Labour on the administration of the fair practices statutes, to make 
recommendations designed to improve this administration, and to develop and conduct an 
educational programme to give the public knowledge about the statutes and to promote 
the elimination of discriminatory practices.302  The effect of this change was to create 
some government “educational” responsibilities, but also to separate these from the 
“enforcement responsibilities”, which remained with the FEPB of the Department of 
Labour.    
In 1961, the government passed legislation to rename the new commission the 
Ontario Human Rights Commission, but without changing its role or responsibilities.303  
In his statement to the legislature introducing this proposed change, Premier Frost 
emphasized the more positive and universal connotation of the different nomenclature: 
 
Arising out of our people’s basic belief in justice for men and women of 
all races and creeds, various laws have been enacted to give formal 
expression to our concept of human rights, to strengthen the fabric of our 
                                                 
302 SO 1958, c 70, s. 3. 
303 The Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission Amendment Act, 1960-61, SO 1960-61, c 63, s 2. 
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freedom and guarantee of equality of opportunity for all, regardless of race 
or religion. 
… 
In order to strengthen the educational arm of our program, the Ontario 
Anti-Discrimination Commission will be re-named the Ontario Human 
Rights Commission. This will be in line with the positive approach to 
human rights which encompasses all of the people of Ontario.304 
 
The fair practices statutes were absorbed into the Ontario Human Rights Code in 1962, as 
the first Canadian anti-discrimination human rights statute. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter One 
 Advocates for fair practices statutes sought this legislation as a tool to redefine 
particular social norms and to provide a legal process for addressing conduct that failed to 
comply with the redefined norms.  In form, the fair practices statutes were also part of a 
developing new approach to civil law, where the state was responsible for administering 
and enforcing legal norms rather than the courts.  The brief history of Ontario’s fair 
practices raises several questions about the promise and practice of this new form of law 
as a tool in struggles against social inequalities.    
 Four questions stand out for me in relation to the subsequent evolution of human 
rights law and practice in Ontario.  One question concerns the extent to which the fair 
practices statutes moved beyond the quasi-criminal roots of their predecessor anti-
discrimination legislation.  The second question concerns the equivocal role of the 
coercive power of law in the enforcement model and implementation.  The third question 
                                                 
304 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 26th Parl., 2nd Sess. No 40 (14 
February 1961) at 1100. 
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concerns the tensions between public and private roles and responsibilities in using law to 
address social inequalities.  The fourth and final question concerns the extent to which 
individual claims reflected the social experiences of discrimination and could provide 
meaningful redress for this discrimination. 
 On the question of the relationship between fair practices statutes and their anti-
discrimination predecessors, Walter Tarnopolsky characterized Ontario’s Racial 
Discrimination Act and other early anti-discrimination legislation as quasi-criminal 
statutes.305  He argued that the quasi-criminal enforcement process was not very effective 
for a number of reasons: victims of discrimination could not initiate criminal actions; it 
was difficult to meet the evidentiary test of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
prohibited conduct had occurred; judges were reluctant to convict; and the sanction was a 
fine, which did not provide a remedy for the victim of discrimination.306  In 
Tarnopolsky’s view, the fair practices legislation and the enforcement model they 
established were a significant improvement over the earlier anti-discrimination legislation 
because they were civil statutes which shifted the focus away from determining fault on 
the part of the alleged perpetrator and instead towards providing remedies for the 
victim.307  
 It is also interesting that in one of the few prosecutions under the Fair 
Accommodation Practices Act, the defendant challenged the constitutional validity of the 
legislation on the ground that it was ultra vires the provincial legislature because it was in 
                                                 
305 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand” at 568-569. 
306 See also the similar observations about court enforcement in the United States context in Will Maslow 
and Joseph B. Robison, “Civil Rights Legislation and The Right for Equality, 1862-1952” (1953) 20 Univ. 
Chicago L.R. 363 at 406 
307 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand” at 568-569. 
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fact criminal legislation.  County Court Justice Lang dismissed the argument, and in the 
course of doing so expressed the view that the statute did not deal with the promotion of 
public morals or the prevention of public wrongs but, rather, that it “create[d] a new civil 
right”.308   
 When we assess the historical record, though, we may ask whether the fair 
practices statutes did, in fact, move that far away from their quasi-criminal roots.   It is 
true that in legal form the primary enforcement process under the fair practices was a 
civil process.  The ultimate goal of this process may also have been to provide a remedy 
for the “victim” of discrimination rather than to punish a “perpetrator” of discrimination.  
However, if the respondent to a complaint did not agree in conciliation to provide a 
remedy, a remedy could be provided only if there was a judgment that the respondent 
engaged in discrimination, and the focus of this judgment was the person whose conduct 
was under legal scrutiny.  Moreover, since the form of discrimination targeted by the fair 
practices legislation was direct discrimination, an intentional element was necessary to 
establish a violation of the legal norm.  Therefore, it was more complicated in the 
enforcement context to maintain the distinction between discriminatory conduct and 
prejudicial attitudes that had been central to the argument for using law against 
discrimination.  This intentional component also bore some resemblance to the mens rea 
component of discrimination as a quasi-criminal offence. 
 On the question of the equivocal role of coercion in the fair practices enforcement 
process, this equivocation was embedded in the advocacy for legislation, in the 
                                                 
308 Regina Ex. Rel. Nutland v. McKay (1956), 5 DLR (2d) 403 at 409 (Ont. Co. Ct.). 
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enforcement model adopted, and in the implementation of the model.  The underlying 
premise of the advocacy and the model was that access to coercive power was a 
necessary element of the scheme but an element that would have effect more in principle 
than in practice.  The fair practices enforcement model also placed access to coercion 
exclusively in the hands of the state, putting the state in the middle of the dispute between 
complainant and respondent.  The short history of fair practices implementation 
demonstrated significant reluctance on the part of the state to use the coercive power of 
legal process, raising questions about whether there really was access to coercive power 
and, if there was not, what might be the impact of lack of access to coercive power on the 
enforcement process as a whole. 
 On the question of the tensions between public and private roles and 
responsibilities in using law to address social inequalities, the campaigns for fair 
practices legislation and enforcement illustrate a rich approach to the public and social 
responsibility, including the state, community and social organizations.  The role of the 
state in the enforcement processes was also important in relation to this question, as it 
was in relation to the question of access to the coercive power of law. 
 On the question of the relationship between individual claims and systemic 
discrimination, the historical record shows that this tension was recognized as soon as the 
legislation and enforcement model were in place, along with tension between the 
competing roles of legal process and other methods of working to address the systemic 
dimensions of discrimination. 
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 Some of these tensions remained after the enactment of the statute creating the 
Ontario Human Rights Commission.  In Chapter Two, I examine the interaction between 
social relations, legal norms, and legal process in the context of the effort to extend fair 
practices protection to include discrimination in rental housing, and the resulting 
litigation that challenged the legitimacy of both the promise and the practice of human 
rights legislation in Ontario.  This second case study focuses in particular on questions 
relating to the on-going connection between human rights law and criminal law, and 

































Social Relations, Legal Norms and Legal Process:  
Ontario’s Human Rights Code, Human Rights Commission and  
Bell v. McKay, 1956-1972 
 
 
Introduction to Chapter Two 
 
 
[T]he case analysis demonstrates the opportunity for choice in legal 
method: choice as to which precedents are relevant and which approach to 
statutory interpretation is preferred; and choice as to whether the ideas of 
the mainstream or those of the margins are appropriate. …. Thus, the 
opportunity for choice of outcome, positive as it appears, will not 
automatically lead to legal results which successfully challenge “vested 
interests” or the “status quo,” especially in relation to the law itself.309 
 
Examining legal norms through the lens of social relations invites us to examine 
how the requirements of legal norms are designed to shape social relations, and to give 
effect to particular social values.  Examining how legal processes respond to claims based 
on these legal norms invites us to consider how legal process can either support or 
undermine the effect of legal norms.  
For example, fair accommodation practices legislation drew upon the common 
law obligation on innkeepers to serve all travelers, unless the innkeeper could 
demonstrate a justifiable reason for refusing service. This common law obligation 
developed in the context of a constituting “innkeeper” and traveler” as social roles, and 
constituted a corresponding social relation between “innkeeper” and “traveler”.  The 
rationale for the legal obligation was grounded in the material realities of being a traveler 
                                                 
309 Mary Jane Mossman, “Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes” in Martha Albertson 
Fineman and Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., At the Boundaries of Law (New York & London: Routledge, 
1991) at 296-297. 
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in medieval England.310  It did not develop from the particular circumstances of an 
individual innkeeper or an individual traveler.  However, the fact that a legal obligation 
was grounded in the constitution of a social relation did not mean the obligation would 
always be accepted, or that its enforcement would be straightforward or uncomplicated.  
Once legal process became involved, there were a plethora of avenues to resist and 
challenge the requirements that the legal obligation sought to impose.311 In his 1968 
article, Henry Molot examined how individuals sought to avoid enforcement of the 
obligation by arguing that they were not innkeepers within the meaning of the legal 
definition of an innkeeper, or that the person making the claim was not a traveler within 
the meaning of the legal definition of a traveler.312   
Ontario’s fair practices legislation established new legal and social norms for 
important social relations – social relations between employers, employees, and trade 
unions; social relations between services providers and service recipients; and social 
relations between citizens and those responsible for access to public spaces and facilities.  
In Chapter One, we saw that the advocates for fair practices legislation experienced 
frustration and disappointment over how the legislation was implemented and enforced.  
In this chapter, I examine how the themes of criminal law and public responsibility 
                                                 
310 A. Alan Borovoy, “The Fair Accommodation Practices Act: The ‘Dresden’ Affair” (1956) 14 University 
of Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 13 at 13 [Borovoy, “Fair Accommodation”].  Borovoy was a third year law student 
at the University of Toronto when he wrote this article.  See also Bruce Ziff, Unforeseen Legacies: Reuben 
Wells Leonard and the Leonard Foundation Trust (Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 105-106 
[Ziff, Unforeseen Legacies]. 
311 The Christie v. York Corp. case, and the litigation under Ontario’s Fair Accommodation Practices Act 
discussed in Chapter One, provide similar examples of how legal process can be used to narrow legal 
obligations. 
312  “The Duty of Business to Serve the Public: Analogy to the Innkeeper’s Obligation” (1968) 56 Can. Bar 
Rev. 612 at 614-621 [Molot, “Duty of Business”].  Nevertheless, in this article, Molot also argued that the 
common law could be developed to provide more extensive protection against the denial of public services 
than the protection offered by the then relatively new human rights legislation – see at 626ff.   
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played out in the struggle to extend fair practices legislation to rental housing and then to 
enforce this new protection.  This history culminated in the Bell v. McKay313 litigation 
which challenged both the substantive protection and the method by which it was 
enforced.  In Part I of the chapter, I discuss the litigation which tested the scope of the 
Fair Accommodation Practices Act and the subsequent legislative history by which 
protection against discrimination in rental housing was incrementally added to the statute.  
In Part II, I examine how Ontario’s first Human Rights Code incorporated the substantive 
protections and enforcement process from the fair practices statutes.  In Part III, I review 
the three human rights tribunal decisions that interpreted and applied the Code’s rental 
housing protection prior to the Bell v. McKay litigation.  In Part IV, I examine the Bell v. 
McKay litigation, with a particular focus on analyzing the tribunal and court decisions in 
the case.314  In Part V, I examine the legislative responses to the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Bell v. McKay.  In the Conclusion to this chapter, I reflect on the ways 
in which questions about public responsibility, the Code’s dual civil and criminal 
dimensions, and the vagaries of legal process, continued to shape the promise and 




                                                 
313 Bell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1971] SCR 756; rev’g sub nom Regina v. Tarnopolsky, Ex 
parte Bell, [1970] 2 OR 672 (CA); rev’g [1969] 2 OR 709 (HCJ) [Bell v. McKay]. 
314 For discussion of the litigation from a more socio-historical perspective, see Frank Luce and Karen 
Schucher, “‘The Right to Discriminate’: Kenneth Bell versus Carl McKay and the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission” in Eric Tucker, Bruce Ziff and James Muir, eds., Canadian Property Law Cases in Context 
(Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012). 
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Part I: Achieving Legislative Protection for Rental Housing 
 Ontario’s Fair Accommodation Practices Act prohibited “… the denial of 
accommodation, services or facilities customarily available to the public” on the basis of 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination – race, religion and ethnic origin.   
Discrimination in rental housing had been on the fair practices advocates’ radar from the 
beginning and it was one of the social issues they targeted for fair practices legislation. 
Once the Fair Accommodation Practices Act was passed, fair practices advocates hoped 
it would be available as a tool to challenge discrimination in rental housing.  However, it 
was not clear whether the statutory language would be interpreted to apply to the social 
relation between landlord and tenant. In this part of the chapter, I review the commission 
decision which held that rental housing was not accommodation, services or facilities 
customarily available to the public and the subsequent efforts to change the legislation to 
achieve this protection.  
 
1  Forbes v. Shields, 1956: Early Interpretation of Fair Accommodation and Rental 
Housing  
The only way for labour human rights activists to formally test whether they 
could use the Fair Accommodation Practices Act against rental housing discrimination 
was by way of a complaint under the statute. It is not clear on the historical record 
whether or not the case which answered this question was set up simply to test the 
landlord, or whether an individual seeking the tenancy subsequently obtained support 
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from the labour human rights activists.  What is clear is that the individual affected did 
receive this support.  
District Court Judge Douglas C. Thomas was appointed as a commission to hear 
and decide the complaint of Sidney Forbes against S.L. Shields.315   In his July, 1956 
decision, Justice Thomas described the complainant, Forbes, as a “Canadian citizen”, a 
“negro”, and an “educated man”, who held “a responsible position as a sales 
organizer.”316  He was looking for new housing accommodation for himself, his wife, and 
their two children.  Forbes responded to an advertisement in the Toronto Daily Star by 
making an application at Edi-Lou Apartments, which managed several large apartment 
buildings in Toronto, on Bathurst St., between Wilson and Sheppard.  A representative 
acting on behalf of the owner showed Forbes a three and one-half room apartment that 
was for rent and available.  Forbes returned two days to see the apartment with his wife 
and two children.  Shortly afterwards, he completed an “application and agreement to 
lease” form and gave the owner’s representative a cheque for $25.  Forbes was to lease 
the apartment for one year beginning June 1, 1956 and was given colour charts to help 
him and his family choose re-decorating colours. 
Later that week, Shields telephoned Forbes to advise him that the apartment was 
not available as it had been previously rented.  Forbes went in person to speak again with 
the owner’s representative and to speak with Shields, both of who told him the apartment 
had already been rented.   When Forbes offered to rent a more expensive apartment that 
                                                 
315 In the Matter of the Fair Accommodation Practices Act, SO 1954, c 28, s.2 and an Alleged 
Discrimination Practiced by S.L. Shields against Sid Forbes, unreported Report of Judge Douglas C. 
Thomas, Commissioner, dated July 16, 1956 [Forbes v. Shields].  
316 Forbes v. Shields at 1. 
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he was given to understand was available, he was told that this apartment too had already 
been rented.  Forbes refused to accept the return of his cheque from Shields, who later 
sent it by mail to Forbes. During the investigation of Forbes’ complaint under the Fair 
Accommodation Practices Act, Shields “denied any intention of discriminating … and 
excused his actions on the ground that the Complainant has two children and that he … 
was trying to ‘cut down on’ the number of children in the apartment building.”317   
The Commission hearing was held in July 1956, at which Forbes was supported 
by the Toronto Joint Labour Committee for Human Rights and represented by lawyer 
Andrew Brewin; lawyer G.R. Dryden represented the respondent.  After reviewing the 
facts set out above, the Commissioner pointed out that it was “… significant to note the 
words ‘children welcome’ in the advertisement …”.318  He wrote that he had “no 
hesitation … in drawing from the facts, as I found them, the logical and irresistible 
inference that the Complainant was denied accommodation by the Respondent because of 
his colour.”319   In Justice Thomas’ view, the evidence was “inconsistent with any other 
conclusion”.320  However, at the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the respondent had 
brought a motion objecting to the application of the statute to his client’s apartment unit.  
 Many of the arguments Forbes’ counsel relied on to oppose the respondent’s 
motion echoed those advanced by the fair practices advocates in their campaigns for anti-
discrimination legislation.  As recorded in the decision, these arguments were:  
• the purpose of the statute; 
                                                 
317 Forbes v. Shields at 2. 
318 Forbes v. Shields at 2. 
319 Forbes v. Shields at 2. 
320 Forbes v. Shields at 2. 
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• the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
• the “broad outlook of emphasizing public policy rather than mere private morals 
and behaviour”;  
• the legislation against restrictive covenants and other anti-discrimination 
legislation “illustrating the intention of the Legislature to furnish the weapons to 
strike at discrimination whenever and where it becomes apparent”; and  
• “… when the owner of accommodation opens it to the public … [it] is far 
removed from the case where the principle of privacy can keep out the operation 
of the Statute.”321    
Justice Thomas rejected these arguments, granted the respondent’s motion, and 
dismissed Forbes’s complaint on the grounds that it was not covered by the legislation.  
His “duty” was to “find what the law is with respect to the facts of the instant case and 
not what it should be and to report accordingly”; his report did not “… concern itself with 
fundamental human rights and public policy.”322  He summarized Forbes’s position as 
“… amount[ing] to the proposition that any owner who, for profit, opens up 
accommodation to the public comes under the Statute”323 and then rejected it, stating: “I 
fail to see how the common type of apartment house, such as that owned by the 
respondent” could “possibly be considered” as open to the public or as a place to which 
the public is customarily admitted.324   For Justice Thomas, apartment units and 
apartment buildings were the essence of privacy since “the whole scheme of operation of 
                                                 
321 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
322 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
323 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
324 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
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such places is designed to ensure maximum privacy to those persons who have their 
lodgings in them.”325   He could not accept that an apartment building owner would 
“throw his buildings open to the public” simply because he “uses the medium of the press 
or places a sign on his lawn to advertise a vacancy”.326  On the contrary, Justice Thomas 
endorsed the view that an apartment building owner “reserves the right to scrutinize a 
prospective tenant and to reject him if, for any reason (and there many be many reasons 
having nothing to do with race, creed or colour), he deems it advisable to do so.”327 
For Justice Thomas, the “plain meaning” of the statutory language required the 
conclusion that the legislation did not apply to the apartment unit, and he had not 
received any extrinsic aid that would have permitted him to reach any other 
conclusion.328  An extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation is any information that goes 
beyond the text of the statute and can include legislative history, similar legislation from 
other jurisdictions, international legal instruments, and jurisprudence.329   Both Forbes 
and Shields presented extrinsic aids to support their arguments, but Justice Thomas did 
not rely on any of them.  Instead, he relied on his own interpretation of the statutory 
language. Given his pronouncement that the “plain meaning” of the statute did not 
include Forbes’ complaint, it seems unlikely that any extrinsic aid would have persuaded 
him to reach a different conclusion.330 
                                                 
325 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
326 Forbes v. Shields at 3. 
327 Forbes v. Shields at 4. (emphasis added) 
328 Forbes v. Shields at 4. 
329 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation 2d (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 279-280. 
330 Forbes v. Shields at 4. 
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The fundamental difference between Justice Thomas’s analysis and the labour 
human rights activists’ analysis lay in how they characterized the space to which access 
was sought.  Justice Thomas focused on apartment units as spaces that were already 
occupied by tenants, even though Forbes was not seeking access to a rented unit where 
people lived; he was seeking access to an empty unit that was available for rent.  The 
labour human rights advocates argued that there should be public access to vacant units 
available for rent in the sense that all members of the public should be prospective 
tenants and, in particular, that it should be illegal to deny racialized and religious 
minorities access to these vacancies.   
Looked at another way, the effect of Justice Thomas’s analysis was to treat the 
entire apartment building and all its rental units as the landlord’s home, so that the 
landlord should be able to have absolute control over the persons with whom the landlord 
“shared” their home.  This approach disregarded two social realities.  First, landlords who 
owned apartment buildings typically did not live in these buildings.  Second, tenants were 
not guests of the landlord, but persons with whom the landlord entered into a commercial 
social relation, similar to the commercial social relations between a grocery store owner 
and their customers, a movie theatre owner and their customers, and a restaurant owner 
and their customers, for example.  The social relation between landlord and tenant may 
have been more on-going than these other commercial social relations, but it was a 
commercial social relation nonetheless. The landlord ran a business of providing places 
to live in exchange of payment for rent.  Justice Thomas’s analysis completely ignored 
this key factor, in favour of supporting a position that a landlord should be free to pick 
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and choose tenants on whatever basis they wished, including rejecting tenants from racial 
and religious minority groups.  
Justice Thomas’s decision in Forbes v. Shields sparked a campaign to extend the 
reach of fair practices legislation to include protection against discrimination in rental 
housing. Legislative protection came incrementally, through a succession of four 
amendments over a period of six years, beginning in 1961 and ending in 1967. 
 
2  Legislative Amendment to the Fair Practices Accommodation Act 
To support their campaigns for legislative protection against discrimination in 
rental housing, the Toronto Labour Committee for Human Rights conducted several 
surveys of discrimination in housing, the overall results of which were that approximately 
50% of Toronto landlords or their representatives admitted to having discriminatory 
rental policies and practices.331  In written submissions urging the government to extend 
legislative protection to rental housing, a group of organizations, including the Toronto 
Labour Committee, emphasized both the need to ensure that all people were able to enjoy 
“the fruits of their employment”, such as housing, and the need to ensure unity and 
democracy by making sure that no people were  “unwanted as a householder” because of 
their race, religion, or ethnicity.332 
                                                 
331 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 11, 1960, File 6, Submissions Re: Racial Discrimination 
in Multiple Housing Accommodations (1959/1960) at Appendices I and II. 
332 OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 11, 1960, File 6, Submissions Re: Racial Discrimination 
in Multiple Housing Accommodations (1959/1960) at 2.  The Association for Civil Liberties was a 
signatory to the submission, but the Joint Public Relations Committee was not.  The JPRC submitted its 
own brief on the need to include housing in fair practices legislation: Ontario Jewish Archives, Canadian 
Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, Box 8 (1957 & 
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The first provision prohibiting discrimination in rental housing was enacted in 
1961 as an amendment to the Fair Accommodation Practices Act.  This provision 
prohibited discrimination in the occupancy of “any dwelling unit in any building that 
contains more than six self-contained dwelling units”.333 When Premier Leslie Frost 
introduced the amending Bill for first reading, he drew a connection between the 
proposed rental housing protection amendment and legislation previously enacted to 
prohibit restrictive covenants, both of which have a connection with where people are 
able to live and make their homes.  Premier Frost also emphasized the need to achieve the 
right balance between people’s personal lives and public policy.334  On the public policy 
side of the equation was the concern to address discrimination, and in his remarks 
Premier Frost also made reference to apartheid in South Africa as a “cause of deep 
concern” and noted that 1961 was the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the civil war 
in the United States.335  On the people’s personal lives side of the equation, Premier Frost 
noted that the government should “not interfere with the rights of people to choose their 
own friends and to operate their own homes as they see fit.”336  Thus, Premier Frost 
explained, the government chose to extend legislative protection to buildings with six 
dwelling units because such buildings were “public” rather than “private” 
accommodation: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1958), 1958 File 5:  CJC Central Region Joint Public Relations Comm. Anti Discrimination Mt., 
Submission to Premier of Ontario re Accommodation dated Jan. 21, 1958. 
333 The Fair Accommodation Practices Amendment Act, 1960-61, S.O. 1960-61, c. 28, s. 2a. 
334 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 26th Parl., 2nd Sess. No 40 (14 
February 1961) at 1100 [Hansard, 14 Feb. 1961]. 
335 Hansard, 14 Feb. 1961 at 1099. 
336 Hansard, 14 Feb. 1961 at 1100. 
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Accordingly, we have confined this legislation, insofar as apartments are 
concerned, to the type of accommodation which can really be termed 
public accommodation.  … This involves no interference with the life of 
an individual in his own home which is, after all, his castle.  It involves no 
interference with the little person who rents rooms or flats in his own 
home. 
 
This legislation is directed, instead, toward the broad area of commerce 
and public accommodation.  This general public policy is in line with the 
thinking which has been accepted so widely in the evolution of our human 
rights code to date.337 
 
Interestingly, Premier Frost’s underlying rationale aligned with the arguments made by 
the fair practices advocates, namely, that activities taking place in the marketplace were 
public activities and properly subject to regulation.   During the second reading debate, he 
described the proposed amendment as extending “a prohibition of discrimination to 
apartment buildings which can be fairly described as being in the business of providing 
public accommodation”.338   
What became the main issue in the debate on this first provision and subsequent 
amendments to it, was whether or not all rental housing accommodation should be 
covered by anti-discrimination legislation regardless of the number of units being rented.  
The debate on the 1961 amendment focused on the government’s decision to draw the 
line at six units rather than some lower number.339  Progressive Conservative MPP 
Grossman urged his colleagues to reach unanimous agreement instead of muddying the 
                                                 
337 Hansard, 14 Feb. 1961 at 1100. 
338 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 26th Parl., 2nd Sess., No. 55 (1 
March 1961) at 1619 [Hansard, 1 March 1961]. 
339 Hansard, 1 March 1961 at 1619-1628; Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), 26th Parl., 2nd Sess., No. 68 (15 March 1961) at 2157-2159. 
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waters by haggling over the minimum number of units required for legislative protection 
to apply: 
 
This suggestion of 3, someone thinks it should be 4, someone thinks it 
should be 5, and someone thinks it should be two units – the danger is, of 
course, it is going to be thrown into the arena of politics, and the bill will 
be found unacceptable.  And if the hon. member thinks I am wrong, let me 
be quote from the London Free Press on this legislation: 
 
    Prime Minister Frost has introduced legislation which may put 
Ontario in the forefront of North America in the matter of 
eliminating discrimination from public accommodation because of 
race, creed or colour.  The proposed amendments to The Fair 
Accommodation Practices Act will prohibit such discrimination in 
rentals for apartment buildings of more than 6 units. The bill has 
been supported by all parties in the Legislature, despite the fact it 
might have been questioned on the ground that this comes close to 
an infringement on private rights.340 
 
The CCF brought an unsuccessful motion to draw the line at two units rather than six and 
the amendment passed with the line drawn at more than six self-contained dwelling units.  
 
3 Human Rights Code Protection Against Discrimination in Rental Housing 
When the Human Rights Code was enacted the following year, in 1962, it 
included the new protection against discrimination in rental housing but with slightly 
revised wording.341  The line was still drawn at more than six units, but the protection 
applied to “any apartment” rather than to “any dwelling unit”. Three years later, in 1965, 
a further amendment was passed to expand the legislative protection by reducing the 
                                                 
340 Hansard, 15 March 1961 at 2158-2159. 
341 The Ontario Human Rights Code, 1961-62, SO 1961-62, c 93 [Code (1962)]. The discrimination in 
rental housing provisions were also modified to include protection against discrimination in terms and 




minimum number of units required from more than six, to more than three.342  Again, the 
debate focused on the minimum number of units required to attract statutory 
protection.343  This time the CCF sought to eliminate any minimum number units and 
draw the line simply at all “self-contained dwelling units”. Just as Premier Frost had 
referred to South African apartheid and the civil rights movement in the United States in 
1961 when the first proposed rental housing protection was introduced, CCF leader MPP 
Donald MacDonald introduced his motion by referring to an 1852 anti-slavery speech 
given by George Brown and to the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, 
Alabama. In discussing his motion, MPP Donald MacDonald also proposed the following 
analysis of  “self-contained”: 
 
We concede that if a dwelling is not self-contained – in other words, if it is 
without separate entrance and without separate facilities – an owner has 
the right to decide, in effect, with whom he is going to share his home.  
That is his basic right. But if there is a separate entrance and if there are 
separate facilities, then he does not have the right to discriminate against 
those who may seek to rent that property because he does not happen to 
like their race or their colour or their creed.344 
 
At that time, the CCF considered the defining features of a “self-contained” dwelling unit 
to be a “separate entrance” and “separate facilities”.  (As will be discussed, this definition 
would have precluded the statute’s application to the rental unit at issue in Bell v. McKay, 
because it did not have a separate entrance.) 
                                                 
342 The Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 1965, S.O. 1965, c. 85, s. 2. This amendment also 
added protection against discrimination in commercial units. 
343 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 27th Parl., 3rd Sess., No. 53 (22 
March 1965) at 1487-1491 (Hansard, 22 March 1965); Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates (Hansard), 27th Parl., 3rd Sess., No. 74 (13 April 1965) at 2207-2208. 
344 Hansard, 22 March 1965 at 1487. 
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Although the CCF did not succeed in 1965 to eliminate the three-apartment 
requirement, this requirement was subsequently removed by a further amendment in 
1967.  This amendment was introduced as following through on a commitment made in 
the Speech from the Throne and was passed without debate.345  It was the final 
amendment to the rental housing discrimination provisions prior to the Bell v. McKay 
litigation. With this last amendment, the protection was extended to “any self-contained 
dwelling unit”, thus also returning to the phrase “dwelling unit” instead of the term 
“apartment”. As we will see, the meaning of “self-contained dwelling unit” was one of 
the two central questions at issue in the Bell v. McKay proceeding.  
 
Part II: Human Rights Code Enforcement Tensions –  
Civil or Criminal, Conciliation or Adjudication, Public or Private 
 
 Ontario’s first Human Rights Code (“Human Rights Code” or “Code”) was passed 
in 1962, bringing together in one statute the Fair Employment Practices Act, the Fair 
Accommodation Practices Act, the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, the 
Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission Amendment Act and the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission Act.  As with the fair practices legislation, Ontario was again the first 
jurisdiction to pass this type of human rights legislation.  The Code largely re-enacted the 
substantive provisions of the fair practices legislation on the basis of the same prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.   
                                                 
345 The Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 66, s. 1.  Ontario, Legislative 
Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 27th Parl., 5th Sess., No 58(10 April 1967) at 1907. 
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 The enforcement process under the Code also retained the same general structure 
as the fair practices enforcement process.  As under the fair practices statutes, the Code’s 
enforcement model provided for a civil process and a quasi-criminal process, but with a 
clear preference for the civil process.  Despite this clear preference for civil process 
signaled in the legislation and implemented in practice, there was on-going tension 
between the civil and criminal dimensions of Code liability and enforcement.  Within the 
Code’s civil process, there was provision for conciliation and adjudication but, as under 
the fair practices statutes, with a clear preference for conciliation over adjudication.  The 
relationship between conciliation and adjudication also created tensions between the 
competing goals of these two enforcement processes.  In this part of the chapter, I 
provide an overview of the Code enforcement process and then examine in more detail 
issues relating to the tension between civil and criminal dimensions and the tension 
between conciliation and adjudication processes.  
  
1   Overview of Code Enforcement 
Under the Code, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (“OHRC” or 
“Commission”) was responsible both for the complaint-processing functions that had 
previously been carried out by the Fair Employment Practices Branch of the Ministry of 
Labour and for the educational and policy functions it had received when it was 
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established in 1958 as the Anti-Discrimination Commission.346  Dr. Daniel Hill was the 
OHRC’s first director and a champion of the Code’s enforcement model.  
The civil enforcement process began with a written complaint filed with the 
Commission.  In principle, the Commission had discretion to decide whether or not to 
investigate the complaint; but if it decided to investigate, the Code imposed a mandatory 
requirement that it “endeavour to effect a settlement”, i.e. the Code required 
conciliation.347  In practice, it appears that the OHRC investigated all cases, including 
cases that were not within its jurisdiction in the hope that they might be able to facilitate a 
resolution nonetheless.348  Hill provided the following as examples of the types of 
settlements investigators tried to achieve during conciliation:  to offer the complainant a 
rental unit where the complaint involved discrimination in rental housing; to offer the 
complainant immediate or forthcoming employment where the complaint involved 
discrimination in employment hiring; to provide the complainant with a haircut where the 
complaint involved denial of haircutting services; to offer the complainant 
accommodation in the current or following season where the complaint involved denial 
                                                 
346 The Commission operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour until 1981, when administration 
of the Code and the Commission were transferred to the Cabinet, but in practice operated under the 
Ministry of Citizenship and Culture.  In 2006, when the entire enforcement process was changed, 
administration of the Code was moved to the Ministry of the Attorney General.  
347 Code (1962), s. 12(1).  
348 Daniel G. Hill and E. Marshall Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation in Ontario” (1967) 9 Race & Class 
193 at 198-199 [Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation”]. Marshall Pollock was at that time a lawyer 
with the Department of the Attorney General.  In this article, Hill and Pollock wrote that as of 1967 the 
Commission had dealt with approximately 2000 complaints outside its jurisdiction, either by investigating, 
settling or referring them to other agencies. Dan Hill had previously published a very similar version of this 
article, co-authored with T.M. Eberlee who at that time was the Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour: T.M. 
Eberlee and D.G. Hill, “The Ontario Human Rights Code” (1963-1964) 15 UTLJ 448 [Eberlee and Hill, 
“Human Rights Code”].  Hill also published a version of this paper in 1969, under his name only but noting 
that the section on compliance and enforcement was jointly written by himself and Marshall Pollock: 
Daniel G. Hill, “The Role of a Human Rights Commission: The Ontario Experience” (1969) 19 UTLJ 390.  
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of resort accommodation.349  Hill also argued that the Commission’s responsibilities for 
conciliation, enforcement and education were inter-related and could not be placed into 
self-contained silos.  For example, he noted that in order for investigators to be effective, 
they had to be “prepared to discuss stereotypes, argue against irrational views regarding 
races and nationalities, and in general know something about the vast literature that is 
now developing in community and race relations.”350  
The board of inquiry took the place of the “commission” under the fair practices 
statute.351  The decision to appoint a board of inquiry was made by the Minister of 
Labour on the recommendation of the Commission, where a settlement could not be 
reached.  Both the Commission’s recommendation and the Minister’s decision were 
discretionary decisions. The board’s role was to “investigate the matter” and make 
recommendations to the Commission if it found that the complaint was supported by the 
evidence.  The Commission would then make recommendations to the Minister of 
Labour, who had the authority to “issue any order he deems necessary to carry the 
recommendations of the board into effect”.   Similarly to the commission under the fair 
practices legislation, the board was required to “give the parties full opportunity to 
present evidence and to make submissions”, and had the same powers as a conciliation 
board under the Labour Relations Act.  These powers were to summon witnesses and 
compel them to give evidence, to accept whatever evidence it deemed appropriate 
whether or not such evidence was admissible in a court of law, and to enter and inspect 
                                                 
349 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 197. 
350 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 199. 
351 HRC 1962, s. 13(1)-(7). 
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premises.352  At a board of inquiry proceeding, the case for the complainant was 
presented by the Commission, who was represented by a Commission employee or by a 
lawyer retained and paid for by the Commission.  
The persons appointed to act as board of inquiries were typically County Court 
judges and law professors.  Judge D.C Thomas, who decided the Sidney Forbes case, was 
the first board of inquiry appointee under the Code.  The Code did not provide any 
recourse for challenging a board of inquiry decision; however, it also did not cloak the 
board of inquiry with any privative clause language, which the fair practices legislation 
had provided for the commission.353  
 Finally, quasi-criminal prosecution was available as the other adjudicative option. 
Similarly to the fair practices statutes, it was an offence to contravene the Code and it 
was an offence to contravene an order made by the Minister. As under the fair practices 
statute, prosecution required the Minister’s consent. 
 
2   Conciliation:  The Velvet Glove 
 The features of the Code’s enforcement model, both in structure and in 
implementation, were very similar to the model advocated by the fair practices advocates. 
Hill endorsed and advocated the primary role of the civil enforcement process, and of 
conciliation and settlement within that enforcement process, stating that the OHRC 
                                                 
352 Labour Relations Act, RSO 1960, s 202, s. 28. 
353 The fair practices statutes included the following protective language for commissions:  “… and no 
order shall be made or process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, 
declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise to question the 
appointment of the commission, or to review, prohibit or restrain any of its proceedings.”  The Fair 
Employment Practices Act, 1951, SO 1951, c 24, s. 71; The Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 
1951, SO 1951, c 26, s. 4(1); The Fair Accommodation Practices Act, 1954, SO 1954, c 28, s. 5(1). 
155 
 
“place[d] a distinct priority on persuasion and conciliation”.354 He used the metaphors of 
the “velvet glove” and the “iron fist” to characterize conciliation and adjudication, 
respectively.355 The velvet glove of conciliation was a form of legal process because it 
was a component of the formal enforcement process.  However, similarly to the fair 
practices advocates, Hill characterized conciliation as being more in the nature of an 
educational process and associated “law” more clearly with the Code’s adjudicative 
processes.  In his description of conciliation, Hill maintained that its goal was to provide 
an opportunity for respondents to recognize, acknowledge and then change their 
prejudicial attitudes.  
 Hill described the interrelationship between conciliation and adjudication – or 
education and law – as a “judicious blending of the ‘velvet glove’ and ‘iron hand’”: 
 
Modern day human rights legislation is predicated on the theory that the 
actions of prejudiced people and their attitudes can be changed and 
influenced by the process of re-education, discussion, and the presentation 
of socio-scientific materials that are used to challenge popular myths and 
stereotypes about people. … Human rights on this continent is a skillful 
blending of educational and legal techniques in the pursuit of social 
justice.356 
  
Tarnopolsky added his own commentary on this passage, arguing that discrimination was 
practiced not only by “bigots” but also by “fine ‘upright, gentlemanly’ members of 
society” whose actions were driven “not so much out of hatred as out of discomfort or 
                                                 
354 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 203. 
355 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 196. 
356 Dr. Daniel Hill, “Human Relations”, June 1965, published by the Ontario Human Rights Commission at 
4, as quoted in Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 572 [Hill, “Human Relations”]. 
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inconvenience, or out of the fear of loss of business”.357  The goal of conciliation was to 
provide people who engaged in discrimination with “an opportunity to re-assess their 
attitudes, and to reform themselves, after being given the opportunity of seeing how 
much more severe is the injury to the dignity and economic well-being of others, than 
their own loss of comfort or convenience.”358  Tarnopolsky also borrowed Hill’s 
metaphors to coin the phrase the “the iron hand in the velvet glove”, substituting the word 
“hand” for “fist”.359 
 Hill wrote that “the Commission’s policy [was] to keep formal correspondence to 
a minimum and to place strong reliance upon personal contact and discussion.”360  He 
emphasized that the investigation procedures were intended to be neither rigidly formal 
nor “loose and unprofessional”.  He further emphasized that it was the Commission’s 
policy that the investigator “concentrates rather less on the issue of legal guilt than on the 
issue of effectuating a satisfactory settlement.”361  On this point, Hill endorsed and 
quoted with approval the Ontario Federation of Labour’s (“OFL”) position that de-
emphasizing a respondent’s liability was critical to the success of conciliation, as set out 
in a 1962 brief on “Standards for Proper Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights 
Code” authored by Sid Blum: 
 
[Accordingly, we submit that the conciliation process should concentrate 
less on the issue of legal guilt and more on the issue of a satisfactory 
                                                 
357 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 572. 
358 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 572. 
359 Walter S. Tarnopolsky, “The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: Administration and Enforcement of 
Human Rights Legislation in Canada” (1968) 46 Can. Bar. Rev. 565 [Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet 
Glove”]. 
360 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 195. 
361 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 195. 
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settlement.] If a respondent is asked whether he has committed a 
discriminatory act, almost invariably he will deny it.  Once having denied 
it, his very self-respect will impel him to resist conciliation overtures.  A 
settlement would be perceived as an admission of guilt.362 
 
Blum also wrote that the conciliation officer should begin by “furnish[ing] respondent 
with face-saving devices.”  Such devices could include telling the respondent that 
“discrimination occurs subconsciously without evil intent”, or that “these situations result 
more from accidental tradition than from malicious design”, or that “Someone in his 
organization has made an inadvertent mistake”, and that the Commission was consulting 
the respondent because they believe the respondent will “want to rectify the difficulty”.363 
This strategy would allow the respondent to “maintain and demonstrate his innocence 
without any loss of face to the officer or the Department.”364 
 This OFL brief would have been submitted when the OHRC was first beginning 
to implement its new, complaint-processing role under the Code.  In the brief, Blum 
referred to an article by Albert Rose reporting on research about how employers viewed 
fair practices legislation.365  According to Blum, Rose’s research supported the 
conclusion that prejudice had increased rather than decreased, and that employers were 
                                                 
362 S. Blum, Executive Director, Human Rights Committee, C.L.C., Submission of the Committee on 
Human Rights of the Ontario Federation of Labor, C.L.C., to the Ontario Human Rights Commission: 
Standards for Proper Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code, June 13, 1962, quoted in Eberlee 
and Hill, “Human Rights Code” at 449-450. 
363 Library and Archives Canada, Jewish Labour Committee of Canada 1925-1978 fonds, R3286-0-8-E 
(formerly MG28-V75), File 26-25,“Submission of the Committee on Human Rights of the Ontario 
Federation of Labour, C.L.C. to the Ontario Human Rights Commission – ‘Standards for Proper 
Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code’” June 13th, 1962 at 6-7 [LAC, JLC 1925-1978]. 
364 LAC, JLC 1925-1978, File 26-25,“Submission of the Committee on Human Rights of the Ontario 
Federation of Labour, C.L.C. to the Ontario Human Rights Commission – ‘Standards for Proper 
Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code’” June 13th, 1962 at 7. 
365 This appears to have been the same Prof. Albert Rose who several years earlier had raised concerns 
about the over-representation of lawyers on the JPRC – see Chapter One at 134. 
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finding ways to circumvent the legal requirements.366  Blum continued by emphasizing 
the difficulties associated with being able to prove discrimination in the employment 
context, given the many variables involved in selecting an employee.   
 This conciliation-heavy framework placed the focus on providing remedies for 
discrimination and simultaneously reduced, or even eliminated, the focus on establishing 
legal responsibility.  One question the framework did not answer was what factual basis a 
conciliation officer would need before they could present “face-saving” proposals to a 
respondent.  Would it be sufficient for a conciliation officer to rely on a complainant’s 
perception that their race or religion or nationality was a factor in how they were treated?  
It may be reasonable to suggest that a complainant’s perception of how they were treated 
should have been sufficient to require a respondent to explain their conduct.  However, 
requiring a respondent to explain their conduct would not have fit well within the 
conciliation process as it was described.  Requiring a respondent to explain their conduct 
was more in the nature of determining whether to assign legal responsibility and, if legal 
responsibility was assigned, to determine what consequences should attach to that legal 
responsibility.  The description of the conciliation process, on the other hand, suggested 
that the goal of conciliation was to bypass the legal responsibility step and go directly to 
consequences.   
 It is also reasonable to suggest that “face-saving” strategies would serve a “face-
saving” purpose only if the respondent believed they could bear legal responsibility for 
                                                 
366 LAC, R2870-0-0-E, File 26-25, Submission of OFL Committee on Human Rights to OHRC re 
enforcement “Submission of the Committee on Human Rights of the Ontario Federation of Labour, C.L.C. 
to the Ontario Human Rights Commission – ‘Standards for Proper Enforcement of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code’” June 13th, 1962 at 3-4. 
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their conduct.  If a respondent denied legal responsibility and was not open to discussing 
the matter, it is not clear how face-saving strategies would encourage them to be 
interested in discussing remedies.  Some respondents might agree to discuss resolution 
for practical reasons, but that is not the same as agreeing to discuss and resolve in order 
to save face. 
 According to a 1977 study by Philip Stenning, approximately 44% of the 
complaints processed by the Commission between 1962 and 1970 were voluntarily 
resolved, approximately 40% were dismissed, and approximately 5% involved boards of 
inquiry.367  As with the fair practices enforcement data, there is no information about the 
content of the settlements for the cases that settled.  Stenning’s comment was that  “we 
may with good reason be somewhat surprised (and even perhaps a little suspicious) at the 
very high percentage of formal complaints which have been resolved in this way by the 
Commission.”368 
 
3   Board of Inquiry Adjudication:  The Iron Fist or Hand 
 Despite the efforts devoted to conciliation, not all complaints did reach a 
voluntarily resolution. When the Commission could not facilitate a voluntary resolution, 
it then had to decide whether or not to proceed to adjudication – the “iron” hand or fist of 
law – or to dismiss the complaint.  Although in principle both the civil board of inquiry 
hearing and the quasi-criminal court prosecution could provide this “iron” hand or fist, it 
                                                 
367 Conciliation to Judgement: The Role of Boards of Inquiry under the Ontario Human Rights Code, 1962-
1974 (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1977) at 108 [Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement].  Stenning’s 
analysis did not account for the remaining 11% of complaints. 
368 Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 263-264. 
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is clear that when Hill and Tarnopolsky used the iron hand or iron fist metaphor, they 
were referring to the board of inquiry hearing.   
 The role of board of inquiry adjudication within this framework was not entirely 
clear.  It is clear that both the civil and criminal adjudicative processes were considered 
the options of last resort, but there was no clear discussion of why that was the case. The 
OHRC could have implemented a policy and practice of preferring conciliation and 
devoting significant efforts to conciliation, but also making equal use of adjudication 
when best efforts at voluntary resolution did not succeed; however, that does not seem to 
be what they did.  
 Tarnopolsky emphasized that the option of access to the iron hand was a 
necessary component of the Code’s enforcement model where conciliation could not 
produce a result:   
 
     However, if persuasion and conciliation fails, then the law must be 
upheld, and the law requires equality of access and equality of 
opportunity.   This is the “iron hand in the velvet glove”.369 
 
Dan Hill, in his 1963-64 publication describing the OHRC enforcement process, wrote 
that the threat of a board of inquiry public hearing, which would generally be attended by 
the press, could be effective in persuading some otherwise unwilling respondents to 
settle; these would typically be respondents who wished to avoid negative public 
exposure because they operated businesses that relied on public goodwill.370  However, 
this argument did not appear in subsequent versions of this article.  As with the fair 
                                                 
369 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 573. 
370 Eberlee and Hill, “Human Rights Code” at 450. 
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practices advocacy, the focus appears to have been on the fact that there was in practice 
little recourse to adjudication. In his 1967 article on the Code’s enforcement process, Hill 
wrote that the OHRC used “sanctions only when the expressed wishes of the public 
[were] purposely being thwarted.”371  Hill did not explain what he meant by the 
“expressed wishes of the public” or what he meant by these express wishes “purposely 
being thwarted”.  However, the statement suggests that the primary purpose of 
adjudication was a public purpose, and thus connected with enforcing legal norms, rather 
than the more “private” purpose of resolving an individual complaint. The threat of 
recourse to a public airing of the complaint either in a board of inquiry hearing or a 
prosecution, together with the associated financial and other burdens of being required to 
participate in litigation, could have enhanced the persuasive impact of face-saving 
strategies for some respondents.   
However, it is not clear how often the threat of public adjudication was used as an 
aid to resolution through conciliation.  In his 1967 article explaining the Code’s 
enforcement model, Hill wrote that only 15 of the approximately 1000 formal complaints 
investigated were referred to a board of inquiry, and that nine of these 15 cases were 
settled either before or during the board of inquiry hearing.372  According to Stenning, as 
noted earlier, only 5% of the complaints processed by the Commission between 1962 and 
1973 involved boards of inquiry.373  As with the fair practices enforcement data, there is 
                                                 
371 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 203. 
372 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 195, 197.  Philip Stenning wrote that complaints were 
settled without a hearing in approximately one-half of the cases where a board of inquiry was appointed. 
373 A board of inquiry was appointed in some, but not all, of the cases that “involved” a board of inquiry. 
Moreover, in some but not all of the cases where a board was appointed, the complaint proceeded to a 
formal hearing before and decision by the board of inquiry.  According to Stenning, there were few board 
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no information about the reasons why cases were dismissed.   And since we do not know 
why cases were dismissed, we cannot know whether any of the cases that were dismissed 
could instead have been referred to a board of inquiry or to prosecution.  However, there 
is a clear implication that this was in fact the case, i.e. not every case that could have 
been referred to adjudication was referred to adjudication.   
Difficulties associated with proving discrimination may also have been a factor in 
decisions about whether to refer a complaint to a board of inquiry.  In a 1972 article, John 
Sopinka wrote that discrimination was “seldom susceptible of direct proof”.374  The 
article was clearly focused on direct discrimination and highlighted two key challenges.  
First, in most cases discrimination could be established only by circumstantial evidence, 
which required the board of inquiry to make a choice between drawing or not drawing an 
inference that discrimination was involved: 
 
A judge trying a divorce case once said that people do not commit 
adultery on a street corner. Neither do they openly admit discrimination by 
advising the prospective purchaser, tenant, employee, customer or guest 
that he is being refused because of race, creed, etc. 
       Discrimination must, therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
that is, it must be inferred from a series of circumstances from which the 
Board is asked to conclude that discrimination exists.375 
 
Sopinka also wrote that proving direct discrimination often required successful cross-
examination of the respondent:  
                                                                                                                                                 
of inquiry appointments between 1962 and 1966, more appointments from 1967 through 1969, and then 
few again from 1970 on.  Stenning also reported that approximately 1% of the cases that were decided by a 
board of inquiry resulted in ministerial orders, and approximately 1% of the complaints resulted in 
prosecutions. Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 248, 109.  
374 “Proving Discrimination in Boards of Inquiry Under Ontario Human Rights Code” (Feb. 1972) Vol. 12, 
No. 20 Human Relations 12 at 12 [Sopinka, “Proving Discrimination]. 




Due to the availability of explanations, the task of the cross-examiner is to 
demonstrate that the explanation has been manufactured.376 
  
Having to rely on evidence obtained through cross-examination is obviously not an ideal 
situation for a legal representative.  Thus, it is possible that in at least some cases the 
Commission decided to not to refer to adjudication because the case would be difficult to 
prove. 
 
4   Civil and Criminal Dimensions 
 In his 1968 “Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove” article, Tarnopolsky argued that 
discrimination should not be an offence under the Code. He wrote that making 
discrimination an offence undermined the primary goals of conciliation and voluntary, 
remedial resolutions: 
 
… the primary object of human rights legislation is to obtain compliance 
through an agreed settlement. This requires negotiation and conciliation.  
This process is foreign to criminal law. When the act of discrimination is 
made a crime, the whole process of negotiation, conciliation, and 
settlement could be likened to compounding a criminal offence.377 
 
Hill, on the other hand, argued that the fact of separate civil and quasi-criminal 
adjudicative options “doubly insulates the respondent from any bureaucratic evil by 
giving him the opportunity of making answer and defence to the allegations at two 
separate and distinct stages and before two separate and unrelated independent 
                                                 
376 Sopinka, “Proving Discrimination” at 13. 
377 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 586. 
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tribunals.”378  It is not clear that a respondent would have perceived as “opportunities” 
the prospect of defending themselves twice against allegations of discrimination.  For 
reasons that I discuss further below, it is also not clear whether a respondent would, in 
fact, have had two opportunities to defend themselves.   
Stenning argued that, although a “rigid distinction” between criminal law and 
civil law is “neither self-evident nor inevitable”, criminal courts tend to give priority to 
the more public purpose of enforcing legal norms and “control of deviance” whereas civil 
courts tend to give priority to the more private purpose of “the settlement of private 
disputes”.379  Stenning did not explore why criminal law enforcement may be regarded as 
focusing more on public goals than on private concerns; one reason that may be 
suggested, however, is the central role of the state in the criminal enforcement process.  
Stenning also argued that the Commission’s enforcement role led to human rights 
complaints having both a public aspect, relating to upholding legal norms, and a private 
aspect, relating to the resolution of the individual situation: 
 
Every complaint which comes before a Board of Inquiry under the Code 
is, to some extent, really two complaints, or at least one complaint with 
two distinguishable aspects – a public allegation of deviance, and a private 
dispute between the complainant and the respondent.  This situation is one 
which inevitably arises from the intervention of any third party (in this 
case the Commission) in what was, ‘prior to such intervention’, a purely 
private dispute between two parties.380 
 
                                                 
378 Hill and Pollock, “Human Rights Legislation” at 198. 
379 Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 139, 140. 
380 Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 134.  
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By characterizing a human rights complaint’s public dimension as a “public allegation of 
deviance”, Stenning appears to have defined the anti-discrimination legal norm as a 
criminal legal norm.  This characterization suggests that even though the Code’s 
prohibition of discrimination was both civil and criminal, the criminal dimension 
subordinated or even eliminated the civil aspect of the prohibition.   
The other public dimension of the Code’s enforcement was the central role of the 
OHRC at both conciliation and the board of inquiry hearing.  This public dimension also 
had a parallel with criminal law enforcement, in that the state was directly involved in the 
enforcement process.  Tarnopolsky emphasized this public dimension when he wrote that 
community vindication was achieved through the fact that a public agency was 
responsible for facilitating the provision of remedies for individual complainants:   
 
The consolidation of human rights legislation into a code to be 
administratively enforced by an independent commission insures 
community vindication of the person discriminated against.  This is 
important to the community itself because of the broad educational value 
of equal treatment.  However, it is important to the people who have 
suffered from discrimination, because without such active community 
involvement, the mere proclamation of human rights tends to soothe the 
conscience of the majority, without producing tangible changes.381 
 
According to this view, even though conciliation was a private process which did not 
result in a public judgment about the legal norm in question, it had a public dimension 
because of the state’s direct involvement in facilitating this process. 
 
 
                                                 
381 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 572.  
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Part III:  Board of Inquiry Decisions on “Self-Contained Dwelling Unit” and  
Civil Remedies for Discrimination 
 
By the time the complaint in Bell v McKay reached the Commission, three board 
of inquiry decisions had addressed the question of whether a rental unit in a house was a 
“self-contained dwelling unit” and thus covered by the Code. In all three decisions, the 
boards of inquiry had no difficulty, or no significant difficulty, concluding that race was 
the reason for the denial of accommodation.  The significant issues were whether the 
units in question were covered by the Code and, if so, what consequential 
recommendations should be made to the Minister. 
 
1   “Self-Contained Dwelling Unit” 
In all three cases, the boards of inquiry concluded that the rental units were self-
contained and therefore covered by the Code and two of the decisions provided detailed 
analyses for their conclusion on this issue. 
The first case, Mitchell v. O’Brien, was decided by Dean Walter Tarnopolsky as 
the board of inquiry.382  The complainant, Miss Mitchell, was a black woman.  The rental 
unit was located on the third-floor of a house in Ottawa, and consisted of one bedroom, 
one kitchen, and a shared bathroom on the second floor.  In addition to sharing a 
bathroom, the unit shared a common entrance, common stairs and common hallways.  
Miss Mitchell’s application for the tenancy was refused by the family living on the 
second floor, who appears to have been acting as an agent for the landlord; Miss Mitchell 
                                                 
382 Mitchell v. O’Brien, unreported decision of a Board of Inquiry appointed under the Human Rights Code, 
SO 1961-62, c 93, dated July 11, 1968 [Mitchell v. O’Brien].  
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had no interaction with the landlord and the complaint was brought against the landlord’s 
“agents”.   
The reasons for decision record that the board and the parties took a view of the 
premises as part of the proceeding.383  In describing what he observed, Dean Tarnopolsky 
noted that there were doors to the living room, dining room and kitchen on the ground-
floor unit, although he did not say whether there were locks on these doors.  The agents 
lived in the second-floor unit.   Dean Tarnopolsky noted that the third-floor rental unit 
could be “lived in” without entering any of the agents’ second-floor “living quarters”.   
For Dean Tarnopolsky, “living” meant preparing food, sleeping, and eating.  Using a 
common stairway and common bathroom were not part of living, in Dean Tarnopolsky’s 
opinion, because: 
 
Neither a hallway, nor a staircase, nor a bathroom can be described as 
living quarters in the sense of either eating, sleeping, or sitting and 
relaxing for the purposes of extended conversation or some form of 
diversion like a radio or television.384 
 
After reviewing the legislative history, Dean Tarnopolsky concluded that first the 
inclusion and then the removal of the words “apartment” and “building” demonstrated a 
legislative intention to “expand its application so that now the provision applies to any 
building, including a private home.”385   On his reading of the legislative history, the 
government would have expressly excluded “private homes” if it had not intended s. 3 of 
the Code to apply to them.    
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Dean Tarnopolsky then turned to interpret the key phrase - “self-contained” - to 
determine which types of private home rental accommodation the legislature intended to 
include and to exclude.  He offered the following legal “test”, that in his view captured 
the legislative intention about which type of rental unit was to be excluded from the 
scope of the legislation: “accommodation consisting of a room or rooms wherein the 
tenants live as part of the landlord’s family”.386   He then identified the following 
concrete situations as possible examples of units where the tenant would be living “as 
part of the landlord’s family”:  where the tenant shared meals with the landlord; where 
the tenant had access to the landlord’s living room; where the tenant had one or more 
rooms “in the midst of rooms occupied by the landlord and his family.”  On the other 
hand, in Tarnopolsky’s view, sharing an entrance hall, stairway or bathroom did not 
constitute living as part of the landlord’s family and, thus, did not remove a unit from the 
category of self-contained.  He noted that there were common hallways and stairways in 
most apartment buildings, and that there were shared bathrooms in many older homes 
converted into multiple dwelling units, as well as in some older apartment buildings.  
Legal “tests” are typically statements that rationalize a conclusion about legal 
liability and responsibility.  Even where the test offers “factors” to consider, application 
of the “test” and the “factors” always (or almost always) involves some discretionary 
judgment on the part of the adjudicator. Those familiar with legal method and process 
can easily speculate about how Dean Tarnopolsky could have reached the opposite 
conclusion.  On the question of the shared bathroom, Dean Tarnopolsky could have 
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reasoned that use of a bathroom is very much a part of daily “living”; he might also have 
added that a bathroom is a quintessentially private space which loses that character if it 
has to be shared.  On the question of common entrances, stairways and hallways, he 
could have reasoned that a person’s living quarters include how they obtain access to 
their living quarters.  Dean Tarnopolsky may also have noted that this type of rental unit 
required people to live in much closer proximity to one another than did rental units in 
apartment buildings. Moreover, where a tenant lived in part of a house with no internal 
locks on the doors that tenant could, in principle, enter any of the other living quarter 
rooms in that building. Thus, Dean Tarnopolsky’s conclusion was as much a conclusion 
about whether or not a landlord or their agent should be able to exclude a racialized or 
religious minority tenant because they did not want to have to pass that tenant in the 
hallways and did not want to have to share a bathroom with that tenant.  If Dean 
Tarnopolsky had believed that the landlord’s agents should not have had to pass a Black 
tenant in the hallways and share the bathroom with a Black tenant, his reasoning and 
conclusion would undoubtedly have been different. 
In the second case, Laws and Mundeba v. Domokos, Prof. E.E. Palmer applied 
Tarnopolsky’s analysis to a similar factual context, where the rental unit consisted of two 
rooms on the third floor and a shared bathroom on the second floor.387   His decision is 
more significant for how he addressed the remedies issue, which I discuss below. 
                                                 
387 Laws and Mundeba v. Domokos, unreported decision of a Board of Inquiry under the Human Rights 
Code, SO 1961-62, c 93, dated January 3, 1969 (E.E. Palmer) [Laws and Mundeba v. Domokos]. 
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The third case, Duncan v. Szoldatits, was decided by Prof. Horace Krever as the 
board of inquiry.388  The complainant, Miss Duncan, was denied rental accommodation in 
a second-floor flat consisting of one bedroom, one kitchen and a shared bathroom.  The 
second-floor bathroom was shared by the second and third floor tenants.  The landlord 
and her family lived on the first floor.  They had access to the second-floor bathroom as 
well as to a bathroom in the basement.  The tenants were permitted to use laundry 
facilities in the basement, and they had to pass through at least one room occupied by the 
landlord’s family in order to reach the laundry room. This case was decided several 
months after the Mitchell v. O’Brien case.  Prof. Krever referred to Tarnopolsky’s 
decision with approval, but presented his own - albeit quite similar - analysis.  
Similarly to Dean Tarnopolsky, Prof. Krever reviewed the legislative history and 
concluded that it showed “an unmistakable pattern in the evolution of legislative intention 
in human rights legislation”.389  Prof. Krever focused in particular on the removal of the 
word “apartments” and the removal of any minimum number of units.  He proposed that 
the modifier “self-contained” be interpreted more in relation to the word “dwelling” than 
in relation to the word “unit”, and articulated the following legal “test” for “self-
contained dwelling unit”: “whether the tenant will be intruding into the landlord’s routine 
family life”.  A dwelling unit was self-contained if the tenant could  “live a complete and 
normal life in the rented quarters”, “liv[ing] unto himself” and not becoming a “part of 
the landlord’s household”.390  By contrast, a unit was not self-contained where the tenant 
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SO 1961-62, c 93, dated November 1968 (Prof. H. Krever) [Duncan v. Szoldatits]. 
389 Duncan v. Szoldatits at 11. 
390 Duncan v. Szoldatits at 11-12. 
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“share[d] the landlord’s hearth”.391  Prof. Krever categorically rejected “the necessity of a 
private and exclusive access to and from the quarters” for a unit to be self-contained,392 
and similarly rejected the common entrance hall and shared bathroom as being 
inconsistent with the dwelling being self-contained. Although at one point Prof. Krever 
described the tenants’ access to the basement laundry room as requiring them to “invade 
the privacy” of the landlord, he did not view the tenants’ access to the basement laundry 
facilities as making “the tenant part of the landlord’s household.”393 
 
2   Civil Remedies for Discrimination 
The decisions also contain interesting analyses of the appropriate remedial 
consequences for discrimination in this factual context. Both Dean Tarnopolsky and Prof. 
Krever remarked that the question of remedial recommendations presented perhaps their 
greatest challenge.   
In Mitchell v. O’Brien, Dean Tarnopolsky wrote: “… I find it very difficult to 
know what could be done in the circumstances to assuage the injury suffered by Miss 
Mitchell.”394  He rejected prosecution as an option because it would not provide the 
complainant with compensation: “The threat of prosecution may be a deterrent, but it is 
[sic] ineffective salve to heal the wounds of one who has suffered discrimination.”395  
Following the precedents for recommendations made in similar previous cases, he 
recommended that the respondent be required to write two letters:  a letter to the 
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complainant apologizing for the discrimination and inviting her to assume the next 
vacancy, and a letter to the OHRC undertaking to comply with the Code.   However, he 
noted that it was difficult for the OHRC to monitor this type of undertaking and, at the 
suggestion of counsel for the OHRC, also made the following recommendations:  that the 
respondent be required to notify the YMCA/YWCA, the Jamaican Canadian Association 
and the OHRC of future vacancies for at least one year; that the respondent be required to 
invite the YMCA/YWCA and the Jamaican Canadian Association to refer prospective 
tenants; and that the respondent be required to include the phrase “no colour or race bar” 
in future advertisements of a rental vacancy.  Finally, he recommended that prosecution 
be considered in the future if the respondent refused to agree to these undertakings or if 
there was evidence of discrimination in the future. 
In Duncan v. Szoldatits, Prof. Krever wrote, “I confess that this had been the 
hardest part of my task.”396   Similarly to Dean Tarnopolsky, he rejected prosecution as 
“inadequate” for three reasons:  prosecution provided “limited solace” to the complainant 
for the “grievous insult suffered”; there was no “educational value” to payment of a fine; 
and there would be problems of proof in a prosecution.397  He then went on to describe 
how his thinking had shifted on the question of making recommendations for action 
against a respondent who did not accept that their conduct was discriminatory.  Prof. 
Krever wrote that, prior to finalizing his decision in Duncan v. Szoldatits, he believed that 
the types of recommendation the Commission proposed (and that Dean Tarnopolsky 
accepted in Mitchell v. O’Brien) made sense only where the respondent accepted these 
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recommendations voluntarily.  According to this (former) view, it did not make sense to 
recommend actions requiring compliance with the Code where a respondent “refused to 
acknowledge that she had discriminated, or, if she had, claimed a right to do so.”398  
Similarly, he believed that “it was difficult to justify a prosecution for failing to obey a 
ministerial order” since that would require the respondent “in effect, to act 
hypocritically.”399  
 What turned the tide for Krever were the opportunity for further reflection and his 
review of the Report of Governor Rockefeller’s Committee to Review New York Laws and 
Procedures in the Areas of Human Rights, dated March 27, 1968, which had been 
submitted to him in another matter where he chaired the board of inquiry.   He described 
this report as emphasizing that “enforcement machinery” was “the greatest deficiency in 
human rights legislation”, and he urged the OHRC to give “serious attention” to the 
report.400  What he found most useful about the Report was its emphasis on providing 
redress to the victim as the “paramount concern”:  “It is not, at this late date, sufficient 
merely to expose discrimination in the hope that such exposure will have an educational 
effect in diminishing the incidence of discrimination in our society.”401  He further 
explained that by the time he came to write the decision in the Duncan case, he had come 
                                                 
398 Duncan v. Szoldatits at 15. 
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400 Duncan v. Szoldatits at 15. 
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to believe that the board of inquiry’s recommendation powers “permit[ted] more by way 
of enforcement than I felt at the time of the hearing.”   
In the result, Prof. Krever made the following recommendations:  (1) that the 
respondent be asked to write a letter of apology to the complainant; (2) that the 
respondent be asked to write to organizations and social services agencies interested in 
minority group rights to advise them that she no longer had a discriminatory rental 
policy; (3) that the respondent be required to offer the complainant the next available 
vacancy and, if the complainant was not able to take this vacancy, to provide the 
complainant with financial and non-financial assistance in finding accommodation the 
next time she was required to move; and (4) that the OHRC publicize the results of the 
board of inquiry proceeding as widely as possible and, in particular, to include publicity 
in German-language and Hungarian-language publications, since the respondent had 
stated both that she did not accept racialized tenants and that she wanted to rent only to 
tenants of Hungarian or German ethnic origin.402  
Nevertheless, despite his change of heart about the scope of enforcement available 
under the Code, Prof. Krever was not prepared to recommend that the requirement to 
write letters (his first and second recommendations) be incorporated into a Ministerial 
order if the respondent refused to comply with them.  He remained of the view that this 
type of recommendation made sense only with the respondent’s voluntary compliance. 
In Laws and Mundeba v. Domoko, Prof. Palmer granted the Commission’s request 
for recommendations that the respondent send letters of apology to the complainants and 
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cooperate with the Commission in any future investigations or consultations.  He also 
granted the Commission’s request for a recommendation that the respondent offer the 
first available vacancy to the complainants and inform the Commission when the vacancy 
became available.  However, he did not grant the Commission’s request for 
recommendations that the respondent send letters to community agencies informing them 
of future vacancies, or that the respondent be required to assist the complainants to find 
alternative accommodation, or that the respondent be required to pay the complainants’ 
expenses in obtaining alternative accommodation.403 
The Bell v. McKay complaint involved a similar rental unit to the ones involved in 
the three board of inquiry decisions, and one of the issues in the litigation was whether or 
not it was a “self-contained dwelling unit”.  Therefore, these three board of inquiry 
decisions were undoubtedly an important part of the context in which the Commission 
responded to the human rights complaint in the Bell v. McKay case. 
 
Part IV:  The Bell v. McKay Litigation 
The Bell v. McKay litigation evolved from a human rights complaint involving a 
denial of accommodation in a rental unit located on the upper two stories of the 
landlord’s home.  The Code complaint did not settle and was referred to a board of 
inquiry which convened in April 1969.  The board of inquiry proceeding hearing was 
aborted by a successful application to the High Court of Justice to prohibit the hearing on 
the grounds that the Code did not apply to the rental unit.  The High Court of Justice 
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decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in November 1969, but then 
restored by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1971.   
The litigation focused on two central issues.  The first issue was whether the Code 
applied to the rental unit because it did not have a separate entrance.  Underlying this 
issue was the broader question of the extent to which the law should regulate landlords’ 
choice of tenants. The second issue was whether the landlord’s liability should be 
decided, at least in the first instance, by the board of inquiry.  Underlying this issue were 
broader questions about the Code’s enforcement process, including the role of 
prosecution.  The High Court of Justice decision focused on the refusal to proceed by 
way of prosecution and on the question of whether the unit was self-contained.  The 
Court of Appeal decision focused almost exclusively on the OHRC’s civil process, 
including the board of inquiry’s role in determining whether the Code applied to Bell’s 
rental unit.  The Supreme Court of Canada decision placed most emphasis on the process 
question but also effectively ruled on the meaning of “self-contained dwelling unit”. 
 
1   OHRC Investigation and Conciliation 
The landlord, Kenneth Bell, worked at the Christie bakery plant.404  In 1965, he 
and his wife bought a three-storey house where they had been living on the ground floor 
as tenants since 1957.  Bell and his wife continued to live on the ground floor and rented 
the upper two floors as a flat.  The rental flat consisted of a kitchen, a bathroom, and one 
bedroom on the second floor of the house, and a second bedroom on the third floor.  
                                                 
404 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts of the case described below are based on the accounts provided in 
the reported decisions. 
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Access to the rental unit was through the common, main door to the house and the ground 
floor hallway to the staircase.  The landlord’s three rooms on the ground floor opened to 
this common hallway and were not kept locked.  Since purchasing the house, Bell and his 
wife had rented the flat three times, each time to a married couple.  When the flat became 
vacant in December 1968, Bell placed an advertisement in the Toronto Daily Star. 
Carl McKay, a young Black man from Jamaica, responded to the advertisement 
by telephone and was told the unit was available.  When he appeared to see the unit the 
following day, together with another young Black man, they were told the unit had been 
rented.  A woman named Nancy Sharp, described as McKay’s girlfriend, went to see the 
unit later that same day and was told it was still available.  McKay then filed a human 
rights complaint, claiming that he was denied rental accommodation on the basis of race, 
colour and national origin.  Although Ms Sharp was not expressly described as white, it is 
presumed that she was white given the prohibited grounds of discrimination alleged in 
the complaint. 
The record suggests that OHRC investigator Brett Mann met with McKay and 
Bell the day after the complaint was submitted.  In a letter to Bell following up on this 
meeting, Mann wrote: 
 
      The Commission has conducted a thorough investigation into Mr. 
McKay's complaint and has found sufficient evidence supporting Mr. 
McKay's allegations of discrimination to warrant further involvement of 
the Commission in this matter. The commission views this matter most 
seriously and I would seek to meet with you at your earliest convenience 




From that point forward, Bell was represented by legal counsel, William Cuttell.  Cuttell 
responded to Mann’s letter, advising that he would accept the invitation to participate in a 
discussion but he first wanted to know what Mann meant by "terms of settlement and 
conciliation", since he could not see “ … that Mr. Bell has any liability in the matter 
which could be the subject of any settlement …”.  Mann responded that the OHRC had 
conducted an investigation and “…produced sufficient evidence to justify Mr. McKay's 
complaint”.   He stated that the OHRC routinely attempted to resolve complaints “in an 
amicable manner” and considered more formal options “only as a last resort”.  He further 
advised that “typical terms of settlement” in a complaint like McKay’s would include a 
written apology, an offer of the next available vacancy, and financial compensation for 
expenses resulting from the denial of rental accommodation. Cuttell appears not to have 
responded to this letter.   
One month later the Assistant Director of the OHRC, Herbert Sohn, wrote to 
Cuttell to advise him that the matter would be submitted to the next regular meeting of 
the Commission if it was not resolved before then.  Cuttell responded that he had 
discussed the matter with Bell and investigated the premises himself, and had advised 
Bell that he had not violated the Code and was not liable for any monetary payment.  In 
Cuttell’s view, the OHRC should proceed by way of prosecution if it wished to take the 
matter further.   OHRC investigator Mann subsequently advised Bell and Cuttell that the 
OHRC had decided to request the appointment of a board of inquiry “to conduct a public 
hearing”.  Cuttell then wrote to the Minister of Labour, asking the Minister to refuse to 
appoint a board of inquiry and to authorize a prosecution instead.  He argued that a board 
179 
 
of inquiry was not necessary because the OHRC had already conducted an investigation.  
He also argued that it was improper for the OHRC to suggest that a breach of the statute 
could “be cured” by payment of money, an apology or the promise of future 
accommodation.   
The Minister of Labour, Dalton Bales, responded to Cuttell’s letter. He began by 
explaining that the Code was “… not punitively-oriented. It is basically educational and 
conciliatory, using prosecution proceedings as a final resort.”405  He continued by saying 
that the board of inquiry was designed to protect the respondent and ensure the 
appropriateness of the commission’s investigation: 
 
… a board of inquiry is another step in ensuring that the respondent is 
safeguarded and that the allegations of discrimination and the 
Commission’s investigatory procedures are carefully examined in a hard 
case.406 
 
Therefore, Bales was declining Cuttell’s request to proceed to prosecution and was 
proceeding to appoint a board of inquiry.  However, he invited Cuttell to put his request 
for prosecution to the board of inquiry chairperson for consideration. 
Mann subsequently informed Bell and Cuttell that Dean Walter Tarnopolsky had 
been appointed as a board of inquiry and that the hearing had been scheduled.  Cuttell 
responded by putting on the record his position that the board of inquiry did not have 
jurisdiction to proceed because the Code did not apply to Bell’s flat, because there was 
nothing further to investigate, and because prosecution was the proper enforcement route.  
                                                 
405 Library and Archives Canada, Supreme Court of Canada fonds, Case Files, R972-18-80E, S. Bell v. 
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1969 [LAC, SCC, Bell v. OHRC].  The Court of Appeal decision summarizes the Minister’s letter to 
Cuttell.  
406 LAC, SCC, Bell v. OHRC, Letter from Dalton Bales to William Cuttell, dated March 13, 1969. 
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He further wrote that “… any further investigation of the matter is nothing more nor less 
than persecution directed to achieving a settlement at the expense of my client, or 
persecution which violates fundamental principles of justice.” It appears that neither Bell 
nor Cuttell gave the OHRC any information about Bell’s position on the merits of the 
complaint during the investigation. 
What harm would there have been for Bell in meeting with the OHRC to discuss 
the complaint?  On the one hand, one can understand how Bell would have felt that a 
judgment had already been made against him and that there was no purpose in meeting 
with the OHRC if he wanted to dispute his liability.  As the Ontario Court of Appeal 
subsequently commented, the OHRC’s correspondence contained “unfortunate 
expressions, as, for example, the declaration of guilt of Bell”.407  The wording of the 
OHRC’s correspondence also raises questions about the extent to which the 
Commission’s practices were consistent with its approval of Sid Blum’s view, discussed 
above, that conciliation overtures would be undermined if a respondent believed that they 
were required to admit to a discriminatory act.   
On the other hand, though, what did Bell stand to lose by participating in a 
conversation with the OHRC, especially if he were accompanied by legal counsel?  It is 
possible that he could have persuaded the OHRC that race was not a factor in his decision 
not to rent the unit to McKay.  It is possible that the OHRC might have agreed to a 
minimalist settlement, for example, a simple apology to McKay for any 
                                                 
407 Bell v. McKay OCA at 680.  As noted earlier, the Court of Appeal’s use of the term “guilt” is one of 
many such linguistic uses that reflected the continuing association between criminal law and human rights 
liability, even by those who expressly rejected this association. 
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misunderstanding.  It is difficult to see how Bell would have been further behind if had 
participated in a conciliation meeting.   At worst, he would have been unable to persuade 
the OHRC that there was nothing to resolve, and the OHRC would have been left to 
decide whether or not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry.   
What Bell’s refusal to participate in conciliate illustrates, though, is that the OHRC 
model depended on respondents’ compliance; and that resort to the “iron fist” was thus 
controlled not only by the OHRC but also by respondents. 
 
2   Board of Inquiry Proceeding: Dean Tarnopolsky 
The board of inquiry hearing into McKay’s complaint proceeded as scheduled on 
Monday April 21, 1969, chaired by Dean Tarnopolsky.408 According to Cuttell, by the 
time the hearing commenced there were about 20-30 spectators and at the end of the 
hearing three men identified themselves as newspaper reporters.409  Cuttell refused to 
address the substance of the complaint at the board of inquiry hearing, because his 
position was that the Code did not apply to a rental unit of the type in Bell’s house.  His 
further position was that Dean Tarnopolsky was required to decline to proceed with the 
hearing because the board of inquiry did not have jurisdiction in the matter. As a remedy, 
Cuttell requested that the board of inquiry disqualify itself and ask the Minister to refer 
the case for prosecution. 
                                                 
408 The transcript of the board of inquiry proceeding is the source for the discussion that follows: LAC, 
SCC, Bell v. OHRC Transcript of Board of Inquiry Proceedings, April 21, 1968. 
409 LAC, SCC, Bell v. OHRC, Affidavit of Cuttell on the prohibition application. Cuttell stated that he did 
not inform anyone other than his client about the hearing. 
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Cuttell advanced six arguments to support his motion.  His first argument was that 
Bell could not be guilty of an offence under the Code because the Code did not apply to 
his rental unit.  His second argument was that Bell’s denial of accommodation was not 
based on race, religion or ethnic origin but for some other reason.  He would not say what 
this other reason was, reserving that information for the “proper time”, but maintained 
that it was a ground on which Bell was entitled to act.  His third argument was that the 
board of inquiry was an improper process because the board only had power to 
investigate and the OHRC had already completed an investigation into McKay’s 
complaint.   
Cuttell’s fourth argument was that the board of inquiry’s appointment was contrary 
to the right to be presumed innocent under s. 2 of the Bill of Rights, because the 
proceeding would definitely expose Bell to the “indignity of cross-examination” and 
would probably expose him to the “impertinence of having his home invaded”.   
According to Cuttell, Bell could do nothing to protect himself against this violation 
because the board of inquiry did not have the power to convict or acquit him.  Dean 
Tarnopolsky interrupted this submission to confirm that Cuttell was not arguing that the 
board of inquiry was a criminal proceeding.  Cuttell agreed this was correct, which was 
also consistent with his position that Bell’s conduct, if it was to be the subject of a legal 
process, should be determined by a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and not the 
board of inquiry civil process. 
Cuttell’s fifth argument was that it did not make sense to discuss possible 
settlement when there had not yet been a finding of “guilt”.  His sixth and last argument 
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was that it would be improper to agree to a settlement, which was a possible outcome of 
the board of inquiry proceeding, because a person cannot “buy their way out of 
prosecution”. From the contemporary vantage point, it is difficult to know how Cuttell 
understood the process and meaning of settlement. On the one hand, it is easy to 
understand how and why people connect settlement with liability - why would someone 
agree to a settlement requiring them to do something if they believed they had no legal 
liability for doing anything wrong.  On the other hand, and while that perception 
undoubtedly remains, settlements can also be a more practical outcome for a respondent 
than proceeding through formal litigation, even if there is a strong likelihood that the 
litigation will be resolved in the respondent’s favour.410 
Throughout the process, Cuttell appears to have been very anxious that he might 
inadvertently say or do something that would trigger jurisdiction for the board of inquiry.  
Even at the end of the hearing, after it was clear that Cuttell was likely going to bring a 
prohibition application but before he provided the paperwork for this application, there 
was an issue relating to formally identifying the complaint.  Dean Tarnopolsky suggested 
that Cuttell’s record for the prohibition application would benefit from having McKay’s 
complaint formally identified.  He offered to accept the complaint if Cuttell agreed to its 
validity; alternatively, he proposed that McKay be called as a witness simply for purposes 
of identifying the complaint.  Cuttell appears to have felt that the chairperson was trying 
                                                 
410 Moreover, as Marc Galanter argues in “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change” (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev. 1, “repeat players” often use settlement to manipulate the 
litigation process to their advantage by, for example, forcing settlements to avoid having a legal precedent 
set against them. 
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to trick him into doing something that he did not want to do and that might derail his 
prohibition application: 
 
 MR. CUTTELL:  All right, as long as I am not put in any position 
as agreeing to anything that goes on with this Board, and then I am 
content, as long as I am not asked to consent to anything before this 
Board, I am content. 
 … 
 THE CHAIRMAN:  Well, I am prepared to call [the complainant] 
into the witness box, unless Mr. Cuttell waives doing so. … 
 
 MR. CUTTELL: As I understand, sir, you are asking me to do 
something. 
 
 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, no, I am just suggesting that if you don’t 
waive proof of the complaint itself, then I will call the complainant to 
swear him and - - -  
 
 MR. CUTTELL: All right, that is fair enough for him. I will waive. 
 
Robin Scott, a lawyer with the Civil Division of the legal services branch of the 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, represented McKay and the OHRC.  Scott did 
not address Cuttell’s arguments one-by one, but took a more global approach.  He argued 
that many boards of inquiry had already been appointed and exercised jurisdiction to 
inquire into complaints involving similar housing arrangements.  He objected to what he 
described as Cuttell’s analogy to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, reflected in 
Cuttell’s use of the term “guilty” to describe Bell’s potential civil liability under the 
Code.  Scott argued that board of inquiry proceedings were “administrative” in nature, 
their function being to “investigate facts upon which administrative action may later be 
taken by Commission or Minister”.   In his view, the statutory language established the 
185 
 
opportunity for the board of inquiry to receive evidence and submissions from both 
parties, and its role was to attend to the rights of both complainant and respondent. 
Dean Tarnopolsky rejected Cuttell’s arguments and proposed remedy. He 
emphasized that the board of inquiry process and the prosecution process were separate 
and independent options under the Code. He stated that the board of inquiry did not have 
jurisdiction to recommend prosecution in the absence of hearing evidence and 
submissions. He similarly declined to rule on Cuttell’s argument that the Code did not 
apply to Bell’s rental unit since he had not been provided with any evidentiary basis on 
which to decide this question.  In relation to the board of inquiry’s appointment, he relied 
on s. 13(1) of the Code which stated that once the Minister appointed a board of inquiry, 
“”… it shall be presumed conclusively that the board was appointed in accordance with 
this Act.”411  Finally, he was doubtful that the Bill of Rights could apply to a board of 
inquiry proceeding, both because it was federal legislation and because the rights that 
Cuttell sought to invoke appeared to apply only to criminal proceedings. 
Dean Tarnopolsky also concluded that the board of inquiry hearing could proceed, 
even in the absence of one of the parties, except in the face of a prohibition application in 
the courts.  Not surprisingly, Cuttell had come prepared with the documentation to 
commence a prohibition application.  Thus, the board of inquiry process was adjourned 
sine die, pending the outcome of the prohibition application. 
Although in my view Bell would not have exposed himself to any real harm by 
participating in a conciliation meeting with the OHRC, the question of what harm Bell 
                                                 
411 Code (1962), s. 13(1). 
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might have been exposed to had he not objected to the board of inquiry proceeding is 
more complicated.  In light of Dean Tarnopolsky’s decision in Mitchell v. O’Brien, it is 
reasonable to assume that he would have found Bell’s rental unit to be self-contained and 
thus subject to the Code.  It also seems likely that Dean Tarnopolsky would have found 
race to be a factor in Bell’s decision to refuse to consider McKay as a tenant.   Dean 
Tarnopolsky would then have had to decide which actions to recommend to the Minister.  
It is possible that Dean Tarnopolsky would have accepted Bell’s request for prosecution 
and recommended prosecution as a course of action.  However, even if Dean 
Tarnopolsky could have been persuaded to recommend prosecution, it seems very 
unlikely that he would have recommended prosecution alone, given the priority he 
attached to providing redress to complainants.  It is much more likely that he would also 
have recommended one or more actions to provide a remedy or remedies for McKay. 
If the Minister had both made remedial orders and initiated prosecution, a further 
decision would have had to be made about whether to prosecute Bell for contravening the 
Code, or for failing to comply with a Ministerial order, or both.   If the Minister 
consented to prosecution for contravening the Code, it is reasonable to speculate that this 
would have provided Bell with a fresh opportunity to establish his liability.412  This 
would be consistent with Hill’s view that a board of inquiry proceeding and a prosecution 
were completely separate proceedings, the implication being that it would have been 
possible for a board of inquiry and a court to make different findings on the same 
                                                 
412 It is possible that the doctrines of res judicata or issue estoppel would not have applied because the 
parties to the proceeding would have been different, the onus of proof would have been different and the 
standard of proof would have been different.  Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada 3d 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) at 27, 131, 187. 
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evidence.  As discussed earlier, in his academic writing Dean Tarnopolsky also accepted 
the potential for separate board of inquiry and prosecution proceedings, but viewed this 
as a disadvantage rather than an advantage.  He was concerned that the Code’s dual civil 
and criminal liability created the potential for conflicting liability decisions given the 
different standards of proof that applied to civil and criminal proceedings.413  He was 
particularly concerned about the consequences for the credibility of the Code’s 
enforcement process if in the same case a board of inquiry found liability and a 
prosecution in court did not:  “If this were to happen, great discredit may result to the 
administration of human rights provisions.”414 
Thus, if Bell had been subjected to a prosecution for contravening the Code, he 
may have escaped liability.  However, based on the limited information available, it 
appears that this outcome would have been less likely if Bell had been prosecuted for 
contravening a Ministerial order than if he had been prosecuted for violating the Code 
itself. The Code did not expressly recognize the possibility of challenging the validity of 
a ministerial order in the context of a prosecution for failure to comply.  Moreover, one 
case precedent appears to have held that a minister’s order could not be challenged on 
prosecution.415 Cuttell could have reasonably believed that he would not have been able 
to challenge the validity of the order if Bell were prosecuted for contravening a 
Ministerial order and, therefore, would have had reasonable basis for concern about 
                                                 
413 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Glove” at 585-586. 
414 Tarnopolsky, “Iron Hand in Velvet Globe” at 585-586.  This concern was another reason why 
Tarnopolsky was opposed to making contravention of the Code an offence.  He did not expressly say 
whether his concern also applied to the offence of contravening a Ministerial order. 
415 The prosecution decision in question, Re Lougheed (April 29, 1969), was an unreported decision 
referred by to Justice Stewart in his decision on the prohibition application.  The Lougheed decision was 
not available to me for independent review. 
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potential jeopardy to his client by participating in a board of inquiry proceeding and then 
proceeding to prosecution. 
 
3   High Court of Justice Prohibition Application: Justice Stewart 
Bell’s prohibition application was heard by Justice Stewart of the High Court of 
Justice in May 1969.  Co-counsel Nelles Starr and Cuttell represented Bell at the High 
Court of Justice.   Marshall Pollock, a lawyer with the Ontario Department of the 
Attorney General, represented the Commission at the High Court of Justice.  
In the context of the prohibition proceeding and subsequent appeals, Bell’s 
position was that McKay and his friend looked like youths and students and he did not 
wish to rent youths and students.  He preferred “mature persons” or married couples as 
tenants because his chattels were unprotected and his wife was alone in the house when 
he worked the night shift.  He acknowledged that he had been untruthful when he told 
McKay the unit was rented, saying that “‘this is the simplest method and avoids 
discussion and argument’”.  According to Bell, the vacancy for which McKay applied 
was ultimately filled by a “45-year-old Semitic Egyptian”.416 
Justice Stewart’s decision reflected a deep concern with both the substantive 
possibility that the Code could have applied to Bell’s rental unit and with the process 
possibility that Bell could have been denied “the right” to have his liability determined by 
a court in a quasi-criminal prosecution instead of by the board of inquiry. For Justice 
Stewart, Bell had two rights at stake.  One was the right to control access to his property; 
                                                 
416 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 710. 
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the other was the right to have this substantive property right determined by a court in a 
quasi-criminal prosecution.  
On the question of whether the Code applied to Bell’s rental unit, Justice 
Stewart’s decision records that Pollock did not make submissions on this issue; Pollock’s 
sole argument was that the court did not have jurisdiction to prohibit the board of inquiry 
because the its function was administrative rather than judicial or, alternatively, that the 
application was premature.  Thus, it appears that Pollock did not provide Justice Stewart 
with the OHRC perspective on why the rental unit was self-contained.  Given the tone 
and content of Justice Stewart’s comments on this issue, however, it seems unlikely that 
he would have been persuaded by the views of board of inquiry chairpersons Dean 
Tarnopolsky, Prof. Krever and Prof. Palmer. Justice Stewart undoubtedly believed that a 
landlord in Bell’s situation should not be forced to rent to a racialized or religious 
minority tenant: 
 
It is equally as important that the rights of a middle-aged white Canadian 
homeowner be protected as those of a young, black, Jamaican tenant. 
Neither more important or less important. Equally. And perhaps it is time 
that this was made clear.417 
 
In his view, the Code was “never intended to limit an arbitrary choice of tenants in a 
man’s house to whom he rents unseparated rooms.”418  A landlord renting a non-self-
contained dwelling unit should be able to “exercise an untrammeled and biassed choice 
                                                 
417 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 718-719. 
418 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 711. 
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of those who dined at his table, or slept under his roof.”419  The landlord would not be 
able to “protect the property, his chattels or the person of his wife from ill-disposed 
tenants” because the tenant would in principle have access to the landlord’s rooms.420 
 On the process question, Justice Stewart’s evident outrage over the Minister’s 
refusal to grant Bell’s request for a court trial seems to have been driven by his 
characterization of the Code as quasi-criminal legislation and by his antipathy toward 
non-court adjudication.  Justice Stewart repeatedly used criminal law language to 
characterize the nature of the legal wrong and the Code’s civil process. He characterized 
the complaint as a “charge”; he described the OHRC’s position as reflecting a decision 
that “Mr. Bell was guilty of an offence against the Ontario Human Rights Code”; he 
described a board of inquiry has having the power to “force a person accused of an 
offence under the Code to give evidence against himself … without any real protection 
from any Evidence Act ….”;  and he described the board of inquiry’s potential 
recommendation as including “what punishment should be inflicted”.421  This language 
echoed Cuttell’s submissions to the board of inquiry and likely reflected the arguments 
that Starr and Cuttell presented in court.  
According to Justice Stewart, if discrimination was a quasi-criminal offence then 
Bell was entitled to the legal process protections provided by prosecution in court: the 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty, protection against self-incrimination, and 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  None of these protections was available 
                                                 
419 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 713. 
420 Bell McKay (HCJ) at 711.  
421 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 710, 713, 716. 717,   
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in the board of inquiry proceeding, in Justice Stewart’s view.  In a board of inquiry 
proceeding, according to Justice Stewart:  McKay would have been considered “more 
equal” than Bell;422 Bell could have been forced to testify against himself; the tribunal 
had the power to enter Bell’s home and to “interrogate people outside of any formal 
hearing”; and the tribunal could make findings on the basis of any evidence it wished to 
consider, whether or not such evidence would have been admissible in court.423   For 
Stewart J., this board of inquiry process was a travesty of injustice:  
 
I do not think any comment is necessary on the danger inherent in such 
powers and that the finding of this board can be the basis of actions 
deleterious to the person and property of the subject.424 
  
Justice Stewart was also outraged by the fact that there were no statutory limitations on 
the orders available to the Minister and, since he assumed – not unreasonably perhaps – 
that there was no doubt as to how Bell’s liability would be determined, he was certain 
that the Minister would have made orders against Bell:  
 
If ever there has been absolute power given to one man it is here, and Lord 
Acton has made further comment by me unnecessary. There is no 
limitation in the nature or scope of the order, the amount to be made 
payable, the extent of the incursion into the real property rights of the 
citizen, or otherwise howsoever.425 
 
Justice Stewart also invoked the then-recent report of the Honourable J.C. 
McRuer, Commissioner of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights. This inquiry 
                                                 
422 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 718, 
423 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 715. 
424 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 715. 
425 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 716. 
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had been established by the government in response to growing resistance to 
administrative law models and, in particular, opposition to proposed legislation that 
would have increased the powers of the Ontario Police Commission in order to address 
organized crime.426  The overall mandate of inquiry was to study the extent to which 
Ontario laws resulted in unjustified encroachment on the personal freedoms, rights, and 
liberties of the individual."427  The Report included both general discussion of broad 
principles and specific discussions of particular agencies and tribunals.  By the time of 
the Bell v. McKay prohibition hearing, the first two volumes of the Report had been 
published, and Volume Two included some preliminary, specific discussion of the 
OHRC. Justice Stewart referenced the Report as providing support for his concern about 
the Code’s very limited access to court proceedings.  He described the Code as 
“…generally so contrary to the principles set forth by the Honourable J.C. McRuer's 
advice … that the policy of not granting access to the Court is understandable.”428   
Justice Stewart was not wrong to highlight McRuer’s general support for 
individual rights protected by the courts.  However, McRuer’s preliminary assessment of 
the OHRC process was generally positive and not opposed to the Code’s emphasis on 
conciliation and voluntary persuasion.  McRuer described the Code as “an outstanding 
                                                 
426 Luce and Schucher, “Right to Discriminate” at 128-129. 
427 Honourable J.C. McRuer, Commissioner, Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights, Report Number 
One, Volume One (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 1.  McRuer’s understanding of the role of law would 
not probably have included room for law as a tool in the hands of social activists in struggles against social 
inequalities.  In his view, “Law as the expression of the power of the State, and its enforcement, are not 
weapons but shields serving to protect and regulate the respective rights, freedoms and liberties of 
individuals, inter se, from whom the authority of the State is derived. Excessive or unnecessary power 
conferred on public authorities corrupts and destroys democratic institutions and gives life to all forms of 
tyranny— some petty and some extreme.” – at 3.  
428 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 714. 
193 
 
piece of legislation” and wrote that the OHRC experience was “most useful and 
instructive when considering what can be accomplished by educative and persuasive 
processes without the imposition of sanctions.”429 McRuer acknowledged that he had yet 
to provide a more complete assessment of the “adequacy of the safeguards for the rights 
of the individuals”430 under the Code; this further assessment was published a few years 
later in Volume Three of the Report and is discussed later in this chapter. 
Finally, Justice Stewart described the Code’s prosecution option as a “legislative 
beartrap” and, thus, not a viable legal process option or an “opportunity”, as described by 
Hill.431   Justice Stewart focused on the potential prosecution for contravening a 
Ministerial order.  He described this option as a legislative beartrap because it was his 
understanding that an individual who was prosecuted for contravening a Ministerial order 
could not challenge the validity of the order as part of that prosecution – and this 
understanding appears to have been correct, based on the limited information available. 
Justice Stewart does not appear to have considered the prosecution option for 
contravention of the Code, other perhaps than to suggest that this option was available 
only with consent of the Minister, which was also correct.  Justice Stewart’s overall 
concern, then, was that the Code did not provide Bell with a right to have his liability 
determined within the procedural framework of a quasi-criminal prosecution and did not 
permit a court to review a board of inquiry’s findings, either directly or in the context of a 
prosecution. 
                                                 
429 Honourable J.C. McRuer, Commissioner, Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights, Report Number 
Two (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 1556 [McRuer, Royal Commission Report #2]. 
430 McRuer, Royal Commission Report #2 at 1556. 
431 Bell v. McKay (HCJ) at 713. 
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Justice Stewart’s understanding of the Code processes was correct from a 
technical and descriptive perspective.  His analysis also reflected a judicial approach to 
law and legal process, rejecting the alternative approach reflected in the Code 
enforcement model.  Justice Stewart did not accept the fundamental policy issues raised 
by the Code enforcement model, and made no effort to understand or engage with 
them.432 
 
4   Court of Appeal for Ontario:  Justice Laskin 
In the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bell appears to have been 
represented by Starr alone, whereas Pollock was joined by Senior Crown Counsel, Frank 
Callaghan, in representing the OHRC.  Bell’s arguments received a completely 
opposition reception from the Court of Appeal than the reception they had received from 
Justice Stewart. Although the Court of Appeal did not specifically address the merits of 
the substantive issue, it did communicate an entirely different sensibility towards the 
Code.  In the decision authored by Justice Laskin, the Court acknowledged that the Code 
had “drastically changed” the common law position of employers, owners of housing 
accommodation and owners of places to which the public was customarily admitted, and 
did not exhibit Justice Stewart’s concern about this fact.433  Moreover, in concurring 
separate reasons (not included in the reported version of the decision), Justice Evans 
                                                 
432 For a critique of the McRuer Report for giving preference to judicial legalism see John Willis, “The 
McRuer Report: Lawyers’ Values and Civil Servants’ Values” (1968), 18 UTLJ 351. 
433 Bell v McKay (CA) at 682.  
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wrote that he was “unable to ascertain from the evidence” how Stewart J. reached his 
conclusion that the premises were not self-contained.434  
The Court of Appeal focused most of its attention, however, on the procedural 
issue.  According to Justice Laskin, the primary argument advanced on behalf of Bell was 
that the Code’s civil enforcement process deprived Bell of his “rights at law” and was “so 
offensive to democratic principle as to justify a Court to prohibit its invocation.”435  
Justice Laskin described this argument as a “startling proposition”.436  Similarly, in 
response to the argument that Bell had a right to be “confronted by his accusers in a 
summary conviction Court” and should not be required to participate in the board of 
inquiry process, Justice Laskin wrote: “This contention is unacceptable.”437  In Justice 
Laskin’s view, it was an open question as to whether a board of inquiry finding or 
ministerial order could be challenged in the context of a prosecution, and he left those 
issues to be determined in a case that squarely raised them.438   
The Court of Appeal’s decision clearly reflected a different perspective from 
Justice Stewart’s on what constituted legitimate “substantive due process”:   
 
[T]he Courts of this country have no mandate to enforce their own, let 
alone Bell’s, notions of substantive due process to nullify legislation 
which is competently enacted under the constitutional distribution of 
legislative powers; at the most, they may, where the legislation is open to 
such construction, enforce procedural due process in line with principles 
worked out by common law techniques.439 
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438 Bell v. McKay (OCA) at 682. 
439 Bell v. McKay (OCA) at 682-683. 
196 
 
In this to and fro between the courts and the legislature, the Court of Appeal’s view was 
that Bell could not claim “legal immunity from administrative procedures prescribed by a 
competent Legislature for effectuating a policy which has been translated into substantive 
statutory prescriptions.”440  However, it is arguable that deference to the legislature, as 
such, was not the principal value underlying this endorsement of the Code and its 
enforcement process.  Given Justice Laskin’s mistrust of the courts’ ability to enforce 
social legislation, it seems most likely that he did not find the board of inquiry process in 
any way offensive, either in general on in relation to any common law prescriptions.  
Justice Laskin would also have viewed the Code’s primary purpose as being civil and 
remedial, rather than criminal (or even “quasi-criminal”) and punitive.  Therefore, he 
would not have been sympathetic to the argument that Bell’s interest in protecting 
himself against liability for discrimination was a paramount legal process value. 
 
5   Supreme Court of Canada:  Justice Martland 
 The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) overruled the Court of Appeal decision, 
with Justice Abbott and Justice Hall dissenting, in separate reasons.  The SCC majority 
decision, written by Justice Martland, represented a return to a more narrow view of the 
Code, somewhere between the approaches of Justice Stewart and the Court of Appeal.  
The overwhelming theme of the decision was boundaries and respect for boundaries. The 
majority described the Code as seeking “to prevent certain kinds of discrimination in 
                                                 
440 Bell v. McKay (OCA) at 683. 
197 
 
respect of specified fields.  It applies only to the fields thus defined.”441  The Court 
repeated that the Code was “specifically limited by its terms to dealing with such 
discrimination when it occurs in relation to defined fields of operation” and then listed 
several fields to which the Code did not apply:  free expression of opinions, employment 
of domestic servants, and rental of non-self-contained dwelling units.442 
The majority decision characterized the main issue in the case as whether the 
Supreme Court of Ontario had the authority to prevent the board of inquiry from 
proceeding where the complaint alleged discrimination in an area not covered by the 
Code.  However, by the time it came to this question, the majority decision had already 
discussed the meaning of self-contained dwelling unit and expressed the opinion that 
Bell’s rental unit was not self-contained.443  The majority based this opinion on their 
analysis of the legislative history, concluding that because the Code had twice previously 
used the language of “apartments” in apartment buildings, the government intended self-
contained dwelling units to be those “similar to an apartment in an apartment house”.444  
Thus, the SCC reached the completely opposite conclusion on the significance of the 
legislative history to the conclusion reached by the boards of inquiry when they examined 
this same legislative history. Whereas the boards of inquiry saw the removal of the word 
“apartment” as signaling an intention to broaden the scope of legislative protection, the 
SCC attached no significance at all to the removal of the word “apartment” from the 
legislation; for the SCC, the meaning of “apartment” was exactly the same as “self-
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contained dwelling unit”.  Thus, the Court effectively based its interpretation of the 
legislation on a version of the statutory language that was no longer in effect.445 
 On the process issue, the SCC majority held that both the board of inquiry and the 
court on a prohibition application had the authority to decide the question of whether or 
not the Code applied to Bell’s unit, and that it was up to Bell to decide whether he was 
willing to go through the board of inquiry process or whether he preferred to have this 
question determined first by a court.446  This view aligned well with the Court’s previous 
conclusion that the Code did not apply to Bell’s unit and, thus, ex post facto legitimated 
Bell’s course of action.  The decision did not express any views about the nature of the 
Code’s enforcement process, did not discuss the dual civil / quasi-criminal options, and 
did not address Bell’s claimed right to have the matter decided by way of prosecution. 
 Justice Hall’s dissenting reasons adopted the Court of Appeal’s reasons.447  
Justice Abbott framed his dissenting reasons with reference to upholding correct 
boundaries for legislatures and courts.  Legislatures had authority to define the 
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal; courts had responsibility to ensure that the 
tribunal remained within its jurisdiction.448 However, it is not clear how he applied these 
principles to Bell’s situation. He stated that the board of inquiry did not have adjudicative 
authority, implying that the board was not subject to prohibition.  He also wrote: 
         
                                                 
445 Ian Hunter was very critical of the SCC’s use and interpretation of the legislative history. See Ian 
Hunter, “Judicial Review of Human Rights Legislation: McKay v. Bell” (1972), UBC L Rev. 17 at 30 
[Hunter, “Judicial Review”]. 
446 Bell v. McKay (SCC) at 774-775. 
447 Bell v. McKay (SCC) at 780. 
448  Justice Abbott made these points by quoting a lengthy passage from the decision of McRuer CJHC in 
Re Jackson and Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1955] OR 83:  Bell v. McKay (SCC) at 779-780. 
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        Whatever view one may take of the desirability or efficacy of such an 
inquiry or of the inconvenience it may cause to persons concerned, these 
are questions which the Courts are not called upon to determine. The 
language of s. 13 is plain and, in my opinion, effect must be given to it.449 
 
In the end, it is not clear what remedy Justice Abbott believed would have been available 
for Bell if he had participated in the board of inquiry process and faced ministerial orders 
as a result of that process. 
 With the SCC decision, the litigation came full circle back to the result imposed 
by Justice Stewart, for slightly less inflammatory reasons but mostly likely with a similar 
ideological sub-text.  However, the SCC did not have the last word on the subject. 
  
PART V:  After the Bell v. McKay Litigation 
The Code’s protection against discrimination in rental housing and its 
enforcement provisions were both amended following the SCC decision in Bell v. 
McKay.   As will be discussed, the legislature overturned the court’s interpretation of a 
self-contained dwelling unit but maintained the Code’s enforcement model, making no 
changes to the fundamental principles or structure of the process. 
In a letter to Tory candidates in the 1971 provincial leadership contest, Alan 
Borovoy, then General Counsel to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, asked 
candidates to express public support for a legislative amendment to override the SCC 
decision and to express public support for the Commission and its work .450  He argued 
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450 Archives of Ontario, Ontario Civil Liberties Assoc. fonds, RG 76-3, Letter from Alan Borovoy to Tory 
Candidates, Feb. 10, 1971 [AO, Civil Liberties]. 
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that the effect of the SCC decision was to deny the Code’s protection to low income 
members of minority groups, since rooming houses and “flats” were typically less 
expensive than rental units in apartment buildings.  He also made the argument about the 
public nature of the market, which was a consistent theme for fair practices and human 
rights advocates: 
 
Of course, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association is as concerned as 
anyone to protect from legislative intrusion the right of privacy. But the 
landlord who offers part of his property for rent on the public market, has 
by that act willingly surrendered a portion of his privacy. … Surely, he 
cannot have it both ways. He cannot simultaneously declare part of his 
building available for rent on the public market and maintain that the same 
part is subject to his right of privacy. In our respectful opinion, it is most 
appropriate for the law to insist that once a portion of property is put on 
the public market all dealings with respect to that portion of property must 
be governed by public standards of fair play.451 
 
The one possible exception Borovoy proposed was the situation where the tenant was 
essentially a companion of the landlord, evidence of which would be that the tenant was 
free to use most or all of the landlord’s space. On the question of the OHRC, Borovoy 
praised the Commission for its work in the field of “race relations”, stating that the 
Commission had achieved something that very few other government agencies had 
achieved:  “…an admirable balance between vigorous enforcement and restrained 
fairness. It has effectively championed the interests of complainants and judiciously 
safeguarded the rights of respondents.”452   He expressed concern that the work of the 
Commission might suffer because “Judicial reversal can undermine communal respect.”  
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The Code’s rental housing protection was amended in 1972, without opposition.  
The amended provision eliminated the “self-contained dwelling unit” language and 
replaced it with the phrase “housing accommodation”.  The amended provision further 
defined housing accommodation to mean “any place of dwelling” other than one in a 
building where the owner or the owner’s family lived and the tenant shared a bathroom or 
kitchen with the owner or the owner’s family.453 Bell’s rental unit would, in my view, 
have been captured by this new language, since Bell’s tenant was not required to share a 
kitchen or bathroom with him and his wife.  
On the procedural side, the final volume of the report of the Royal Commission 
Inquiry into Civil Rights was published in 1971.  In this report, McRuer continued to 
endorse the Code’s enforcement model.   He emphasized that the purpose of the Code 
“can best be accomplished by an investigatory procedure rather than by an adversary 
one” and expressed continuing approval of the OHRC’s emphasis on conciliation:  
 
      In the administration of the Act the emphasis has been rightly placed 
on education and conciliation. The area of human behaviour covered by 
the Act is a field for law enforcement that has many social aspects making 
it quite different from that covered by ordinary criminal law.  Respect for 
the dignity of the individual human being is something that cannot readily 
be enforced by sanctions, although sanctions are necessary as a last resort 
to enforce compliance and minimum standards.454 
 
                                                 
453 The Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 1972, SO 1972, c 119, s. 4. 
454 J.C. McRuer, Commissioner, Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights, Report Number Three, Part V 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 1980 [McRuer, Royal Commission #3.5]. 
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In the passage above, McRuer appears to have characterized the Human Rights Code as a 
form of criminal law, albeit a somewhat different form of criminal law.  At a later point 
in his commentary, however he wrote that the Code was more like “health legislation”: 
 
This legislation is more like health legislation, than criminal legislation.  
There are a great many health statutes and by-laws designed to maintain 
health standards that are enforced by inspection, warning and agreement to 
improve facilities, but these nevertheless make it an offence to fail to 
maintain prescribed standards.455 
 
Although this comparison appears to have been intended to shift the focus away from 
criminal law and toward civil law, it made no reference to the remedial dimension of the 
Code and identified criminal liability as the only potential form of liability.  McRuer also 
disagreed with Tarnopolsky’s view that the discrimination should not be an offence under 
the Code, writing that it made the legislation “more meaningful to say in express terms 
‘thou shalt not discriminate’ and to provide that if you do sanctions will flow.”456  At the 
same time, however, McRuer recommended that failure to comply with a Minister’s 
order not continue to be an offence; alternatively, if it did continue to be an offence, he 
recommended that the order should subject to challenge in the context of a prosecution 
for failure to comply with it.457 
This continuing link with criminal law was also reflected in McRuer’s 
recommendations for changes to the adjudication component of enforcement.  He 
described the respondent in a case where conciliation failed as a “person accused of 
                                                 
455 Royal Commission Inquiry Into Civil Rights, Report #3.5 at 1983. 
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wrongdoing” and recommended that persons in this situation “should have a clear right of 
resort to the ordinary courts where the issue of his guilt may be decided rather than his 
guilt being determined on the mere order of the Minister.”458 McRuer was not 
recommending that the board of inquiry process be eliminated; he was instead 
recommending that a Minister’s order be enforceable in civil court and that the person 
against whom the order was made – described as the “alleged offender” – be able to 
challenge the basis for the order.459    
McRuer acknowledged that concerns about the Code’s enforcement process had 
been raised in the Bell v. McKay litigation, but he did not recommend any changes of the 
kind that Bell’s counsel and Justice Stewart clearly preferred.  In his view, the 
conciliation procedure was “well designed to safeguard civil rights and to protect 
individuals from unnecessary prosecution.”460  McRuer did appear to agree that there 
were some concerns relating to the board of inquiry process, but he did not recommend 
any changes to that process itself.  Instead, he appeared to be of the view that the 
concerns would be addressed by ensuring that the respondent could challenge the basis 
for Ministerial orders either in a civil proceeding to enforce the order or in a prosecution 
for failure to comply with the order.461  Moreover, he responded to Bell’s counsels’ and 
Justice Stewart’s concerns about the potential for self-incrimination by expressing the 
opinion that a respondent who was “sufficiently advised” could take advantage of the 
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Evidence Act.462  Indeed, McRuer’s only recommendations for the board of inquiry 
process were recommendations to give the Commission even more power in that process 
in the following ways:  by giving the Commission power to consider the board of inquiry 
report; by making it a condition precedent that the Commission consider the board of 
inquiry report before it was recommended to the Minister; and by giving the Commission 
power to change or  rescind  board of inquiry recommendations. 
When the Civil Rights Law Amendment Act was passed in 1971 to implement 
McRuer’s recommendations, it included amendments to the Code.463  Some, but not all, 
of McRuer’s recommendations for the human rights enforcement were implemented; 
indeed, the main components of the Code’s enforcement process emerged intact. The 
amendments: 
• expanded the Commission’s investigatory powers [s.12(4)];  
• identified the Commission, the complainant, and the respondent(s) as parties to 
a board of inquiry proceeding and specifically gave the Commission carriage of 
the complaint [s. 13b(1)]; 
• made clear that a member appointed to a board of inquiry could not have 
participated in the prior Commission investigation [s. 13b(3)];  
• provided for the recording of oral evidence presented to a board of inquiry 
[s.13b(4)]; 
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• required a board of inquiry’s findings of fact to be based exclusively on 
evidence in accordance with the newly-minted Statutory Powers Procedure 
Act, 1971 [s. 13b(5)];  
• gave the board of inquiry exclusive jurisdiction to determine any question of 
fact, law, or both, required to reach a decision about whether the Code was 
contravened [s. 13b(6)]; 
• gave the board the authority to decide whether or not a party contravened the 
Code and the authority to make orders required to constitute full compliance 
with the Code, to rectify injuries caused, and to provide compensation for 
injuries [s. 13c(a)(b)]; and 
• provided a right of appeal from a board of inquiry decision to the Supreme 
Court of  Ontario on questions of law, fact, or both [s.13d(1)(4)]. 
These amendments not only maintained the Code’s enforcement model but also arguably 
strengthened the board of inquiry process to which Cuttell, Starr and Justice Stewart had 
been so opposed and to which the Supreme Court of Canada declined to give preference. 
However, although the Code’s enforcement process remained formally intact, this model 
had already raised a number of questions about the role of anti-discrimination legislation 
in governing social relations and the meaning of legal responsibility in relation to anti-






Conclusion to Chapter Two 
When law becomes involved in governing social relations, there will be many 
opportunities for decisions to be made, and for questions about who should be given the 
power and control to make these various decisions.  Ian Hunter’s 1972 commentary on 
the SCC’s decision described it as a “pernicious” result rooted in “muddled logic”, and as 
a hypocritical, “shortsighted essentially ethnocentric result”.464  He wrote that the 
decision led to the Code’s protections being “effective for those who need them least”, 
because the type of rental housing provided by Bell and other landlords was the “lowest 
cost urban housing” most needed by members of minority groups who were often 
immigrants and poor.465  Hunter repeated this view in an article published in 1979, albeit 
in a somewhat more muted tone, writing that the result of the decision was “anomalous” 
for the same reason: that the Code would not apply to lower cost urban housing, which 
was “economic necessity” for racialized minorities.466  By contrast, in the same article, 
Hunter castigated the 1974 British Columbia board of inquiry decision in the Gay 
Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun case.467  The complaint in that case was 
against a newspaper that refused to publish an advertisement for a gay rights magazine.  
The newspaper’s argument was that the advertisement would offend many readers. The 
board of inquiry rejected this argument as “ludicrous”.  Prof. Hunter described the board 
                                                 
464 Hunter, “Judicial Review” at 30, 31. 
465 Hunter, “Judicial Review” at 30. 
466 Ian A. Hunter, “The Origin, Development and Interpretation of Human Rights Legislation” in R. St. 
MacDonald and John P. Humphrey, The Practice of Freedom: Canadian Essays on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) 77 at 92 [Hunter, “Origin, Development and 
Interpretation”]. 
467 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] 2 SCR 435, aff’g (1977), 77 DLR (3d) 487 
(BCCA).  The board of inquiry decision was upheld on judicial review but then reversed on appeal to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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of inquiry’s conclusion “one of those arrogant, self-righteous assertions that increasingly 
characterize decisions of human rights inquiries and that must give pause to even the 
most ardent supporter of the legislation.”468  
Why did Hunter see the social issue of minority group access to low-cost rental 
housing as an issue of concern, but not the issue of a newspaper refusing to publish an 
advertisement for a gay rights magazine?  Perhaps he had more sympathy for newspapers 
than for landlords?  Perhaps he believed that access to housing was a more serious social 
issue than access to newspaper advertising?  In fairness, part of Hunter’s rationale was 
that the existing BC human rights legislation did not expressly protect sexual orientation 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination.  However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
responded similarly in Bell v. McKay, in finding that the Ontario Code did not apply to 
non-self-contained dwelling units, and that Bell’s rental unit was not self-contained.  In 
the same way that Hunter had different views about how human rights legislation should 
apply to two different social issues – low-cost rental housing for racialized minorities, on 
the one hand, and social inclusion of gays, on the other hand - the Ontario High Court of 
Justice, Court of Appeal for Ontario and Supreme Court of Canada in Bell v. McKay had 
different views about how human rights legislation should apply to the social issue of 
access to rental housing. 
The Bell v. McKay litigation also raised other issues about decision-making 
authority involved in legal regulation of social relations: issues about the respective 
authority of legislatures and adjudicative bodies to decide how to approach the 
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substantive and procedural regulation of social issues; and issues about the respective 
authority of administrative agencies and citizens to decide questions about access to the 
processes where legal responsibility and consequences are at stake. In his commentary on 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bell v. McKay, Peter Hogg focused on the 
question of who had the authority to decide whether Bell’s rental unit was self-contained 
- should this authority have rested with the board of inquiry or with the courts.469 
On the question of the dual civil and quasi-criminal dimensions of the Code, the 
Bell v. McKay litigation mirrored on-going issues about the nature of human rights legal 
norms and the legal processes for enforcing these norms. Discrimination was constituted 
by statute to be simultaneously a civil wrong and an offence, and the Code created both 
civil liability and quasi-criminal liability for discrimination.  The civil wrong was 
enforced primarily through the conciliation-board of inquiry process, with a clear 
emphasis on providing remedies for the complainant through a process that was private 
and, preferably, voluntary.  The offences were enforced (to the limited extent that they 
were used) through prosecution in court.   On the one hand, the clear intention was that 
the focus of the Code and its enforcement would be civil and remedial rather than 
criminal and punitive.  On the other hand, the language of criminal law continued to be 
pervasive.  This criminal law language was not only used by Bell’s counsel, Justice 
Stewart and the McRuer Report, but also by those who advocated for a remedial and non-
punitive approach: Dan Hill described the written human rights complaint as “a statement 
                                                 
469 P.W. Hogg, “The Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine in the Supreme Court of Canada: Bell v. Ontario Human 
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of charges” and the respondent to a complaint as “the accused”;470 Sid Blum used the 
word “guilt” to describe legal responsibility for discrimination;471 board of inquiry 
chairpersons described the complaint as “charges”,472 discriminatory conduct as an 
“offence”, 473 and respondents as “offenders”474 and as “found guilty of discriminatory 
practices”;475 and even Justice Laskin, in the Court of Appeal decision in Bell v. McKay, 
referred to the OHRC’s letter as containing “the declaration of guilt of Bell”.476  
Tarnopolsky alone seems to have refrained from this use of criminal law language, 
although he too drew a comparison between human rights law and criminal law on the 
question of the using law to address morality: 
 
       Opponents of human rights legislation have often argued that the law 
cannot legislate morality.  However, this overlooks the fact that our 
Criminal Code is based to a large extent upon a commonly accepted moral 
code.477 
 
It could be said that this continuing use of criminal law language was simply a semantic 
legacy of the original quasi-criminal law roots of anti-discrimination.  However, I believe 
it is more than this.  I believe this language reflected on-going tension between the dual 
civil and criminal perspectives on human rights legal norms, with the civil perspective 
                                                 
470 Dan Hill, “Protecting Human Rights in Ontario, 1793-1968” I1968) 8 Human Relations 8-9, as quoted 
in McRuer, Royal Commission #2 at 1556, 1557. 
471 At 162 above. 
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focusing more on their remedial goals and the criminal perspective focusing more on 
their role in defining public norms for social conduct. 
Finally, the Code’s public goal of norm enforcement and private goal of resolving 
individual claims had the potential to be into conflict with one another.  A remedial 
outcome that was considered appropriate from the perspective of private dispute 
resolution, because it satisfied the parties, might not be considered appropriate from the 
perspective of public goals if, for example, it did not include public recognition of legal 
responsibility, and vice versa.478  As discussed above, under Dan Hill’s leadership the 
OHRC’s perspective on the implementation of its public role within the Code’s 
enforcement model gave priority to the more private purpose of complaint resolution.  
Since we do not know anything about the content of these settlements, we do not know to 
what extent they sought to balance the Code’s competing public and private purposes.   
For those cases that proceeded to a board of inquiry hearing, board chairpersons 
were faced with having to determine how to balance the Code’s competing public and 
private purposes.  Stenning reported that some chairpersons, such as Tarnopolsky, 
resolved the conflict by defining the separate purposes in relation to one another, that is, 
by “… defining the compliance enforcement purpose primarily in terms of the 
achievement of a settlement between the parties”479.  Other chairpersons believed that the 
conflict was irreconcilable because it reflected competing policy “paradoxes” which by 
definition called for contradictory processes and resolutions: 
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… the Act embodies a series of policy paradoxes. On the one hand, public 
respect for the policies embodied in the statute is enhanced by publicity, 
yet at the same time the opportunity to preserve confidentiality and 
anonymity, and to avoid stigma, is an inducement to a respondent to agree 
to a settlement. Second, because there is an individual complainant on 
whose behalf the proceedings are instituted, a premium is properly placed 
upon obtaining effective relief for him. Moreover, the hazards of litigation 
generate pressures for both sides to compromise their differences with the 
result that the complainant may forego some degree of vindication. Yet to 
the extent that the complainant abandons his claim, the Commission's 
objectives remain unfulfilled. To this extent, pursuing the private interests 
of the complainant may be inimical to the full achievement of public 
purposes.480 
  
This passage captures what I would suggest are better described as tensions, than as 
paradoxes.481 I would also suggest that these tensions were not, and are not, unique to the 
Code but are shared by most, if not all, legal norms and their enforcement. It may be the 
case that some legal norms and related enforcement processes are considered to be more 
“public” than others; for example, criminal and quasi-criminal legal norms and processes 
are often held out as paradigmatic of public law.482 However, all legal norms have a 
public dimension, since they all seek in some way to govern social relations by 
establishing public expectations and requirements.   
This tension between public and private goals and processes was a key issue in 
                                                 
480 Ruest v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Report of a Board of Inquiry (Professor H. W. 
Arthurs) under the Ontario Human Rights Code, dated April 9th, 1968 at 24, quoted in Stenning, 
Conciliation to Judgement at 142. 
481 I prefer to characterize these competing values and goals as tensions rather than paradoxes because the 
concept of tensions is more dynamic and more suggestive of the processes by which law in action engages 
with these competing goals and values.  The concept of paradoxes is more static and suggests that it is 
possible, or should be possible, to create legal processes that do not have to contend with paradoxical 
challenges. My work assumes that conflict over issues of social inequality is on-going, and that law is one 
tool with which people engage with conflicts over social inequalities. I recognize that other ideological 
perspectives may hold the view that it is possible to create societies without conflict, but I do not share this 
view. 
482 Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 127-134. 
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the developments that ultimately led to the dismantling of the OHRC enforcement model 

























Statutory Human Rights and Access to Justice: 
From “Gatekeeper” to “Direct Access”, 1972-2012 
 
 
Introduction to Chapter Three 
  
 
To purport to give someone a ‘right’, and then insist that he may only dispose of 
that right in ways which are consistent with a government agency’s perception of 
the dictates of social policy, however, is inherently problematic.483 
 
I feel I should also return for a moment to the matter of litigiousness.  It has been 
argued that not enough human rights cases go before a tribunal.  But there are other 
observers who find the system too litigious, in other words that too many cases 
wend their way through tribunals and the courts, with the additional delays and 
potential harm to both complainant and respondent that they may involve. The 
question who is right will not be settled here today. My only plea is that we not 
simply assume that the gate keeping functions of commissions that intervene before 
complaints reach a tribunal are necessarily all bad.484 [emphasis in original] 
 
The decades following the Bell v. McKay litigation saw three significant 
developments in the Canadian statutory human rights regimes.  The first two 
developments expanded the scope of the legislation to respond to more social conditions. 
The third development, in some provinces, was to change the processes for enforcing 
statutory human rights.  Developments relating to the enforcement process were 
provoked by questions about which legal process best provides “access to justice” for 
                                                 
483 Philip Stenning, From Conciliation to Judgement: The Role of Boards of Inquiry under the Ontario 
Human Rights Code, 1962-1974 (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1977) at 149 [Stenning, Conciliation to 
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statutory human rights claims.485  Should a government agency be responsible for 
resolving claims submitted by individuals and groups?  Or should claimants be able to 
bring their claims directly to a tribunal, with government support provided by funding the 
tribunal and funding legal services for claimants?  These were the principle questions that 
dominated discussions that began in the late 1980s about the role of statutory human 
rights as a tool in struggles against social inequalities.  On their face, these questions 
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the enforcement of human rights statutes, and 
engaged little with the promise of human rights statutes.  However, this development 
raised questions not simply about the practice of human rights law, but also about how 
this practice relates to and interacts with the promise of human rights law.  
As we saw in Chapter Two, the human rights commission model of claims 
resolution that evolved from the similar state agency fair practices enforcement model, 
embodied several tensions that reflected competing goals and values: 
• tension between “public” goals and interests and “private” goals and interests; 
• tension between “voluntary” legal processes and more “coercive” legal processes; 
• tension between “social” goals and values and “legal” goals and values; and 
                                                 
485 As we know from Chapter Two, in the context of human rights commission enforcement models, a 
human rights claim is called a “complaint” and a person who brings a human rights claim is called a 
“complainant”.  I prefer to use the terms “claim” and “claimant”, rather than “complaint” and 
“complainant”, even though they are not technically accurate in relation to commission enforcement 
models. In my view, the “complaint”/“complainant” terminology labels a claimant as a “whiner” and a 
“victim”.  The “complaint”/“complainant” terminology also ignores, or at least de-emphasizes, the 
relational dimension of legal claims.  The  “complaint”/“complainant” terminology no longer applies in 
jurisdictions which have moved away from commission enforcement models. 
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•   tension between the commission’s claims-resolution function and its other 
“enforcement” responsibilities.486  
In Ontario, questions about which legal process best provides “access to justice” for 
statutory human rights claims led to the adoption in 2006 of a new model of claims 
resolution, which its proponents call a “direct access”487 enforcement model, and the 
corresponding elimination of the OHRC’s responsibility for claims resolution.  Central to 
the “direct access” model is the replacement of the human rights commission’s claims 
resolution role with a process in which persons bring statutory human rights claims 
directly to an adjudicative tribunal.  
The case for “direct access” in Ontario evolved in a context of wide-ranging 
critiques of how human rights commissions carried out their claims resolution role. 
Proponents of “direct access” relied on these criticisms to support their arguments for 
moving to a “direct access” model.  However, the case for “direct access” went beyond 
criticisms of how the commission-based model was implemented; it challenged the 
fundamental structure of a model in which a claim is adjudicated only at the behest of a 
third-party agency.  Many human rights activists had lobbied for moving to a “direct 
access” model and supported the draft legislation when it was introduced, but others were 
strongly opposed to moving to this model.  Thus, the Ontario government’s introduction 
                                                 
486 I describe the human rights commission claims resolution process in the past tense because it no longer 
exists in Ontario (or in British Columbia).  However, many of the observations about the human rights 
claims resolution process apply not only to its operation in Ontario but to is operation in jurisdictions across 
Canada.  Therefore, these observations would continue to apply in jurisdictions which continue to maintain 
the human rights commission complaints resolution model. 
487 “Direct access” is a contested descriptor and goal. Opponents of the “direct access” model do not accept 
that it provides direct access to adjudication.  As we will see later in the chapter, they argue that this model 
simply replaces the commission as gatekeeper with new gatekeepers to the tribunal. 
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of Bill 107, the draft legislation to implement a “direct access” model, led to a fierce and 
often acrimonious debate within the human rights advocacy community over whether this 
proposal, if implemented, would enhance or diminish access to justice for statutory 
human rights claims (“Bill 107 debates”). 
This chapter examines the Ontario move to “direct access” through the lens of 
four tensions identified above, as well as the tension under the new model between the 
role of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”) and the role of other 
adjudicative tribunals in addressing claims of discrimination.  The chapter is divided into 
three parts. In Part I, I analyze the contextual background for the move to “direct access” 
in Ontario. In Part II, I analyze Ontario’s move to a “direct access” model in 2006. In Part 
III, I examine themes that have emerged in the first years of Ontario’s experience with 
the “direct access” model.  Ontario’s move to a “direct access” model provides 
opportunities to reflect on different approaches to the role of legal process in struggles 
against social inequalities. It also provides opportunities to reflect on the tension between 
the substantive goals of social struggles and the formal goals of legal process that may 









Part I:  Contextual Background to Ontario’s Move to “Direct Access” 
The statutory human rights landscape evolved considerably in the period between 
the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bell v. McKay in 1971 and Ontario’s move to 
“direct access” in 2006.  In this part of the chapter, I examine themes in three areas that 
had particular implications for the move to “direct access” and that played a role in the 
Ontario debates on this question.  These three areas are: (1) developments in the 
substantive scope of the Code’s protection, (2) developments in the practice of engaging 
with the Code in formal legal processes outside the OHRC claims resolution process, and 
(3) critiques of the commission-based claims resolution model.  
 
1     Expanding the Substantive Scope of Statutory Human Rights 
The scope of Ontario’s statutory human rights protection expanded in two 
significant ways in the post-Bell v. McKay period – through the addition of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination to the Code, and through the recognition of adverse effect and 
systemic discrimination in addition to direct discrimination.488  The addition of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination to the Code began with age, sex and marital status in 1972,489 
followed by disability and family status in 1981,490 sexual orientation in 1986,491 and 
                                                 
488 There were similar expansions in the substance of statutory human rights in all Canadian jurisdictions. 
489 The Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 1972, SO 1972, c. 119.   This amending statute 
repealed The Age Discrimination Act, SO 1966, c 3, which was passed in 1966 to prohibit discrimination in 
employment on the basis of age, where age was defined to mean between 40 and 65 years of age, and The 
Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, RSO 1970, c 501 passed in 1970, to prohibit discrimination in 
employment on the basis of sex and marital status. 
490 Ontario’s Code was re-enacted in 1981 as the Human Rights Code, 1981, SO 1981, c 53, which was 
then incorporated in the 1990 statutory revision as the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19  [Code 
(1990)].  When the Code was re-enacted in 1981, the substantive statutory provisions were re-framed as 
rights “to equal treatment without discrimination” in the following social areas:  s. 1 (goods, services, 
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most recently gender expression and gender identity in 2012.492  Incorporating more 
prohibited grounds of discrimination expanded the range of social conduct and practices 
that could potentially be challenged under the Code, and expanded the range of social 
groups with a direct stake in the potential of the Code to address social inequalities.493 
Expansion of the legal understanding of discrimination to include not only “direct 
discrimination” but also “adverse effect discrimination” and “systemic discrimination” 
began in 1985 with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ont. Human Rights Comm. 
v. Simpsons-Sears.494   The historical record suggests that the limits of the legal concept 
of direct discrimination were understood from the beginning.  The stated intention of 
expanding the legal concept of discrimination was to extend the anti-discrimination legal 
norm to include other social conduct and practices.  As we will see, there are challenges 
with proving all forms of discrimination.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
facilities), s. 2, 4 (accommodation), s. 3 (contract), s. 5 (employment), s. 6 (trade union, occupational 
association, self-governing profession). 
491 Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, SO 1986, c 64, s. 18. 
492 Toby’s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Expression or 
Gender Identity, 2012, SO 2012, c 7, s. 1. 
493 In recent years, there has also been much debate about whether poverty should be recognized as a 
prohibited ground of discrimination in human rights legislation.  In these debates, this proposed new 
category is often called “social condition”. In Promoting Equality, the CHRA Review Panel recommended 
that social condition be added as a ground of discrimination to the Canadian Human Rights Act: Canadian 
Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa, 2000) at 106-113 [CHRA 
Review Panel, Promoting Equality].  A consultation report on economic and social rights prepared by the 
OHRC canvasses differing views about the potential effectiveness of adding social condition as a ground of 
discrimination – see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Commissions and Economic and 
Social Rights, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/consultations/economic-social-rights-paper.shtml. The 
Quebec Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, CLQR, c C-12 includes provisions dealing with 
“economic and social” rights. However, Colleen Sheppard argues that social condition will have limited 
effect as a prohibited ground of discrimination unless it is interpreted to recognize the material 
disadvantage that flows from being a social assistance recipient. See Colleen N. Sheppard, “The Promise 
and Practice of Protecting Human Rights: Reflections on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms” in Nicholas Kasirer and Roderick Macdonald, eds. Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau, 
(Cowansville, Québec : Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997) at 106-113 [Sheppard, “Promise and Practice”]. 
494 [1985] 2 SCR 536 [Simpsons Sears]. 
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Direct Discrimination and Legal Responsibility 
As we know from the preceding chapters, conduct and practices may be judged 
discriminatory under Canadian human rights law when there is a link between the 
conduct or practice and one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination.  Legal 
responsibility for direct discrimination is predicated on a respondent’s intention to engage 
in conduct or practices that are directly or expressly linked to one or more prohibited 
grounds of discrimination. In disputes over legal responsibility for direct discrimination, 
it is not necessary to prove that a respondent intended to cause harm, but only that the 
respondent intended the conduct which the legal prohibition deemed to be harmful. It is 
also not necessary for a claimant to prove that a prohibited ground of discrimination was 
the sole reason for the conduct or practice, as long as it was a factor in how the claimant 
was treated.   
Where there is no expressly demonstrable connection, and a respondent refuses to 
acknowledge a connection, an adjudicator may sometimes be persuaded to infer an 
intended connection.  In some situations, the adjudicator may reject a respondent’s denial 
that their conduct or practice was linked to one or more prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.  In other situations, an adjudicator may conclude that the respondent 
made an “unconscious” link between their conduct or practice and one or more prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.495 Despite all these refinements, however, there is a long-
                                                 
495 See, for example, Shaw v. Phipps, 2010 ONSC 3884, upholding Phipps v. Toronto Police Services 
Board, 2009 HRTO 877 (liability decision) and Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 
1604 (remedy decision).    “Unconscious discrimination” is analyzed as a form of direct discrimination by 
arguing that people are responsible for both their conscious and their unconscious biases.  In relation to 
their unconscious biases, they have a responsibility to make themselves aware of unconscious biases and 
find strategies to eliminate the impact of these biases.  See, for example: Charles R. Lawrence III, “The Id, 
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standing recognition that in the absence of direct evidence of the respondent’s intention, 
it is generally difficult to persuade an adjudicator that one or more prohibited grounds of 
discrimination was in some way a factor in the respondent’s conscious or unconscious 
mind. 
 
Adverse Effect Discrimination and Legal Responsibility 
With adverse effect discrimination, the analytical underpinning of legal 
responsibility purports to shift away from the respondent’s intention and towards the 
impact of the conduct or practice on the claimant.  There are two key aspects to this 
analytical framework.  The first aspect is that the conduct or practice alleged to be 
discriminatory is “neutral” on its face, because there is no direct or explicit connection 
with prohibited grounds of discrimination.  The second aspect is that it is not necessary 
for the respondent to have intended the conduct or practice to have a disadvantageous 
impact linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination.  Béatrice Vizkelety described 
direct discrimination as requiring a “causal connection” between the conduct or practice 
and prohibited grounds of discrimination, and adverse effect discrimination as removing 
this causal connection.496  In Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, Justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism” (1987), 39 Stan L Rev 317; Charles 
R. Lawrence III, “Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of ‘The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection’” (2008), 40 Conn. L Rev 931.  See also Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2011). 
496 “Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress and the Common Law: A Century-Old Debate” in Justice 
Walter S. Tarnopolsky, Joyce Whitman, Monique Ouellette, eds., Discrimination in the Law and the 
Administration of Justice / La Discrimination dans le Droit et l’Administration de la Justice (Montreal: 
Éditions Thémis, 1993) 555 at 567-568 [Vizkelety, “Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress”]. 
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McIntyre wrote that impact on the claimant should be the central concern in assessing 
responsibility for discrimination: 
 
The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the 
obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, 
but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result 
or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in 
fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group 
of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on 
other members of the community, it is discriminatory.497 
 
However, legal responsibility for adverse effect discrimination still requires a link 
between the challenged conduct or practice and one or more prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.  If the respondent’s intention to make this link is no longer required, the 
link has to be established in some other way.  
In the absence of express or deemed intention by the respondent to link their 
conduct or practice with prohibited grounds of discrimination, it may be possible to 
establish this link if the facts support a conclusion that the respondent intended the link 
but found a way to hide their intention behind what appears on the surface to be “neutral” 
conduct or practice. Bill Black has suggested that the concept of adverse effect 
discrimination was in fact initially developed to circumvent this type of situation:  “… the 
Courts seem originally to have developed their approach to systemic discrimination as 
much to avoid problems of proof of intent as to cover effects that are truly unintended . . 
                                                 
497 Simpsons-Sears at para. 12. 
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.”.498  The Supreme Court of Canada made a similar observation in Ont. Human Rights 
Comm. v. Simpson Sears:  
 
The idea of treating as discriminatory regulations and rules not 
discriminatory on their face but which have a discriminatory effect, 
sometimes termed adverse effect discrimination, is of American origin and 
is usually said to have been introduced in the Duke Power case, supra, in 
the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case the employer required 
as a condition of employment or advancement in employment the 
production of a high school diploma or the passing of an intelligence test. 
The requirement applied equally to all employees but had the effect of 
excluding from employment a much higher proportion of black applicants 
than white. It was found that the requirements were not related to 
performance on the job, and the Supreme Court of the United States held 
them to be discriminatory because of their disproportionate effect upon the 
black population…. 
... 
To take the narrower view and hold that intent is a required element of 
discrimination under the Code would seem to me to place a virtually 
insuperable barrier in the way of a complainant seeking a remedy. It 
would be extremely difficult in most circumstances to prove motive, and 
motive would be easy to cloak in the formation of rules which, though 
imposing equal standards, could create, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), injustice and discrimination by the equal treatment 
of those who are unequal …499 
 
In its subsequent 1999 landmark decision in British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (“Meiorin”), the Supreme Court of Canada similarly 
commented that the categories of direct and adverse effect discrimination are not 
mutually exclusive, inasmuch as an intention to discriminate does not need to be 
expressed but can be couched in non-expressly discriminatory actions.500   
                                                 
498 William W. Black, “Human Rights Reform in B.C.” (1997) 31 UBCL Rev. 255 at note 11, citing Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
499 In the Court’s decision, these paragraphs appear in reverse order. Simpsons Sears, paras. 16, 13.  
500 [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 29. 
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While the difficulties associated with proving direct discrimination may have 
been the origin of the doctrine of adverse effect discrimination, this basis for liability is 
not really any different than the basis for liability for direct discrimination. Once it is 
accepted that there can be legal responsibility for conduct or practices that are 
intentionally linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination, it is not a leap to find legal 
responsibility where a respondent was deliberately seeking to masquerade direct 
discrimination in the form of “facially neutral” conduct or practice. The more difficult, 
and authentic, adverse effect situation is where the facts do not support a conclusion that 
the respondent was seeking to avoid liability for discrimination.  In this situation, the 
human rights claim is that facially neutral conduct or practice adversely affects an 
individual or group because of one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination.   
For example, what was at issue in the Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-
Sears case was a workplace rule requiring full-time employees to rotate through Friday 
evening and Saturday work shifts.  The employee, Theresa O’Malley, who alleged a 
Code violation, was a Seventh Day Adventist whose religious observance made it 
impossible for her to work on Friday evenings and Saturdays.  The workplace rule was 
facially “neutral” because it did not explicitly target persons affiliated with particular 
religions for disadvantageous impact.  The SCC held that link with a prohibited ground of 
discrimination was established on the basis that the claimant’s religion made it 
impossible for her to meet the requirements of the workplace rule.  Underlying this 
finding was the Court’s willingness to accept the requirements of religious practice as a 
basis for exemption from a workplace rule applying to all employees.  Put another way, 
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underlying this finding was Court’s willingness to say to the employer that the impact of 
the rule on the claimant was something for which the employer may have to account, 
even though the employer in no way intended this impact.501   
The Court could have refused to find the link between the impact and the 
prohibited ground of discrimination, by finding that the cause of the impact was the 
neutral work rule and not the claimant’s religion.  This alternative analysis may sound 
disingenuous and contrived; however, there are many cases where this type of reasoning 
has been applied to deny a link with prohibited grounds of discrimination.502 
As noted earlier, the connection between conduct or practices and prohibited 
grounds of discrimination is at the heart of the legal recognition of discriminatory harm. 
With direct forms of discrimination, the respondent’s intent creates the link between the 
conduct or practice and prohibited ground(s) of discrimination.  With claims of adverse 
effect discrimination, the lynchpin is a link between the negative effect of the conduct or 
practice and one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination.  A legal finding of 
responsibility for adverse effect discrimination thus requires either the respondent’s 
                                                 
501 The question of the link between the respondent’s conduct and prohibited grounds of discrimination was 
not the central issue in the BCGSEU case. At issue in the BCGESU case was a workplace rule that required 
all forest fighter employees to pass new physical fitness tests, including a test of aerobic capacity. The 
grievance arbitrator accepted the Union’s evidence that women employees would generally not be able to 
pass the aerobic capacity test.  In the courts, the central issues were whether the standard was justified 
because it was bona fide and reasonable and provided for individual testing and, if not, whether the remedy 
was limited to exempting the individual grievor from the application of the standard.  
502 See, for example, Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons: Stopping the Charter at the Statutory 
Human Rights Gate” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike, and M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality 
Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 409 
[Faraday et al, Making Equality Rights Real].  Wright’s analysis focuses on the use of problematic 
comparisons; cf. Daphne Gilbert and Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada 
Dooms Section 15” (2006), 24 Windsor YB Access Just 111.  See also Elizabeth J. McIntyre, Karen 
Schucher and Fay Faraday, “The Arbitrator as Human Rights Adjudicator:  Has Meiorin Made a 
Difference?” (2000-2001) Labour Arbitration Yearbook 31. 
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acceptance of a link between the unintended negative effect and prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, or an adjudicative finding that there is this link.  When adverse effect 
discrimination claims are addressed through formal legal process, the question of linking 
the conduct or practice with prohibited grounds of discrimination is tied to the question of 
whether or not the adjudicator is prepared to impose legal responsibility for the truly 
unintended impact of conduct or practices. 
In principle, the recognition of adverse effect discrimination had the potential to 
expand the scope of social conduct and practices that might be challenged under the 
Code, and there have been certainly been situations where the doctrine of adverse effect 
discrimination has been successfully used through formal legal process.  More often, 
though, it has been difficult in practice to persuade adjudicators to accept these claims.503  
One reason why it is difficult to establish adverse effect claims through formal legal 
process is the adjudicative preference for finding some intentionality as the basis for 
imposing legal responsibility.  Therefore, although intent is not formally a requirement to 
establish adverse effect discrimination, from the beginning it has played a subterranean 
role in the process of determining when and why “facially neutral” conduct or practices 
should be judged discriminatory.  Adverse effect discrimination claims are also difficulty 
to establish in formal legal process because they typically put into question social 
                                                 
503 On the difficulties of “providing” or establishing adverse effect discrimination claims, see also 
Vizkelety, “Discrimination, the Right to Redress” at 584 and Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The 
Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2010) at 147 [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality]. For a period of time after adverse effect was 
first held to be conduct prohibited by the Code, there was a substantive reason for distinguishing between 
the legal categories of direct and adverse effect discrimination because they attracted different remedial 
consequences.  The Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Meiorin case eliminated this distinction.  
However, the separate legal categories continue to serve the purpose of making clear the range of conduct 
and practices that may constitute discrimination under statutory human rights.  
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conduct and practices that are considered “normal” and, therefore, should not be judged 
harmful and unlawful.   
Thus, the conceptual underpinning of adverse effect discrimination gives rise to 
questions about how formal legal process responds to claims based on adverse effect 
discrimination.  One reason adjudicators might hesitate to impose legal responsibility is 
because they believe it is unfair to hold people responsible, and require them to provide 
remedies, where they had no actual or constructive understanding that their conduct or 
practice could result in discriminatory harm.504  A second reason adjudicators might 
hesitate to impose legal responsibility is because, by imposing a judgment of 
discrimination on conduct or practices considered “normal” and not harmful, they 
effectively establish a new norm relating to discriminatory harm.  It can therefore be 
argued that adjudicators will make the linkage between conduct or practice and 
prohibited grounds of discrimination in two possible situations:  (1) where they can find 
some element of intent or proxy for intent, 505 or (2) where they are persuaded that it is 
                                                 
504 A similar concern about the reintroduction of intent as a requirement to establish a prima facie violation 
of s. 15 of the Charter has also been the subject of considerable commentary.  See, for example, paras. 20-
24 of the Factum of the Intervener Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund and accompanying 
references in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E. in Faraday et al, Making Equality Rights Real 
471 at 476-477  (Fiona Sampson and I were LEAF’s co-counsel in this case); Sheila McIntyre, “The 
Equality Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court: Back to the 70s” in Sanda Rodgers and Sheila McIntyre, 
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat (Canada: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2010) 129;  Bruce Ryder, Emily Lawrence and Cidalia Faria, “What’s Law Good 
For? An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 SCLR (2d) 103. 
505 Similarly, although the more recent doctrinal development, which imposes a proactive obligation on 
respondents to anticipate discriminatory impact in their conduct and practices, is a positive development, it 
too introduces an element of intent similar to the reasonable foreseeability element of negligence law. 
Vizekelety considered and rejected a comparison with negligence principles as basis for liability for 
adverse effect discrimination: “Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress” at 569-572.  As noted in the 
Introduction to this dissertation, Denise Réaume reconsidered this question in  “Harm and Fault in 
Discrimination Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001) Theor Inq 
L 349. Réaume has since moved away from this tort-type analysis of discrimination and now focuses on a 
dignity-based analysis of discrimination- see, for example:  Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and 
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appropriate to impose a judgment of discrimination on conduct or practice previously 
considered “normal” and unharmful. 
In the end, there are significant challenges to successfully advancing both direct 
and adverse effect discrimination claims.  In the case of direct discrimination, the 
challenges are more connected with problems of proof than with problems of the 
conceptual basis for liability.  In the case of adverse effect discrimination, in my view the 
challenges are more connected with the conceptual basis for liability, and with the fact 
that liability is more a question of adjudicative fiat than a question of proof. 
 
Systemic Discrimination and Legal Responsibility 
Lastly, systemic discrimination was also recognized as a new category of 
discrimination with potential to expand the substantive scope of Code protection. 
Systemic discrimination is often connected with adverse effect discrimination; indeed, 
adverse effect discrimination is sometimes incorrectly used as a synonym for “systemic 
discrimination”.   Similarly, “individual” discrimination is often connected with direct 
discrimination, and direct discrimination is sometimes incorrectly used as a synonym for 
individual discrimination.  As Colleen Sheppard explained, systemic discrimination 
includes both adverse effect and direct discrimination: 
 
The legal concept of “systemic discrimination” emerged in the 
1980s to describe discrimination that is pervasive, linked to structural 
inequalities, and institutionalized in social and organizational practices 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dignity” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: Seeking 
Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto:  Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 123 and Denise Réaume, 
“Dignity, Equality and Comparison” in Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds., Philosophical 
Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 7. 
228 
 
and procedures. Though sometimes considered synonymous with adverse 
effect discrimination, it is a broader concept that often results from both 
adverse effect discrimination (inequitable policies and practices) and 
direct discrimination (e.g. recurrent and pervasive harassment, overt 
exclusions and mistreatment) within a particular workplace environment, 
school, occupation, or profession [or other social area covered by statutory 
human rights]. … 
… What is so disconcerting about systemic discrimination is the ways in 
which it often imperceptibly reproduces, reinforces, and legitimizes 
inequality and exclusion. Inequitable opportunities, resources, and socio-
economic conditions result in unequal accomplishments, which then 
appear to justify the initial inequitable distribution of social goods.  
Accordingly, stereotypes and prejudices are perpetuated by the conditions 
of exclusion and inclusion, making social privileges and advantages 
seemingly fair. The complex interplay between intentional and 
unintentional discrimination means that unraveling the two is almost 
impossible. The idea of systemic inequality embraces both.”506 
 
The concept of systemic discrimination reflects the argument that discrimination in 
society is not an exceptional or isolated event, but is pervasive and deeply embedded in 
social structures and practices.  This does not mean, however, that individual claims of 
discrimination arise only in situations where discrimination is in fact an exceptional or 
isolated event.   Individual claims may also come forward in contexts where they are 
simply one instance of systemic issues. 
In the Bill 107 debates, the categories of “systemic” and “individual” claims, 
rather than direct and adverse effect claims, were predominant, but in ways that are not 
always entirely clear. In some cases, the categories seem to have been used correctly: that 
is, systemic discrimination was used to refer to claims of widespread discrimination - 
whether the form of discrimination was direct or adverse effect or a combination, and 
individual claims was used to refer to claims by individuals about their individual 
                                                 
506 Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 21-22. 
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circumstances - even though in some situations such individual claims might also involve 
systemic discrimination.  In other cases, the categories seem to have been used 
incorrectly: that is, they seem to have been used as substitutes for adverse effect and 
direct discrimination.  Acknowledging the conceptual distinctions underpinning these 
different categories is important to analyzing how legal process responds to these 
different types of claim.  At the same time, the interplay between direct, adverse effect, 
individual, and systemic claims of discrimination can be confusing, and this confusion 
sometimes obscured aspects of the competing perspectives in the Bill 107 debates. 
 
2     Access to a Range of Legal Processes for Advancing Human Rights Claims 
The legal process for addressing statutory human rights claims and issues was the 
second area in which there were important developments after Bell v. McKay. The first 
development related to the potential for using civil court legal processes either to enforce 
the Code itself, or at least to seek remedies for discrimination outside the OHRC process.  
The second development related to the potential for using other administrative law 
processes to enforce the Code or to address human rights issues that were connected with 
other issues being addressed.  These developments raise questions about the practice of 
human rights, or how legal process engaged with statutory human rights.  They also raise 
questions about the tension between statutory human rights as a discrete area of law and 





No Civil Action for Discrimination: Bhadauria v. Seneca College 
A potential role for the courts in providing an enforcement avenue for statutory 
human rights protections was dealt a significant blow by the 1981 decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v. 
Bhadauria (“Bhadauria”).507 Pushpa Bhadauria commenced a civil action claiming that 
Seneca College discriminated against her at common law on the basis of ethnic origin, 
and breached the Code by failing to grant her an interview on any of the ten job 
competitions she applied for in a four-year period.  Seneca College successfully brought a 
motion to strike out the statement of claim.  Two issues were raised on the appeal to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal: (1) whether or not the claim could give rise to a civil cause of 
action based on a common law duty not to discriminate, and (2) whether or not a claimed 
violation of the Code could give rise to a civil cause of action.  In reasons written by 
Justice Bertha Wilson, the Court addressed the first issue first, holding that there was a 
common law duty not to discriminate: 
 
I regard the preamble to the Code as evidencing what is now, and probably 
has been for some considerable time, the public policy of this Province 
respecting fundamental human rights. If we accept that "every person is 
free and equal in dignity and rights without regard to race, creed, colour, 
sex, marital status, nationality, ancestry or place of origin", as we do, then 
it is appropriate that these rights receive the full protection of the common 
law. The plaintiff has a right not to be discriminated against because of her 
ethnic origin and alleges that she has been injured in the exercise or 
enjoyment of it. If she can establish that, then the common law must, on 
the principle of Ashby v. White et al., supra, afford her a remedy. 
 
I do not regard the Code as in any way impeding the appropriate 
                                                 
507 [1981] 2 SCR 181; rev’g sub nom Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts 
and Technology (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 142 CA [“Seneca College v. Bhadauria”]. 
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development of the common law in this important area. While the 
fundamental human right we are concerned with is recognized by the 
Code, it was not created by it. Nor does the Code, in my view, contain any 
expression of legislative intention to exclude the common law remedy. 
Rather the reverse since s. 14a [enacted 1974, c. 73, s. 5] appears to make 
the appointment of a board of inquiry to look into a complaint made under 
the Code a matter of ministerial discretion.508 
  
In the Court of Appeal’s view, the rights protected by the Code were public policy, for 
which the common law must provide a remedy.  These rights were not “created” but 
“recognized” by the Code; the codification of these rights could not impede 
developments in the common law; and the Code did not exclude the possibility of 
common law remedies for discrimination.   In light of this conclusion, the Court did not 
address the second issue as to whether the Code itself could be enforced by way of civil 
action.  
The Court of Appeal decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
reasons written by Chief Justice Laskin, who rejected both the possibility of a common 
law civil action for discrimination and the possibility of enforcing the Code by way of 
civil action rather than by way of the OHRC process. Chief Justice Laskin appears to 
have rejected the Court of Appeal’s distinction between founding a civil action on the 
“public policy” of legislation and founding a civil action on an alleged breach of 
legislation, for reasons based entirely on the Code’s enforcement scheme: 
 
        There is, in my view, a narrow line between founding a civil cause of 
action directly upon a breach of a statute and as arising from the statute 
itself and founding a civil cause of action at common law by reference to 
policies reflected in the statute and standards fixed by the statute. 
                                                 




It is one thing to apply a common law duty of care to standards of 
behaviour under a statute; that is simply to apply the law of negligence in 
the recognition of so-called statutory torts. It is quite a different thing to 
create by judicial fiat an obligation--one in no sense analogous to a duty of 
care in the law of negligence--to confer an economic benefit upon certain 
persons, with whom the alleged obligor has no connection, and solely on 
the basis of a breach of a statute which itself provides comprehensively for 
remedies for its breach. 
…         
      I confess to some difficulty in understanding the basis of the learned 
justice's observation that "While the fundamental human right we are 
concerned with is recognized by the Code, it was not created by it" (or, I 
assume, by its predecessors). There is no gainsaying the right of the 
Legislature to establish new rights or to create new interests of which the 
Court may properly take notice and enforce, either under the prescriptions 
of the Legislature or by applying its own techniques if, on its construction 
of the legislation, enforcement has not been wholly embraced by the terms 
of the legislation …509 
 
In Chief Justice Laskin’s view, the Code and OHRC claims resolution process occupied 
the entre field of discrimination law, leaving no room for common law, civil court 
processes: 
 
In the present case, the enforcement scheme under The Ontario Human 
Rights Code ranges from administrative enforcement through complaint 
and settlement procedures to adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative 
enforcement by boards of inquiry. The boards are invested with a wide 
range of remedial authority including the award of compensation 
(damages in effect), and to full curial enforcement by wide rights of 
appeal which, potentially, could bring cases under the Code to this Court. 
… 
I would have thought that [Ministerial discretion to request the 
appointment of a Board of Inquiry] fortifies rather than weakens the 
Legislature's purpose, being one to encompass, under the Code alone, the 
enforcement of its substantive prescriptions. It is unnecessary to consider 
here how far the Minister's discretion is untrammelled, or whether a clue 
                                                 
509 Seneca College v. Bhadauria (SCC) at 188, 189, 193-194. 
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to its character is afforded by the ensuing provisions for appeal to the 
courts from a decision or order of a board of inquiry. 
 
The view taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal is a bold one and may be 
commended as an attempt to advance the common law. In my opinion, 
however, this is foreclosed by the legislative initiative which overtook the 
existing common law in Ontario and established a different regime which 
does not exclude the courts but rather makes them part of the enforcement 
machinery under the Code.510 
 
Chief Justice Laskin acknowledged the possibility of breakdown in the OHRC claims 
resolution process, but held that this was not in itself a justification for allowing civil 
actions based on the Code:511 
 
There is a possibility of a breakdown in full enforcement if the Minister 
refuses to appoint a board of inquiry where a complaint cannot be settled 
and, further, whether penalties on prosecution will be sought also depends 
on action by the Minister. I do not, however, regard this as supporting (and 
no other support was advanced by the respondent) the contention that the 
Code itself gives or envisages a civil cause of action, whether by way of 
election of remedy or otherwise. The Minister's discretion is simply an 
element in the scheme.512 
 
From the perspective of competing legal processes, the decision in Bhadauria can be read 
as a vindication of the OHRC claims resolution process, a process that the SCC had been 
so willing to override in its Bell v. McKay decision one decade earlier.   From the 
perspective of effective legal process, Chief Justice Laskin’s analysis does appear to be 
predicated on an assumption that the OHRC claims resolution process was reasonably 
                                                 
510 Seneca College v. Bhadauria, SCC at 194. 
511 The facts of the decision state that Ms Bhadauria never filed a claim with the OHRC, but say nothing 
about whether this was a deliberate choice.  According to Philip Girard, Ms Bhadauria had previously made 
22 complaints to the OHRC about earlier job applications, none of which had been referred to a board of 
inquiry. Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 
at 496 [Girard, Bora Laskin]. 
512 Seneca College v. Bhadauria (SCC) at 188. 
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functional.513  More significantly in relation to the “direct access” initiatives that later 
evolved, Chief Justice Laskin’s reasons also suggest that his analysis assumed that claims 
would be referred to adjudication if they could not be resolved by agreement.  Put another 
way, it seems fair to read the decision as upholding the view that claimants should have 
access to all dimensions of the legal process, but that it is appropriate for access to be 
gained by way of an administrative law process rather than in the courts. 
In principle, the decision in Bhadauria foreclosed the option of using civil actions 
to pursue discrimination claims.514  Over time, courts began to chip away a bit at the 
potential impact of Bhadauria in situations where discrimination claims could be 
attached to another civil wrong.515  The Bhadauria case did, however, continue to prevent 
civil claims that alleged a tort of discrimination or that rested directly and exclusively on 
an alleged human rights statutory violation.  More recently, in Honda v. Keays, the 
Supreme Court of Canada opened the door to revisiting Bhadauria’s rejection of a 
common law tort of discrimination: 
 
                                                 
513 Philip Girard speculated that even if evidence of dysfunction in the OHRC process had been presented, 
this would not have changed Chief Justice Laskin’s approach or conclusion. In Girard’s view, with which I 
agree, Chief Justice Laskin “… would likely have replied the involving the courts was no panacea – 
witness the decision of the B.C. Court of Appeal in the Gay Alliance case just two years earlier.  If an 
agency was broken it should be fixed, not ignored.”  Girard, Bora Laskin at 496. 
514 As Philip Girard wrote, the decision in Bhadauria was, and continues to be, controversial – Bora Laskin 
at 492-496.  For commentary on the Bhadauria issues and decisions see: Vizkelety, “Discrimination, the 
Right to Seek Redress” at 558-561; Maureen E. Baird, “Pushpa Bhadauria v. the Board of Governors of 
The Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology: A Case Comment” (1981) 39 UT Fac L Rev 96; Dale 
Gibson, “The New Torts”(1979) 11 CCLT 141; Ian Hunter, “Civil Actions for Discrimination” (1977) 55 
Can Bar Rev 106; Ian A. Hunter, “The Stillborn Tort of Discrimination” (1982) 14 Ottawa L Rev 219; Ian 
B. McKenna, “A Common Law Action for Discrimination in Job Applications” (1982) 60 Can Bar Rev 
122.  
515 See, for example, L'Attiboudeaire v. Royal Bank of Canada (1996), 88 O.A.C. 70 (C.A.); Anne L. 
MacTavish and Andrew J.F. Lenz, “Civil Actions for Conduct Addressed by Human Rights Legislation – 
Some Recent Substantive and Procedural Developments” (1996) 4 CLELJ 375; Janice B. Payne and 
Christopher C. Rootham, “Are Human Rights Commissions Still Relevant” (2005) 12 CLELJ 65 at 72-75. 
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I agree that it is not necessary to reconsider Bhadauria in the present 
appeal.  But in my opinion Laskin C.J. went further than was strictly 
necessary in Bhadauria….  
 
The development of tort law ought not to be frozen forever on the basis of 
this obiter dictum. The legal landscape has changed. The strong 
prohibitions of human rights codes and of the Charter have informed many 
aspects of the development of the common law.516 
 
There are opposing perspectives on whether or not there is any meaningful benefit 
either to recognizing a tort of discrimination or to enabling people to use civil actions for 
the sole purpose of enforcing statutory human rights.517  From an access to justice 
perspective, civil actions are generally not considered to be the most accessible form of 
legal process because they tend to be more expensive and more complex than 
administrative legal processes.518  Most human rights advocates also continue to believe 
that tribunals are generally more effective at addressing human rights issues than courts 
are.  In Ontario, the question has for now been answered by a policy decision made in 
connection with the Bill 107 process.  When the Code was amended to implement the 
“direct access” model,519 it was also amended to allow civil courts to decide and provide 
remedies for Code claims, provided that the civil action is not “based solely on an 
infringement of” the Code, and that persons cannot make an application to the tribunal 
                                                 
516 [2008] 2 SCR 362 (“Honda v. Keays”) at paras. 118, 119. 
517  For some critique of Honda v. Keays see Geoffrey England, “Evaluating the Implications of Honda 
Canada v. Keys” (2008) 14 CLELJ 327 at 351-355 and note 71.  For discussions, that are more favourably 
oriented to civil actions for discrimination, see: Larry Chartrand, “The Crumbling Wall of Bhadauria: If 
Not Today, Tomorrow” (2009) 44 SCLR 107 and Rakhi Ruparelia, “I Didn't Mean it That Way!: Racial 
Discrimination as Negligence” (2009) 44 SCLR 81.  
518 In Ontario, this issue is also complicated by the ever-increasing jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, 
which is now set at the $25,000 and is expected to increase in the future. 
519 The amending statute enacting Bill 107 was the Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 




under the Code where their human rights claim is settled or decided in the context of a 
civil action.520   These provisions essentially codify the Bhadauria outcome, as qualified 
by subsequent cases that permitted statutory human rights claims and issues to be 
integrated with a civil action based on other claims.  
 
Addressing Statutory Human Rights Claims in Other Social and Legal Contexts  
The second development in the practice of statutory human rights was an 
increasing engagement with these issues in other legal contexts and processes.  When the 
Code was re-enacted in 1981, a new provision was added which acknowledged that Code 
claims could arise in other contexts.  This provision, s. 34(1), gave the Commission the 
authority to decide not to deal with complaints that, in its opinion, “could or should be 
more be appropriately dealt with under an Act other than this Act”.521   This new power 
gave the Commission another tool with which to manage its claims resolution caseload. 
 Collective agreement grievance arbitration processes, in particular, became a key 
area where human rights issues where frequently raised and litigated.  The integration of 
human rights claims and issues in grievance arbitration has had significant impact on 
grievance arbitration.522  This integration has also produced some important 
developments in substantive human rights doctrine, with application beyond the 
collective agreement context, the most significant example being the Meiorin case.  
                                                 
520 Code (1990), ss. 34(11), 46.1. 
521 Code (1990), s. 34(1).  Section 34 was repealed by Bill 107. 
522 See, for example: Fay Faraday, “The Expanding Scope of Labour Arbitration: Mainstreaming Human 
Rights Values and Remedies” (2005) 12 CLELJ 355 [Faraday, “Mainstreaming Human Rights”]; Michael 
Lynk and Lorne Slotnick, “The Final Frontier: Labour Arbitrators and Human Rights Remedies” (2000), 
40 Labour Arbitration Yearbook 40; Guylaine Vallée, Michel Coutu and Marie-Christine Hébert, 
“Implementing Equality Rights in The Workplace: An Empirical Study” (2002), 9 CLELJ 77. 
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Furthermore, the integration has raised significant issues about the scope of union 
responsibility for human rights issues in the workplace, and about competing legal 
forums for addressing human rights issues in unionized workplaces.523  In relation to 
grievance arbitration, the OHRC adopted a policy in 1993 of exercising its discretion 
under s. 34(1) so as not to deal with most claims by unionized employees.524  
The Supreme Court of Canada has resoundingly endorsed the authority of non-
human rights tribunals to address human rights that are raised in connection with the 
other issues before the tribunal.   In the Parry Sound v. OPSEU case,525 the SCC upheld a 
grievance arbitrator’s ruling that a probationary employee could challenge her dismissal 
from employment on human rights grounds, even though the collective agreement denied 
probationary employees the right to grieve employment termination.  The employee, 
Joanne O’Brien, went on maternity leave during her probationary period, and the 
employer terminated her employment within a few days after she returned to work.  
When the employee and the union grieved the employment termination, the employer 
took the position that the arbitration board did not have jurisdiction to review the 
termination of probationary employees.  The main issue in the case was whether the 
                                                 
523 See, for example:  Shelley McGill and Ann Marie Tracey, “Building a New Bridge Over Troubled 
Waters: Lessons Learned from Canadian and U.S. Arbitration of Human Rights and Discrimination 
Employment Claims” (2011) 20 Cardozo J. of Int’l & Comp. Law 1; Elizabeth Shilton, “Choice, but No 
Choice: Adjudicating Human Rights Claims in Unionized Workplaces in Canada” (2013) 38 Queen’s LJ 
461; Elizabeth Shilton, “‘Everybody’s Business’: Do the Renaud Rules Still Govern in Modern Canadian 
Workplace Human Rights Enforcement?” (forthcoming Canadian Lab. & Emp. L.J.) [Shilton, 
“Everybody’s Business”].  See also Martin Malin, Sara Slinn, and Jon Werner, “An Empirical Evaluation 
of the Adjudication of Statutory Human Rights Claims before Labour Arbitrators and Human Rights 
Tribunals in Ontario: A Report” (30 July 2014). 
524 Faraday, “Mainstreaming Human Rights” at 362-364. See also Brian Etherington, “Promises, Promises: 
Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice” (2000-2001) 26 Queen’s LJ 43 at 56. 
525 Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union, Local 324 (O.P.S.E.U.), [2003] 2 SCR 157 [Parry Sound v OPSEU]. 
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arbitrator had jurisdiction over the grievance by virtue of s. 48(12)(j) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995, which provides that a labour arbitrator has power “to interpret and 
apply human rights and other employment-related statutes, despite any conflict between 
those statutes and the terms of the collective agreement.”526  The decision records that the 
OHRC intervened in the Supreme Court of Canada appeal to ensure that it did not lose 
jurisdiction, and took the position that there should be concurrent jurisdiction for both the 
Code’s statutory enforcement process and labour arbitrators.  As part of its analysis 
upholding the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the Court reasoned that unionized employees 
would have less protection in relation to human rights in the workplace if these rights 
could not be addressed through grievance arbitration and had to be pursued under the 
Code’s enforcement process: 
 
… Put simply, there are certain rights and obligations that arise 
irrespective of the parties' subjective intentions. These include the right of 
an employee to equal treatment without discrimination and the 
corresponding obligation of an employer not to discharge an employee for 
discriminatory reasons. To hold otherwise would lessen human rights 
protection in the unionized workplace by allowing employers and unions 
to treat such protections as optional, thereby leaving recourse only to the 
human rights procedure.527 
 
Labour arbitration has arguably been the main site where statutory human rights 
have been addressed outside the Code’s enforcement process.  However, it is also 
arguable that integration of human rights in labour arbitration has provided a model for 
                                                 
526 Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sch A, s. 48(12)(j). 
527 Parry Sound v OPSEU at paras. 36-37.  
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the integration of human rights issues in other tribunal and civil contexts.528   The point is 
demonstrated by the second Supreme Court of Canada decision endorsing the authority of 
non-human rights tribunals to address human rights issues.  The case of 
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario529 involved the Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal, a statutory 
tribunal that deals with appeals involving social assistance benefits claims.  The issue in 
this case was whether a provision of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997 
that excluded coverage for disability related to substance abuse was contrary to the 
Code.530  The Attorney General was the respondent and took the position that the tribunal 
did not have the authority to decide this question.  The SCC disagreed.531  The Court 
confirmed that statutory human rights issues can and must be considered in the context 
where they arise and held that the tribunal was not only authorized, but also obliged, to 
address human rights issues and challenges that arise in connection with the disputes it is 
statutorily mandated to decide: 
 
The Code is fundamental law. … the adjudication of Code issues is no 
longer confined to the exclusive domain of the intervener the Ontario 
Human Rights Commission ("OHRC"): s. 34 of the Code. The legislature 
has thus contemplated that this fundamental law could be applied by other 
administrative bodies and has amended the Code accordingly. 
… 
In its present form, the Code can be interpreted and applied by a myriad of 
administrative actors. Nothing in the current legislative scheme suggests 
                                                 
528 Other contexts include professional regulation, e.g. Siadat v. Ontario College of Teachers (2007), 83 
O.R. (3d) 401 (Div Ct), and tenant-landlord regulation, e.g. Walmer Developments v. Wolch (2003), 67 
O.R. (3d) 246 (Div Ct).  
529 Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 SCR 513 
[Tranchemontagne v. Ontario]. 
530 SO 1997, c 25, Sch B, s. 5. 
531 The Social Benefits Tribunal and Divisional Court ruled that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction.  The 




that the OHRC is the guardian or the gatekeeper for human rights law in 
Ontario. … [I]n Charette, I noted how allowing many administrative 
actors to apply human rights legislation fosters a general culture of respect 
for human rights in the administrative system: see para. 28; see also Parry 
Sound, at para. 52. These pronouncements are consistent with the 
legislature's removal of the exclusive jurisdiction clause for the OHRC, as 
well as its current policy of permitting the OHRC to decline jurisdiction 
where an issue would be best adjudicated pursuant to another Act: see s. 
34(1)(a) of the Code. It is hardly appropriate for this Court to now argue 
with this legislative policy shift towards concurrent jurisdiction, and seek 
to restore exclusive jurisdiction for the OHRC.532 
 
The Tranchemontagne holding was not based on a novel legal proposition. As early as 
1971, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts and administrative tribunals have 
both the authority and the obligation to consider and potentially apply laws that are 
relevant to the claims and issues in the case they are deciding.533  However, in 
Tranchemontagne the Court went even further, to suggest that the non-statutory human 
rights tribunal would usually be the most appropriate adjudicative body to address the 
human rights issue in the context of the whole claim to which it was connected:  
 
Where a tribunal is properly seized of an issue pursuant to a statutory 
appeal, and especially where a vulnerable appellant is advancing 
arguments in defence of his or her human rights, I would think it 
extremely rare for this tribunal to not be the one most appropriate to hear 
the entirety of the dispute. I am unable to think of any situation where 
such a tribunal would be justified in ignoring the human rights argument, 
applying a potentially discriminatory provision, referring the legislative 
challenge to another forum, and leaving the appellant without benefits in 
the meantime.534 
 
                                                 
532 Tranchemontagne v. Ontario at at paras. 13, 39. 
533 McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 SCR 517. 
534 Tranchemontagne v. Ontario at para. 50. 
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The Tranchemontagne decision thus had significant implications for the competing 
authority over human rights issues that would emerge with the adoption of an 
enforcement model providing “direct access” to a statutory human rights tribunal.   
Integrating human rights issues within legal processes outside the OHRC process 
highlighted the argument that human rights issues are not  “separate” and “discrete” 
issues which can only be addressed in a separate and dedicated legal process.  Indeed, the 
ultimate goal of human rights protections should be to affect conduct and practices in the 
important social areas of employment, housing, public spaces and services.  On the one 
hand, then, it should be possible to address human rights issues in the social contexts in 
which they arise, using the legal processes that are part of those social contexts.  On the 
other hand, there is debate about whether human rights issues will be addressed 
adequately if they are determined by non-human rights adjudicators.  With the move to 
“direct access”, there is also debate about the role of the statutory human rights tribunal 
in relation to other legal processes where human rights issues may be raised.   I will 
return to all of these issues later in this chapter, and in my concluding reflections. 
 
3     Critiques of the Commission-Based Claims Resolution Process 
Human rights commissions in Canada were (and in some provinces still are) 
mandated to carry out multiple responsibilities, which typically include(d): claims 
resolution, education, policy development, and research.  It is possible to look at all of 
these responsibilities as different forms of “enforcement”, inasmuch as they can all 
provide opportunities for using the legislation to respond to social inequalities.  However, 
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enforcement is more traditionally understood as a form of legal process, and the claims 
resolution function was the only one carried out using legal process.   
There is nothing to suggest that any one of these responsibilities was in principle 
considered more important than the others. Over time, though, commissions’ claims 
resolution responsibilities consumed increasing proportions of their resources, eventually 
reaching the point where commissions typically spent most of their resources on their 
claims resolution role.  At the same time, and despite the significant allocation of 
resources to claims processing and resolution, there was growing dissatisfaction with how 
commissions were carrying out this responsibility; there was also growing disgruntlement 
with the relative lack of attention being paid to commissions’ other responsibilities. 
As we know from the earlier chapters, there was a typical structure to the 
commission-based claims resolution process.  The process was “reactive”, rather than 
proactive, in that its function was to receive claims and respond to claimants seeking 
remedies under the Code.  When a claim was received, the commission was typically 
mandated to investigate the claim and assist the parties to try to achieve a voluntary 
resolution.  If the commission could not facilitate a voluntary resolution, it then decided 
whether or not to refer the claim to formal adjudication before a tribunal.  If the 
commission decided not to refer the claim to formal adjudication, which was typically the 
case, the claimant’s only recourse was to ask the commission to reconsider the non-
referral decision or bring an application in court for judicial review of the non-referral 
decision.  Although commission decisions not to refer to adjudication were occasionally 
reversed, this did not happen often.  Moreover, judicial review in particular is an 
243 
 
expensive legal process, and would not have been an option for most human rights 
claimants.   
Between 1989 and 2004, seven Canadian common law jurisdictions conducted 
government-sponsored reviews of their statutory human rights regimes.535  New 
Brunswick was the first province to conduct a review, in 1989, with a follow-up review 
in 2004.536  It was followed by Ontario in 1991,537 Alberta538 and British Columbia in 
1994539 (with a second review in British Columbia in 2001540), Saskatchewan in 1996,541 
the Federal government 2001,542 and Nova Scotia in 2002.543  All of these reviews 
addressed questions relating to enforcement of human rights legislation, at least to some 
extent. They reported similar concerns with how the commission-based claims resolution 
model was working, but came to different conclusions about how these concerns should 
be addressed.  Several of the reviews also addressed questions relating to substantive 
                                                 
535 This discussion does not include the Québec regime.  For more information on that regime, see:  A. 
Coté, A. and L. Lemond, Discrimination et commission des droits de la personne (Montreal: Saint-Martin, 
1988); Lamarche, L. La regime quebecoise de protection et de promotion des droits de la personne: 
Elements de reflexion pour un bilan (Cowansville, Qué.:  Éditions Y. Blais, 1996); Commission des droits 
de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Aprés 25 ans: La Charte Quebécoise des droits et libertés, Vol. 
1 Bilan et recommendations (Québec, 2003).  
536 Charles Ferris, Towards a World Family: A Report and Recommendations Respecting Human Rights in 
New Brunswick (Fredericton, 1989) [Ferris, Towards a World Family]; New Brunswick Human Rights 
Commission, Position Paper on Human Rights Renewal in the Province of New Brunswick (February 
2004). 
537 Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force (Chair: M. Cornish), Achieving Equality: A Report on 
Human Rights Reform (Toronto: Ministry of Citizenship, 1992) [Cornish, Achieving Equality]. 
538 Alberta Human Rights Review Panel, Equal in Dignity and Rights: A Review of Human Rights in 
Alberta  (June, 1994) [Alta. HR Rev. Panel, Equal in Dignity]. 
539 Bill Black, Special Advisor, B.C. Human Rights Review, Report on Human Rights in British Columbia 
(December 1994) at 85-114 [Black, B.C. Human Rights Review]. 
540 Deborah K. Lovett, Q.C. and Angela R. Westmacott, Human Rights Review: Prepared for 
Administrative Justice Project (British Columbia, 2001) [Lovett and Westmacott, Human Rights Review]. 
541 Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, Renewing the Vision – Human Rights in Saskatchewan 
(Saskatoon, 1996) [Sask. HRC, Renewing the Vision]. 
542 Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa, 2000) [La 
Forest, Promoting Equality]. 
543 Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, Moving Forward with Human Rights in Nova Scotia: The Path 
for the Future (November 2002) [NS HRC, Moving Forward]. 
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protection.  However, with the notable exception of the 1994 report for British Columbia, 
the reviews generally did not draw links between questions of substantive protection and 
questions of enforcement.544 
The reports emphasized six areas of concern, which I group into three categories.  
The first category of concern was low rates of referral to tribunal adjudication and undue 
pressure to settle claims.  The second category of concern was conduct of the 
investigation and related settlement processes and, in particular:  extreme delays and 
backlogs, unevenness in the quality of investigations and duplication of investigation for 
cases referred to tribunal adjudication; and tension and confusion between the 
commissions’ roles as “advocate” and as “neutral” investigator.  The third category of 
concern was excessive focus on individual claims and inadequate attention to systemic 
discrimination issues.545  These areas of concern often involved interrelated issues about 
the design of the process and how the process worked in practice.  
 
Concern About Low Rates of Referral to Adjudication 
Critics of the commission-based claims resolution model dubbed it the 
“gatekeeper” model.  It was empirically accurate to describe the commission as a 
gatekeeper to the tribunal, because that is what it did.  However, the “gatekeeper” label 
was not meant to be a neutral moniker. Critics of the model did not like the fact that there 
                                                 
544 See also M. Kaye Joachim, “Reform of the Ontario Human Rights Commission” (1999) 13 Can J 
Admin Law & Prac 51 at 64-80 [Joachim, “Reform of OHRC”]. 
545 See, for example: Rosanna L. Langer, Defining Rights and Wrongs: Bureaucracy, Human Rights, and 
Public Accountability (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) at 9 [Langer, Defining Rights and Wrongs].   
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was a gatekeeper to the tribunal, nor did they like how commissions exercised their 
gatekeeping function.  
The concern about limited access to tribunal adjudication had both design and 
operational aspects. From the design perspective, the human rights claims-processing 
model was built on the view that most claims would, and should, be resolved by 
voluntary agreement and that recourse to formal adjudication would, and should, be the 
exception.  From the operational perspective, given the very high proportion of cases not 
referred to adjudication, one can speculate that there may have been some elision 
between what would happen and what should happen, i.e. the expectations about what 
“would” and “should” happen became the reality of what did happen. Most claims that 
resolved were resolved by agreement; very few of the cases that did not resolve by 
agreement were referred to adjudication for determination.  
From the operational perspective, there were a number of concerns. One issue was 
the process commissions used to make their referral decisions.  Commissions based their 
decisions on reports prepared by staff and on written submissions from the claimants and 
respondents; there was never an opportunity for oral submissions.  Commissions 
provided no reasons for their decisions not to refer a claim for adjudication. The “behind 
closed doors” nature of the process, and lack of reasons for the non-referral decision, 
fuelled arguments that commissions routinely denied access to formal adjudication to 
claimants with meritorious claims.  It should be no surprise that this process was 
perceived as procedurally unfair; nor did the process instill confidence in the substance of 
the non-referral decisions. At the same time, in the absence of concrete information about 
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the substance of settlements and about why cases were not referred to adjudication, it is 
impossible to do any meaningful analysis of the cases that were not referred.  In the 
absence of reasons for non-referral decisions, there is no way of knowing to what extent 
meritorious claims may not have been referred to adjudication.  It is also impossible to 
know whether commissions could have provided reasons for non-referral that would have 
satisfied most claimants. 
A related operational concern was the allegation that commissions placed undue 
pressure on the parties, and particularly on claimants, to agree to voluntary resolutions. 
With a model that both structurally and operationally gave preference to voluntary 
resolution of claims, it is perhaps not surprising to hear that claimants experienced 
pressure to agree to settlements of their claims.  To say that there was undue pressure to 
settle, however, is to assert – or at least to suggest - that claimants were pressured to 
settle for an outcome that was less favourable than the result they should have received.  
It seems clear that at least some claimants experienced dissatisfaction with the 
conciliation process and its outcomes.  Again, however, since there is no concrete 
information about the types of settlements to which claimants were being asked to agree, 
there is no way to analyze their content and try to assess their substantive fairness or 
unfairness. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, lack of access to information about 
settlements has been a chronic challenge in the commission-based enforcement process. 
The Ontario review report recommended that settlements be publicly available unless the 
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claimant requested confidentiality or the mediator felt that confidentiality would be 
appropriate.546   
 
Concern About Conduct of the Investigation Process 
Access to a publicly-resourced investigation process was a hallmark of the 
commission-based claims resolution model. The reviews tended to note three areas of 
concern with the conduct of the investigation and related settlement processes:  (1) delay 
and inconsistent quality, (2) confusion about the commissions’ various roles, and (3) 
pressure to agree to voluntary resolutions (addressed above). 
Delay was a primary concern, and there is no question that the commission-based 
investigation and related settlement processes were often subject to significant delays. 
Concerns about the quality of investigation were more vague and difficult to assess. 
Insufficient staff, created by inadequate funding of human rights commissions, was often 
identified as a significant cause of the delay and of other operational problems, and there 
is no reason to doubt that commissions could have been better funded.547  Underfunding 
alone cannot, however, explain all the delay that plagued the commissions' process. The 
claims-resolution function was a legal process, and delay is a pervasive problem for all 
                                                 
546 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 118. 
547 Ron Ellis, for example, described the Ontario Human Rights Commission as being “starved every year 
of the resources that would actually be required to meet its statutory responsibilities in a reasonably timely 
manner” – see "Super Provincial Tribunals: A Radical Remedy for Canada's Rights Tribunals" (2002) 15 
Can J of Admin L & Prac 15 at 24. See also R. Brian Howe and David Johnson, Restraining Equality: 
Human Rights Commissions in Canada (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 
70-100 [Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality].  According to Kaye Joachim, only 1% of the Ontario 
budget was generally allocated to the OHRC:  “Human Rights Reform” at 106. 
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Canadian legal processes, whether in the courts, before government agencies, or at 
administrative tribunals - it is not a problem unique to the commissions.548 
In the Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) case, the 
Supreme Court of Canada expressed concern about the delays for which the commission 
claims resolution process was notorious, but was not willing to provide a remedy and also 
did not accept lack of resources as the sole explanation: 
 
To summarize, it cannot be said that the respondent's s. 7 rights were 
violated nor that the conduct of the Commission amounted to an abuse of 
process… 
 
Nevertheless, I am very concerned with the lack of efficiency of the 
Commission and its lack of commitment to deal more expeditiously with 
complaints. Lack of resources cannot explain every delay in giving 
information, appointing inquiry officers, filing reports, etc.; nor can it 
justify inordinate delay where it is found to exist. The fact that most 
human rights commissions experience serious delays will not justify 
breaches of the principles of natural justice in appropriate cases….549 
 
I share Rosanna Langer’s view that it is important to put the concerns about how 
commissions conducted their investigation and settlement processes into a larger context 
of legal process generally. As Langer commented, the claims resolution process was 
carried out “… in an administrative environment constrained by expectations about 
procedural fairness and operational efficiency and held to an ideal standard promised by 
                                                 
548 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice: A Study Paper by 
Roderick A. Macdonald with commentaries (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995). 
549 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307 at paras. 134-135. 
249 
 
the subject of the Commission’s mandate.”550 Langer focused in particular on the 
competing goals of human rights legal practitioners:  
 
The community of human rights practitioners shares an understanding that 
the current structure of human rights administration in Ontario is deeply 
flawed and that appropriate reform would involve a significantly enhanced 
role for legal representatives and advocacy.  Collectively, these 
practitioners may be considered one of the organizational pressures faced 
by the Commission, but many comments made by lawyers condemning 
the current structure of human rights administration indicate that there is 
much more at work than the faults of the system itself. [T]hese 
intermediaries have multiple layers of motivation in taking and 
discouraging individual cases, based on client advocacy, professional 
advancement, and desire for social change.551 
  
I focus more generally on questions about the enforcement role of the OHRC in relation 
to broader questions about the role and operation of legal process. There are innumerable 
ways in which the formal requirements of legal processes can result in delay.  For 
example, parties can bring motions and make procedural requests that, when granted, will 
results in delays.  In the context of the human rights commission claims resolution 
process, the strong preference in favour of voluntary resolution also likely contributed to 
delays.  Since respondents would have known there was little likelihood of a human 
rights claim being referred to adjudication, there was little if any incentive for them to 
engage efficiently with the conciliation process. 
 The concern about commissions playing conflicting roles, and the confusion that 
resulted from these conflicting roles, was more of a structural concern. Human rights 
                                                 
550 Langer, Defining Rights and Wrongs at 9. Langer argued that the critiques of human rights commissions 
fail to take account of other relevant factors, such as, increased privatization, increased role for lawyers, 
etc. at 19-20. 
551 Langer, Defining Rights and Wrongs at 63. 
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commissions were clearly expected to be advocates for human rights in their education, 
research and policy-development capacities.  Their role in relation to individual claims 
was more complicated.  Critics argued that commissions understood themselves as 
playing a neutral role in relation to individual claims, which created confusion for 
individuals in the claims resolution process.  Another perspective on this question was 
that commissions were neutral in relation to individual claims in the sense that they were 
not advocates for individuals, but that they were advocates in relation to the human rights 
issues that could be raised by individual claims.  This is perhaps a subtle distinction, and 
it goes to the question of who decides the human rights merits of an individual claim - a 
key feature of the commission-based model, which “direct access” proponents reject.  
 
Concern About Insufficient Focus on Systemic Discrimination 
Some of the reviews argued that the emphasis on claims resolution also had the 
effect of improperly determining the commission’s priorities – both in relation to method 
of enforcement and in relation to substantive issues.552  Critique of the disproportionate 
emphasis on individual claims resolution was also linked to a concern that systemic 
discrimination did not receive enough attention.  One aspect of this concern was the view 
that claims resolution, as a legal process, was not an effective or preferable method for 
addressing systemic discrimination.  It was not always clear, however, whether the 
concern arose from the idea that claims tend to be focused on individuals rather than 
groups, or whether it arose from the idea that claims resolution processes tend to be 
                                                 
552 Black, BC Human Rights Review at 16-17; La Forest, Promoting Equality at 51. 
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reactive rather than proactive.  Although the claims resolution model often focused on 
individuals, this model did not necessarily preclude group claims, third-party claims, and 
commission-initiated claims.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, it is also possible to 
raise systemic issues in the context of individual claims. 
The second aspect of the argument was that positive or proactive enforcement 
methods are better equipped to address systemic discrimination.  The individual claims 
model tended to be characterized as a reactive or responsive approach because it was 
activated as a response to claims when they came forward.  Positive or proactive 
measures, on the other hand, can be pursued at any time and are usually systemic in 
nature.  They include research, policy development and education, as well as standard-
setting and related compliance processes, and affirmative action measures.  The reviews 
generally agreed that commissions were not devoting enough attention to education, 
research and policy functions, and that these functions needed to be given more 
“enforcement” priority.  They generally recommended that the commissions’ research, 
policy and educational roles should be maintained, invigorated and expanded.553  A 
number of the reviews also suggested greater use of regulatory measures such as 




                                                 
553 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 64-82; Alta. HR Rev. Panel, Equal in Dignity at 54-55; Black, BC 
Human Rights Review at 26-28, Sask. HRC, Renewing the Vision at 83-87; La Forest, Promoting Equality 
at 41-45. 
554 Ferris, Towards a World Family at 112, 139; Cornish, Achieving Equality at 173-180; Black, BC Human 
Rights Review at 183-185; Sask. HRC, Renewing the Vision at 10; La Forest, Promoting Equality at 34-38. 
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4    Human Rights as a Shared Responsibility 
In addition to recommending changes or improvements to the human rights legal 
regime, a number of reviews of statutory human rights regimes also suggested that there 
is a need to share or spread responsibility for addressing discrimination and inequality.  
According to these reviews, responsibility could be shared by expanding the enforcement 
avenues for human rights statutes, as well as by incorporating anti-discrimination and 
equality goals into more statutes and statutory provisions.  The reports generally 
encouraged measures that create alternative enforcement avenues for addressing human 
rights claims and issues.  For example, where collective agreements include anti-
discrimination provisions, the grievance-arbitration procedure can in some cases be 
available for employee claims.  The Federal review went one step further to recommend 
that an internal responsibility model be required for all workplaces with more than five 
employees.  It recommended that the internal responsibility system include an internal 
claims-resolution mechanism, and that the human rights tribunal be allowed to dismiss a 
claim unless the claimant could show that the internal system either failed to deal fully 
with the human rights issues or failed to provide an adequate remedy.555  In relation to the 
public school system, the Saskatchewan review argued that human rights education is a 
fundamental proactive strategy for eliminating discrimination and achieving equality, but 
recommended that schools and schools boards have primary responsibility for providing 
this education. 
                                                 
555 La Forest, Promoting Equality at 32-33. The Nova Scotia review recommended that an internal 
responsibility system be considered in the future: NS HRC, Moving Forward. 
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On the question of additional legislative measures, one option suggested in the 
reviews was to incorporate anti-discrimination and equality-promoting provisions into 
other statutes.  For example, anti-harassment provisions could be added to occupational 
health and safety legislation.556  This strategy can both provide additional substantive 
protection and make available the enforcement avenues under the other statute.  For 
example, if harassment provisions were added to occupational health and safety 
legislation, government enforcement avenues available under this legislation could be 
available for harassment claims.  Similarly, if building codes included accessibility 
requirements, these requirements could be enforceable under building code enforcement 
mechanisms.  Some reviews also identified a need for more statutes, such as employment 
equity and pay equity legislation.557  Employment equity and pay equity statutes in 
Canada have typically sought to prescribe proactive measures for addressing 
discrimination in access to employment (in the case of employment equity legislation), 
and sex discrimination in wages (in the case of pay equity legislation). 
 
5   Recommendations for Statutory Human Rights Enforcement 
Four of the seven reviews supported the commission-based claims processing 
model, but with appropriate changes to ensure that the commissions substantially 
                                                 
556 In Ontario, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1 was amended in 2009 to add some 
protection against workplace harassment, but not specifically relating to human rights prohibited grounds 
of discrimination - Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Act (Violence and Harassment in the 
Workplace), 2009, SO 2009, c 23. 
557 Black’s BC Human Rights Review did not specifically recommend the adoption of pay equity and 
employment equity legislation because analysis of these measures was beyond the scope of the review 
mandate, but recommended that the government study these options, at 17-18.  The Sask. HRC, Renewing 
the Vision review did recommend the adoption of pay equity and employment equity legislation, and also 
encouraged the creation of complaint procedures outside the human rights legislation, for example, 
including anti-harassment provisions in occupational health and safety legislation, at 10, 96-97, 114. 
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improved their performance of this role: New Brunswick (1989), Alberta (1994), British 
Columbia (1994), and Saskatchewan (1996).  In the case of New Brunswick and British 
Columbia, the recommendation to maintain a commission-based model flowed from 
slightly different contexts than in the other provinces. In New Brunswick, the 
commission did not previously have gatekeeper authority.  The 1989 review 
recommended that it be given this authority, which it was, and a subsequent 2004 review 
did not recommend any changes to the structure of the enforcement process.558  In the 
case of British Columbia, there had been a commission-based complaints processing 
model, which was dismantled in 1983 and replaced with a system that had some 
structural similarities but was significantly scaled down.559  The review conducted in 
1994 by Bill Black recommended a return to the commission-based model that British 
Columbia had previously had and that was more similar to models across the country.560  
A second review was conducted in British Columbia in 2001, as part of an 
Administrative Justice Project undertaken by the British Columbia Ministry of the 
Attorney General. The report prepared as part of this review was intended to inform the 
work of at least two other projects, a Workplace Tribunals Review and an Agency 
Appointments Policy Paper, and was not expected itself to make recommendations.561  
However, British Columbia was subsequently, in 2003 the first Canadian province to 
implement a “direct access” model.   
                                                 
558 Ferris, Towards a World Family; NB HRC , Position Paper on Human Rights. 
559 For a discussion of the “turbulent history” of statutory human rights enforcement in British Columbia, 
see Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality at 13-14 and 65-68. 
560 Black, BC Human Rights Review. 
561 Lovett and Westmacott, Human Rights Review at 5-6, 10-14. 
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Although the Saskatchewan review recommended maintaining the commission 
enforcement model, it included an additional recommendation that had elements of a 
“direct access” model, by proposing that human rights claimants have the option of going 
to the tribunal at their own expense and without commission representation.562  In 
addition, although Saskatchewan still maintains a commission-based model, in 2011 the 
Saskatchewan government eliminated the statutory adjudicative tribunal and amended the 
statute to provide for the commission to refer cases to court for adjudication.563  Finally, 
the Alberta review did not recommend any changes to the commission’s role, but did 
recommend staffing increases to address the delays and backlog in the process.564 
The Ontario (1991) and Federal (2001) reviews recommended eliminating the 
commissions’ claims-processing role and replacing it with a ““direct access”” model that 
would establish a process for claimants to file claims directly with an adjudicative 
tribunal.  The Nova Scotia review report recommended that consideration be given in the 
future to moving to a “direct access” model.565  The analysis in the Ontario review is 






                                                 
562 Sask. HRC, Renewing the Vision at 42-49, 58-59. 
563 The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1, ss. 29.5-29.8. 
564 Alta. HR Rev. Panel, Equal in Dignity. 
565 NS HRC, Moving Forward at 5. 
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Part II:  Ontario’s Move to Bill 107 and “Direct Access” 
Ontario’s move to “direct access” began in 1991 with an initiative led by a group 
of more than 40 community groups called the Coalition for Human Rights Reform.566  
This initiative led to the creation of the Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force 
(“Cornish Task Force”), which issued its report (“Cornish Report”) and recommendations 
in 1992.567  The Cornish Report recommended a complex, tripartite structure composed 
of an adjudicative tribunal, community-based legal services organizations, and a body 
similar to the OHRC focusing on systemic issues, education, policy development, and 
research.   
The NDP government that established the Cornish Task Force did not take up 
these recommendations.  Instead, it passed employment equity legislation, a proactive 
approach, which required employers to analyze their workforces through a diversity lens 
and develop plans to achieve statutory diversity goals.  This employment equity 
legislation became a high profile issue in the next provincial election and may have 
played a role in the successful 1995 campaign of the Progressive Conservative Party, led 
by Mike Harris.  The new government acted quickly to repeal the employment equity 
legislation and, not surprisingly, did not take up any of the Cornish Report 
recommendations during its two terms in government.   
                                                 
566 In “Reform of the OHRC” Joachim also reviews other government initiatives to study and try to address 
concerns with the OHRC and its processes, beginning in 1985 (at 83-90).  There is also a paper dated 1995, 
authored by the Coalition for Reform of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and titled “Dysfunction in 
the Human Rights Complaint System”, which describes concerns with the OHRC complaint-processing 
process: on-line at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/scholarship-
publications/conferences/archives/administrative-design. 
567 Cornish, Achieving Equality.  
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In the 2003 election campaign, the Liberal party included a commitment to move 
the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Code from the Ministry of Citizenship to the 
Ministry of the Attorney General, which “‘has the authority to treat human rights issues 
with the gravity they deserve.’”568 Also in 2003, British Columbia became the first 
Canadian jurisdiction to implement a “direct access” model.  The BC version of the 
model not only replaced the commission enforcement process with tribunal adjudication 
but also completely dismantled the human rights commission in British Columbia.569 
In January 2005, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law hosted a conference, 
titled “Administrative Design and the Human Rights Process in Ontario: Can We Do This 
Better?”, at which all of the presenters were supporters of moving to a “direct access” 
model.570  In February 2006, Ontario Attorney General Michael Bryant announced the 
government’s intention to “modernize” Ontario’s human rights system. Like the “direct 
access” model implemented in British Columbia, the model proposed for Ontario would 
take the claims-processing role away from the OHRC.  Unlike the approach taken in 
British Columbia, Bill 107 proposed maintaining the OHRC, but with a modified 
mandate.   
                                                 
568 Juliet S. Robin, “Modernising Ontario’s Human Rights System: The Human Rights Code Amendment 
Act, 2006” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau du Québec, eds., L’accès direct à un 
tribunal specialize en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec?  Access to a Specialized 
Human Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec? (Québec: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc.: 2008) 
321 at 326 [Robin, “Modernising Ontario”.  The OHRC had previously been under the authority of the 
Ministry of Labour.  Ms Robin was Senior Counsel to the Ministry of the Attorney General. 
569 For more discussion on the British Columbia “direct access” model see Heather M. MacNaughton, 
“Direct Access: The B.C. Experience” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau du Québec, 
eds., L’accès direct à un tribunal specialize en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec?  
Access to a Specialized Human Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec? (Québec: Les Éditions 
Yvon Blais Inc.: 2008) 169 [McNaughton, “The B.C. Experience”].  MacNaughton was chair of the British 
Columbia Human Rights Tribunal when she wrote this article. 




Many human rights activists, as well as the OHRC itself, supported the move to a 
“direct access” model in Ontario.  However, other human rights activists strongly 
opposed the proposed change, and the introduction of Bill 107 led to a divisive and 
acrimonious debate within the community of human rights advocates.  Opponents of the 
proposed move to “direct access” also voiced concerns that the Attorney General had 
failed to carry out a proper consultative process before moving forward with this 
initiative, and repeatedly called on the Attorney General to halt the Bill 107 process, go 
back to the drawing board, and engage in a consultative process.  The Attorney General 
denied these accusations, and maintained that he had consulted widely before moving 
forward. 
Bill 107 was introduced for First Reading on April 26, 2006.   Second Reading 
began on May 8, 2006, but was then adjourned to May 30, 2006; it continued on June 5 
and June 6, 2006, when the motion passed and the bill was referred to the Standing 
Committee on Justice Policy.  Although the bill was vigorously opposed by some 
advocates, Attorney General Bryant repeatedly signaled that there was no room for 
debate over whether or not to move to a “direct access” model, but only over how to 
move to that model.   
Public hearings were held in London, Ottawa and Thunder Bay in August, and 
were scheduled for Toronto in November and December.  In an article published in the 
Toronto Star on October 16, 2006, journalist Ian Urquhart queried whether the 
government might shelve Bill 107 after losing a by-election in Parkdale-High Park in 




… my sources say the bill, while not quite dead, is in critical condition. 
However, as word of this began to leak out this month, supporters of the 
bill, heretofore mostly silent because they assumed a government with a 
majority would tough out the criticism, began their own counter-lobby.  
 
In recent days, McGuinty has been on the receiving end of anxious letters 
from a variety of supporters of Bill 107. 
 
"I urge you to demonstrate the leadership that is called for at this time," 
Catherine Frazee, the highly respected former head of the human rights 
commission, wrote to McGuinty. "I urge you to stay the course." 
"Please do not lose courage on this important legislation," wrote 
representatives of more than 40 legal clinics in a joint letter to the premier. 
A letter from a group of eminent citizens - including former Supreme 
Court judge Claire l'Heureux-Dube, June Callwood, three senators, and 
five law deans and professors - noted that the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission has urged Canada to adopt the very reforms contained 
in Bill 107. 
… 
And the Ontario Bar Association issued a hopeful-sounding press release 
last week that commended McGuinty and Bryant "for having the courage 
to bring forward pioneering legislation that, if passed, will fix a broken 
human rights system." The conditional phrase, "if passed," is not usually 
needed with a majority government.571 
 
The Toronto hearings scheduled for November proceeded as scheduled, but the 
December dates were cancelled, leaving the key spokesperson against “direct access”, 
David Lepofsky of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act Alliance 
(“AODAA”), without an opportunity to make oral submissions to the Committee.572  
Instead, the bill was referred for Third Reading, which it received on December 4 and 5, 
2006.  The Bill received Royal Assent on December 20, 2006 and came fully into force 
on June 30, 2008, providing for an 18-month transitional period. 
                                                 
571 “Is rights' reform bill on life support?”, Toronto Star, 16 Oct 2006: A17. 




1   Who were the Key Players in Ontario’s 2006 “direct access” Debates? 
There was no direct correlation between the positions taken in the “direct access” 
debates and different areas of social inequality.  Indeed, disability rights advocates 
arguably had the highest public profile in the debates and they found themselves on both 
sides of the question.  The move to “direct access” was supported by Catherine Frazee - 
disability rights activist, former Chief Commissioner of the OHRC and one of the few 
non-lawyers who had a high profile in the debates, and by two specialty legal clinics 
focusing on disability rights issues - ARCH Disability Law Centre and the HIV and Aids 
Legal Clinic Ontario.  Opposition to “direct access” was in large measure led by the 
AODAA, and supported by community-based disability activists.   
Most of the key spokespeople on both sides of the “direct access” debate were 
lawyers.  Some of these lawyers were specifically human rights practitioners; others 
practiced in community legal clinics; one was a government lawyer, whose human rights 
advocacy was done in his personal capacity.  These lawyers would all describe 
themselves as human rights advocates, sharing a common goal of achieving access to 
human rights justice, and they would all be publicly recognized as human rights 
advocates.  Like the lawyers involved in the campaigns for fair practices legislation and 
enforcement, they are “cause lawyers”.  Yet they also held radically different views about 
what access to human rights justice meant, and the debates over the proposed move to 
“direct access” were both divisive and publicly acrimonious. 
 The key spokespeople supporting the proposed move to “direct access” were 
private practice lawyers Mark Hart and Geri Sanson, and legal clinic lawyer Katherine 
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Laird, who at that time was with the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (“ACTO”), a 
specialty clinic.573  Many other legal aid clinics supported the proposed “direct access” 
model, both general service community clinics across the province and other specialty 
clinics, including ARCH Disability Law Centre and the HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic 
(Ontario).574  Other supporters of moving to a “direct access” model included Raj Anand 
(a human rights practitioner who served briefly in the late 1980s as Chief Commissioner 
of the OHRC), the Advocates’ Society,575 the Centre for Equality Rights in 
Accommodation (CERA), a coalition of women’s anti-violence and other equality rights 
organizations, and  the Ontario Bar Association, represented by its Civil Liberties and 
Human Rights Section. 
The key spokesperson for the opposition to Bill 107 was David Lepofsky, 
speaking through the AODAA.  He was joined by legal clinic lawyers Avvy Go (with the 
Metro Toronto Chinese & Southeast Asian Legal Clinic) and Margaret Parsons (with the 
African Canadian Legal Clinic), the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario and Parkdale 
Community Legal Services, and also supported by the Native Women’s Association of 
                                                 
573 Mark Hart and Geri Sanson were in private practice together, having both previously worked in the legal 
services department of the Ontario Human Rights Commission.  Mark Hart subsequently became a vice-
chair of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, while Geri Sanson remains in private practice. Katherine 
Laird became counsel to the Chair of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario after the Code was amended to 
create the “direct access” model, and then the Executive Director of the Human Rights Legal Support 
Centre. 
574 A joint community legal clinic written submission to the Standing Committee was endorsed  by 48 
general service community legal clinics and 7 specialty legal clinics:  “Joint Community Legal Clinic 
Submission –Standing Committee on Justice Policy – Legislative Hearings on Bill 107, An Act to Amend 
the Ontario Human Rights Code” (November 2006). 
575 Advocates’ Society, “Submission on Bill 107” (November 2006). 
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Canada (“NWAC”) and the Ontario Native Women’s Association (“ONWA”).576  The 
Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the League for Human Rights of B’Nai 
Brith Canada and 519 Anti-Violence Programme also opposed Bill 107.577 
Organized labour does not appear to have taken an official position on Bill 107.  
The Ontario Federation of Labour co-sponsored at least one community forum raising 
concern about Bill 107, but did not make oral or written submissions to the Standing 
Committee.578  Several large trade unions supported Bill 107 in written submissions to 
the Standing Committee:  the Canadian Auto Workers, the Elementary Teachers’ 
Federation of Ontario, the Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation, and the 
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and 
Service Workers International Union.579  The Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ 
Association opposed Bill 107 in written submissions, as did several labour councils.580 
The Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 710 (Thunder Bay) made brief 
                                                 
576 NWAC and ONWA, “The Proposed ‘Direct Access’ Model Equals Less Access to Human Rights for 
the Most Marginalized and Disadvantaged in Ontario! – Joint Submission by the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada (NWAC) and Ontario Native Women’s Association (ONWA)” (August 2006). 
577 Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses, “Submission on Bill 107” (November 2006) [CFIB, 
“Bill 107 Submission”]; League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada, “Submission on Bill 107” 
(August 2006); “Submission of the 519 Anti-Violence Programme Concerning Bill 107, the Proposed 
Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act” (November 2006). 
578 The OFL co-hosted “A Community Forum on the Need to Rescue the Ontario Human Rights 
Commission” held on April 5, 2006 at the United Steel Workers Hall, with guest speaker Mary-Woo 
Simms, former Chief Commissioner of the by then dismantled British Columbia Human Rights 
Commission. 
579 Canadian Auto Workers, “Submission on Bill 107” (November 2006); Elementary Teachers’ Federation 
of Ontario, “Submission on Bill 107” (November 2006); Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation, 
“Submission on Bill 107” (November 2006); United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, “Submission on Bill 107” (November 
2006). 
580 London and District Labour Council, “Submission on Bill 107” (August 2006); Oxford Regional Labour 
Council “Submission on Bill 107” (August 2006); St. Thomas & District Labour Council, “Submission on 
Bill 107” (August 2006); Sarnia & District Labour Council, “Submission on Bill 107” (August 2006);  
Thunder Bay & District Labour Council, “Submission on Bill 107” (August 2006).  
263 
 
written to the Standing Committee, which did not explicitly oppose Bill 107 but which 
recommended instead a model which would provide a choice between filing claims with 
the commission or with a tribunal.581  
The high profile of human rights practitioners as supporters of Bill 107 gave rise 
to some criticism that these practitioners were driven by self-interest rather than the 
public interest.  Attorney General Michael Bryant dismissed this criticism in the 
following way when he introduced Bill 107 for second reading: 
 
I've cited a number of people in support of this model, but I want to pause 
with respect to some of those endorsements and respond to a particularly 
invidious line of inquiry that has been brought by both of the opposition 
parties in trying to label some the people who support this model as 
somehow acting in their own self-interest. Those who support this have 
been dismissed as lawyers by the leader of the official opposition and by 
the justice critic in the third party. Certainly, the former chief 
commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Catherine 
Frazee, doesn't happen to share the profession that is being castigated here. 
 
But I want to say something about the people who work in the human 
rights system. Believe you me, if they wanted to act in their self-interest, 
they would be in a different area of law. They would be practising 
something else; they would not be in the area of human rights. People who 
work in the human rights field, who have devoted their careers, their 
talents and their energies to that area, do so out of a spirit of social justice 
and for assistance, trail-blazing, championing in many cases the underdog, 
people who are victims of human rights discrimination. I think it would be 
helpful in the debate going forward if that really invidious line of 
argument did not play the prominent role it has played thus far, because it 
does not, firstly, in any way characterize the people who have lent their 
name and support to this social justice reform.582 
 
                                                 
581 Ontario Public Services Employees Union, Local 710, “Submission on Bill 107” (August 2006). 
582 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session, No 
72A (8 May 2006) at 1610 online.  
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Attorney General Bryant was correct to challenge the argument that support for “direct 
access” was driven by self-interest on the part of human rights practitioners. To the extent 
that this “invidious line of criticism” might have been based on a stereotype of practicing 
lawyers as highly-paid – or even excessively-paid - professionals, this stereotype is 
generally not a good fit for the human rights practitioners and legal clinic lawyers who 
supported Bill 107.  At the same time, to the extent that Ontario’s “direct access” model 
would include some public funding specifically for legal services, there was the potential 
for some benefit to practitioners. 
Nonetheless, the lawyer dominance critique reflects the extent to which the Bill 
107 debate was focused much more on legal process than on social issues.  Relatively 
few human rights social activist groups were active participants in the debates, and 
relatively few of the submissions to the Standing Committee addressed the social issues 
relevant to the Code and its enforcement.583 These absences may to some extent be 
explained by the extent to which the Bill 107 debate was focused on legal process rather 
than on social issues. One wonders, however, whether non-legal social advocacy 
organizations did not consider the Bill 107 debate - and thus the important questions 




                                                 
583 The written submissions to the Standing Committee by the African Canadian Legal Clinic, 
“Submissions on Bill 107” (November 2006) and the Canadian Hearing Society, “Submissions on Bill 107” 
(August 2006) did include discussion of the social issues at stake. 
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Additional Note on the OHRC 
In the context of the Bill 107 debates, supporters and opponents of “direct access” 
agreed that the commission-based claims resolution process was not working, although 
there does seem to have been some difference of opinion about the degree to which the 
process was not working.584  There was also significant consensus about how the process 
was not working.  However, the fact that there were human rights advocates who 
supported retaining the commission-based process indicates that they believed the 
process was capable of functioning effectively and consistently with human rights goals 
and values.  It is impossible to assess in the abstract whether or not their confidence was 
misplaced.  One of the ADOAA’s recommendations was that an independent review and 
audit of the OHRC process be conducted to determine the source of the problems and 
how to reform the process.585 
The OHRC was ready to relinquish its claims processing role in 1992, when the 
Ontario review was being conducted.  In the period between the release of the Ontario 
review report and the move to “direct access” in 2006, the OHRC continued to be willing 
to relinquish its claims processing role, unless the government legislated procedural 
requirements that would enable the OHRC to exercise more control over the process. 
These changes never came. 
                                                 
584 In their submission to the Standing Committee, the AODAA indicated that they did not agree with all 
the statistics or with the interpretation of the statistics relating to the OHRC’s performance, although they 
did agree that the OHRC process was not working well and needed substantial reform. 
585  Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act Alliance, Submission to the Standing Committee on 
Justice Policy on Bill 107, The Proposed Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act (November 28, 




 During the public hearings on Bill 107, MPP Peter Kormos took great exception 
to the accusations or suggestions that the OHRC was abusing its gatekeeper role: 
 
The government and its collaborators have made a concerted effort to 
generate a myth around the Human Rights Commission and its staff, a 
myth that quite frankly allows no other inference than widespread 
incompetence or outright corruption. 
 
This ain't Telus Corp. It's not a huge corporate body with hundreds of 
staff; it's a pretty small group of people. You see, Chair, if there's 
incompetence or corruption by the front-line staff, there's incompetence 
and corruption by their managers and there's incompetence and corruption 
by the chairs of the commission. What a ridiculous, what an absurd 
allegation. It is beyond belief. It is incredulous. That's how this 
government has been marketing this legislation.586 
 
However, there is no evidence that the OHRC was interested in “clearing its name” in 
2006, when a “direct access” model was on the verge of being adopted. 
   
2   Moving Adjudication from the Exception to the Norm 
Unmediated access to formal adjudication is at the heart of “direct access” models 
for resolving statutory human rights claims.  Examining the arguments made by “direct 
access” proponents provides an opportunity to reflect on the contribution of formal legal 
processes to the aspirational promises of law.  
Within the Canadian legal system, formal legal process generally refers to a 
process in which there are disputing parties, one of whom bears the burden of proving 
two things:  (1) that the other party is responsible for engaging in conduct or practices 
                                                 
586 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session, 
Standing Committee on Justice Policy, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006 (23 November 2006) at 
0950 online [Hansard, Justice Policy Ctte Hearings, 23 November 2006]. 
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which are contrary to law, and (2) that the other party should be held to account through 
the imposition of a consequence, either remedial or punitive or both. The process creates 
a triad consisting of opposing disputants and an impartial adjudicator.587  While there is a 
wide range of formal legal process practices, they all share this general structure.  For 
persons who wish to advance legal claims, formal legal process offers the potential 
opportunity to tell their story and, if their claims are accepted, to receive a remedy or to 
have some other consequence imposed.588   Formal legal process is potentially coercive in 
its power to require parties to listen and respond to each other’s perspectives, and its 
power to impose consequences for illegal conduct and practices.  
Proponents of “direct access” focused on the claimant perspective and the benefits 
for claimants of having unmediated access to formal legal process.  They emphasized 
three goals:  (1) empowerment, (2) control, and (3) being heard.  All these goals reflected 
a concern for individual and group agency, and the potential for law to be a vehicle for 
social agency. Access to formal legal process would be empowering for claimants 
because it would connect them more directly with the power of law.  As discussed in 
Chapters One and Two, there were structural similarities between the commission-based 
enforcement process and the criminal justice system.  In the commission-based model, as 
in the criminal justice model, the person(s) claiming to have been negatively affected by 
conduct or practice are on the sidelines; they are not in charge of directing how the legal 
                                                 
587 There is much discussion about the extent to which adjudicators are and can be impartial. See, for 
example, Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987), 38 
Hastings LJ 814 at 843;  Sheilah L. Martin and Kathleen E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial 
Neutrality (Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver: Carswell, 1987). 
588 As we saw in Chapter Two, formal legal process will not always allow a claimant to tell the story they 
want to tell. 
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process will address their claim.  Thus, the Bill 107 supporters’ argument for 
empowerment and control for claimants was also an argument for abandoning an 
enforcement framework in which the claimant’s interest was inextricably tied to the 
“public” interest, and in which the “public” agency determined how the claimant’s 
interest should and would be addressed and resolved. 
The goals of empowerment and control were closely connected in the arguments 
made by “direct access” proponents.  The commission-based model was criticized for 
being “paternalistic” and for “disempowering” claimants, because it gave the commission 
control over deciding whether or not a claim had sufficient merit to warrant a particular 
voluntary resolution or to be referred to adjudication.  In the OHRC’s 1992 submission to 
the Cornish Task Force, empowering “equality-seekers”589 was one of twelve 
fundamental principles proposed to guide “establishing a fair and practical enforcement 
system”: 
 
2.2.7 Recognizing the inherent imbalance of power within 
society, the human rights complaint resolution system must 
be built from the perspective of the equality seeker, and must be 
enacted to empower the equality-seeker.590 
 
In elaborating on this principle, the submission described the commission-based process 
as “paternalistic” and out-moded: 
 
                                                 
589 The OHRC explained that its use of the terms “equality-seeker” and “equality-seeking group” was “in 
the context of a substantive equality model”: Ontario Human Rights Commission, Submission to Ontario 
Human Rights Code Review Task Force (May 5, 1992) at 3, fn 1 [OHRC, Submission to Cornish Task 
Force]: on-line at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/scholarship-
publications/conferences/archives/administrative-design. 
590 OHRC, Submission to Cornish Task Force at 3. 
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The process established by the Code should empower the communities 
whose interests are protected and promoted under the legislation. The 
paternalistic model, which may have seemed progressive and innovative in 
the 60’s, is now out of step with our developing understanding of equality, 
as well as with current standards of administrative and procedural fairness. 
 
Equality-seekers are entitled to a process which respects their right to 
frame the issues according to their own experience, to settle complaints on 
their own terms, or alternatively, to present their own complaints at a 
public hearing. The equality-seeker must have the right to decide if (s)/he 
wants a private remedy, a public interest remedy or both.591 
 
The Cornish Report echoed the importance of empowerment by describing the Code as 
playing a role in providing redress for imbalances in social power resulting from social 
disadvantage: 
 
Many individuals and community groups called for a system that will give 
a stronger and more empowering role to people who make rights claims. 
Equality means more than just treating people the same on the surface. It 
means changing deep patterns of exclusion and power imbalances and 
bringing about more equal relationships in society. The process of making 
a claim should empower people to bring about such a change.592 
 
People of colour, people with disabilities, people on public assistance, 
women, and other minority groups lack social, legal, political, and 
economic power. It is precisely because of this imbalance of power that 
the Code was passed with the specific purpose of breaking down 
discriminatory barriers and bringing about the full and equal participation 
of these groups in all aspects of society.593 
 
Joanne Birenbaum and Bruce Porter, in their research paper prepared for the La Forest 
Review, described the experience of dialogue at a hearing as empowering, in contrast 
with the disempowering dialogue of the commission screening process: 
                                                 
591 OHRC, Submission to Cornish Task Force at 21. 
592 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 22. 




The experience of rights claiming at the screen is thus the opposite of the 
transformative or empowering dialogue which we experience when 
claimants get a hearing.   The screening function ensures that rights 
claiming will frequently repeat rather than redress the systemic patterns of 
social disadvantage and marginalization which are the subject of the claim 
itself.594 
 
Our consultations have discovered that equality seekers want a partnership 
with a Human Rights Commission based on a recognition of their own 
capacities, not a paternalistic system in which the Commission assumes 
carriage of all of their issues or sets itself up as the “screen” to determine 
if their complaints are meritorious.595 
 
They also emphasized the need to recognize the right of “equality-seekers” to frame their 
own claims: 
 
The original idea of human rights commissions assuming responsibility 
for investigating all human rights complaints, selecting the ones to take 
forward and retaining a monopoly on all human rights litigation was likely 
rooted in a sincere desire to relieve those who are most disadvantaged in 
society of the burden of challenging discrimination.  But we cannot relieve 
these groups of the burden of challenging discrimination.  It is equality 
seekers themselves who are best qualified to identify discrimination, to 
challenge it and to develop appropriate remedies.  The point is not to 
relieve them of the burden but to ensure that they have the opportunity to 
take their claims forward and have them heard, free of the many systemic 
barriers which are now put in the way of advancing their claims.596 
 
Geri Sanson, in her oral submissions at the Justice Policy Standing Committee hearings 
on Bill 107, explicitly connected the goals of empowerment and control over the process 
in the following way: 
                                                 
594 Joanne Birenbaum and Bruce Porter, “Screening Rights: The Denial of the Right to Adjudication under 
the Canadian Human Rights Act and how to Remedy It” A Research Paper Prepared for the Canadian 
Human Rights Act Review Panel (November 4, 1999) at 23 [Birenbaum and Porter, “Screening Rights”]: 
on-line at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/scholarship-publications/conferences/archives/administrative-design. 
595 Birenbaum and Porter, “Screening Rights” at 99. 




But for women, apart from the delay -- and you've heard lots about 
that -- this is an issue of empowerment. This is something that the 
women's movement refers to as agency. That means they do not want a 
paternalistic, patronizing, anachronistic process which is going to say, 
"There, there. We'll tell you what's good for you." They want the right to 
make their own choices and decisions, they want the right to control how 
their case is managed, and they want to [sic] right to be able to speak 
directly to the decision-maker.597 
 
 
Another common critique was that this paternalistic approach to enforcing legal rights 
was unique to human rights, as the CERA noted in their oral submissions to the Bill 107 
public hearings: 
 
The present system of human rights [in Ontario] is based on an outdated 
notion of rights and of rights claimants. It is a paternalistic system that 
appropriates control of the process from the claimant and invests 
significant powers in a bureaucracy. In no other area of the justice system 
is there so little control by the person whose rights are infringed.598 
 
The goals of empowerment and control were ultimately connected to a claimant 
having the right to have their claim proceed to adjudication, i.e. to a hearing. The “direct 
access” model in effect turned the commission-based model upside-down, by making the 
formal legal process a primary goal and an entitlement, instead of a rare necessity.  This 
model did not mean that “direct access” proponents expected every claim in fact to 
proceed to a hearing and to be decided by an adjudicator. They expected informal legal 
processes to be a part of a new system; they also expected that some number of claims 
                                                 
597 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session, 
Standing Committee on Justice Policy, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006 (16 November 2006) 
on-line at1130 [Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 16 November 2006]. 
598 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session, 
Standing Committee on Justice Policy, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006 (22 November 2006) 
on-line at1130 [Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 22 November 2006]. 
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would continue to be resolved through informal legal process and not proceed to formal 
legal process.  It did mean, though, that the decision to proceed to a hearing would be the 
claimant’s decision rather than the Commission’s decision. 
The Cornish Report described as “unconscionable” the fact that the commission-
based process denied claimants the right to a hearing:  
 
The Task Force believes it is unconscionable for the Code to give people 
and groups fundamental equality rights and then deny them access to a 
hearing to claim those rights.599 
 
CERA described the hearing as “… an opportunity to tell [a claimant’s] story to a 
decision-maker. Under the current system, it's very difficult for [CERA’s] clients to be 
able to tell their story to a decision-maker.”600   
Being able to tell one’s story would not necessarily result in a positive outcome 
for the claimant, but it would give the claimant the opportunity to test their story against 
the requirements of law.  Birenbaum and Porter described this opportunity as a form of 
engaging with law through conversation.  Their description of this conversation illustrates 
the potentially coercive aspect of the formal hearing, which can provide claimants with 
an opportunity to call respondents to account for their conduct and practices:  
 
We often experience in human rights work the sense of initiating a 
conversation which would otherwise never take place.  A bank refuses an 
applicant a mortgage based on its income rules.  The applicant suggests 
the rule is not fair or reasonable.  The banker says rules are rules.  The 
conversation is over.  Human rights protections create the possibility of a 
new conversation wherein rules are not rules but patterns which can be 
                                                 
599 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 108. 
600 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 22 November 2006 at 1109. 
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judged against higher values.   Where the process works, claimants may be 
as astonished to find themselves listened to as respondents are surprised to 
find themselves having to justify something which they had never 
questioned.601 
 
The Cornish Report also argued that an additional potential benefit of placing 
formal adjudication at the centre of the legal process would be to increase the number of 
voluntary settlements. The rationale was that placing the decision to proceed to 
adjudication within the control of the claimant would significantly alter the dynamic of 
the conciliation process.  If adjudication was inevitable rather than improbable, there was 
much more at stake for both claimants and respondents if a settlement could not be 
reached.  As the Cornish Report stated: “The imminence of hearing has often proven to 
be a strong incentive to settlement.”602   
In the “direct access” model’s central focus on claimant access to adjudication, 
there is a clear link between the opportunity to present a claim to a decision-maker and 
the opportunity to receive a remedy from that decision-maker. Indeed, Bill 107 supporters 
sometimes suggested that access to a hearing would inevitably lead to a “remedy”.  The 
primary emphasis, though, was on gaining access to the decision-making process – to the 
opportunity to “tell” one’s “story” and to require the respondent to respond to that story.  
In my view, this argument resonates with Sarat and Scheingold’s category of  “individual 
client” cause lawyers, whom they contrasted with “impact” cause lawyers. Sarat and 
Scheingold argued that individual client cause lawyers emphasize the client goals to be 
achieved through cause lawyering, while impact cause lawyers emphasize the social 
                                                 
601 Birenbaum and Porter, “Screening Rights” at 20. 
602 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 119. 
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goals to be achieved through cause lawyering.603  I would argue that “direct access” 
proponents more closely resemble Sarat and Scheingold’s category of “individual client” 
cause lawyers than their category of “impact” cause lawyers.  For “direct access” 
proponents, the primary emphasis was on furthering client control and client goals, with 
no real attention given to what those goals were or to the broader social impact of those 
goals.  I acknowledge that it would be unfair to say that “direct access” supporters were 
indifferent to how claimant control over claims resolution would affect substantive 
outcomes for claimants, and would more generally address issues of social inequality.  
However, it is interesting to note their virtual silence on questions of substantive 
outcome, both for clients and for social groups. 
 It was understood that there would be exceptions for claims clearly not within the 
jurisdiction of the Code and tribunal.  There was also some discussion about whether the 
tribunal should have some ability to refuse to hear “unmeritorious” claims.  However, 
there was extensive debate over a provision in the original version of the bill that would 
have given the tribunal considerable authority to dismiss a claim without a hearing.  This 
provision was removed from the final version of the bill, leaving to the tribunal the 
authority to develop rules to provide for summary processes for certain kinds of claims. 
The final statutory wording states that the HRTO must afford the parties “an opportunity 
to make oral submissions in accordance with the rules” before finally disposing of an 
application within its jurisdiction.604  Pursuant to this power, the HRTO has developed 
                                                 
603 Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, “Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority: 
An Introduction” in Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and 
Professional Responsibilities (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 3 at 15. 
604 Code (1990), s. 43(1), (2)1. 
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Rule 19A to establish a “Summary Hearing” process for claims that either the Tribunal or 
a party believe have no “reasonable prospect” of success:  “The Tribunal may hold a 
summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of 
whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is 
no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.”605 
Bill 107 opponents were not specifically opposed to formal legal process. They 
agreed that more claims should proceed to adjudication; they argued that more cases 
would be referred to adjudication with a better-functioning commission-based model; and 
they suggested that there were situations when cases should automatically be referred to 
adjudication, or when claimants and respondents should be entitled to make their own 
decision to proceed to adjudication. They did not, however, share the view that “direct 
access” would empower claimants, and they did not place value simply on giving – or 
appearing to give - claimants control over the process. 
 
Note on Respondents 
 The arguments for “direct access” were made primarily on behalf of individuals 
and groups seeking to bring claims and seek remedies.  Little attention was directly paid 
to the interests of respondents during the Bill 107 debates.  Where there was reference to 
the effects of a “direct access” model on respondents, Bill 107 proponents asserted that a 
“direct access” model would work better for respondents as well as for claimants.  This 
can be contrasted with the arguments made in the fair practices campaigns and in the 
                                                 
605 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Rules of Procedure, Rule 19A.1 
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OHRC’s description of its processes in the 1960s, when the stated disadvantages of 
formal legal process related primarily to the impact of formal legal process on 
respondents.   
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, one disadvantage of formal process was 
that it would encourage respondents to focus on defending themselves and the propriety 
of their conduct, instead of focusing on examining the nature of their conduct and 
providing remedies and solutions for its negative impact.  A second and related 
disadvantage was the potential for formal legal process to expose a respondent to adverse 
publicity; informal resolution processes offered respondents the benefit of avoiding this 
potential adverse publicity. Although the effects of formal legal process on the 
respondent were the direct focus of this concern, a respondent’s resistance to efforts to 
resolve a claim would of course also have negative implications for claimants who might 
have wanted to achieve a voluntary resolution. 
Concern about the potential impact of formal legal process on respondents has 
also given rise to a perceived need for a high level of due process when formal legal 
processes are engaged in the human rights context.  This perceived need arises, at least in 
part, from the continuing concern about the stigma that can result from a finding (or even 
an allegation) that a respondent has violated a human rights statute.  The La Forest 
Report, in the context of considering the appropriateness of confidentiality clauses in 





Confidentiality clauses for settlements may be contrary to the public 
interest in educating the public about human rights issues.  However, 
respondents would normally want to avoid the stigma of a finding, or even 
an accusation of discrimination.606 
 
Similarly, during the Bill 107 debates, this concern was emphasized by the then-Chair of 
the HRTO, Michael Gottheil: 
 
Being involved in a human rights complaint, whether as a complainant or 
a respondent, is a very serious matter. While an individual human rights 
complaint certainly has a public element, being involved in a complaint 
can be an intensely personal affair. It affects economic rights, oftentimes 
the ability to work free of harassment and discrimination, or indeed the 
ability to work at all. It involves, for the complainant, issues of dignity and 
self-worth and, for the respondent, the stigma of being labelled a violator 
of human rights.607 
 
The argument that there is a stigma associated with “being labeled a violator of human 
rights” resonates strongly with the arguments made in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s for 
preferring conciliation over adjudication.  It also resonates with what I see as a 
continuing association between discrimination and questions of fault, immorality, and 
criminal law, also seen in the arguments for fair practices legislation and in the Bell v. 
McKay litigation.  This association continues despite the Simpsons Sears analysis of 
statutory human rights, which sought to de-emphasize a respondent’s legal fault in 
preference to the opportunity for a respondent to correct a problem that has been created 
by their conduct or practice. 
                                                 
606 La Forest, Promoting Equality at 81.  
607 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 16 November 2006 at 1050.  In their written submission to the Standing 
Committee, the CFIB stated: at 3 “… the proposed legislation creates an unfair and grossly prejudicial 
system that assumes guilt until proven innocent.” – “Submission on Bill 107” at 3. 
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 It is also arguable that the special status that began to be accorded to human rights 
legislation in the early 1980s had the negative effect of increasing the potential stigma 
associated with discrimination.  Beginning with the 1982 decision of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink,608 the 
jurisprudence developed a rhetoric of human rights legislation as having elevated status:  
it was “fundamental”, “special”, “not quite constitutional but certainly more than the 
ordinary”.609  Looked at from the perspective of social inequalities, this rhetoric focuses 
on the positive and remedial benefits associated with human rights legislation. Looked at 
from the perspective of imposing liability and legal responsibility, however, I believe this 
rhetoric had the effect of elevating the bar for procedural fairness concerns for 
respondents, in the same way as criminal law does.   Both the New Brunswick and the 
LaForest reviews linked the elevated status of human rights legislation with an elevated 
concern for procedural fairness. While these comments can apply to the interests of both 
claimants and respondents, in relation to respondents it is my view that they reflect the 
concerns about stigma and liability for discrimination. The LaForest review stated: 
 
Since the Act was passed, the courts have recognized human rights issues 
to be almost constitutional in nature.  This heightens the importance of the 
process used for determining whether there has been a breach of the 
Act.610 
  
The New Brunswick review stated: 
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Paralleling the need for a fast, efficient and economical investigative 
function is the belief that the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission 
must be respectful of the principles associated with due process. This 
respect is especially significant in view of the fact that the Commission is 
charged with the administration of a near constitutional document.611 
 
These two perspectives on according elevated status to human rights legislation 
also resonate with the two perspectives on using legislation against discrimination in the 
arguments for fair practices legislation:  the positive perspective focused on fairness and 
the negative perspective focused on harm.  The harm perspective is linked with 
arguments that discrimination is wrong, immoral and unacceptable conduct, which in the 
context of formal legal process tends to attract more rigorous procedural requirements.  
As Sheila McIntyre has argued, individuals and groups who benefit from the dominant 
worldview respond to claims of discrimination by trying to reduce them to a small 
number of grave allegations.  Since these allegations are grave, they cannot be dealt with 
informally but require a high degree of formality and legal due process.612  
Thus, the need to attend to the interests of respondents flows both from the 
potential stigma attaching to discrimination and from the fact that the legal process may 
hold respondents accountable and require redress from them.  And where due process 
requirements are enhanced to protect the interests of respondents, this change will affect 
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612 Sheila McIntyre, “Studied Ignorance and Privileged Innocence: Keeping Equity Academic” (2000) 12 
C.J.W.L. 147 at 195.  McIntyre developed her argument in relation to the handling of claims of sexism and 
racism in the graduate Political Science department at the University of British Columbia.  See also Peter 
Fitzpatrick, “Racism and the Innocence of Law”(1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 119 and Margaret Thornton, 
“Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of Discrimination Complaints in Australia” (1989), 52 




claimants as well.  They will face heavier burdens to establish that “normal” conduct or 
practices are contrary to law, and to establish entitlement to the remedy or other 
consequence they seek to have imposed. 
 
3   Public Wrong and Public Process: Public “Prosecution” or Public Funding  
 
As we know from Chapters One and Two, public responsibility for addressing 
discrimination was a central theme in the rationale for enacting fair practices and then 
human rights legislation, and a central theme in the OHRC enforcement model.  We also 
know that the argument for public responsibility to address discrimination had its roots in 
the argument that discrimination harms both society and the individuals and groups who 
are directly affected.  
Public responsibility for discrimination was also a central theme in the Bill 107 
debates, with both sides claiming that their model would further the public responsibility 
to address discrimination.  For Bill 107 supporters, public responsibility was to be 
maintained through funding the tribunal, through the provision of publicly-funded legal 
support for claimants at the tribunal, and through maintaining the OHRC as a public 
advocate for human rights.  Bill 107 opponents disagreed, and argued that the “direct 
access” model privatized statutory human rights enforcement by taking away the 
commission’s role as public investigator and public prosecutor, and the commission’s 
responsibility to pursue public interest remedies. 
For “direct access” supporters, unmediated access to an adjudicative tribunal was 
the central goal, but this unmediated access to an adjudicative tribunal was never a stand-
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alone proposition.  They argued that “direct access” to an adjudicative tribunal had to be 
accompanied by publicly-funded legal assistance and representation.  Some “direct 
access” supporters expressly linked the requirement to provide publicly-funded legal 
assistance to claimants to the argument that there is a public responsibility to address 
discrimination because discrimination causes public harm.  For example, the Cornish 
review maintained that publicly-funded legal representation was a vehicle for recognizing 
discrimination as a public harm and fulfilling the public responsibility to address this 
harm: 
 
… it has been public policy for many years that human rights claimants 
should receive publicly funded assistance to bring their claims forward. 
This was evident in the creation of the Ontario Human Rights Commission 
with its mandate to investigate and try to settle claims and at times assign 
lawyers to argue claims before Boards of Inquiry. 
 
… it is important that the good and essential features of the system are not 
lost in the reform process. 
 
The public commitment to funding representation for human rights claims 
is crucial and should be continued.  It represents an important statement by 
Ontarians that discrimination is a societal problem requiring publicly 
funded solutions. 
 
… many if not most people who make a human rights claim need 
assistance and support. Often they feel hurt, angry, confused and afraid. 
Without assistance they cannot enforce their rights. Opening up access to a 
hearing may be a hollow achievement if support and advocacy are not 
provided.613 
 
The South Ottawa Community Legal Services legal clinic, in their oral submissions to the 
Standing Committee, compared public responsibility to fund human right enforcement 
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with the public responsibility to fund criminal law enforcement: 
  
All claimants who are victimized by illegal acts of discrimination should 
not have to bear those costs of righting the wrong. The same way we 
protect our society from criminal violations, we must protect society from 
discrimination. It is a social commitment, not an individual cost.614 
 
Some “direct access” proponents also argued that there was a broader public interest in 
providing legal assistance to claimants because this would enable the adjudicative 
process to run fairly and more smoothly.  As Raj Anand stated in response to a question 
from NDP MPP Peter Kormos: 
 
Without the public interest element in the form of a legal support centre to 
advise, assist and represent complainants in the human rights process, I 
say that the system falls to the ground, and it falls to the ground for exactly 
the reason that you've indicated: that there's less of a public interest.615 
 
Similarly, in an article written after Bill 107 was passed, Michael Gottheil and Katherine 
Laird expressly connected this public interest dimension in part to the public harm of 
discrimination: 
 
The greatest challenge perhaps is the need to balance the public interest 
role that the Tribunal is required to play under the Code and the more 
narrow function of individual dispute resolution. In the end, however, 
these two mandates are not that divergent. While there is a public interest 
in eliminating discriminatory policies and barriers, and in promoting 
equality, there is likewise a public interest in ensuring that individuals 
have timely access to a Tribunal that can resolve human rights claims 
                                                 
614 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session, 
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fairly and expeditiously, through a transparent and understandable 
process.616 
 
More often, though, the rationale for publicly-funded legal assistance for 
claimants was based on the need to provide meaningful access to justice by increasing the 
likelihood of claimants being able to present their claims effectively. For example, in the 
La Forest Report, the requirement to provide legal assistance to claimants was based on 
evidence that claimants in the United Kingdom and Quebec were rarely successful 
without legal representation:  
 
In our view, providing assistance to claimants is key for the “direct 
access” model to be successful. As noted above, the experience in the 
United Kingdom and Québec have shown that unrepresented claimants are 
rarely successful, partially because respondents are often large well-
resourced corporations or governments. This will be particularly true in 
the federal sector. The practical result of no assistance would be to deny 
access. The human rights tribunal process is often complicated and 
requires experience in human rights in order to assemble and argue a case 
successfully. In the human rights context many claimants do not speak 
either official language or have disabilities that may make it difficult for 
them to access the system.617 
 
It goes without saying where one party to litigation has legal representation and the other 
party does not, the party with legal representation generally has a better chance to achieve 
a successful outcome.  In the human rights enforcement process, moreover, claimants are 
already at a disadvantage in relation to respondents because of the particular challenges 
                                                 
616 Michael Gottheil and Katherine Laird, “Direct Access to a Specialized Tribunal: The Ontario 
Experience” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau du Québec. L’accès direct à un tribunal 
spécialisé en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec? / Access to a Specialized Human 
Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec? (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) 145 at 168 
[Gottheil and Laird, “Direct Access”]. 
617 La Forest, Promoting Equality Report at 74. The Cornish Report expressed the view that much of this 
advocacy could be provided by paralegals: Cornish, Achieving Equality at 28, 140. 
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of proving both direct and adverse effect discrimination; this disadvantage is 
compounded if the claimant does not have legal representation and the respondent does.  
The first reading version of Bill 107 made a very weak commitment to public 
funding for legal representation, so that obtaining a clear commitment for this public 
funding became a key issue during the public hearings.618  The argument that claimants 
needed legal assistance in order to have meaningful access to an adjudicative process was 
repeated throughout the Bill 107 debates. 
Bill 107 opponents agreed that it was essential to provide financial support to 
claimants.  Conservative MPP Christine Elliot, for example, described legal support as 
“…the linchpin, the fundamental piece of this legislation that has to be right in order for 
it to be successful.”619  However, they were skeptical about the government’s statements 
that there would be funding for legal representation for all claimants.  More significantly, 
Bill 107 opponents contended that the “direct access” model structurally privatized 
statutory human rights enforcement by shifting the enforcement responsibility on to 
claimants.  They argued that Bill 107 took away “victim’s rights” to a public 
investigation and a public prosecution, and took away the commission’s responsibility to 
seek public interest remedies: 
 
The Human Rights Code now gives every discrimination victim who files 
a timely and non-frivolous complaint the right to have the Human Rights 
Commission publicly investigate his or her human rights complaint…. 
 
                                                 
618 The original version of Bill 107 only provided the government with discretionary authority to enter 
agreements for the provision of legal services in tribunal proceedings:  46.1 (1) The Minister may enter into 
agreements with prescribed persons or entities for the purposes of providing legal services and such other 
services as may be prescribed to applicants or other parties to a proceeding before the Tribunal.  
619 Hansard, Justice Policy Ctte Hearings, 23 November 2006 at 1120. 
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Section 33 of the Code now gives the Commission extensive investigatory 
powers, including the ability to enter businesses, to interview witnesses, to 
request documents, and to seek a search warrant to compel access to 
relevant documents and other physical evidence. 
… 
At the Human Rights Tribunal hearing, the Commission is the public 
prosecutor. The Commission has carriage of the case to prove that the 
complainant was the victim of discrimination. … The prosecutor therefore 
effectively represents the complainant's interest as well as that of the 
public. 
… 
In contrast, Bill 107 would totally abolish the complainant's right to have 
his or her case investigated by the Human Rights Commission. Bill 107 
would repeal s. 33 of the Code. That takes away from the Commission its 
power and duty to investigate human rights complaints. Bill 107 would 
force all discrimination victims to go directly to the Human Rights 
Tribunal, without a prior Human Rights Commission public investigation 
of their human rights complaint.620 
 
Bill 107 opponents also compared the benefits of the commission-based enforcement 
system to the benefits of the criminal justice system.  A representative for Parkdale Legal 
Services, a student community legal clinic attached to Osgoode Hall Law School, 
described the benefits of state-controlled enforcement in the following way in their oral 
submissions to the Standing Committee:   
 
The second conceptual flaw is the shift that Bill 107 requires toward the 
privatization of human rights disputes. The current system, underfunded 
and flawed as it is, still conceives of each and every violation of human 
rights as being a harm to the crown or to society at large. There is a public 
prosecutor at the tribunal to represent that societal interest in maintaining a 
society free of discrimination. When I explain this to my students, I 
compare it to criminal law: The police investigate the crime and, where 
there is sufficient evidence, the matter is passed to crown counsel for 
prosecution. Crimes are suffered by victims, but they are also violations 
against society. There is a deep public interest in maintaining a society 
free of crime, and a very similar system is currently in place for human 
                                                 
620 AODA, Submission to Standing Committee at 3. 
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rights. There is a slight difference, as noted by Mr. Shulman: In the human 
rights system the victim remains a party and can participate actively if 
they are able to do so. But if they cannot actively participate, the public 
prosecutor is there to proceed against the offender.621 
 
This comparison between statutory human rights enforcement and criminal justice 
enforcement underscored the link between discrimination as public harm and public 
responsibility to address this harm.  At the same time, as it always did, the language of 
“offender” and “prosecution” undermined the remedial perspective on human rights and 
instead fed the fault and stigma perspective.  As discussed earlier, comparisons have been 
drawn from the beginning between the structure of the commission enforcement model 
and the structure of the criminal justice enforcement model.622  In both models, 
responsibility for enforcement rests with the state, and the state is in theory advancing the 
interests of both the community and the “victim”,623 although the “victim” in the 
commission-based enforcement model had more status than the “victim” in a criminal 
justice process.624 
Bill 107 opponents agreed that human rights claimants have an interest in their 
claims and the resolution of their claims.  However, they had confidence in the ability of 
                                                 
621 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 22 November 2006 at 1240. 
622 There may also be similarities with some regulatory enforcement models.  I focus on similarities with 
the criminal justice model since this is the model with which comparisons have been made throughout the 
history of human rights enforcement. 
623 There has been much debate over the role of victims within criminal justice process, and some 
expansion of their ability to participate in the process in recent years.  One of the reasons I have been 
interested in restorative justice approaches is because they seek to fully integrate the interests of “victims” 
or claimants, “perpetrators” or respondents, and the community.  See, for example: Jennifer Llewellyn, 
Bruce P. Archibald, Donald Clement and Diane Crocker, “Imagining Success for a Restorative Approach to 
Justice: Implications for Measurement and Evaluation” (2014) 36 Dal LJ 281.  
624 In the commission-based model, the commission had exclusive authority over whether or not a claim 
was referred to adjudication and generally had “carriage” of the claims they did refer to adjudication. 
However, the human rights claimant was a party to the proceeding before the tribunal, and entitled to have 
separate legal representation if they had the financial ability to obtain it. 
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an improved commission to properly further the claimant’s interest and, at the same time, 
the public interest. Similarly, they did not in principle object to the commission playing a 
gatekeeper role, as long the performance of this role was improved.  They believed that 
the commission-based process could be made to work properly.   
Bill 107 opponents also argued that the “direct access” model would not eliminate 
gatekeeping as such but would simply transfer the gate-keeping function from the 
commission to the tribunal, as well as to whichever body would be responsible for 
deciding how to allocate public funding for legal representation at the tribunal and to 
private lawyers who might consider taking human rights cases: 
 
The Government suggests it’s eliminating the “gatekeeper” who decides 
whether a discrimination victim gets a hearing on his or her human rights 
complaint. However, the Government’s plan doesn’t eliminate the gate-
keeping role. It just moves it from the Human Rights Commission to the 
Tribunal. Also, private lawyers and Legal Aid clinics will become 
gatekeepers, when they decide which human rights complainants they will 
or won’t represent.625 
 
Proponents of Bill 107, on the other hand, flatly rejected the commission’s 
gatekeeper role.  They also fundamentally disagreed that the commission, as public 
investigator and public prosecutor, was in fact representing the claimant’s interests.  In 
their view, the commission represented the claimant’s interest only to the extent that the 
claimant’s interest aligned with the commission’s view of the public interest; the role of 
the commission was not to represent the claimant but to represent the public interest 
raised by the claimant’s claim.  Put another way, the commission-based process was not 
                                                 
625 AODAA, Submissions to Standing Committee at 72. 
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tied to what claimants sought but to the commission’s judgment about what claimants 
sought or should have sought.626   
This objection went to the core of the tensions between public and private 
interests and responsibilities embedded in the commission enforcement model, and to the 
division between “direct access” supporters and their opponents.  The debate was not 
about whether the commission-based process could be made to function better.  The 
debate was a philosophical (or ideological) debate about different perspectives on the role 
of the state in legal processes for addressing statutory human rights claims, as illustrated 
in the following exchange between Liberal MPP David Zimmer and Mark Hart, 
representing the Association of Human Rights Lawyers:627 
 
Mr. Zimmer: How is it that experts with the same background, dealing 
with the same problems with the same good ambitions in place, can be so 
different in their approach to the problem?" I know that's a philosophical 
query, but I'd be interested in your reaction. 
 
Mr. Hart: It's a very important question and a very interesting question. 
There is a fundamental structural and philosophical difference between the 
two sides of this debate. What I'm encouraging this committee to have 
consideration of is the fact that these very debates, in terms of different 
approaches to trying to address these well-documented problems, have 
been debated before. They were debated in the context of the widespread 
consultations, both in the Cornish report and the La Forest report. These 
blue-ribbon task forces, with people who have a tremendous amount of 
expertise in the areas, considered all of the back and forth and conflicting 
                                                 
626 Nina Gupta notes that the claimants in three precedent-setting cases had to retain their own legal 
representatives to force the commissions to take their cases forward: the Robichaud and Cashin cases in the 
federal sector and the Leshner case in Ontario - Neena P.A. Gupta, Reconsidering Bhadauria: A Re-
examination of the Roles of the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the Courts in the Fight Against 
Discrimination (University of Toronto: LLM Thesis, 1993) at 53 [Gupta, Reconsidering Bhadauria].  
David Lepofsky also had separate legal assistance provided by Mary Cornish and Greg Sitch, in his human 
rights claim against the Toronto Transit Commission: Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Lepofsky, 
2005 HRTO 36. 




views and, having considered all of that, came to conclusions which are 
now embodied in Bill 107.628 
 
Bill 107 supporters divided public responsibility for discrimination into two 
categories:  public responsibility in relation to individual claimants, and public 
responsibility in relation to society as a whole. In relation to individual claimants, they 
argued that the state has a responsibility to facilitate the independent social agency of 
human rights claimants in their efforts to engage law to address social inequalities; this 
aspect of the state’s public responsibility would be fulfilled by maintaining an 
adjudicative tribunal and by providing claimants with legal support to bring claims to this 
tribunal.  In relation to society as a whole, they argued that the public responsibility was 
to continue the OHRC as a public advocate for human rights, with a particular focus on 
systemic discrimination. Opponents of Bill 107 did not separate the public responsibility 
to claimants from the public responsibility to society.  For them, public responsibility to 
address discrimination was simultaneously a responsibility to individual claimants and a 
responsibility to society, to facilitate remedial outcomes, in the public interest, through 
public investigations and public prosecutions. 
 
4   The Commission’s New Role: Legal Process vs Education, Policy, Research 
During the Bill 107 debates, opponents of “direct access” raised concerns that Bill 
107 would result in dismantling the commission, as had happened in British Columbia. 
However, there is no suggestion that eliminating the commission was ever part of “direct 
                                                 
628 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 15 November 2006 at 1010. 
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access” advocacy in Ontario; what advocates for “direct access” wanted to eliminate was 
the commission’s role in claims processing. A continuing role for the OHRC, or a similar 
body, appears to have been consistently contemplated by Ontario “direct access” 
advocates.629  In the Ontario “direct access” model, the commission was to be the third 
pillar in the human right access to justice system, in which the other two pillars would be 
the adjudicative tribunal and the provision of legal support for claimants. There were also 
two consistent themes relating to the proposed role for the commission. One was that the 
commission would be focused on systemic discrimination. The second related to the 
methods by which the commission would carry out its role, and whether the methods 
would include litigation as well as education, policy development and research. 
Human rights advocates, regardless of their position on “direct access”, shared the 
view that the systemic dimensions of discrimination were the most pressing concern. 
They also shared the view that these systemic dimensions included both direct and 
adverse effect forms of discrimination.  Moreover, as noted earlier, one of the critiques of 
commissions was that the predominant focus on their claims resolution function had led 
them to pay insufficient attention to systemic discrimination issues, and one of the 
arguments put forward by advocates for “direct access” was that removing Commission’s 
responsibility for claims resolution would allow them to direct their attention to systemic 
issues. The Cornish Report presented the argument as follows: 
 
[The Commission’s] role has been reactive, not proactive, and geared to 
individual cases of discrimination, not systemic discrimination. 
                                                 
629 The La Forest Report also recommended maintaining the federal commission, with a role similar to the 




Placing almost all the resources into pursuing individual claims and 
leaving out a broad, strategic approach is costly, time-consuming, and 
unlikely to bring about positive results. Even if an individual claim is 
successful, it usually changes the circumstances of the individual only and 
makes little difference in overcoming widespread, systemic discrimination 
in society. 
… 
The absence of a systemic approach to achieving human rights for all has 
worked to the detriment of everyone concerned. 
… 
Under the new system proposed by the Task Force, Human Rights Ontario 
[proposed new name for the OHRC] will no longer have responsibility for 
handling individual claims. It will therefore have the ability to concentrate 
on its other significant equality responsibilities.630 
 
Katherine Laird (representing ACTO) emphasized the Commission’s responsibility for 
systemic discrimination in her description of the three pillars to the Standing Committee: 
 
Catherine [Frazee] said it so much better than I could, but what is 
important to people in these circumstances is “direct access” to a hearings 
tribunal, access to publicly funded legal services, a commission that will 
fight the systemic battles, the public interest battles, will intervene, launch 
applications and will educate employers and landlords and service 
providers and government.631 
The argument advanced by Bill 107 proponents rested on a distinction between 
“individual claims” and “systemic claims”.  In their framework, the category of 
individual claims represented claims brought by individuals and groups, which might 
raise exclusively individual issues or which might also raise systemic issues. The goal of 
Bill 107 advocates was to remove the Commission’s role in processing and “gate-
keeping” individual claims, and to have it focus exclusively on systemic discrimination 
issues. This framework did not set up a dichotomy between individual and systemic 
                                                 
630 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 67-68. 
631 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 16 November 2006 at 1150. 
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claims, inasmuch as individual and group claimants could bring systemic discrimination 
claims directly to a tribunal.  What it did do, though, was remove the Commission from 
having a direct role in relation to individual claims.  
The AODAA rejected this analysis, arguing that the effort to distinguish between 
individual and systemic cases in this way was misplaced and misguided because 
“individual” claims are often indicators or instantiations of systemic discrimination.  The 
AODAA argued that removing the Commission’s responsibility for individual claims 
processing would cut off its ability to become aware of and to address the systemic 
discrimination issues raised by these individual cases: 
 
Under the current system, for the Commission to be involved in a case, 
there is no need to specifically categorize a case's issues as "individual" or 
"systemic." The Human Rights Commission as investigator, conciliator or 
public prosecutor can address all issues which arise from a complaint. 
Every violation of the Code is treated as potentially raising societal 
concern. 
 
Bill 107 effectively limits the Commission's mandate and prosecutorial 
powers or focuses it on "systemic" matters. This is based on the false 
premise that from the outset, human rights cases and issues can be easily 
divided into either of two categories, either "systemic" cases or 
"individual" cases. … The Bill's provisions then design parts of the human 
rights system on the basis of this problematic categorization of human 
rights cases. Making things worse, Bill 107 doesn't define "systemic" 
matters. 
 
It is fundamentally wrong to design a human rights enforcement system on 
this elusive and unhelpful categorization of human rights cases. Those 
individuals who are victimized don't present themselves to the human 
rights enforcement system with a label of "systemic complaint" or 
"individual complaint" stamped on them. A case might begin as a single 
report of a seemingly isolated incident. If properly investigated, a broader 
pattern of discrimination could be revealed, or a deep-rooted, hitherto-
unseen practice can have produced this result. Many, if not most so-called 
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"systemic" cases come to light because an individual complained about an 
individual incident of mistreatment.632  
 
Barbara Hall, Chief Commissioner of the OHRC, responded to this argument in her oral 
submissions to the Standing Committee, by maintaining that the OHRC’s priorities in 
addressing systemic issues had been unduly shaped by individual claims rather than by 
proactively working to identify systemic issues: 
 
But I think one of the challenges of the current system is that we have 
identified systemic issues primarily based on what has come before us as 
individual complaints, and we have tended to focus on what's come in the 
door as opposed to working more closely with communities out there to 
identify what the systemic issues are and how they can be strategically 
proceeded with or addressed. Our priorities, in a sense, are set by what 
comes in the door, and I believe that there are many situations where we 
miss issues because communities are not connected to the process, are not 
aware of those rights, do not believe that there's a way of addressing them. 
As I said in my comments, we need to go out and work more closely with 
communities and set our priorities through that relationship.633 
 
When Bill 107 proponents said that the Commission would focus on systemic 
issues in a “direct access” model, this argument was another way of saying that the 
Commission would no longer have responsibility for individual claims.  There is no 
evidence they meant that systemic discrimination would be the exclusive responsibility of 
the Commission, or that individuals could not raise systemic discrimination issues in their 
claims to the tribunal.  They appear to have meant that the Commission’s independent 
role related only to systemic discrimination. What remains unclear in the debate on this 
point, however, is exactly what Bill 107 advocates meant when they distinguished 
                                                 
632 AODAA, Submissions to the Standing Committee at 67. 
633 Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 15 November 2006 at 1050. 
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“individual” claims from “systemic” issues.  When they talked about individuals and 
individual claims, were they referring to claims that affected only one individual, or a few 
individuals?  If so, how did their emphasis on improving enforcement for individual 
claims mesh with the position that systemic discrimination issues are the most important 
concern? 
On the question of how commissions would fulfill their responsibility to address 
systemic discrimination, considerable emphasis was placed on using education, policy 
development, and research as key tools.  For example, the La Forest Report stated: 
 
In this Report, the Panel has been particularly concerned with the issue of 
systemic discrimination. We have described a number of ways that the 
goal of equality can be furthered within the federal sector. Human rights 
education and promotion is perhaps one of the most powerful tools for 
addressing equality issues, particularly in the area of systemic 
discrimination which is based on attitudes and assumptions that are held 
and acted on, often unknowingly. Giving people this knowledge should be 
the first step towards eliminating the problem.634 
 
The Cornish Report also emphasized the important role for strategic education: 
One strong common thread throughout the consultation was a call to use 
strategic education initiatives to enforce the Code. Research conducted for 
the Task Force by the Urban Alliance on Race Relations finds that ‘[f]ew 
people know what rights are protected under the Code.” “[T]he best anti-
discrimination laws with the strongest of provisions are ineffective if no 
one knows about them, understands them or is able to use them.” Many 
respondents said that education would enable them to improve their 
performance in ensuring equality. 
… 
The Task Force believes that the strategic use of education initiatives is an 
important part of the new human rights enforcement system. Human 
Rights Ontario has a unique and important role to initiate and oversee 
education activities which will advance its overall strategic plan for the 
                                                 
634 La Forest, Promoting Equality at 44. 
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enforcement of human rights. Human Rights Ontario should focus on 
educational initiatives which are most likely to concretely contribute to the 
reduction of systemic discrimination in the strategic areas it has identified. 
 
Education can help to establish the proper environment of understanding 
for dealing with and redressing systemic discrimination and therefore 
avoiding the filing of claims.635 
 
However, the Cornish Report insisted as well that the commission retain investigatory 
powers and powers to take cases forward.  The original version of Bill 107 did not make 
provision for the Commission to take cases to the tribunal or to seek to intervene in cases 
at the tribunal.  These powers were added as amendments following the Standing 
Committee hearings, with the result that Ontario’s “direct access” model includes a role 
for the Commission within the adjudicative process, both as an initiator of claims and as a 
potential intervenor in claims initiated by others.636 
The assumptions underlying “enforcement” by way of claims resolution are very 
different from the assumptions underlying “enforcement” by way of research, policy and 
education.  Research and policy development assume that there are, or may be, social 
problems which should be studied and for which remedies should be proposed.  
Education similarly assumes that there are, or may be, social problems to be addressed 
and that information and training can contribute to providing remedies for these 
problems.  The resolution of claims, on the other hand, does not necessarily assume that 
there is a problem to be addressed.  From the claimant’s perspective, the ultimate goal of 
a claims resolution process is to require the respondent to provide a remedy for a problem 
                                                 
635 Cornish, Achieving Equality at 173. 
636 Code (1990), s. 35. 
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the claimant identifies.  Unless the respondent voluntarily agrees to provide a remedy, 
however, the legal process will first need to determine whether there is a problem and 
whether the respondent should be judged responsible for that problem.  In a claims 
resolution process, then, the first question to be addressed is whether the claim raises a 
problem to be addressed.  
This aspect of the “direct access” debate again illustrates the extent to which the 
debate was disconnected from the substantive goals for statutory human rights 
enforcement. The most important problem was said to be systemic discrimination, best 
addressed by the Commission - but the most important goal was obtaining individual 
access to adjudication.  This aspect of the debate underlines questions about the role of 
the Code and the role of legal process in addressing social inequalities resulting from 
systemic discrimination.  In addition, the attribution of fundamental importance to human 
rights laws adds a further layer of complexity to the tensions among these different 
enforcement processes.  From the research, policy and education perspectives, the 
importance of human rights underscores the importance of pursuing proactive 
enforcement activities. In relation to claims processing, however, the importance of 








Part III:  Ontario’s “Direct Access” Model Post-Implementation 
Ontario’s “direct access” model has been in place since June 2008.  The implementation 
of Bill 107 saw the continuation and growth of the HRTO, the continuation but 
diminution of OHRC, and the establishment of a Human Rights Legal Support Centre 
(HRLSC).   The HRT0 has received on average 46% of the budget allocation for the 
three-pillared human rights system, and the HRLSC and OHRC have each received 
approximately 27% of this budget allocation.637  The funding allocation for Ontario’s 
three-pillared human rights system has increased from the level of funding provided to 
the previous commission-based system by approximately 40%, although it remains to be 
seem whether that level of funding will be maintained during periods of fiscal restraint. 
The HRTO is one of seven adjudicative tribunals within the Ontario Social Justice 
Tribunals cluster.638  It has an Associate Chair and 21 full-time Vice-Chairs, who provide 
both mediation and adjudication services.  Mediation at the HRTO is voluntary, but 
encouraged; the tribunal’s Practice Directions allow a Vice-Chair to try to engage the 
parties in mediation even where one or both parties indicate that they are not willing to 
participate in mediation:  
 
If the applicant or a respondent does not indicate a willingness to 
participate in mediation, the HRTO will determine whether, nonetheless, 
                                                 
637 Andrew Pinto, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 
2012) at 176 [Pinto, Human Rights Review]: on-line 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/human_rights/Pinto_human_rights_report_20
12-ENG.pdf. 
638 The other six tribunals in this cluster are the Child and Family Services Review Board, the Custody 
Review Board, the Landlord and Tenant Board, the Ontario Special Education (English) Tribunal, the 
Ontario Special Education (French) Tribunal, and the Social Benefits Tribunal.  The clustering of 
administrative tribunals was introduced in 2009 with the enactment of the Adjudicative Tribunals 
Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009, SO 2009, c 33, Sch 5.  Michael Gottheil is 
currently the Executive Chair of the Ontario Social Justice Tribunals cluster. 
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mediation appears to offer an opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious 
resolution. If so, the HRTO may contact the parties and discuss the 
possibility of engaging in mediation. The decision to participate in 
mediation remains voluntary.639 
 
The Tribunal’s Rules of Practice also provide hearing dates can be used for mediation-
adjudication with the agreement of the parties640 
The HRLSC was set up to be an independent agency and not a clinic within the 
Legal Aid Ontario system.  Its statutory objects are: 
 
(a) to establish and administer a cost-effective and efficient system for 
providing support services, including legal services, respecting 
applications to the Tribunal under Part IV; 
 
(b) to establish policies and priorities for the provision of support services 
based on its financial resources.641 
 
The legislation does not stipulate that the HRLSC can provide services only to applicants, 
but the Centre has so far implemented its mandate to provide services exclusively to 
claimants.  
The Commission has been continued with its revised mandate, and downsized to 
conform to its more-than-50% reduction in budget.  
Bill 107 called for a review of “the implementation and effectiveness of the 
changes” to be conducted three years after the legislation came into effect, i.e. three years 
after June 30, 2008.642  In August 2011, Attorney General Chris Bentley appointed 
                                                 
639 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Practice Direction on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediations, 
Rescheduling Requests, and Requests for Adjournments, Scheduling Mediations. 
640 Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Rules of Procedure, Rules 15 and 15A. 
641 Code (1990), s. 45.12. 
642 Code (1990), s. 57(1). 
299 
 
Andrew Pinto to conduct this review of the “direct access” model.  Andrew Pinto is a 
human rights practitioner who was a public supporter of Bill 107.  His Report was 
released in November 2012. 
Pinto provided some comparative data on the number of cases resolved through 
mediation and the number of cases decided through adjudication.   The data on voluntary 
resolution were as follows:  in the Commission process, approximately 71%-73% of 
claims were resolved voluntarily during the period from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008; 
in the HRTO process, approximately 65% of claims were voluntarily resolved during the 
period from 2009-2010 through 2011-2012.643  The data on access to adjudication are 
more difficult to compare, because the Report did not (and could not because of the 
structural differences between the two processes) present the same data for both 
processes.   I have chosen to compare the data for referrals to adjudication in the OHRC 
process with the data on decisions on the merits in the HRTO process, as these data are 
the most closely comparable in my view.  In the Commission process, approximately 5% 
of claims were referred to the tribunal (some of these would have settled after referral) 
during the period from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008.644  In the HRTO process 
approximately 5% of the decisions made by the Tribunal during the period from 2009-
2010 through 2011-2012 were final decisions on the merits of the cases; 29% of the 
decisions were decisions dismissing claims on a preliminary basis; the remaining 
decisions were deferrals, withdrawals, other procedural issues, reconsideration decisions, 
                                                 
643 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 42, 60, 203, and 213. 
644 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 9, 203. 
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and breach of settlement decisions.645  The HRTO does not yet have a long track record. 
However, it is interesting that on average 5% of claims were referred to adjudication in 
the OHRC process, and on average 5% of claims in the HRTO process have so far 
resulted in decisions on the merits. 
Pinto reported that during the period from June 30, 2008 to March 31, 2012, the 
HRTO found discrimination on average in 40% of the cases it decided.646  He did not 
express a view on whether a rate of 40% for findings of discrimination was reasonable or 
disappointing.  He also did not compare this success rate with the success rate under the 
commission-based enforcement system;  in my view it would have been impossible for 
him to conduct a meaningful comparison, since the OHRC would have referred to 
adjudication only cases it believed to be meritorious.  Although the Commission did not 
win every case, its screening function would have affected the proportion of meritorious 
cases proceeding to adjudication.  With a significant increase in the number of cases 
proceeding to adjudication, it would not be surprising to see some decrease in the rates of 
success.647  However, it is difficult to assess whether the success rate would be higher if, 
for example, more applicants had legal assistance. 
On the issue of legal representation, Pinto reported that 35% of applicants, on 
average, had legal representation in proceedings at the HRTO (both mediation and 
adjudication), as compared to 85% of respondents.648  Pinto correlated data on applicants 
                                                 
645 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 214. 
646 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 214. 
647  Heather McNaughton similarly noted diminishing success rate with the increase in the number of cases 
proceeding to adjudication under the BC direct access system: McNaughton, “The B.C. Experience” at 
193-194.  
648 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 46. 
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succeeding at the tribunal with the data on applicant representation, and concluded that 
applicants had some form of legal representation in 66% of the cases where they were 
successful, and no representation in 44% of cases in which they were successful.  He 
interpreted these data to suggest the following:   
 
The insight that arises from my analysis of the 143 Tribunal cases is that, 
while representation by a lawyer (from the [HRLSC] or otherwise) can 
make an important contribution to the success of a case before the 
Tribunal, it may not be as important a factor as has traditionally been 
believed. Out of the 50 cases in which applicants won, they were self-
represented in 44% of them.  This is a significant percentage of self-
represented applicants who successfully argued their own case. Of course, 
we should also not overstate the case for self-representation keeping in 
mind that, in the 93 cases in which applicants lost, they represented 
themselves 72% of the time. The conclusions I draw are: (a) applicants 
fare relatively better with legal representation at Tribunal hearings; 
however (b) applicants who are self-represented can still fare reasonably 
well.649 
 
There may be other relevant considerations, as well, that this analysis did not address. 
First, at least some of the applicants who were “self-represented” at a hearing may have 
received assistance and coaching from the HRLSC to help them prepare to “represent 
themselves”.650  Second, at least some of the claims may have been ones on which the 
HRLSC would not provide any legal services since the claim did not raise a human rights 
issue or a meritorious human rights issue.  Pinto reported that the HRLSC was only able 
                                                 
649 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 108. 
650 I generally do not accept “self-representation” as a legitimate category in the context of a legal process 
where one party has a legal representative and another party does not have a legal representative.  This does 
not mean I believe that all legal representation is competent.  This also does not mean I believe that a 
person without legal training can never be effective in advancing their own interests.  However, where one 
party has legal representation and another party does not, I believe it is more accurate to describe the party 
without legal representation as “unrepresented” rather than “self-represented”, since I believe there is an 
imbalance of power between a formally trained legal representative and a person without legal training.  
302 
 
to provide representation at the HRTO to 12% of all applicants and, even though he 
affirmed that it was appropriate for the HRLSC to assess the merits of claims and provide 
services accordingly, he described this rate of representation as too low.651  Nevertheless, 
he did not make a specific recommendation about what level of representation would 
reflect a better balance.  He did, however, recommend that the HRLSC work with the 
HRTO to provide more duty counsel mediation services to applicants.652 
In examining what the OHRC has done in its new role, Pinto observed that the 
Commission has rarely exercised its power to bring cases to the HRTO or to seek to 
intervene in cases at the HRTO.  He described the Commissioners as being conflicted on 
the extent to which they should engage in litigation strategies: 
 
Commissioners explained that they have debated and held divergent views 
on the appropriate balance between litigation and cooperative strategies to 
effect positive change.  To date, the consensus of the Commission has 
been that collaboration with respondents is more effective than 
confrontation. 
… 
Litigation is seen as a last resort that, if used unwisely, could result in the 
Commission setting the clock back on much of the progress it has 
achieved.653 
 
Pinto expressed the view that the OHRC should engage more with litigation, making 
more use of its power to initiate cases and to seek leave to intervene in cases, 
emphasizing that the OHRC’s mandate includes strategic litigation: 
 
                                                 
651 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 93-110. 
652 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 117. 
653 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 128, 129. 
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Ontario followed the recommendations of the Cornish Report and La 
Forest Report to reorient the Commission to championing human rights in 
the province without the burden of mandatory involvement in each and 
every individual human rights case.  However, that did not mean 
abandoning strategic litigation in select applications with systemic 
dimensions – particularly where an individual or group of individuals 
would have great difficulty in obtaining justice without the Commission’s 
involvement.654 
 
Ironically, perhaps, one of Pinto’s rationales for this view was that more OHRC 
participation at the HRTO could reduce the high rate of “self-represented” claimants: 
 
Another reason why the Commission should be more actively engaged at 
the Tribunal is to incrementally reduce the high rate of self-represented 
applicants at the Tribunal. As discussed earlier, in the last 4 years since the 
Code reforms, the Centre has only been able to represent (as opposed to 
give advice to) 12% of all applicants before the Tribunal. If the 
Commission took on greater responsibility of representing applicants with 
cases (a) involving the public interest; (b) involving a systemic deprivation 
of rights; and (c) where the applicants would otherwise have difficulty 
advancing and proving their case, I anticipate this would make a small but 
strategically important contribution towards reducing the high number of 
self-represented applicants in the system. 
 
The Commission was preserved, in part, not only to promote human rights 
through education and outreach, but also through inquiries, applications 
and interventions.  During the second reading of Bill 107, the Attorney 
General introduced amendments that enhanced the Commission’s powers 
in the area of conducting investigations, intervening in and bringing 
applications if, in the Commission’s opinion, it was in the public interest. 
 
The Commission cannot champion human rights without becoming more 
involved in litigation at the Tribunal, specifically by initiating cases 
against recalcitrant respondents.655 
 
                                                 
654 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 130. 
655 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 131. 
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Pinto’s overall conclusion was that the Bill 107 reform was a “qualified success”. 
He also commented that there continued to be strong opposition to the reform: 
 
In conducting the Review, I heard from many Ontarians with strongly held 
views on how the human rights system should work. My characterization 
of the Code reforms as a qualified success is unlikely to change the minds 
of those firmly committed to the previously enforcement model where the 
Commission played  a predominant role in complaints. Indeed, I do not 
believe that the values that animate the previous and present Ontario 
human rights system are entirely reconcilable, which suggests that my 
Report will contribute to, but not end the underlying debate. 
… 
Those who believe that human rights breaches are almost entirely about a 
public wrong will favour an approach closer to the criminal public 
prosecution model whereby the state takes on the entire responsibility for 
“prosecuting” the human rights breach. Those who believe that human 
rights disputes are closer to private civil disputes, albeit with a public 
dimension, will favour an approach that apportions responsibility for 
dispute resolution to the parties and the state. The approaches are not 
really reconcilable and the public policy options flow from this 
fundamental difference of characterization. 656  
  
 Pinto also noted that the role of the three-pillared human rights system must also be 
assessed in relation to the other legal venues where human rights issues are addressed, 
with specific reference to grievance arbitration and internal workplace procedures. Pinto 
found it beyond the scope of his mandate to assess how the statutory human rights system 
interacts with other “methods of human rights dispute resolution”, but expressed the view 
that this interaction must be considered in future reform efforts.657   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, human rights issues were being addressed in 
multiple legal venues by the time Bill 107 was implemented.  This reality raises issues for 
                                                 
656 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 192, 193. 
657 Pinto, Human Rights Review at 195. 
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potential human rights claimants about whether or not they can raise claims in multiple 
venues and, if they cannot raise claims in multiple venues but must select one, which is 
the best venue to select. To the extent that decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 
involving access to non-human rights tribunals appear to offer claimants more and 
different options about where they can pursue human rights claims, it may seem that 
potential claimants have access to multiple venues in which to pursue human rights 
issues. However, having potential access to multiple venues does not mean that claims 
may be simultaneously, or even sequentially, pursued in more than one venue.  Several 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada suggest that any appearance of multiple 
forums is illusory; the Court is more likely to take an exclusive jurisdiction approach to 
potential multiple venues, and to leave claimants who made the wrong choice without 
any venue at all.658 
The HRTO has the power to dismiss an application, in accordance with its rules, 
“… if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with 
the substance of the application”;659 the reality of multiple legal venues in which human 
rights issues can be raised has produced hotly contested issues for the HRTO in terms of 
whether it has a special, and potentially supervisory role, in relation to human rights 
issues, or whether it is simply one of many adjudicative bodies that can address human 
rights issues. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada appear to have resolved 
                                                 
658 Karen Schucher, “Human Rights Statutes as a Tool to Eliminate and Prevent Discrimination: 
Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Jurisprudence” (2010) 50 SCLR 387 at 416-421.  See also 
Shilton, “Choice, but No Choice” and Shilton, “‘Everybody’s Business’”. 
659 Code (1990), s. 45.1 
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this issue against according human rights tribunals any special over supervisory role 
where human rights issues have been addressed by other tribunals or by courts, although 
some chinks may remain.660  These decisions also seem to confirm that although human 
rights issues can be raised in multiple venues, in most cases claimants will only be able to 
select one of these venues, and this selection will not always be easy. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter Three 
The evolution of statutory human rights that led to the critiques of the human 
rights commission claims resolution process and the Bill 107 debates paint a complex 
picture of the promise and practice of human rights law.   This historical record provokes 
questions about tensions between the role of law as directing particular social outcomes 
and the role of law as providing a process in which parties can argue about what the 
social outcomes should be.  In my view, it also demonstrates increasing tension between 
social goals and legal goals - to what extent do social goals become subordinated to legal 
goals and to what extent might legal goals be subordinated to social goals?  Were 
advocates for “direct access” pursuing social equality goals through law, or were they 
seeking to engage with legal process in order to pursue social equality goals? 
As I note earlier, it may be unfair to criticize the Bill 107 debates for their heavy 
focus on legal process and for failing to include discussion about the substantive issues to 
which these processes are addressed.  However, it does seem fair to ask what it means to 
                                                 
660 British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52;  Penner v. Niagara 
(Regional Police Services Board), [2013] 2 SCR 125.  Figliola was followed by the HRTO in Paterno v. 
Salvation Army, 2011 HRTO 2298 and Gomez v. Sobeys Milotn Support Centre, 2011 HRTO 2297. 
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debate the relative merits of different legal processes in the absence of debate over the 
substantive goals that may be pursued through these legal processes.  This focus on legal 
process suggests that process has, in some sense, taken the place of substance.  
This historical record also provokes questions about the role of different forms of 
legal process, and demonstrates on-going tensions between public and private goals, and 
between informal and formal legal processes.  In this context, I discuss my concluding 
reflections on how the three case studies contribute to examining the potential for law as 


















Concluding Reflections on the Promise and Practice of Law 
 
 
“Justice means children with full bellies sleeping in warm beds under 
clean sheets.” I have often reflected upon the wisdom of Mari Matsuda’s 
words, which remind us of the importance of articulating the meaning of 
human rights concepts in concrete, everyday terms. For if we cannot 
translate the rhetoric of justice, democracy, human rights and equality into 
the concrete contexts of everyday injustices, we will not be able to build 
upon these norms to effect social change.661 
 
The history of statutory human rights in Ontario (and Canada), as examined 
through the preceding three case studies, paints a complex picture of the promise and 
practice of anti-discrimination law as a tool for achieving concrete justice.   In these 
Concluding Reflections, I reflect on this history in relation to the three themes discussed 
in the Introduction - law and social power, agency through law, and responsibility at law 
– together with the overlaying theme of tensions between public and private aspirations, 
and public and private processes for pursuing these aspirations.  
In the first section of these Concluding Reflections, I examine the themes of law, 
social power, and agency in relation to tensions between the aspirational significance of 
the coercive power of law and its equivocal role in the practice of statutory human rights.   
In the second section of these Concluding Reflections, I examine the theme of 
                                                 
661 Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 3 [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality].  See 
also: “… it is not enough simply to aspire; the reason we frame our aspirations as we do is because we 
conceive them as actually informing our practices. Translating aspiration into action requires us to take 
account of the diverse sites of these practices and of the processual modes inherent in these sites. We 
cannot, I argue, recuse ourselves from the hard work of deriving a menu of possible procedural and 
institutional forms by and through which the paths pointing in the direction of these aspirations may be 
traced.” -  Roderick A. MacDonald, “Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs” in René 
Provost and Colleen Sheppard, eds. Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (Dordrecht: Springer 
Science+Business Media, 2013) 15 at 17. 
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responsibility at law in relation to tensions between the moral condemnation and remedial 
dimensions of the aspirations and practice of legislated human rights norms.  In the third 
and final section of these Concluding Reflections, I return to questions of law, social 
power and agency through law in relation to tensions between law as an end in itself and 
law as a tool for social outcomes.  
 
1 The Equivocal Power of Law 
If access to the power of law is a key element of law’s appeal as a tool in 
struggles against social inequalities, as I argued in the Introduction, what does the 
historical record examined in this dissertation suggest about access to the power of law in 
the context of statutory human rights?  In my view, this historical record demonstrated 
considerable achievement in harnessing the legislative power of the state to enact anti-
discrimination legal norms, and a more complex experience with efforts to harness the 
power of law to enforce these legislated norms.662   In particular, this record demonstrated 
that the most coercive power of law - the adjudicative process – has been the power least 
used in the practice of human rights law. While adjudication is not the only way to use 
legislated norms, it has been the primary way for legislated norms to develop public, 
concrete meaning.  Thus, the enforcement record raises questions about how “public” the 
OHRC enforcement process really was, and questions about the role of social power in 
the everyday efficacy of engaging with legislated human rights norms.  
                                                 
662 I do not suggest that the struggles to persuade the state to pass anti-discrimination legislation were easy, 
as they were not, and those struggles continued in the advocacy for providing human right protection to 
other social groups by adding more prohibited grounds of discrimination to the Code. 
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The anti-discrimination legislated norms established by fair practices legislation, 
and then the Human Rights Code, were and continue to be very open-ended.  These 
norms contain only two statutorily prescribed elements - the social areas covered by 
human rights statutes, and the requirement for a link between social conduct or practices 
and prohibited grounds of discrimination.  The social areas are broad and have for the 
most part been broadly interpreted since Bell v. McKay.663  In terms of the link between 
conduct or practices and prohibited grounds of discrimination, the legal norm was first 
targeted at direct discrimination, that is, at conduct and practices that were intentionally 
linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination.  This understanding of discrimination 
has remained an important paradigm, but was never explicitly written into the statutory 
language.  The open-ended statutory language thus created ample room for adjudicators 
to decide that adverse effect discrimination came within the legislative protection as well.  
The open-ended nature of anti-discrimination legislated norms similarly created the 
potential for many different concrete situations to come forward as claims of 
discrimination.  How those claims were and are received is a question of the practice of 
human rights law. 
The extent to which legislated norms may increase the social power of relationally 
disempowered individuals and groups is a question of how the norms can be used and are 
used.  Like all legal norms, anti-discrimination legislated norms receive concrete 
meaning, and have social impact, through their application to everyday conduct and 
                                                 
663 Two arguable exceptions to the broad interpretation of social areas covered by human rights legislation 
are the decisions in University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 and in Gould v. Yukon Order 
of Pioneers, [1996] 1 SCR 571. 
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practices. The case studies discussed in this dissertation showed citizens using human 
rights legislated norms and legal processes in two ways as tools in struggles against 
discrimination:  they engaged with the process for direct enforcement of statutory human 
rights, and they introduced anti-discrimination norms into other legal processes through 
which the norms have, in effect, been indirectly enforced.  Citizens have also engaged 
directly with legislated human rights norms outside of legal processes, using them as a 
tool in a range of ways to inform social conduct and practices.  Citizens’ experiences with 
these three ways of engaging with anti-discrimination legal norms reflect different ways 
in which the power of the state has, or has not, been available to facilitate citizens’ 
agency in struggles against discrimination. 
Turning first to citizen agency in relation to processes for direct enforcement of 
statutory human rights, the human rights commission enforcement model enlisted the 
power of the state directly in the enforcement of human rights claims. From one 
perspective, the human rights commission model enhanced the agency of relationally 
disempowered citizens by connecting claimants directly with state power.  However, this 
model also connected respondents directly with state power.  In effect, the state was 
inserted between the claimant and the respondent, and the state had to decide to what 
extent it would engage the coercive power of law in favour of claimants and against 
respondents.  This model therefore gave the state considerable power to determine which 
concrete instances of social conduct and practices would be considered contrary to the 
anti-discrimination legal norm, and which would not. 
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The historical record has told us that the state rarely engaged the most coercive 
enforcement power, namely, adjudication.   Therefore, we can say that in practice the 
formal legal process was rarely used to develop the meaning of the legal norm in relation 
to everyday social conduct and practices.   This also meant that the commission 
enforcement model rarely used the state’s most coercive power to engage the 
adjudication process on behalf of claimants.  However, the historical record also told us 
that we can only speculate about the reasons for state reluctance to refer more cases to 
adjudication, since there is no evidence of the state’s rationales for dismissing cases that 
did not resolve voluntarily. We can speculate that in at least some cases the state decided 
to dismiss a claim to avoid taking on the challenges and costs of litigation.  We can also 
speculate that in some cases the respondent’s social power may have been a factor in the 
state’s decision not to refer a claim to adjudication.664    
In order to gain more access to the coercive power of law, citizens turned to using 
legislated human rights norms in legal processes outside the direct statutory human rights 
enforcement process.  Although initially these efforts were blocked, as in the Bhadauria 
case, legal processes outside the human rights commission enforcement process 
increasingly became a more effective route to using legislated human rights norms to 
advance claims of discrimination.  This method allowed citizens to engage more directly 
                                                 
664 As Philip Girard has noted, questions have been raised about whether “expert agencies” did in fact 
operate to the advantage of socially disempowered groups or whether they operated as a “… kind of buffer 
zone in which the state mediated and deflected the claims of those groups, and behind which capital 
accumulation and inequality could proceed more or less unimpeded”.  In particular, he referred to the 
theory of “agency ‘capture’”, according to which “administrators easily fell under the sway of sophisticated 
and talented business advocates with whom they shared much in terms of social background and 
education.”  - Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 
2005) at 295. Girard’s references for this point include Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour before the 




with the power of the legislated norm because they could, in principle, exercise more 
independent agency over how they wanted to frame the claim and how far they wanted to 
pursue the claim.  In practice, of course, their actual ability to advance claims depended 
on the social power available to them, including financial resources, and it is no 
coincidence that much of this litigation was initiated and supported by trade unions.   
These efforts to pursue legislated human rights norms in non-human rights legal 
processes did not affect the legal power of the norm, as such.  However, having non-
human rights adjudicators develop the meaning of these norms by applying them to 
concrete situations was, in effect, a form of indirectly enforcing the norm and, as I 
discuss later, questions have been raised about the implications of having non-human 
rights adjudicators significantly involved in developing the meaning of legislated human 
rights norms.  
Citizens have also engaged directly with legislated human rights norms without 
any recourse to legal process.  As expressed in the following passage from a 1977 report 
of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, legislated norms are tools in and of 
themselves, which may enhance citizens’ social power by providing evidence of the 
state’s endorsement of expectations for social conduct and practices: 
 
      Legislation on human rights can and should perform several functions 
in relation to community consensus. It should sum up and declare public 
policy, officially and unequivocally.  It should, thereby, encourage people 
to take a personal stand against imagined or real pressures to ‘go along 
with’ discriminatory practices. It should provide legal redress for 
individuals and minority groups whose rights are being over-ridden.  It 
should create peaceful means for resolving inter-group tensions that might 
otherwise seek more explosive solutions. Human rights legislation should 
in itself be an expression of the decent values of its community and 
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provide support by example and by law for better public understanding 
and respect for these values.665 
 
Legislated human rights norms are well known and have become part of the social 
landscape.  They have, for example, been used as educational and organizing tools, been 
incorporated into employment contracts, policies, and practices, and been incorporated 
into service standards, including education policies and practices. 
Taken as a whole, then, the historical record prior to the implementation of the 
“direct access” model in Ontario suggests that the power of law enhanced the agency of 
socially disempowered citizen primarily through the establishment of legislated norms 
and through citizen engagement with these norms outside the statutory enforcement 
process.  This observation suggests that citizens’ ability to use law was shaped not only 
by legislated norms and legal processes for enforcing these norms, but also by the 
existing social power they brought to their engagements with law.  The legislated norm 
establishes a tool, but the extent to which this tool can be used effectively continues to be 
informed by social power independent of the norm and of legal processes. 
Because the statutory enforcement process relied primarily on the more private 
voluntary resolution method than on the more public adjudication method of resolving 
claims, the practice of the statutory enforcement process also had limited effect on 
developing public concrete meanings for legislated human rights norms.666  The 
                                                 
665 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Life Together: A Report on Human Rights in Ontario (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1977) at 20. 
666 The OHRC summarized some settlement agreements in its Annual Reports.  Undoubtedly the OHRC 
retained data on settlement outcomes, as Andrew Pinto stated in his Report, but these data were for the 
most part not publicly available: Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer for Ontario, 2012 at 64 [Pinto, Human Rights Review]. 
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preference for voluntary resolution in the OHRC enforcement process thus resulted in the 
public norms remaining largely abstract, and their concrete meanings remaining largely 
private.667  Philip Stenning similarly argued that infrequent recourse to adjudication 
stunted the development (and in his view the acceptance) of anti-discrimination legislated 
norms, although, he made this point in relation to the even less frequent recourse to 
adjudication through prosecution.  I agree with Stenning that infrequent recourse to 
adjudication in the statutory enforcement process has affected the development of 
legislated human rights norms, but I do not share his view this development could or 
should have happened only through prosecutorial adjudication rather than through board 
of inquiry adjudication. 
A large proportion of cases continues to be resolved informally under Ontario’s 
“direct access” model.  One of Andrew Pinto’s recommendations was that (anonymized) 
content of these settlements be made publicly available, so that there can be more public 
awareness of how the legislated norms are being used in concrete situations.  I agree with 
this recommendation.  Although information about settlement outcomes would not 
formally contribute to developing the public meaning of the legislated norms, this 
information could provide some guidance as to how others might try to use the norm. 
Will there be more use of the coercive power of law with the implementation of 
“direct access” enforcement in Ontario and, if so, will this be a positive development?  In 
principle, the “direct access” model creates more potential for adjudication.  It is 
interesting, then, that the initial data suggested little difference between the OHRC model 
                                                 
667 I recognize that this point may be relevant to all legal processes where many cases are resolved through 
alternative dispute resolution which, at this historical juncture, may be most - if not all - legal processes. 
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and the “direct access” model in terms of the proportion of cases adjudicated on the 
merits.  Indeed, it is arguable that the “direct access” model in practice to date looks 
considerably like the OHRC model, with the exception that the state is no longer directly 
involved and the process moves more quickly.   At the same time, more cases are being 
adjudicated, with the result that there will be more decisions on the merits of claims and 
these decisions will affect the public development of legislated human rights norms.    
Adjudication is important for publicly demonstrating how legislated norms can be 
used – or not used.  However, for individuals and groups who have at least some ability 
to compete with the social power of the individuals or groups against whom they wish to 
bring claims, informal resolution processes may ultimately be more effective.  The 
findings in the Pinto Report about the disparity between claimant and respondent legal 
representation at hearings also provide a basis for some concern about how the HRTO 
adjudication process will contribute to the development of human rights legal norms.  In 
my view, the greatest potential for engaging with the adjudicative process will probably 
lie with social activist groups and advocacy organizations; and their ability to exercise 
this potential will depend on whether they choose to make their resources available for 
engaging with formal legal process. Thus, it remains to be seen how Ontario’s “direct 
access” model will in practice contribute to the public definition of the concrete 






2 Moral Condemnation, Remedy and Responsibility 
As I argued in the Introduction, an important goal of seeking agency through law 
in struggles against social inequalities is to establish norms for responsible conduct and 
practices and methods for imposing responsibility when those norms are not fulfilled.  
The historical record examined in the case studies demonstrated a strong focus on public 
responsibility, but also a changing understanding of what public responsibility meant in 
the context of statutory human rights.  The historical record also demonstrated a tension 
between moral condemnation and remedial aspirations as motivators for accepting and 
imposing responsibility through legislation and legal process. 
The advocacy for fair practices legislation drew on a rich and robust analysis of 
public responsibility, emphasizing both state responsibility and citizens’ responsibility.  
Fair practices advocates argued that discrimination was both a public harm and a private 
harm, and the analysis of discrimination as public harm was seen in all three cases studies 
as a rationale for the commission-based, public enforcement model.  Fair practices 
advocates also drew a parallel between anti-discrimination law and criminal law, and 
relied on this comparison both to support the argument that discrimination was conduct 
requiring moral condemnation and to support the argument for a strong public role in 
enforcing anti-discrimination legislation.  The parallel between anti-discrimination law 
and criminal law continued to be drawn throughout the historical record; however, in 
subsequent periods it was relied on primarily as part of the rationale for a state-controlled 
enforcement model.  Advocates for “direct access” challenged the view that public 
responsibility for discrimination required a state-controlled enforcement process similar 
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to the criminal law enforcement model.   They argued that public responsibility would be 
fulfilled by state funding for an adjudicative process, claimants’ access to this process, 
and a continuing role for the OHRC as a public advocate for human rights.   Opponents 
of “direct access” continued to support the commission-based model as the appropriate 
model of public responsibility and the appropriate method for fulfilling public 
responsibility to address discriminatory conduct and practices. 
Moral condemnation of discrimination, the second basis for the comparison 
between anti-discrimination and criminal law, was an important element of the advocacy 
for fair practices legislation.  We saw that this more negative perspective on the need for 
anti-discrimination legislation was also in tension with a more positive perspective, 
which sought to place anti-discrimination legislation within a remedial framework rather 
than a punitive framework.  In the subsequent periods, we saw continuing efforts to 
emphasize remedy over fault.  An important argument underlying the OHRC preference 
for voluntary, private resolution over more coercive, public adjudication was that moral 
condemnation, and the consequent social stigma, would have a negative impact on the 
potential to achieve remedies for claimants.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons for 
recognizing adverse effect discrimination similarly emphasized that discrimination 
should be approached from a remedial perspective rather than a fault-based perspective, 
and that the consequences for discrimination should be remedial rather than punitive, 
focusing on compensation for past harm and prevention of future harm.  We saw a similar 
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analysis of the appropriate consequences for discrimination in the board of inquiry 
decisions examined in Chapter Two.668 
Despite the repeated emphasis on remedy over fault, however, it is my view that 
there continues to be a link between discrimination and moral condemnation.  I suggest 
that the historical record examined in the case studies resonates with Angela Harris’s 
argument, in the context of anti-racism struggles in the United States, that success in 
attaching moral opprobrium to discrimination has had the consequence of undermining 
effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws: 
      
      The elevation of antiracism to a fundamental moral principle in 
American life represents the strongest repudiation yet of centuries of race-
based slavery, violence, exploitation, and exclusion in constitutional and 
political discourse.  Yet the moralization of antiracism has at the same 
time limited its potential effects.  Socially, it allows everyone who is not 
actually a racist skinhead or member of the Klu Klux Klan to feel 
innocent, to condemn racism without taking any responsibility for one’s 
own unwitting complicity with it.  Legally, it insulates vast expanses of 
American life from scrutiny and attributes discriminatory effects to 
preference, ‘private’ bigotry, or the faults of racial minorities 
themselves.669 
 
In my view, the moral condemnation associated with discrimination contributed to 
enhancing the social importance attached to the anti-discrimination legislated norms in 
the Ontario (and Canadian) context.   At the same time, this moral condemnation 
contributed to the challenges of addressing discrimination through adjudicative processes.  
                                                 
668 Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears [1985] 2 SCR 536.  This same analysis was used also to 
support the recognition of systemic discrimination in CN v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights 
Commission), [1987] 1 SCR 1114 (often referred to as the Action Travail des Femmes case) and to support 
vicarious liability for discrimination in  Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 SCR 84. 
669 Angela P. Harris, “Equality Trouble:  Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law” (2000) 
88 Cal L Rev 1923 at 2012. 
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Thus, from the responsibility perspective as well from the agency perspective, the 
historical record on anti-discrimination legislation and enforcement has demonstrated 
reliance on voluntary assumption of responsibility over imposition of responsibility 
through formal legal process.   
Establishing a new legal norm for conduct and practices called upon citizens to 
accept responsibility by ensuring that their conduct and practices complied with the new 
legal norm.  The spectre of moral condemnation has produced an emphasis on voluntary 
resolution as the most effective route to remedial outcomes.  For cases that reach formal 
adjudication, emphasizing remedy over fault has not mitigated the challenges associated 
with establishing responsibility for discrimination through statutory adjudication 
processes.  Concerns about the stigma attached to a finding of discrimination affect both 
direct and adverse effect discrimination claims, and call for a heightened concern to 
ensure procedural fairness for respondents. Direct discrimination claims are further 
plagued by the challenges associated with proving a respondent’s intention.  Adverse 
effect discrimination claims are further plagued by the challenge of holding people 
responsible for negative impact of conduct and practices otherwise considered “normal” 
and acceptable: 
       
      [T]he social and cultural relations of any particular workplace can be 
assessed as ongoing and unfolding social and cultural processes, practices 
and values present in a society as a whole. This is to treat ‘power’ as a 
‘concrete’ social form and relation with a specific history and locale – not 
as an abstract concept, and this is the only way to point out the systemic 
socio-structural and historical aspects of sexism or racism.  This moves 
our understanding of oppression from intentionality (good/bad people 
story) to a more fundamental notion of social organization, where such 
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experiences are routinely possible because they are intrinsic to the 
properties of certain organizations.670 
 
It is difficult for adjudicative processes to engage with claims that challenge everyday 
norms and seek to have these norms judged discriminatory because of their unintended, 
differential impact on particular groups and individuals.  In this regard, it is useful to 
recall that advocates for “direct access” argued that the OHRC had an important role in 
tackling these forms of discrimination and that its methods would likely focus on 
education and policy development rather than on litigation. 
It may be interesting to explore, however, whether questions of responsibility and 
fault in relation to discrimination are considered differently when human rights issues are 
addressed outside the statutory human rights enforcement process.  Are non-human rights 
adjudicative bodies concerned about questions of fault and potential moral condemnation 
resulting from findings of discrimination?  Or is their approach to discrimination and 
human rights issues driven by how they approach the interaction between human rights 
issues and the social context in which the human rights issues are being raised?  For 
example, when labour arbitrators are asked to address human rights issues, they are 
required to consider whether, and if so how, human rights issues might change their 
analysis of the collective agreement issue(s).  Is it possible that they do not view findings 
of discrimination through the lens of moral condemnation, and that they are more 
concerned with how to assess the social impact of imposing responsibility?  And if so, is 
it possible that this different orientation contributes to questions, which I consider in the 
                                                 
670 Himani Bannerji, “In the Matter of ‘X’: Building ‘Race’ into Sexual Harassment” in Thinking Through: 
Essays on Feminism, Marxism and Anti-Racism (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1995) at 131. 
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next section, about whether human rights issues can be “properly” decided by non-
statutory human rights legal processes? 
 
3 Social Goals in Tension with Legal Goals 
One way of looking at human rights statutes is that they promise concrete changes 
in the lives of people who have experienced various forms of negative and exclusionary 
treatment because they are identified with particular social categories or groups.  Another 
way of looking at human rights statutes is that they do not “prejudge” their concrete 
goals, but rather create a method for citizens to come forward and seek changes through 
the legal process.  I suggest that the historical record examined in this dissertation 
demonstrates a shift away from viewing human rights legislation as a tool for achieving 
specific social outcomes and toward viewing human rights legislation as a tool for 
seeking to define and then achieve social outcomes.  The first approach clearly gives 
priority to social outcomes over law.  The second approach does not abandon social 
outcomes, but can lead to tension between legal process as a goal in itself and legal 
process as a tool for achieving social outcomes.  I also suggest that this shift reflects three 
developments in the promise and practice of human rights.  The first development was 
the expansion of the potential social conduct and practices about which discrimination 
claims might be raised; the second development was the increasing recourse to enforcing 
legislated human rights norms outside the statutory human rights enforcement process; 
and the third development was an evolving sense that there is a distinct value in the 
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process of engaging with law for the purpose of achieving social impact, separate from 
the social impact that may or may not be achieved in that process. 
As we saw in Chapter One, anti-discrimination legislation was first sought as a 
response to a specific form of social conduct and practice.  Advocates for fair practices 
legislation argued for law as a tool to achieve specific, concrete changes for racialized, 
religious and ethnic minority individuals and groups.   Their advocacy “prejudged” the 
concrete goals for the law in the sense that they were campaigning for the legislation as a 
tool to assist them in achieving already-defined social goals.  As the scope of human 
rights legislative protection was expanded to include more prohibited grounds of 
discrimination and to recognize adverse effect discrimination, there was no longer a 
clearly-defined paradigm of discrimination, as there had been in the advocacy for fair 
practices legislation.  Enlarging the scope of human rights legislative protection also 
significantly expanded the range of social conduct and practices that might be challenged 
as discriminatory.  Recognition of adverse effect discrimination, in particular, made it 
more difficult to “prejudge” concrete goals for human rights law because, unlike direct 
discrimination for which there was a relatively clear paradigm, there was no clearly-
defined paradigm of adverse effect discrimination that could correspond to the many 
potential claims.   
As the universe of social conduct and practices that might be found discriminatory 
grew, it arguably became easier for social discourse to rely on the more abstract, legal 
norms as shorthand for the social conduct and practices that could be challenged using 
the legal norm.  It similarly became easier to view the role of law as not being to 
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prescribe particular social outcomes but instead to create a forum in which to use the 
legislated norm to argue for particular social outcomes. Within the commission-based 
enforcement model, the OHRC’s role as arbiter of what social outcomes should be 
required by the legislated norms became increasingly more complex as the scope of 
human rights legislative protection expanded.  Through its policy documents, the OHRC 
has demonstrated considerable leadership by providing guidance about how and why 
social conduct and practices should or might be considered discriminatory.671  However, 
as we know from the historical record, the OHRC (and human rights commissions across 
Canada) provided relatively little leadership in seeking to develop the concrete meaning 
of the legislated norms through adjudication. 
A shift away from viewing legislation as prescribing concrete social outcomes to 
viewing legislation as establishing a framework and process for citizens to argue for 
concrete social outcomes was also consistent with the arguments against state imposed 
social outcomes, which increasingly dominated public discourse beginning in the 
1980s.672  At the same time, this shift is also consistent with the responsive regulation 
arguments for more participatory processes of norm establishment and enforcement.  
Increasing the citizen participation in norm development and enforcement also resonates 
with different approaches to who has “expertise” in the nature of social issues and 
potential remedies for social harms:  advocates for “direct access” viewed claimants as 
                                                 
671 The OHRC’s policies are generally lengthy research documents, providing detailed analysis of the 
particular issue and much discussion about the meaning of the legislated norm in social practice: 
www.OHRC.on.ca.  The Bill 107 amendments to the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 [Code 
(1990)] included a provision which permits the HRTO to consider OHRC policies at its discretion, and 
requires the HRTO to consider OHRC policies when asked to do so by a party or intervenor: s. 45.5. 
672 For example, see: Brenda Cossman and Judy Fudge eds., Privatization, Law and the Challenge to 
Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).  
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being the primary experts about the claims they wished to advance, whereas advocates 
for maintaining the OHRC model saw the OHRC as having expertise and an important 
role in contributing to the development of legislated human rights norms.  These shifts 
are all consistent with the tension between striving to achieve social outcomes through 
common, public norms and striving to achieve the best specific resolutions of individual 
claims, which will often best be achieved voluntarily and have little or no public audience 
or impact.   
The possibility of addressing human rights issues outside the statutory human 
rights process opened up new opportunities to develop legislated human rights norms.  
This development also raised new questions about the role of statutory human rights 
enforcement and the relationship between direct and indirect enforcement of legislated 
human rights norms. By the time the “direct access” model was implemented in both 
British Columbia and in Ontario, statutory human rights enforcement was no longer the 
only legal process venue for addressing legislated human rights norms.  Pursuing human 
rights “justice in many rooms” 673 created opportunities for the meaning of legislated 
human rights norms to be considered directly in their own contexts. As Colleen Sheppard 
has written: 
 
… an integrated approach to enforcing anti-discrimination norms is 
considered particularly important with regard to systemic or structural 
discrimination, which is not easily redressed through retroactive 
complaints processes that tend to focus on discrete and severe incidents of 
discrimination. From this more pluralist perspective, the legal norm of 
equality is subject to interpretation and application by numerous 
                                                 
673 I borrow this phrase from Marc Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and 
Indigenous Law,” (1981), 19 J Leg Pluralism & Unofficial L 1 [Galanter, “Many Rooms”].  
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institutional actors; legal interpretation and enforcement are not the 
exclusive domain of lawyers and adjudicators. Indeed, legal norms will be 
most effectively enforced when they form the normative backdrop for 
institutional decision-making. In such a context, anti-discrimination law 
operates indirectly as facilitative law. Law enforcement does not simply 
refer to formal, state-based processes. Rather, legal norms and principles 
become embedded in the institutional culture and practice of everyday 
life.674 
 
Engaging with human rights legal norms in their social context is consistent with the idea 
that human rights legal norms do not and should not belong simply to human rights legal 
process, since their ultimate purpose is to achieve positive social impact in the concrete 
social situations to which they apply.  The argument from this perspective is that human 
rights legal norms have greater potential for social impact if they also permeate the 
concrete social contexts to which they apply, and if they are engaged with through the 
various legal and non-legal processes that are part of those social contexts.  This 
argument gives priority to the social goals that may be achieved using legislated human 
rights norms as a tool. 
The competing argument is that non-statutory human rights adjudicators may 
dilute the potential force and impact of human rights legal norms, by subordinating them 
to other norms specifically related to the social contexts in which the human rights norms 
are being engaged.  As discussed in Chapter Three, this argument has so far not been 
successful - it is now generally thought to be a good thing for human rights issues to be 
addressed in their social contexts, and human rights adjudication has not received special 
status or authority.  However, “direct access” is still in the early stages, and new issues 
                                                 
674 Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 133-134.  See also Galanter, “Many Rooms”, and in particular at 16-25. 
327 
 
may well arise as the system matures.  For example, at some point there may be conflicts 
between how the HRTO addresses human rights issues and how non-statutory human 
rights adjudicative bodies address them.  It also remains to be seen whether the 
perception of better access to statutory human rights enforcement will affect how 
individuals, associations and organizations view their independent responsibility for 
human rights issues.  For example, will trade unions and other organizations that stepped 
into the enforcement void now try to unburden themselves of some of this responsibility? 
Thus, it seems likely that there will be further elaborations of the relationship between 
statutory human rights enforcement and indirect enforcement of human rights issues in 
other legal venues. 
Finally, there is the question of the distinct value of access to legal process as a 
tool in struggles against social inequalities.  As I argued in Chapter Three, it is my view 
that supporters of “direct access” were more focused on claimant access to legal process 
than on the social goals that might be achieve through this access, whereas opponents of 
“direct access” were more focused on achieving social goals than on achieving access to 
legal process.  The arguments for “direct access” emphasized citizen agency and the 
potential for greater citizen participation in defining social equality goals and developing 
the meaning of legislated human rights norms.  Two key challenges to fulfilling these 
goals, anticipated during the Bill 107 debates and now emerging with the implementation 
of “direct access”, are the ability to ensure that “direct access” provides meaningful 
access to legal process and the potential for access to legal process to become a substitute 
for achieving social outcomes.  The arguments against “direct access” placed greater 
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emphasis on social outcomes than on legal process, and on substantive public 
responsibility for achieving social outcomes.  However, the historical record suggests that 
the state enforcement process was rarely, if ever, effective, and a weak public 
enforcement system can have a negative impact on enforcement of human rights legal 
norms in other contexts.  
As the new system continues to evolve, I believe it is important to find a better 
way of tracking and communicating what the “direct access” system is achieving in 
substantive terms.   The fact that all HRTO decisions are publicly available through 
CanLII is small comfort for everyone, including people who might want to provide legal 
services to human rights applicants and respondents.  There are currently approximately 
13,250 HRTO decisions published on CanLII for the period from 1 January 2008 through 
31 August 2014.675  A significant proportion of these decisions address a wide range of 
procedural issues, which can sometimes be as important as substantive issues.  Although 
there are a few human rights textbooks, none of them is really designed to assist people 
find their way through the fast-growing human rights jurisprudence.  There are, however, 
many people who read most, if not all, of these decisions, including people at the Human 
Rights Legal Support Centre and people at the Ontario Human Rights Commission.  In 
my view, it would be useful to find a way to capture the time people are investing in 
                                                 
675 CanLII’s HRTO database provides continues coverage from 1 January 2000; there are 273 decisions on 
this database for the period from 1 January 2000 through 31 December 2007.  The CanLII database for the 
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (“BCHRT”) provides continuous coverage for the period from 1 
January 2008 through 31 August 2014 and, by contrast, contains approximately 2,575 decisions.  Although 




reading these decisions and turn their efforts into a useful public guide to the substance 
and procedure of human rights enforcement at the HRTO. 
I conclude by returning to Diana Majury’s cautionary call to “Using law against 
itself, seeing law simultaneously as a tool, as foe, and as focus for change, demystifying 
law as institution, and recognizing law as presenting multiple sites of struggle rather than 
a solid one-dimensional monolith …”.676  Law is many things, always a work in progress, 
and not something that can be ignored.  As Carol Smart has suggested, law is “…. a 
refracted agency, full of contradictions and largely unpredictable in its outcomes, which 
in turn responds to different pressures at different times.”677  I am not sure I would say 
that law is “largely” unpredictable, but it certainly can be unpredictable at least as often 
as it can be predictable.   And law is always a work in progress because of its on-going 
responses to different social conditions and pressures.   Thus, law can be a powerful tool 
in struggles against social inequalities, but it is a tool to be used with caution.  Claims 
that challenge social power will be often be resisted by the “siren call of abstract 






                                                 
676 Diana Majury, “Women’s (In)Equality before and after the Charter” in Radha Jhappan, ed., Women’s 
Legal Strategies in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 101at 102, also quoted in the 
Introduction to this dissertation. 
677 C. Smart, “Reflection” (2012), 20 Fem Leg Stud 161 at 164. 
678 I borrow this phrase from Sheila McIntyre, “Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the 
Subjects and Verbs of Domination” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making 
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